Discursive Pragmatics
Handbook of Pragmatics Highlights (HoPH)

The ten volumes of *Handbook of Pragmatics Highlights* focus on the most salient topics in the field of pragmatics, thus dividing its wide interdisciplinary spectrum in a transparent and manageable way. Each volume starts with an up-to-date overview of its field of interest and brings together some 12–20 entries on its most pertinent aspects.

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Volume 8

Discursive Pragmatics  
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Discursive Pragmatics

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Preface to the series

In 1995, the first installments of the Handbook of Pragmatics (HoP) were published. The HoP was to be one of the major tools of the International Pragmatics Association (IPrA) to achieve its goals (i) of disseminating knowledge about pragmatic aspects of language, (ii) of stimulating various fields of application by making this knowledge accessible to an interdisciplinary community of scholars approaching the same general subject area from different points of view and with different methodologies, and (iii) of finding, in the process, a significant degree of theoretical coherence.

The HoP approaches pragmatics as the cognitive, social, and cultural science of language and communication. Its ambition is to provide a practical and theoretical tool for achieving coherence in the discipline, for achieving cross-disciplinary intelligibility in a necessarily diversified field of scholarship. It was therefore designed to provide easy access for scholars with widely divergent backgrounds but with converging interests in the use and functioning of language, in the topics, traditions, and methods which, together, make up the broadly conceived field of pragmatics. As it was also meant to provide a state-of-the-art report, a flexible publishing format was needed. This is why the print version took the form of a background manual followed by annual loose-leaf installments, enabling the creation of a continuously updatable and expandable reference work. The flexibility of this format vastly increased with the introduction of an online version, the Handbook of Pragmatics Online (see www.benjamins.com/online).

While the HoP and the HoP-online continue to provide state-of-the-art information for students and researchers interested in the science of language use, this new series of Handbook of Pragmatics Highlights focuses on the most salient topics in the field of pragmatics, thus dividing its wide interdisciplinary spectrum in a transparent and manageable way. The series contains a total of ten volumes around the following themes:

- Key notions for pragmatics
- Pragmatics and philosophy
- Grammar, meaning and pragmatics
- Cognition and pragmatics
- Society and language use
- Culture and language use
- The pragmatics of variation and change
The pragmatics of interaction
- Discursive pragmatics
- Pragmatics in practice

This topically organized series of paperbacks, each starting with an up-to-date overview of its field of interest, each brings together some 12-20 of the most pertinent HoP entries. They are intended to make sure that students and researchers alike, whether their interests are predominantly philosophical, cognitive, grammatical, social, cultural, variational, interactional, or discursive, can always have the most relevant encyclopedic articles at their fingertips. Affordability, topical organization and selectivity also turn these books into practical teaching tools which can be used as reading materials for a wide range of pragmatics-related linguistics courses.

With this endeavor, we hope to make a further contribution to the goals underlying the HoP project when it was first conceived in the early 1990's.

Jan-Ola Östman (University of Helsinki) &
Jef Verschueren (University of Antwerp)
Acknowledgements

A project of the HoP type cannot be successfully started, let alone completed, without the help of dozens, even hundreds of scholars. First of all, there are the authors themselves, who sometimes had to work under extreme conditions of time pressure. Further, most members of the IPrA Consultation Board have occasionally, and some repeatedly, been called upon to review contributions. Innumerable additional scholars were thanked in the initial versions of handbook entries. All this makes the Handbook of Pragmatics a truly joint endeavor by the pragmatics community world-wide. We are greatly indebted to you all.

We do want to specifically mention the important contributions over the years of three scholars: the co-editors of the Manual and the first eight annual installments, Jan Blommaert and Chris Bulcaen were central to the realization of the project, and so was our editorial collaborator over the last four years, Eline Versluys. Our sincerest thanks to all of them.

The Handbook of Pragmatics project is being carried out in the framework of the research program of the IPrA Research Center at the University of Antwerp. We are indebted to the university for providing an environment that facilitates and nurtures our work.

Jan-Ola Östman (University of Helsinki) & Jef Verschueren (University of Antwerp)
Most introductions to the interdisciplinary fields of discourse analysis and linguistic pragmatics begin by emphasizing that there is no consensus on the meaning of these terms. Neither discourse nor pragmatics are straightforward concepts and it may be correct to suggest that only the most vague and the most general definitions are able to unite the variety of disciplines, researchers, research programmes, heuristics, methodologies, objects of investigation, and terminologies lumped together under these headings. A book title such as ‘discursive pragmatics’ might therefore be interpreted as an oxymoron consisting of two signifiers whose referents are diverse in both quantitative and qualitative senses of the term. In this sense, the usefulness – i.e. the pragmatic value – of the label discursive pragmatics may be called into question. Yet, I will argue that this notion holds great potential as an instrument for establishing a platform for inter-disciplinary and inter-theoretical cross-fertilization. In this sense, the usefulness of the term resides in its communicative potential for researchers who tend to view their activities as either pragmatic or discursive ways of approaching empirical language use.

Many of the topics, themes, theories and perspectives discussed in this volume would also fit in publications related to rhetoric, cognitive linguistics, semantics, studies on language acquisition, sociolinguistics, communication studies, philosophy, literature, and many other (inter)disciplinary fields. But whatever their focus, all of the contributions collected in this volume contribute in one way or another to the linguistic or discursive turns that have taken place throughout the humanities and social sciences since the second half of the twentieth century. Moreover, they are all products of an increasing pre-occupation with pragmatic concerns related to functional and communicative language use conceived in terms of interactional processes and context generation. This point of convergence has generated an ever-growing number of eclectic studies of real-life discourse(s) described in terms of empirically observable language use. Such discourses may be defined in terms of topic (such as racism, ecology, doctor/patient interaction), genre (such as literature, scientific publications, newspaper articles), or function (such as narrative, manipulative, rhetorical), depending on the researcher’s main interests.
In this introduction, I will trace the pragmatic features of the perspectives and approaches to discourse as presented by the various contributors to this book. However, this collective volume is far from exhaustive. I will argue that approaches to discourse such as those presented under the headings of post-structuralist discourse analysis, discursive psychology, or conversation analysis would also belong here. In some cases, there were good reasons to deal with them in one of the other volumes of the Handbook of Pragmatics Highlights series. In other cases, they represent gaps to be filled in future updates of the Handbook. This introduction does not explore the various potential areas of application of discursive pragmatics.

In their article on Text and discourse linguistics, Jan-Ola Östman and Tuija Virtanen point out that “differentiating between discourse analysis, text linguistics, pragmatics, semiotics, and even linguistics has become a field of inquiry in itself.” Neither their article nor this volume is intended to present an overview of this meta-field. Recognizing that the term discourse analysis is used in a rather restricted sense by some scholars, they advocate a perspective in which the notion functions as “an umbrella term for all issues that have been dealt with in the linguistic study of text and discourse”. With respect to the relationship between pragmatics and discourse studies, they note that a discussion has emerged around the question as to which notion is more general. Even though they prefer to think of pragmatics as the more general term, they emphasize that it is more productive to consider the debate as a matter of perspectives: “Discourse and pragmatics have the same fields of interest, but different aspects in focus. Thus, discourse will typically require larger stretches of text or conversation, whereas for pragmatics this is not necessarily the case”.

Such a perspective view is also relevant with respect to other approaches contained in this volume. For instance, Critical linguistics and critical discourse studies as discussed by Ruth Wodak can easily be viewed as constituting a perspective as well. Wodak conflates CL and CDA on pragmatic grounds and goes on to characterize “CDA basically as a research program” instead of a theory or a methodology. For her, CDA is first and foremost an approach the specificity of which can be defined in terms of a “concern with power as a central condition in social life that may be indexed in language use”. But ultimately, CDA is considered to be an “approach” characterised by interdisciplinary and problem-oriented principles. In the same sense, it is open to a multiplicity of theories, methodologies, and objects of investigation.

Interestingly, in his article on Text linguistics, Robert de Beaugrande describes the development of this approach in terms of three historical stages. He points out how text linguistics was initially an attempt to extend grammatical principles to texts and how from the seventies on this approach became increasingly preoccupied with textuality as a structure with both linguistic and social aspects. The most recent stage witnessed an increasing focus on textualization processes in the actual production and reception of texts. He goes on to suggest that these developments allow for a pragmatics which includes “a ‘critical’ view of communication as an ongoing interaction
whereby the significance of a situation (real or hypothetical) is being negotiated, speaking turns are assigned and relations of power or solidarity are enacted”. The convergences with (critical) discourse analysis and pragmatics become even more obvious when he points out that “today, the ‘text’ is widely defined as an empirical communicative event given through human communication rather than specified by a formal theory”.

At first sight, the contributions that go under the headers Text and discourse linguistics, Critical discourse analysis and critical linguistics, and Text linguistics seem to situate themselves at a higher level of abstraction than the contributions that focus on particular aspects of discourse such as the French notion of Énonciation, the principles of Polyphony, Intertextuality, Cohesion and coherence, the concepts of Appraisal, Public discourse, Pragmatic markers, Genre, Figures of speech, or notions such as Narrative, Manipulation, or Humor. However, if one takes a closer look, it becomes clear that these labels do not merely designate an object of investigation for discursive pragmatic approaches to language. Rather, researchers trained in a variety of disciplines deploy them as principles structuring our language use at various levels of abstraction. As such, they also provide perspectives or points of view from which phenomena related to language use can be approached.

The linguistic or discursive turn in the social sciences and in the humanities in general is not merely a turn towards new objects of investigation that had been previously neglected. Rather, it is a turn which implies a change in perspective – foregrounding and backgrounding both new and old phenomena for empirical research with a linguistically inspired toolbox at hand. This process was often realized by means of a double movement whereby concepts were decontextualized from their normal use and metaphorically applied to new areas of investigation. This is definitely the case with notions such as Narrative, Enonciation, Polyphony, Intertextuality, Cohesion and Coherence.

Marjut Johansson and Eija Suomela-Salmi explicitly describe French enunciation theory or enunciative linguistics as a set of “several different diversified approaches to pragmatic questions”. These questions are not merely linguistic but are relevant to the issue of subject formation as well. In spite of its diversity, it is possible to identify three stages in the development of enunciative pragmatics which culminate in Benveniste’s statement that “nothing is in language that has not been before in discourse”. This quote bears witness to the struggle of pragmatically oriented authors to emancipate themselves with respect to dominant perspectives on language which tended to focus on the formal rules and structures that supposedly work at a deeper level of semiotic organization than individualized utterances, parôles, or énoncés. Ultimately, French pragmaticians do not merely study individual énoncés and their indexical functions in relation to the I or to other aspects of contextual reality. Rather, they arrived at a view of the human subject as a subject split by the discourse it produces. This view was most clearly expressed in Ducrot’s work by means of his integration of Bakhtinian dialogism and French enunciation theory. Johansson and Eija point out that Jacqueline
Authier-Revuz voiced similar points of view underscored by an integration of Lacanian psycho-analysis into the theoretical mixture. Interestingly but not surprisingly, some of the concepts central to French linguistic pragmatics proved to be important to the Anglo-American strands as well: this goes for notions such as deixis, context, reported speech and modality.

Enunciation moved from being strictly an empirical object of investigation towards a perspective in which even the subject should be seen as an effect of discourse understood as a set of enunciations. A similar movement may be observed in the interconnected theories of *Polyphony* discussed by Eddy Roulet and *Intertextuality* discussed by Stef Slembrouck. To Bakhtin, the notion of polyphony is just one type of dialogism – an instance of multi-voiced discourse. It does not refer to an actual dialogue between two speakers but rather to the fact that even monological texts incorporate and articulate a multiplicity of voices through various linguistic forms and processes. Whereas Bakhtin illustrates his point first and foremost with forms of reported speech, Ducrot extends the dialogic and polyphonic principles to French linguistics in general. He investigates how polyphony is realized by means of a variety of linguistic forms and pragmatic processes including irony, negation, negative polarity, discourse markers, and presuppositions. Polyphony is therefore one of the metaphors that allow for a perspective on discourse in which the unity of the speaking subject is challenged without falling into the trap of removing all of its agency in the process.

Slembrouck points out that it is possible to consider intertextuality as a matter of those factors which make the utilization of one text dependent upon knowledge of one or more previously encountered texts. In this sense, intertextuality is a phenomenon or a function of discourse which finds itself at the same level of abstraction as cohesion, coherence, intentionality, acceptability, informativity and situationality. Intertextuality is then an object of investigation rather than a principle constitutive of a perspective on (discursive) reality. Such is the view of most text linguistic approaches. A broader notion of intertextuality is to be found in the writings of Kristeva and Bakhtin whose works have been rediscovered by one of the main voices in the field of critical discourse analysis – Norman Fairclough. Here intertextuality gains the status of a perspective on language use. As Slembrouck points out, the Bakhtinian/Kristevian notion of intertextuality is broader than the text linguistic one. In addition to the manifest type of intertextuality which is a shared point of interest with text linguistics, Fairclough’s notion of intertextuality is a constitutive one. In a Foucaultian argument, Fairclough claims that intertextual analysis draws our attention to: the orders of discourse that consist of configurations of conventionalised practices at the disposal of producers and consumers of texts; to the way texts depend upon society and history; and to the way texts transform social and historical resources. Put differently, intertextuality becomes a metaphor constitutive of a perspective on social relations and historical development in general. As Slembrouck points out, this is the main reason why the notion of
Intertextuality can be linked to the concepts of hegemony, polyphony and heteroglossia in critical discourse analysis. However, one may ask in what sense we are dealing with a pragmatic mode of investigation when the notion of intertextuality is taken to such abstract heights. Slembrouck argues that teasing out the various dimensions of intertextuality – both its manifest linguistic forms and its constitutive senses – allows us “to take the dialogic beyond the boundedness of recognized domains of language study”. Slembrouck goes on to draw out the implications of this view on intertextuality and concludes by shedding a rather pragmatic light on the issue. Arguing that recent work on (re)contextualization and (en)contextualization processes in language essentially deals with the same phenomena as the issues discussed in Kristeva’s original article on intertextuality, he claims that “(inter)text is a contextually grounded process” whereby “publicly recognized textualities count as by-products of situated practice and cannot be divorced from language ideologies”. Moreover, “intertextuality is about how history is inscribed into situated practice”. The pragmatic dimension of CDA thus resides in its intersubjective stance, in its emphasis on the importance of socio-political and textual context, and in the emphasis on the process-based nature of discourse.

Like CDA, the study of discourse as performed within the framework of Appraisal theory is informed by the principles of SFL (Systemic Functional Linguistics) as proposed by Halliday. It is a decidedly functional perspective on language use in the sense that it holds that “linguistic phenomena can best be explained by reference to the social functions performed by language” and “by reference to the functional demands placed upon language by its users”. In contrast to the approaches to discourse we have encountered thus far, the appraisal framework is rather typological. It categorizes the various functions that a variety of linguistic forms such as adjectives, nouns, adverbs or verbs may perform. Also, it has not engaged with social and political theory to the same extent as critical discourse analysis, even though both perspectives are informed by Bakhtinian insights and SFL principles. On the other hand, appraisal does deal with the social function of texts in the sense that it is concerned with the “systematic analysis of evaluation and stance as they operate in whole texts and in groupings of texts. It is concerned with the social function of these resources, not simply as the means by which individual speakers/writers express their feelings and take stands, but as the means by which they engage with socially-determined value positions and thereby align and dis-align themselves with the social subjects who hold these positions”. White argues that the appraisal perspective is pragmatic in the sense that it recognizes that some evaluations are not marked explicitly in a text. In such cases, one has to take recourse to aspects of context in order to understand the evaluative dimension of a text. This view of context is definitely not the most radical one in the landscape of linguistic pragmatics. On the other hand, there is a clear pre-occupation with pragmatic concerns: the functions of actual language use, the role of context and form with respect to the realization of these functions; and an emphasis on evaluation as an ongoing and intersubjective process.
The article on *Public discourse* by Srikanth Sarangi is not merely about public texts in the sense of a genre or a set of discursive genres in a reified public sphere. Rather, it is about publicness defined in terms of “*social processes of talk and text in the public domain which have institutionally ratified consequences*”. Moreover, discourse is taken to mean “*a stretch of talk or text (including semiotic icons) as well as a form of knowledge and the social processes of production and consumption of such knowledge in the Foucauldian sense*”. After presenting three dichotomies (private/public; expert/lay knowledge; microcosmic/macrocosmic) that structure dominant understandings of the notion of publicness, he moves on to consider various sociolinguistic and interaction-based approaches to public discourse. In addition to work in conversation analysis and rhetorics, he explores Goffman’s interactional concept of the public order. On the other hand, Sarangi contrasts these approaches with Habermas’ philosophical and normative perspective on the public sphere. He describes pragmatics as a concern with “*meaning-making* against a set of parameters such as power, status, rights and obligations” and claims that as such, “*various pragmatic theories of human communication can be reassessed to account for public discourse*”. To Sarangi, both pragmatic theories and theories of the public sphere are ultimately concerned with information exchange. More specifically, he points out that “*information exchange lies at the heart of the three most dominant models of pragmatic inquiry: the cooperative principle and conventional/conversational implicatures, face wants and positive/negative politeness strategies, and principles of relevance and message processing*”. Sarangi argues that these theories can be extended to theories of the public domain as a domain in which concerns related to information exchange are intertwined with issues related to role-relationships, identity construction, strategic goal imposition and so on. He claims that this would allow for a research programme that “*will blend well with the Habermasian characterisation of public discourse as systematically distorted communication, without subscribing to his universal pragmatics model*”.

Public discourse is often described as a particular genre of discourse. However, discursive pragmatic approaches to discourse have problematized the notion of genre itself. Anna Solin points out that the notion is traditionally associated with “*the idea that texts (and other cultural products) can be grouped into types or classes according to formal and/or functional similarities*”. However, Solin points out that it is also possible to consider genre “*not merely as forms, but as social and symbolic action*”. In her overview of genre studies, she discusses three contemporary approaches to genre research. The first one is the Sydney school which is based on SFL principles. It inherits the SFL preference for functionalist typologies and defines genres as “*stage goal-oriented social processes*”. The specific identity of a genre is defined by recourse to text-internal linguistic criteria. There are strong affinities with text linguistics. At the same time the Sydney approach is both pedagogical and political in the sense that its researchers assumed that it was possible to teach a number of key genres to social groups with less
extensive discursive resources in particular societies (e.g. migrants and working class students). A more thorough familiarity with key genres was supposed to help them in their emancipation processes. The Sydney approach was therefore decidedly pragmatic in its functional emphasis and in its goals with respect to increasing people’s language awareness with respect to genre conventions. The New Rhetoric approach is even more pragmatic. Following Bakhtin, genres are perceived as “intertextually related to other genres”. Moreover, they are defined as particular types of social action: “a rhetorically sound definition of genre must be centred not on the substance or the form of discourse but on the action it is used to accomplish. At first sight, this does not go against the idea of an SFL goal-oriented attitude to genre. However, within New Rhetoric, social actions always take place within particular communities. Consequently, genres can only be investigated and taught if one ethnographically understands the communal and institutional contexts in which they are deployed. Within this perspective, genre education on the basis of formal linguistic principles only is an absurdity: “if genres are responses to contexts, can they be learned at all out of context?” Drawing on the ethnographic insights of New Rhetoric and on the text linguistics of the Sydney school, English for Specific Purposes is characterized by its pedagogical agenda: “to assist non-native English speakers in mastering academic and professional genres”. It defines genres as sets of intersubjective and goal-oriented functions or as communicative actions. As such, we are dealing with a pragmatic perspective.

Throughout her discussion of Narrative, Alexandra Georgakopoulou describes how “the reification of narrative has nonetheless increasingly been shied away from, as attention has shifted from narrative as text to narrative as social practice”. She describes how studies move towards viewing narrative as “a process of the participants’ joint construction, negotiation and contestation of alternative interpretative viewpoints on the events related as well as on the local relevance of the storytelling activity itself”. Interestingly, narrative – as a perspective – is also engaging with the principle of subjectivity. Here, it is not so much French pragmatics which serves as a source of inspiration for the exploration of the metaphorical split subject, but Goffman’s notion of footing and his corresponding view on the self.

The shift towards a pragmatic and functional consideration of discourse in terms of (inter)subjective social action and processes, is one of the factors contributing to the success of the linguistic turn across the disciplines. In this sense, I do not think of pragmatics as the study of a limited set of phenomena such as speech acts or the establishment of cohesion or coherence. Rather, linguistic pragmatics is a perspective on and a going concern with language use. Pragmatics-oriented researchers investigate empirical data of language-related actions and processes without losing sight of the various contextual layers that play a role in these actions and processes. Pragmatic interpretations of abstract concepts such as narrative, dialogue or genre thus allow for the empirical analysis of large-scale processes which leave material traces at the
micro-level of language. Put differently, they allow for a de-reification of the things we consider discourse to be.

In his article on *Cohesion and coherence*, Wolfram Bublitz points out that both notions refer to meaning and bear on relations of connectedness which may or may not be linguistically encoded. Whereas cohesion refers to “*inter-sentential semantic relations which link current items with preceding or following ones by lexical and structural means*”, coherence is a cognitive category depending on the language user's interpretation. Bublitz provides an overview of research on the relationship between cohesion and coherence and arrives at a pragmatics-oriented perspective. He considers the establishment of coherence as an interactive achievement resulting from negotiations within specific socio-cultural settings. As such, coherence becomes a “*context dependent, user oriented and comprehension based notion*”. Moreover, “*it is not texts that cohere but rather people who make texts cohere*”. On the other hand, speakers and writers can use linguistic cohesive tools to help create coherence and the associated gestalts. Once again, we are faced with a pragmatic perspective on discourse.

Interestingly, the article of Karin Aijmer and Ann-Marie Simon-Vandenbergen on *Pragmatic markers* illustrates how pragmatic perspectives do not necessarily originate from macro-discursive concepts such as dialogue, narrative or intertextuality. On the contrary, the notion of pragmatic markers is connected to a whole range of associated concepts among which the notion of indexicality. As Aijmer and Simon-Vandenbergen point out, the main function of pragmatic markers is indexical. They point us to features of context we need to take into account in order to connect discourse with relevant aspects of context. Context involves ideational relations between ideas and propositions, relations with respect to how speech acts relate to preceding, following or intended actions, linguistic exchanges or turns, information, and social relations between participants in discourse. Pragmatic markers index elements which are less concrete than more prototypical deictic elements such as pronouns, temporal or spatial expressions. But the pragmatic potential of discourse markers or particles also resides in their reflexivity: “*they comment on the utterance and thus assist in the interpretation of that utterance*”. Aijmer and Simon-Vandenbergen point out that pragmatic markers perform a meta-linguistic or meta-pragmatic role. Put differently, they assist in the (inter)subjective establishment of coherence. A theorization of meta-pragmatic markers is therefore not restricted to the study of a particular linguistic phenomenon but constitutes a perspective on the overall functioning of discourse. Aijmer and Simon-Vandenbergen emphasize that pragmatic markers are diverse. Connectives, modal particles, adverbs, interjections, routines, feedback signals, vocatives, disjuncts, approximators, conjunctions, and reformulations may all perform a multiplicity of (meta)pragmatic functions. Moreover, they may be deployed in linguistic theories and discursive perspectives ranging from speech act theory, conversation analysis, discourse analysis, semantics, socio-linguistics and SFL. The types of texts in
which they are studied also vary greatly. However, regardless of the specific pragmatic perspective in which pragmatic markers are studied, they force the researcher to face questions with respect to pragmatic processes constitutive of (inter)subjectivity and functional context-generation.

Of course, there are many other linguistic phenomena that are investigated in the pragmatic study of discourse. Manfred Kienpointner’s article on Figures of speech draws our attention to argumentative patterns and linguistic forms deployed in both ancient rhetoric and in the contemporary study of discourse. He argues for a perspective on figures of speech that differs from the ancient deviation view in which the so-called ornamental features of language – e.g. metaphor and metonymy – are considered to be deviations of a supposedly pure form of expression. Kienpointner states that “FSP are not merely ornamental or aesthetic devices” but “inevitably shape our cognition and culture-specific views of reality”. Moreover, they are “the output of discourse strategies which we use to select units from linguistic paradigms of different levels (phonetics/phonology, morphology, syntax, semantics) to create texts (in the sense of both written and spoken genres of discourse) which are adequate as far as their communicative purpose in some context is concerned”. He goes on to present a typical pragmatic argument against structural typologies by stating that figures of speech “should be considered as linguistic elements having certain communicative functions like clarification, stimulation of interest, aesthetic and cognitive pleasure, modification of the cognitive perspective, intensification or mitigation of emotions etc.”.

Paul Chilton touches upon the issue of rhetoric as well. He points out that the theoretical question underlying the topic of manipulation amounts to “does or can language determine the thoughts you have?”. For Chilton, linguistic structures are not “inherently deceptive or manipulative”. He states that “linguistic structures are just linguistic structures” which hold varying degrees of potential for manipulation by human users with goal-directed intentions. Throughout his article, Chilton explores some conditions which would allow for a manipulation of the ideas of language users: exposure of a population to a repeated message; the wide-spread dispersal of a linguistically encoded notion; and/or the malfunctioning or potential over-riding of the human consistency-checking device. Throughout his argumentation, Chilton argues for a perspective on manipulation that we may call pragmatic. He writes that producers and consumers of discourse can only be partly aware of what they are doing when they engage in discourse. In this sense, all communication is manipulative to some degree and not just “some particular kind of communication that we call manipulative”. Consequently the issue of responsibility appears. In this context, Chilton points out that “the human mind has the capacity or the potential to inspect or introspect”. Moreover, this “capacity to reflect on their unconscious cognitions, communicative behavior and physical action” can be trained and encouraged by a variety of factors. One of these is education and it is here that Chilton attributes a role to the enlightening potential of
critical approaches to discourse such as CDA. Increasing the awareness of speakers and writers with respect to the various functions of discourse is probably not specific to CDA. Rather it is characteristic of discursive pragmatics in general.

The last article in this reader deals with Humor and is written by Salvatore Attardo. He explores various approaches that exhibit this phenomenon. He points out that linguistics did not contribute much to research on humor until the eighties. Attardo starts out with some semantic theories such as the isotopy-disjunction model, the script-based semantic theory of humor, and the general theory of verbal humor. He then moves towards a discussion of approaches who exhibit a more pragmatic point of view. These include Gricean approaches to humor as it relates to conversational maxims and principles of relevance, but also humor as it relates to informativeness and to the way it is processed in psycholinguistic terms. Conversation analysis and sociolinguistics are also incorporated in this overview. As such, Attardo concludes that “the field of humor research is definitely taking a pragmatic perspective”.

At the beginning of this overview, I emphasised that the articles collected in this volume on discursive pragmatics do not constitute an exhaustive collection of the themes, issues, terminologies and perspectives which take pragmatic insights as a point of departure and/or as a topic of investigation. For instance, this is the case with respect to an approach such as discursive psychology where discourse is considered to consist of “text and talk as parts of social practices” and where the relationship between cognition and the use of discourse as conceptualised in cognitive psychology is called into question. From a discursive psychological point of view both knowledge, reality and cognition are discursively constructed through situated language use. In this sense, we are dealing with a discursive pragmatic perspective within the domain of qualitative psychology (Potter 1996). Also, a whole set of socio-linguistic, anthropological and ethnographical approaches that are implicitly and explicitly pragmatics-oriented have not been discussed within the context of this book (but see other volumes of this series, in particular: Jaspers et al. 2010; Senft et al. 2009).

There are also strong pragmatic tendencies in approaches that are not usually considered to be pragmatic at all. This is especially the case with respect to Foucaultian and other post-structuralist approaches to discourse. One might argue that these approaches are first and foremost philosophical or macro-sociological at best. One might also claim that they are not so much dealing with a linguistics-based discourse analysis as with a perspective on self, subjectivity and social processes which deploy linguistic categories in a metaphorical way in order to account for the phenomena under investigation. In this sense, one might even argue that we are basically dealing with non-empirical and non-pragmatic modes of investigation. Nevertheless, there are strong parallels to be drawn. For instance, Foucault’s archaeological approach to discourse explicitly focuses on the basic units of discourse in terms of enunciative functions (Foucault 1969:119–20). The unity of discourse and its delineation in terms of
genre, narrative, subject, and so on is therefore always a functional enterprise that needs to be performed in relation to contextual correlates. Moreover, it is precisely because of this concern with function that Foucault refuses to reduce his archaeologies – defined as descriptions of statements – to the linguistic features that may characterize specific statements (Foucault 1969: 97–98). In this sense, his proposal to add a level of discursive description to those levels of analysis provided by linguistics constitutes a decidedly pragmatic agenda. Moreover, there is an inter-subjective dimension to his work as well. Foucault explicitly stated that he was interested in how it was possible for individuals to produce so many contradictory statements and to occupy such varying positions at a particular point in time (Foucault 1969: 221). His theory of discourse is therefore one of a historically over-determined process. Linguistic pragmatic perspectives which focus on the inter-subjective and processual aspects of establishing cohesion, coherence, narrative, dialogue, enunciation, manipulation, genres, public discourse, and so on might be able to help answer these questions.

Today, the approach to discourse that is best known in socio-political theory and philosophy was formulated by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. Their discourse theory is a theory of articulations in the sense of a set of connections between semiotic elements that can be identified at various levels of discursive organization (Critchley & Marchart 2004; Howarth 2005; Laclau & Mouffe 1985). These elements include statements, subject positions (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 115), subjectivities (Laclau & Zac 1994), empty signifiers (Laclau 1994), nodal points (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 110–13), and other notions that can be traced back to French linguistic sources of inspiration (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 106, 12), Foucaultian theory and Lacanian psycho-analysis (Glynos & Stavrakakis 2004; Stavrakakis 1999). At first sight, their terminology is inspired by structuralist tendencies. However, their general line of argumentation is typically pragmatic. Even though they hold on to a structuralist notion of the sign based on de Saussure’s distinction between the signer and the signified, their general line of argumentation is decidedly pragmatic. They are interested in the ways in which political meanings are partially and inter-subjectively fixed. They claim that meanings can only be temporarily fixed to a certain degree within specific contexts because of the sliding values of signifiers and signifieds. Moreover, these contexts are themselves results of a series of articulations of not necessarily linguistic elements. To name a context is to alter the significance of a context (Butler & Laclau 2004). Linguistic pragmaticians will not contest such statement. However, there is a problem with respect to the linguistic aspect of their theory.

It is important to realise that the model of the sign as set out in the discourse theories of Laclau, Mouffe and successors such as Howarth, Glynos and Stavrakakis, is not always compatible with the model of the sign as it is found in pragmatic linguistic approaches to discourse. Most importantly, the Essex variant of post-structuralist discourse theory does not deal with the notions of indexicality and
deixis (Levinson 1998; Sidnell 2009), i.e. with those signifiers whose functional interpretation is dependent on the non-linguistic aspects of extra-linguistic reality. This neglect can be explained by the fact that according to Laclau and Mouffe nothing can be thought outside of discourse. Since these authors do not distinguish between linguistic and non-linguistic discourse in their texts, this has led to a methodological stalemate. Torfing points out that the post-structuralist anti-positivist stance has led many discourse theorists to throw “the methodological baby out with the epistemological bath water” (Torfing 2005: 27). As a result, “there is an urgent need for critical, explicit and context-bound discussion of what we do in discourse analysis, why we do it, and what the consequences are” (Torfing 2005: 28). The type of discourse analysis he refers to is the type of discourse analysis as performed in the post-structuralist line of thought.

Today, a response to the methodological deficit of post-structuralist discourse theory has started to emerge. Especially authors dealing with CDA (Fairclough & Chouliaraki 1999) have started to engage with Foucaultian and Essex-based approaches to discourse (Glynos & Howarth 2007; Howarth 2005; Howarth & Torfing 2005). Nevertheless, I would like to argue that an explicit recognition of pragmatics-oriented perspectives would add even more depth to this discussion. As the articles in this volume demonstrate, the pragmatic focus on language use does not need to lead to a neglect of the non-linguistic semiotic elements that allow us to articulate ourselves to others and to the world in general. In this sense, the increasing interest in studies on the multimodal aspects of discourse as considered from the point of view of interactional (Kress & van Leeuwen 2001), systemic functionalist (O’Halloran 2004) and pragmatically oriented approaches to language use holds great promise. As Scollon and Levine argue, “language in use, whether this is in the form of spoken language or text, is always and inevitably constructed across multiple modes of communication, including speech and gesture not just in spoken language but through such “contextual” phenomena as the use of the physical spaces in which we carry out our discursive actions or the design, papers, and typography of the documents within which our texts are presented” (Scollon & Levine 2004: 1–2).

All of the articles collected in this volume present some recent tendencies. Some even suggest future trends. I would like to conclude by suggesting a direction for future reflection that starts from a platform that we may choose to call discursive pragmatics. It is a route that allows the linguistic approaches presented in this volume to engage with the theories and approaches to discourse located at the macro-level of analysis. It is a road across the methodological deficit characterizing some of the dominant approaches to discourse outside of the field of linguistics. The various perspectives that may be grouped together under the heading of discursive pragmatics are characterized by an internal evolution towards an investigation of language use in terms of contextualized performances and in terms of the interactional functional processes involved. The specific terminologies deployed within each of the perspectives discussed within
the context of this book vary greatly. The continuing success of this discursive pragmatic turn will depend on its ability to demonstrate its own pragmatic value in a variety of empirical studies across disciplines. Success is guaranteed if one considers the varying areas of application that are touched upon in the individual contributions to this volume.

References

1. Introduction

Appraisal is a framework for analyzing the language of evaluation. It has emerged from within systemic functional linguistics (see, for example, Halliday 1994; Martin 1992; Matthiessen 1995) and was driven in its early days by work in the field of educational linguistics and the development of Australia's genre-based literacy programs (see, for example, Iedema, Feez & White 1994; Christie & Martin 1997; Martin 2000). It provides techniques for the systematic analysis of evaluation and stance as they operate in whole texts and in groupings of texts. It is concerned with the social function of these resources, not simply as the means by which individual speakers/writers express their feelings and take stands, but as the means by which they engage with socially-determined value positions and thereby align and dis-align themselves with the social subjects who hold to these positions.

The systemic functional linguistics out of which the framework has emerged holds that linguistic phenomena can best be explained by reference to the social functions performed by language, by reference to the functional demands placed upon language by its users (see, for example, Halliday 1971: 330–68). Additionally, it holds that these social functions fall into three broad types: those by which language represents the world of experience (the ideational), those by which social roles and relationships are constructed (the interpersonal), and those by which texts are made coherent, both internally and with respect to the context in which they operate (the textual) (see Halliday 1994). Within this context, the appraisal framework is directed towards developing the account of interpersonal functionality, with extending descriptions and understanding of those aspects of language by which speakers/writers construct for themselves particular identities or personae and by which they position themselves and those they address.

An array of text analytical interests and issues have shaped its development over the past decade or so. However, some three or four of these have had the greatest influence.

In the late 1980s, a group of functional linguists in Australia were exploring modes of narrative and were interested in criteria for articulating a taxonomy of story telling sub-types. They noted, for example, that what they termed the 'anecdote' (Plum 1988; Martin & Plum 1997) had a distinctive evaluative orientation in acting to evoke
a shared emotional reaction between narrator and audience. This contrasted with what they termed ‘the exemplum’, a sub-type concerned with evaluations of human actors in terms of morality, social esteem and social acceptability. At the same time, the group was interested in an observed disjunction between the approach to English literature essay writing adopted by many secondary-level students in New South Wales schools and what was looked for in these essays by teachers. The students devoted themselves primarily to describing how they personally felt about the characters or the plots or the texts as whole, whereas the teachers were looking for analyses of the texts in terms of the insights they provided into the moral order and the human condition (Rothery & Stenglin 1997, 2000). In the early 1990s, other members of the group turned their attention to observed variation in the style of journalistic discourse according to whether the author performed the role of general reporter, correspondent or commentator. They noted that these different ‘styles’ or ‘voices’ were associated with certain combinations of different types of appraisal, certain syndromes of choices from the resources of evaluation and stance (Iedema et al. 1994; Martin 2002). This then led to an interest in the role of these syndromes more generally in the discursive construction of authorial/speaker personae and the modelling by texts of ‘ideal’ or ‘intended’ readerships/audiences (for example, Fuller 1998; White 2000; Körner 2001; White 2003).

Two central issues ran through these various projects. The first is concerned with the question of the nature of attitude, with how texts activate positive and negative assessments. The second is concerned with how texts adopt a stance towards these assessments and related evaluative meanings, with how these assessments and related meanings are negotiated intersubjectively. It is the answers which the group has proposed for these questions which have given the appraisal framework its current shape. Accordingly, the discussion which follows will be organized around explorations of these two issues.

It needs to be noted that, in concerning itself with questions of attitudinal positioning and the discursive construction of communities of shared values, the appraisal framework addresses an area of linguistic enquiry which has only relatively recently come into the linguistic mainstream. It is only in the last decade or so, for example, that work within corpus linguistic into ‘semantic prosodies’ has revealed just how thoroughly suffused the language is with attitudinal associations and implications. (See, for example, Sinclair 1991 or Louw 1993). (It is noteworthy that Malrieu in his Evaluative Semantics declares that, “Despite this variety of approaches [to dealing with meaning in linguistics], very little attention has been paid to evaluation in language”, 1999: 114.) Accordingly, the development of the appraisal framework has required the exploration of new approaches to linguistic taxonomizing and new modes of linguistic argumentation in support of those taxonomies. Inevitably, then, the project remains a work in progress with some of its analytical typologies still having the status of proposals or hypotheses requiring further investigation and testing.
2. Overview

2.1 Attitude – the activation of positive or negative positioning

In their early work into evaluation in narrative and student writing, the Australian group drew on the well-established tradition of research into the language of affect, a tradition which was exemplified by a special issue of *Text* concerned with the “potential of language to express different emotions and degrees of emotional intensity” (Ochs 1989: 1). The group shared with this tradition the view that emotion is crucially implicated in attitudinal assessment, in the activation by texts of positive and negative viewpoints. The group, however, has departed from the tradition in its view that ‘affect’ in its broadest sense should not be too closely tied to emotion and that, in order to address the text analytical issues with which the appraisal research has been concerned, it is useful to identify additional modes of affectual or attitudinal meaning. (See, for example, Martin 1997, 2000). Specifically, the appraisal framework proposes that attitudinal meanings (positive and negative assessments) can be grouped into three broad semantic domains.

2.1.1 Affect

Firstly there are these fundamentally attitudinal meanings associated with emotion – texts indicate positive or negative views via either reports of the speaker/writer's emotional responses or reports of the emotional responses of third parties. For example (values of Affect are underlined):

(1) I am *disappointed* and *ashamed* that two of our most *admired* and respected sportsmen could behave in such a manner. To play for your country is an honour and a privilege, not a right. *(The West Australian – 11/12/98: 12, letter to the editor, Jennifer Black, Riverdale)*

The traditional term ‘Affect’ has been taken up as a label for such meaning.

2.1.2 Judgement

Secondly, there are meanings by which a view is indicated of the social acceptability of the behaviour of human actors, assessment by reference to some system of social norms or morality.

(2) Those who are chosen to represent Australia should not only be *talented* but they should be *above reproach*. Sport is supposed to teach honour, fair play, teamwork, leadership and social skills. It is not supposed to “create” or support greed and egos. *(The West Australian – 11/12/98: 12, letter to the editor, Jennifer Black, Riverdale)*

The term ‘Judgement’ has been adopted to reference such meanings.
2.1.3  **Appreciation**
Thirdly, there are meanings by which assessments are made of semiotic and natural phenomena by reference to their value in a given field, perhaps most typically by reference to their aesthetic qualities.

(3) It [the E-type Jaguar] is a masterpiece of styling whose proportions are dramatic...; its crisp details are in complete harmony with the broader outlines of the gorgeous general arrangement... *(The Independent, Weekend Review: p. 1 27/01/2001)*

The term 'Appreciation' has been adopted to reference these meanings.

2.1.4  **Modes of activation – direct and implied**
The framework makes a distinction in terms of the way in which such meanings are activated in text. Least problematically they can be activated by explicitly attitudinal terms, terms which generally carry a negative or positive meaning. For example,

(4) Without the intervention of a partisan, right-wing Supreme Court to ensure the election of a Republican, Mr Bush would now be a forgotten loser. The Observer considers his election an affront to the democratic principle with incalculable consequences for America and the world. *(The Observer, Jan 21, 2001 – leader page)*

More problematic are activations which rely on implication, inference and association, which rely on the reader/listener to interpret the depicted happening or state of affairs as positive or negative according to the value system they bring to the text. For example,

(5) George W. Bush delivered his inaugural speech as the United States President who collected 537,000 fewer votes than his opponent. *(The Observer, Jan 21, 2001 – leader page)*

Here an essentially ‘factual’ depiction points the reader towards a negative assessment of Bush and/or the US electoral process and clearly has the potential to activate such an assessment, depending, of course, on the viewpoint the individual reader brings to the text. The sentence, however, contains no explicitly attitudinal (positive or negative) lexis, no meanings which of themselves convey negative assessments.

Clearly such ‘implied’ appraisal poses major theoretical and analytical problems. In moving from direct to indirect activation, we step here from what certain Anglo-American traditions would see as ‘semantics’ into what would be seen as ‘pragmatics’, from meanings seen to be inscribed in the text to meanings seen to be operating only in the context. Accordingly, those operating with analytical philosophical notions of ‘semantics’ might want to exclude such formulations from treatments of ‘evaluative
language', arguing that there is nothing about the actual 'language' here which is attitudinal. While this might be attractive in terms of avoiding complication and providing for more easily replicable analyses of texts, it would mean that much of the evaluative work being done by texts would simply be missed out. Analyses would not only be unable to attend to the role of implied or indirect evaluation generally, but they would also be unable to take account of the often rhetorically crucial interaction between direct and indirect assessment. (For a demonstration of how appraisal analysis can be used to explore this interaction, see Coffin 1997.) Under the appraisal framework, then, such formulations are seen as falling very much within the scope of linguistic analyses of evaluative effects.

In this, the framework stands with writers such as Gruber (1993) and Malrieu (1999). Gruber, for example, includes in his taxonomy of ‘Evaluative Units’ the use of directly quoted material which is likely to be seen by the reader as evidence of that quoted source’s ethical shortcomings. Although the quoted source need not in any way be overtly evaluated, the use of the source’s own words still clearly serves an evaluative function. Malrieu provides what is, perhaps, even stronger support, arguing that when expressions are considered in their actual textual context, “it is difficult to conceive of any phrase which would be evaluation free. In context, even adverbs and complement such as ‘always’ and ‘with a knife’ have an evaluation” (Malrieu 1999:134). In taking this view of evaluation, the appraisal framework, of course, also takes a lead from corpus linguistic research into ‘semantic prosodies’, an area of research already mentioned above.

Accordingly, appraisal proposes a distinction between what it terms ‘inscribed’ evaluation, where the positive/negative assessment is directly inscribed in the discourse through the use of attitudinal lexis, and what it terms ‘invoked’ evaluation, where it is not possible to isolate such explicitly attitudinal vocabulary. The extract in (5) would thus provide an example of ‘invoked’ attitude. Considerably more research is required in order to provide a systematic account of the mechanisms by which this process of ‘invocation’ operates.

2.1.5 Typological criteria

The exact criteria upon which this three-way taxonomy are based remains a central issue for the ongoing appraisal analysis project. The distinction between Affect and the other categories (Judgement and Appreciation) is a relatively unproblematic one. The semantics of Affect is one by which meanings are most typically realized through a verbal process undergone or experienced by a conscious human participant – the reactional Mental Processes of systemic functional linguistics (Halliday 1994) – *Your decision saddens me, I fear ghosts*. But no such canonical realizational mode applies for Judgement and Appreciation, with the picture complicated by the fact that all three categories have diversified realizations as, for example, adjectives (*adored*...
leader [affect], corrupt leader [judgement], handsome man [appreciation]); adverbs (adoringly, corruptly, beautifully); nouns (his love of, tyrant, masterpiece); and verbs (I love bagpipe music, he corrupted the political process).

At this stage there is some evidence suggesting that the distinctions are reflected in patternings in collocational frames. (For more general work on evaluation and collocational frames, see Hunston & Sinclair 2000). We find, for example, that Judgement values are available for the frame, ‘It was X-Judgement value of Y to…’ (‘It was dishonest of him to…’, ‘It was lazy of her to…’, ‘It was wise of her to…’) while Appreciation values are not. Thus, ‘It was thoughtless of you to leave the cat out in the rain’ is possible but not ‘It was elegant of you to wear that outfit’. Similarly when terms such as ‘beautiful’ operate as Appreciation, the ‘It was X of Y to…’ frame is not available (‘It was beautiful of you to wear your hair like that.’), but when they operate as Judgement it is available (‘It was beautiful of you help out those street kids the way you did.’). More work, however, is required in this area. At this stage the three-way taxonomy is proposed as an hypothesis about the organisation of the relevant meanings, being offered as a point of comparison for those with alternative classifications, as a resource for those who need something to manage the analysis of evaluation in discourse, and as a challenge to those concerned with developing appropriate reasoning.

2.1.6 The interplay between the attitudinal modes
It must be stressed, however, that while the framework extends established notions of the ‘affectual’ in this way, it still sees the three categories as fundamentally inter-connected in that they are all to do with the expression of ‘feelings’. It is just that the grounding of that feeling varies across the three modes. Under Affect, the action of emotion is directly indicated – feelings are presented as the contingent, personalized mental reactions of human subjects to some stimulus. But under both Judgement and Appreciation, these ‘feelings’ are institutionalized in some way and are recast as qualities which inhere in the evaluated phenomenon itself. Thus ‘I like that picture’ grounds the evaluation in the contingent, individual reactions of the speaker while ‘that is a beautiful picture’ grounds the evaluation in the ‘objective’ properties of the evaluated phenomenon itself. Under Judgement, feelings are reconstrued as proposals about correct behaviour – how we should or shouldn't behave. Thus, in ‘He cruelly left the cat out in the rain’ the negative feeling towards the perpetrator of this act is here reworked as a proposal about what it right and wrong behaviour towards cats. Under Appreciation, feelings are reconstrued as propositions about the value of things. Thus in ‘That’s a beautiful picture’, the positive feeling towards the picture is reworked as a proposal about the picture’s aesthetic worth. (For a more extended discussion of Judgement and Appreciation as institutionalizations of feeling, see Martin 2000). The role of Affect at the heart of institutionalized feelings is depicted diagrammatically below.
Feeling institutionalized as ethics/morality (rules & regulations)

Judgement: *she is naughty*

Affect: *she disappoints me*

Appreciation: *she is an unattractive child*

Feeling institutionalized as aesthetics/value (criteria & assessment)

Figure 1. Judgement & Appreciation as institutionalized affect (from Martin 2000)

### 2.2 Intersubjective stance

In its modelling of the resources of intersubjective stance, the framework is concerned with formulations which have traditionally been analyzed under such headings as modality (see for example Palmer 1986), polarity (see for example Pagano 1994), evidentiality (Chafe & Nichols 1986), hedging/boosting (Markkanen & Schröder 1997; Hyland 1996; Myers 1989; Meyer 1997), vague language (Channell 1994), intensification (Labov 1984), and meta-discourse (Crismore 1989). Under the appraisal framework, these lexico-grammatically diverse wordings are brought together on the grounds that they are all resources which vary the terms of the speaker’s engagement with propositions and proposals, which vary what is at stake interpersonally both in individual utterances and as the texts unfolds cumulatively. These resources of intersubjective stance are divided into two further broad categories – (a) resources by which the textual voice positions the current proposition with respect to actual or potential alternatives to that proposition (given the label Engagement) and (b) resources which provide grading or scaling (given the label Graduation), either in terms of the degree of the textual voice’s personal investment in the proposition (intensifiers/down-toners) or in terms of choices the textual voice makes with respect to the preciseness of focus of its formulations. For reasons of space I will confine myself here to considering only Engagement. (For a full account of both Engagement and Graduation, see Martin & White 2003).

The approach taken to accounting for the intersubjective functionality of these values of Engagement is informed by Bakhtin’s now widely influential notion of dialogism and heteroglossia under which all verbal communication, whether written or spoken, is ‘dialogic’ in that to speak or write is always to refer to, or to take up in some
way, what has been said/written before, and simultaneously to anticipate the responses of actual, potential or imagined readers/listeners. As Vološinov states,

The actual reality of language-speech is not the abstract system of linguistic forms, not the isolated monologic utterance, and not the psychological act of its implementation, but the social event of verbal interaction implemented in an utterance or utterances.

Thus, verbal interaction is the basic reality of language.

Dialogue [...] can also be understood in a broader sense, meaning not only direct, face-to-face, vocalised verbal communication between persons, but also verbal communication of any type whatsoever. A book, i.e. a verbal performance in print, is also an element of verbal communication. [...] [it] inevitably orients itself with respect to previous performances in the same sphere [...] Thus the printed verbal performance engages, as it were, in ideological colloquy of a large scale: it responds to something, affirms something, anticipates possible responses and objections, seeks support, and so on. 

(Vološinov 1995:139)

The approach adopted by the appraisal framework holds that the functionality of these resources can only be adequately explained when such dialogistic effects are taken into account. That is to say, it holds that by the use of wordings such as ‘possibly’, ‘It is my contention that…’, ‘naturally…’, ‘admittedly’, ‘I believe…’, the textual voice acts first-and-foremost to acknowledge, to engage with and to align itself with respect to positions which are in some way alternatives to that being advanced by the text.

In this, the appraisal framework represents a departure from much of the modality and evidentiality literature (see for example, Lyons 1977; Palmer 1986; Chafe & Nichols 1986) and at least some of the hedging literature (see Markkanen & Schröder 1997) where accounts of epistemic modals and similar resources, for example, often assume that the sole function of these wordings is to reveal the writer/speaker’s state of mind or knowledge, to indicate that the speaker/writer is uncertain or tentative and is not committed to the truth value of the proposition.

3. Attitudinal assessment – a brief outline

3.1 Affect

The appraisal framework is oriented towards mapping semantic domains as they operate in discourse. Accordingly, as indicated above, the categorizations frequently bring together diverse grammatical structures under single discourse semantic headings. Affect is typical in this regard – its values are sometimes construed as qualities (adjectives – ‘I am happy about that’), sometimes as processes (verbs – ‘This pleases me’) and sometimes as comment adjuncts (‘Happily.’). They may also be realised as virtual entities (nouns) via nominalization – ‘happiness’.
Following Martin (1997) and Martin (2000), the appraisal framework classifies different instances of affect according to the following 6 factors:

i. Are the feelings popularly construed by the culture as positive (enjoyable) or negative ones (unenjoyable)?

ii. Are the feelings represented as a surge of emotion involving some kind of paralinguistic or extralinguistic manifestation (for example, weeping or trembling), or more internally experienced as an emotive state or ongoing mental process?
   - behavioural surge: She broke down crying.
   - mental process/state: She was distraught.

iii. Are the feelings represented as targeting or responding to some specific emotional stimulus or are they represented as a general ongoing mood?
   - reaction to stimulus: Her mother’s absence is upsetting her.
   - undirected mood: She is sad.

iv. Where do the feelings lie on a scale from low to high intensity?
   - low: I dislike bagpipe music.
   - median: I hate bagpipe music.
   - high: I detest bagpipe music.

v. Do the feelings involve intention (rather than reaction), with respect to a stimulus that is not yet actualised (irrealis) as opposed to an actual stimulus (realis)?
   - realis: I’m upset by what she said.
   - irrealis: I fear what she might say.

vi. Finally, emotions can be grouped into three major sets having to do with un/happiness, in/security and dis/satisfaction. The un/happiness variable covers emotions concerned with ‘affairs of the heart’ – sadness, anger, happiness and love; the in/security variable covers emotions concerned with ecosocial well-being – anxiety, fear, confidence and trust; the dis/satisfaction variable covers emotions concerned with telos (the pursuit of goals) – ennui, displeasure, curiosity, respect.
   - un/happiness: I am sad.
   - in/security: I am anxious.
   - dis/satisfaction: I am bored.

3.2 Judgement

Judgement is the domain of meanings by which attitudes are construed with respect to human behaviour – approval/disapproval of human behaviour by reference to social
acceptability/social norms; assessments of a person's character or how they 'measure up' to social requirements of expectations. The framework divides these Judgements into those dealing with social esteem and those oriented to social sanction. Judgements of social sanction involve an assertion that some set of rules or regulations, more or less explicitly codified by the culture, are at issue. Those rules may be legal, moral or religious. Judgements of social esteem involve evaluations under which the person judged will be lowered or raised in the esteem of their community, but which do not have legal or moral implications. Thus negative values of social esteem will be seen as dysfunctional or inappropriate or to be discouraged but they will not be assessed as sins or crimes.

Judgements of social esteem can be to do with normality (how usual someone's behaviour is), capacity (how capable they are) and tenacity (how resolute they are). Judgements of social sanction have to do with veracity (how truthful someone is) and propriety (how ethical someone is).

Table 1. Judgement (after Iedema et al. 1994)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social esteem</th>
<th>positive [admire]</th>
<th>negative [criticize]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>normality</strong> (custom)</td>
<td>standard, everyday, average…; lucky; charmed…; fashionable, avant garde…</td>
<td>eccentric, odd, maverick…; unlucky, unfortunate…; dated, unfashionable…</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘is the person's behaviour unusual, special, customary?’</td>
<td>skilled, clever, insightful…; athletic, strong, powerful…; sane, together…</td>
<td>stupid, slow, simple-minded…; clumsy, weak, uncoordinated…; insane, neurotic…</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>capacity</strong></td>
<td>plucky, brave, heroic…; reliable, dependable…; indefatigable, resolute, persevering</td>
<td>cowardly, rash, despondent…; unreliable, undependable…; distracted, lazy, unfocussed…</td>
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<tr>
<td>‘is the person competent, capable?’</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>tenacity</strong> (resolve)</td>
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<tr>
<td>‘is the person dependable, well disposed?’</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social sanction</th>
<th>positive [praise]</th>
<th>negative [condemn]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>veracity</strong> (truth)</td>
<td>honest, truthful, credible…; authentic, genuine…; frank, direct…;</td>
<td>deceitful, dishonest…; bogus, fake…; deceptive, obfuscatory…</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘is the person honest?’</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>propriety</strong> (ethics)</td>
<td>good, moral, virtuous…; law abiding, fair, just…; caring, sensitive; considerate…</td>
<td>bad, immoral, lascivious…; corrupt, unjust, unfair…; cruel, mean, brutal, oppressive…</td>
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<tr>
<td>‘is the person ethical, beyond reproach?’</td>
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</table>

(Please note that the lists of terms in the right-hand columns are intended only as a guide to the types of meanings which are involved here and not as some sort of
dictionary of Judgement sub-types. In actual analysis, it is always meaning in context which is addressed. Thus the evaluative meaning of a particular word form may vary from text to text under the influence of co-textual factors.)

Under the appraisal framework, this five-way taxonomy (normality, capacity, tenacity, veracity, propriety) is grounded in the semantics of modalization as articulated by Halliday (1994). That is say, each of the sub-categories of Judgement can be understood as a lexicalization of one of the grammatical categories of modality. This relationship operates in the following proportions: normality is to usuality, as capacity is to ability, as tenacity is to inclination, as veracity is to probability, as propriety is to obligation. In the early work on Judgement (Iedema et al. 1994), the labels for the five sub-types were closer to these modal oppositions, as reflected in Figure 2 below (fate for normality, resolve for tenacity, truth for veracity, ethics for propriety).

![Figure 2. (from Iedema et al. 1994)](image)

The bridge between the underlying grammatical modal options and the lexical categories of Judgement is provided by Halliday’s notion of interpersonal metaphor (Halliday 1994). Under Halliday’s framework, modal values can be realized ‘congruently’ (non-metaphorically) by modal auxiliaries (may, must, might, could etc.) and adjuncts (perhaps, possibly, certainly) and metaphorically through more lexical formulations such as ‘It is possible that’, ‘It is required that’, ‘I think that…’, etc. It is possible to construct a series of realizations for the ‘epistemic’ modal values of probability, usuality and capacity which begins with congruent realizations (via ‘grammatical’ formulations) and extends through metaphorical ones (more lexicalized) towards lexis which is clearly appraising in nature. In this way modalizations of probability can be related to lexicalized Judgements of veracity:

He took the money. (unmodalized)
He must have taken the money.
Certainly he took the money.
It’s certain he took the money.
It’s true that he took the money.
She was honest in stating that he took the money. [Judgement: veracity]
Similarly, modalities of usuality can be related to Judgements of normality:

My students dress entirely in black. (unmodalized)
My students often dress entirely in black.
It's usual for my students to dress entirely in black.
It's normal for my students to dress entirely in black.
It's fashionable for my students to dress entirely in black. [Judgement: normality]

Likewise for ability and capacity:

He can go.
He's able to go.
He's capable of going.
He's strong enough to go.
He's healthy enough, mature enough to go [Judgement: capacity]

A similar relationship of proportionality holds for the deontic modal values (obligation, inclination) and the Judgement values of propriety and tenacity. Thus inclination can be related to lexicalized tenacity:

I'll go.
I'm determined to go.
I'm intent on going.
I'm resolved to go
I'm resolute, steadfast, unyielding, unflinching etc. [Judgement: tenacity]

And obligation can be related to lexicalized Judgements of propriety:

Don't do that.
You shouldn't do that.
You're not supposed to do that.
It's expected that you won't do that.
It'd be unfair for you to do that.
It's corrupt, insensitive, arrogant, selfish, etc. of you to do that. [Judgement: propriety]

(For a full account see Martin & White 2003)

3.3 Appreciation

As indicated above, Appreciation is the domain of meanings for construing evaluations of the products of human endeavour such as artefacts, buildings, texts and works of art, and also of natural phenomena and states of affairs. The semantic is one by which such objects are assigned a value (negative or positive) in a given discourse or field of activity. One of the most salient systems for the assignment of such value is that of aesthetics. Human subjects may be ‘appreciated’ rather than ‘judged’, but only when
it is, for example, their aesthetic qualities which are being addressed rather than the social acceptability of their behaviour.

The appraisal framework sub-divides Appreciations into those assessments which turn on our reactions to things (do they catch our attention; do they please us?), their composition (balance and complexity), and their value (how innovative, authentic, timely, effective, healthy, relevant, salient, significant etc.). Some illustrative examples are supplied below in Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2. Values of appreciation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Positive</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reaction: impact</td>
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<tr>
<td>'did it grab me?'</td>
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<td>reaction: quality</td>
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<td>'did I like it?'</td>
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<td>composition: balance</td>
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<td>'did it hang together?'</td>
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<td>composition: complexity</td>
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<td>'was it hard to follow?'</td>
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<td>valuation</td>
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<td>'was it worthwhile?'</td>
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The fact that affectual values underpin all three sub-categories of Attitude (Affect, Judgement, Appreciation) is perhaps most obviously demonstrated in reaction values of Appreciation such as ‘a fascinating book’, ‘a boring piece of music’. Such instances, of course, involve lexis which could otherwise be used to realize Affect – ‘the book fascinates me’, ‘that music bores me’. Under the framework, such instances are kept apart on the grounds that there is something rhetorically significant at stake in choosing between explicitly grounding the evaluation in the emotional reactions of an individual
human subject (‘That book bores me’) and externalizing that feeling by representing it as a characteristic which inheres in the evaluated entity itself. That is to say, it is seen as important to be able to distinguish between construing the emotions someone feels (Affect) and ascribing the power to trigger such feelings to things (Appreciation).

4. Engagement: An overview

As indicated previously, the treatment of the resources of intersubjective positioning developed within the appraisal framework is informed by the view that all verbal utterances are ultimately dialogic. To illustrate this style of treatment I will consider briefly the functionality of the phrase ‘there is an argument, is there’ in the following short extract from a radio interview. The interviewer quizzes the then conservative Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, about the behaviour of the Australian banks in raising interest rates at a time when they have been making record profits.

(6) There is an argument, though, is there, the banks have been a bit greedy I mean, the profits are high and good on them, they’re entitled to have high profits, but at the same time the fees are bordering on the unreasonable now.

There is, of course, a backwards looking ‘dialogistic’ aspect to the use of this phrase. The interviewer presents himself as ‘simply’ taking up the words of some other, non-specified prior group of speakers. He represents himself as conveying ‘community concerns’ rather than his own, individual views. But there is rather more going on here in terms of the way the text recognizes and hence engages with potential alternatives to the current proposition. By such a device the interviewer indicates that this is a contested, debated assessment of the bank’s behaviour – he acknowledges that this it is but one of a number of views currently in play in the community. He thereby indicates that he anticipates that at least some elements in society will object to, and challenge such a suggestion. By representing the proposition as ‘arguable’ in this way, he represents himself as not personally committed to this position and hence signals a preparedness to enter into debate on the issue. In this sense, then, the formulation can be seen as an instance of dialogistic anticipation.

Under the framework, the following options (which may be multiply present in a given utterance) are seen as enabling the textual voice to vary the terms by which it engages with alternative voices and alternative positions.

Disclaim – the textual voice positions itself as at odds with, or rejecting, some contrary position:

– (deny) negation
– (counter) concession/counter expectation
Proclaim – by representing the proposition as highly warrantable (compelling, valid, plausible, well-founded, generally agreed, reliable, etc.), the textual voice sets itself against, suppresses or rules out alternative positions:

- (concur) naturally..., of course..., obviously..., admittedly...etc.; some types of ‘rhetorical’ question
- (pronounce) I contend..., the truth of the matter is..., there can be no doubt that...etc.
- (endorse) X has demonstrated that...; X as compellingly argued...etc.

Entertain – by representing the proposition as grounded in a contingent, individual subjecthood, the textual voice represents the proposition as but one of a range of possible positions – it thereby entertains or invokes these dialogic alternatives:

- it seems, the evidence suggests, apparently, I hear
- perhaps, probably, maybe, it's possible, may/will/must; some types of ‘rhetorical’ question

Attribute – by representing proposition as grounded in the subjecthood of an external voice, the textual voice represents the proposition as but one of a range of possible positions – it thereby entertains or invokes these dialogic alternatives:

- (acknowledge) X said..., X believes..., according to X, in X's view
- (distance) X claims that, the myth that..., it's rumoured that

4.1 Dialogic contraction and expansion

These various options, then, are seen as enabling variations in stance – they all provide for a different orientation to the heteroglossic diversity in which the text operates. They are further seen as falling into two wider categories according to a broader-scale axis of variation in rhetorical functionality. They are characterized as either ‘dialogically expansive’ or ‘dialogically contractive’, with the distinction turning on the degree to which an utterance, by dint of one or more of these wordings, entertains dialogically alternative positions and voices (dialogic expansion), or alternatively, acts to challenge, fend off or restrict the scope of such (dialogic contraction).

Consider the following by way of illustration of this distinction.

(7) (Endorsement) Follain punctures the romantic myth that the mafia started as Robin Hood-style groups of men protecting the poor. He shows that the mafia began in the 19th century as armed bands protecting the interests of the absentee landlords who owned most of Sicily. He also demonstrates how the mafia has forged links with Italy’s ruling Christian Democrat party since the war

(Cobuild Bank of English)
Both extracts are obviously dialogistic in that they explicitly reference the utterances and viewpoints of external voices. But there is more at stake here than simple attribution, than a simple multiplying of voices. Extract (7) is an example of a formulation in which a special type of reporting verb has been used (show, demonstrate) – one which presupposes the warrantability of the attributed proposition, which, for example, holds it to be true, reliable, plausible or fair. (Reporting verbs of this type have, of course, been widely discussed in the literature on attribution and direct and indirect speech. See, for example, Hunston 2000 or Caldas-Coulthard 1994). By such ‘endorsing’ formulations, the textual voice aligns itself with some external voice which is represented as correct, authoritative or otherwise argumentatively compelling, at least in the context of this particular proposition. By indicating in this way a heightened personal investment by the author, by co-opting some authoritative second party to the current rhetorical cause, such formulations set themselves against, or at least fend off, actual or potential contrary positions. That is to say, they increase the interpersonal cost to any who would advance such an alternative. Thus in the above instance, ‘show’ and ‘demonstrate’ are employed as the textual voice sets itself against the discredited alternative view of the Mafia as ‘Robin Hood types’. Such endorsements, then, can be construed as ‘dialogically contractive’ – the close down the space for dialogic alternatives.

Extract (8) has the opposite effect. Here, of course, the textual voice distances itself from the proposition framed by ‘claim’, representing it as, if not doubtful, then at least as doubtable, as potentially open to question. The effect is to invite or at least entertain dialogic alternatives, to lower the interpersonal cost for any who would advance such an alternative. Accordingly, such ‘distancing’ formulations can be seen as dialogically expansive, as opening up the dialogic space for alternative positions. (It must be stressed that it is not proposed that a verb such as ‘to claim’ necessary has this function in all cases. The rhetorical potential of such formulations, for example, may vary systematically across registers, genres and discourse domains.)

In this distinction, then, between ‘Endorsing’ and Distancing’ we see the fundamental contrast between dialogic contraction and expansion.

4.2 Further resources of dialogic expansion

The values of ‘Acknowledge’ and ‘Entertain’ align with such ‘Distancing’ formulations in acting to open up the dialogic space to alternative positions.
4.2.1 Acknowledge

The category of ‘Acknowledge’ involves attribution where ‘neutral’ frames are employed to simply report the words and viewpoints of external voices – by the use, for example, of reporting verbs such as ‘say’, ‘report’, ‘state’ and wordings such as ‘according to’, ‘in her view’. Just as in the case of the other attributions (Distance, Endorse), such formulation are obviously dialogic in that they explicitly introduce an alternative voice into the text. And once again they are dialogistic in an additional sense – in that, by this explicit grounding of the proposition in an individual subjecthood, they represent the proposition as individual and contingent, as but one of a range of possible propositions. Those alternatives to the current proposition are, in this sense, recognized and the heteroglossic context in which the text operates is thereby revealed.

4.2.2 Entertain

Formulations which actively ‘entertain’ dialogic alternatives include

– deductive formulations such as it seems, apparently, the evidence suggests;
– forms which represent the proposition/proposal as more or less likely, including modals of probability, as well as certain ‘rhetorical’ uses of questions.

In such contexts, the proposition is shown to be grounded in the subjecthood of the textual voice since it provides assessments of the proposition’s likelihood or evidential basis. Grounded in this way, the proposition is shown to be contingent and associated with an individualized point of view. As such, it is revealed to be but one of a number of possible alternative position. In this way, these alternatives are entertained or acknowledged and the dialogic space for those alternatives is thereby expanded.

4.3 Further resources of dialogic contraction

4.3.1 Pronounce

Under the appraisal framework, ‘Pronouncements’ are formulations which involve certain types of intensification, authorial emphases or explicit authorial interventions or interpolations. For example: I contend..., The facts of the matter are that..., The truth of the matter is that..., We can only conclude that..., You must agree that..., intensifiers with clausal scope such as really, indeed etc. and, in speech, appropriately placed stress (e.g. ‘The level of tolerance is the result of government intervention’).

For example, the phrase, ‘It is absolutely clear to me’ in the following performs this function

(9) It is absolutely clear to me that what Charlotte was arguing was that Crouching Tiger was a bad film to which liberal audiences imputed a significance shaped by their own prejudices about Chinese cinema and the Chinese in general.

(Letter to the www.dimsun.co.uk website from Ian Katz, features editor, the Guardian.)
Such intensifications and interpolations are dialogically motivated. The textual voice doesn’t indicate this heightened personal investment in the proposition in a communicative vacuum. Rather it does so against some opposed dialogic alternative – here against a contrary view of what ‘Charlotte’ was arguing. Thus such formulations are dialogic in that they acknowledge an alternative while simultaneously acting to challenge or fend it off. They are dialogically contractive by dint of this action of confronting and fending off the contrary position.

4.3.2 Concur
The ‘Concur’ option involves wordings such as *of course* and *naturally*. These formulations are like ‘Pronouncements’ in that they also provide for the textual voice to explicitly convey its investment in the viewpoint being advanced and thereby to confront or rule out possible alternatives. They differ, however, in that they represent the proposition/proposal as uncontentious within the current communicative context, as a ‘given’, as being in accord with what is generally known or expected. The textual voice is represented as taking up a viewpoint held by people generally, and hence the reader/listener. Consider by way of example the use of ‘of course’ in the following.

(10) When, belatedly, their selectors chose Paul Adams, who would assuredly have won them the second Test in Johannesburg, their attack became ‘very good’ in the opinion of Trevor Bailey, who has seen a few in his time. Bailey, *of course*, *was that rarity, a cricketer who at his best was world-class with both bat and ball.*

(From the Bank of English OzNews corpus)

Here the writer represents himself/herself as simply agreeing with the reader, as recounting a view (that Bailey was a cricketing rarity) which is already held by the dialogic partner and by people in general. The location of the current proposition within a dialogistic exchange is thus employed to increase the cost of any subsequent challenging or rejecting of the proposition.

4.3.3 Disclaim (Deny and Counter)
The final dialogically contractive option is supplied by meanings by which some prior utterance or some alternative position is invoked so as to be directly rejected, replaced or held to be unsustainable. Obviously to deny or reject a position is maximally contractive in that, while the alternative position has been recognized, it is held not to apply – the alternative position is thus directly confronted. This is the domain of negation and concession/counter-expectation. The term ‘Disclaim’ is used to reference such formulations which operate in this way, with two further sub-types identified.

4.3.4 Disclaim: Deny (negation)
From the appraisal framework’s dialogistic perspective, negation as a resource for introducing the alternative positive position into the dialog, and hence acknowledging
it and engaging with it, and then rejecting it. Thus in these interpersonal/dialogistic terms, the negative is not the simple logical opposite of the positive, since the negative carries with it the positive, while the positive does not reciprocally carry the negative. This aspect of the negative, though perhaps at odds with common-sense understandings, has been quite widely noted in the literature – see for example, Leech (1983: 101); Pagano (1994); Fairclough (1992: 121). Consider, for example, the following extract from an advertisement placed in magazines by the British Heart Foundation.

(11) We all like something to grab hold of. But sometimes you can have too much of a good thing. And a man whose table diet consists of double cheeseburgers and chips can end up looking like a tub of lard. There's nothing wrong with meat, bread and potatoes. But how about some lean meat, wholemeal bread and jacket potatoes?

Here the denial, ‘There is nothing wrong with meat, bread and potatoes’, is clearly dialogic in the sense that it invokes, and presents itself as responding to, claims/beliefs that ‘There is something wrong with meat, bread and potatoes’. A prior and alternative position is thus clearly engaged with dialogistically.

4.3.5 Disclaim: Counter

Related to such negating formulations are those which represent the current proposition as replacing and supplanting a proposition which would have been expected in its place. Consider, for example

(12) They [Kevin and Ian Maxwell, sons of Robert Maxwell] have a lot to prove in the coming years. Now they will not only seek to make their own fortunes but to clear their father’s besmirched name. They grew up to see him as the eternal outsider, the man who had fought Establishment prejudice and pettifogging bureaucracy to get where he was. Sure, he broke rules. Yes, he ducked and dived. Admittedly, he was badly behaved. But look at what he had achieved. From nothing, he had become a multinational businessman with an empire stretching across the world, the confidant of statesmen and just as famous himself.

(From the Bank of English UKMags corpus)

The extract (from The Times) is concerned with the notorious British businessman, newspaper magnate and former Labour MP, Robert Maxwell (now deceased) and his two sons, Kevin and Ian. In the extract, the writer seeks to explain, even justify, why the two sons might have continued to regard their father favourably, despite the negativity with which Maxwell had come to be viewed generally. (Maxwell had been found after his death to have secretly diverted millions of dollars from two of his companies and from employee pension funds in an effort to keep his business empire solvent.) For our current purposes we are concerned with the latter part of this sequence, the utterances which follow ‘But’ – ‘But look at what he had achieved. From nothing he had become
a multinational businessman...' The textual voice is here setting itself against what is represented as a generally applying negative view of Maxwell. By the formulation, the negative view is held not to apply, at least for Maxwell's sons. Thus through a dialogic interaction, a certain view is referenced and then rejected.

4.4 Engagement resources – summary

The following table provides an overview of the resources of Engagement.

Table 3. Engagement resources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dialogic contraction</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Disclaim:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Deny: e.g. <em>It is a review which doesn't consider the feelings of the Chinese community.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter: e.g. <em>What is surprising is to find such offensive opinions in the Guardian.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Proclaim:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concur: e.g. <em>The Premier, of course, wants us to think what a fine anti-racist fellow he is.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pronounce: e.g. <em>It is absolutely clear to me that what Charlotte was arguing was that Crouching Tiger was a bad film.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Endorse:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Ruffman's work has shown that parents or carers who talk to their children about mental states -thoughts, beliefs, desires and feelings end up with children who know much earlier in life what another person is thinking.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dialogic expansion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Entertain:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perhaps the most telling thing about Charlotte Raven's review of Crouching Tiger isn't in the review itself but in the one line preamble on the Guardian website.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Attribute</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attribute/Acknowledge: e.g. <em>It states: “Crashing bore, wooden drama: Charlotte Raven dares to differ from the unanimous acclaim for Ang Lee's Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon”.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attribute/Distance: e.g. and someone went as far as to suggest that by using the phrase “it seemed to contain multitudes” to describe the performance of the cast, Charlotte was alluding to Western images of “Chinese masses”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Conclusion

This, then, in outline is the model provided by the appraisal framework of some of the key resources of evaluation and stance. In its taxonomy of values of Attitude it provides an account of the options available for construing different types of positive or negative assessment. In its notion of direct versus invoked attitude, it provides an account of the options available for activating these assessments. By its account of the resources of Engagement, it offers a framework for exploring how the textual voice positions itself with respect to such assessments, a framework for characterizing the different intersubjective stances available to the textual voice.
It is not possible or appropriate in the current context to go beyond this descriptive outline and to set about demonstrating applications of the framework to text analytical issues. For such demonstrations, see, for example, Iedema et al. 1994; Eggins & Slade 1997; Christie & Martin 1997; White 2002; Martin & White 2003; Macken & Martin 2003). By way of conclusion, however, it may be useful to note that the applications which have been developed to this point have attended to the following types of issues:

- differences in attitudinal profiles (different patterns of occurrence of attitudinal subtypes) by which individual texts or groupings of texts (for example those representing a given register or genre) can be contrasted;
- patternings within a text of the occurrence of attitudinal values by which functional stages can be identified;
- associations between given social actors and particular types of attitudinal assessment;
- the role of implicit or invoked attitude in providing for the strategic impersonalization of texts;
- the association of particular patternings of dialogistic resources with rhetorical effects such as the construction of authorial personas or the modelling of an ‘intended’ audience;
- patterns of interplay between Attitude and Engagement which reveal the ideological assumptions operating in the text.

The ongoing research project out of which the appraisal framework has emerged is one which seeks to provide a systematic account of the social semiotic principles by which attitudinal assessments are activated and negotiated in texts and by which those texts construct for themselves communities of shared feelings, values, tastes and beliefs. In this it provide an account in which the lexico-grammatical, semantic and the social and contextual are integrated, and by which, therefore, it becomes possible to provide linguistically based explanations of such social effects as attitudinal positioning, the construction of authorial personae and negotiations of solidarity.

References

Cohesion and coherence

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1. Introduction

Linguists use the two notions of cohesion and coherence to refer to the (linguistically encoded or just assumed) connectedness of spoken as well as written discourse or text. Of course, connecting relations also hold among elements of structure within grammatical units such as word, phrase, clause or sentence. But these intra-sentential relations are different in kind because they are determined by phonological and grammatical rules and described, inter alia, as syntactic-semantic relations of valency, dependency, constituency, modification. Cohesion, operating inter-sententially, and coherence are key notions in text and discourse analysis, as well as in pragmatics because they also relate to the complex interrelationship between form, meaning and use of linguistic expressions in specific (social) contexts.

Native speakers have intuitions about which sequences of utterances do or do not constitute discourse or text. If, by way of an experiment, we deliberately distort a perfectly comprehensible and acceptable text by, e.g. changing the order of its utterances or its linguistic, situational or socio-cultural context, the effect will be one of confusion on the part of our hearers or readers. They may still understand each individual utterance but not the resulting string of utterances as a whole, i.e. as one unit with a definite function in its environment. In the eye of the language user who is trying to interpret them, they do not ‘hang together’ in a reasonable way. I.e., they do not display order and do not form a meaningful gestalt that fits both into the linguistic environment as well as the social situation, serves the accepted communicative goal and contributes to the topic at hand; in other words, they are not coherent. Accordingly, the defining characteristic of such instances of discourse or text is coherence, which itself rests on text-forming resources such as cohesion and general structural properties determined by register or genre.

Though both cohesion and coherence refer to meaning resting on relations of connectedness (between individual propositions and sets of propositions), which may or may not be linguistically encoded, they are descriptive categories which differ in kind. Cohesion refers to inter-sentential semantic relations which link current items with preceding or following ones by lexical and structural means (cf. below). Cohesion is a kind of textual prosody. Since J. R. Firth, who perceived prosodic effects as phonological colouring, we use prosody to refer to the property of a feature to extend
its domain, stretch over and affect not just one but several units. Analogously, textual prosody refers to cohesive colouring involving more than one element in discourse or text. As cohesion is anchored in its forms, we can argue that it is an invariant, user and context independent property of a piece of discourse or text. Coherence, on the other hand, is a cognitive category that depends on the language user’s interpretation and is not an invariant property of discourse or text.

Though both cohesion and coherence have found their place as key terms in text and discourse analysis, they still mean different things to different people. Simplifying matters drastically, we can say that form and structure oriented linguists, who regard a text as a kind of long sentence, i.e. as a unit beyond the sentence, focus on cohesion as an essential feature of textuality. Function oriented linguists, on the other hand, who equate text with any linguistic expression of any length which is used to perform a specific function, focus on coherence as the defining feature of textuality.

2. Focus on form: Cohesion

The most influential account of cohesion was developed by Halliday and Hasan in their book *Cohesion in English*. Their concept of cohesion is “a semantic one” because it refers “to relations of meaning that exist within the text” (1976: 4) and “enable one part of the text to function as the context for another” (Halliday & Hasan 1989: 489). Cohesion manifests itself in linguistic means that appear at the surface level of language. An example of such a cohesive means is *them* in “Wash and core six cooking apples. Put them into a fireproof dish” (1976: 2), which “presupposes for its interpretation something other than itself” (1976: 4), here the expression *six cooking apples* in the preceding sentence. “Cohesion”, they argue, “occurs where the interpretation of some element in the discourse is dependent on that of another. The one presupposes the other, in the sense that it cannot be effectively decoded except by recourse to it. When this happens, a relation of cohesion is set up” (1976: 4).

Halliday and Hasan focus on five kinds of cohesive ties between utterances: (1) reference, (2) substitution, (3) ellipsis, (4) conjunction, and (5) lexical cohesion. (1) Reference is described as situational or exophoric, resting on means that refer to the situation at hand (as in *Would you like to join me for a cup of tea this afternoon?*), and as textual or endophoric reference, resting on anaphora or cataphora that refer to participant roles (personal reference as in *Doris likes him very much*), to (degrees of) proximity (demonstrative reference as in *Joe won't get tenure. This is what I can't understand*), or to (degrees of) similarity (comparative reference as in *He always eats meat balls with his fingers. I detest such manners*). (2) Substitution involves noun phrases (*My beer is warm. Please get me a chilled one*), verb phrases (*I have never talked in Jena before. But*
I did in Halle a couple of years ago) and clauses (I trust you know how to open a bottle of wine? I believe so). (3) Ellipsis is described as “substitution by zero” (1976: 142) and likewise involves noun phrases, verb phrases and clauses. (4) There are four types of conjunction: additive (expressed by and, or, furthermore etc.), adversative (but, however etc.), causal (so, therefore etc.), temporal (then, next, finally etc.). (5) Lexical cohesion, which rests on “identity of reference” between two items, is realized by forms of reiteration such as word-for-word repetitions, synonyms, superordinates, general words, so-called collocations, i.e. members of the same lexical field (euro, cent; mountain, climb, peak) and items which, though they are not hyponyms or synonyms in the language system, are nonetheless used as such in discourse or text, acquiring their coreferential status only “instantially” (1976: 289).

In the wake of Halliday and Hasan’s proposal, much work has been devoted to re-classify and extend their inventory of cohesive means (cf. Martin 1992). Essentially, all means can be categorized into three types because cohesion stretches three ways: there is reference to what has been said, to what will be said and also to what could have been said instead. This three-way distinction corresponds to Roman Jakobson’s well-known two modes of arrangement of verbal means, selection (paradigmatic choice, relatedness in the system) and combination (syntagmatic relatedness), to which, for a higher degree of delicacy, we can add the two vectors of retrospection and prospection (cf. Hasan 1984). The following overview categorizes cohesive means into classes according to their prospective or retrospective orientation.

Retrospective cohesive means are proforms (as anaphora), substitutions, synonyms, hyponyms, word-for-word repetitions, general words or labels and second pair parts of adjacency pairs. Except for the latter, they are based on similarity of form, structure, content and function and can therefore be labelled ‘forms of repetition’ (or ‘parallelism’). The three essential properties of repetition are quality, quantity and distribution. Quality is best described as a scale which represents a continuum of fixity vs. looseness of form and indicates the degree of formal as well as semantic correspondence between the parallel items involved; there is a cline from total equivalence to paraphrastic substitution. Quantity refers to the length of the repeating item and is likewise best represented on a scale with a single word (or even phone) at one end and a string of utterances at the other. Distribution refers to the distance between the repeated and the repeating item, which can be anywhere between closely adjacent and considerably removed.

Prospective devices are used to create a slot (to be filled), thereby reducing the number of options and, generally, setting up expectations. They include proforms (as cataphora), text structuring discourse markers (incidentally, actually, cf. Lenk 1998) and gambits (first of all, before I forget, and another thing), and also general nouns or labels (Francis 1994) like aspect, dilemma, episode, pattern, problem. Labels do not just
refer to sections but categorize them; in (1) there is both a prospective (*stuff*) and a retrospective (*things*) label:

(1) “I always meant going down to the shops on Saturday to get fresh all the *stuff* to get meat and vegetables beefburgers sausages all these *things* the children eat for tea”.  

(*London Lund Corpus 4.3.90 ff*)

To these two classes of cohesive means we can add forms of ordered arrangements that function both prospectively and retrospectively at the same time. They rest on principles such as information assessment and iconicity. The former has been described from a variety of different points of view, prominent among them the Prague School’s principle of *functional sentence perspective*, according to which each sentence part is evaluated for its relative importance for the information carried by the sentence as a whole and thus for its communicative function within its contextual environment. Known or given information (i.e. theme or topic status) has a low degree of communicative dynamism (because it contributes little to informational progress) while new information (i.e. rheme or comment status) has a high degree of communicative dynamism. The assignment of theme and rheme to parts of an utterance has a clear cohesive function because it sets up links with preceding and following utterances (cf. Firbas 1992). The second principle of arrangement, iconicity, is easiest illustrated by Harvey Sacks’ much-quoted example “The baby cried. The mommy picked it up”, where the temporal sequence of events is reflected in the linear sequence of the two adjacent utterances. Adjacency based on iconicity is thus another powerful means of creating cohesive linkage.

3. **Cohesion as a condition for coherence**

Cohesion should be kept strictly apart from coherence. It is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for coherence. Referring to van Dijk’s example

(2) We will have guests for lunch. Calderón was a great Spanish writer  

(*van Dijk 1972: 40*)

Edmondson shows that, though the two utterances are not cohesively connected, they are nonetheless coherent in a context like (3):

(3) Do you know Calderón died exactly 100 years ago today? – Good heavens! I’d forgotten. The occasion shall not pass unnoticed. We will have guests for lunch. Calderón was a great Spanish writer. I shall invite Professor Wilson and Senor Castellano right away.  

(*Edmondson 1981: 13*)

Furthermore, in authentic discourse or text, we can encounter long stretches of utterances which, though they are not cohesively connected, are nonetheless accepted as
coherent texts because they are, e.g., parts of enumerations or cases of dissociated interior monologue.

However, while cohesion is not a necessary condition of coherence, studies have shown that discourse and text tend to be cohesive to a greater or lesser extent, depending on genre. Following a general principle of cooperation, speakers/writers are anxious to generate cohesion as a means of guiding their recipients’ interpretation of coherence and thus, ultimately, of securing comprehension. Cohesive means are cues which 'signal' or indicate the preferred line of coherence interpretation. A lack of cohesive means may disturb the hearer’s/reader’s interpretation of coherence. Easy and unimpeded interpretation of both discourse and text as coherent depends considerably on the presence of communicative and meta-communicative textual links.

Of course, the equation ‘more cohesion = more coherence’ is not valid per se. And yet, there are genres, among them everyday face-to-face conversation, in which the wealth and abundance of cohesive means is quite extraordinary, as in (4):

(4)  A well I must admit I mean Edward's mother and his great and his grandfather will come up on Christmas Day but I feel somehow the sheer fact of not having to have this really sort of it's for one thing it does nark me that it's so bloody expensive that he won't eat anything except the largest most splendid pieces of meat you know
B how annoying
A and it upsets me you know if he needed it I wouldn't mind
D come to think of it he's also he's also an extremely greedy individual who
A yeah so that if you buy enough [f]
D he isn't satisfied with a normal portion
A for cheese for for three days if he sees it's there he'll eat it you know

(London Lund Corpus 4.3)

Cohesive means come on all levels. In (4) we find on the level of phonetics and prosody alliteration, assonance, rhythm (cf. Couper-Kuhlen 1983) and ‘sound-rows’ or ‘-sequences’ as in cheese – three – he – sees – eat (Sacks 1992). On the lexico-syntactic level we notice articles, proforms, deictics, conjunctions, complementizers, labels (somehow, do, anything, individual) and members of a common script or semantic field (mother, grandfather; eat, meat, greedy, portion; nark, upset, annoy). And from a pragmatic and text-analytic viewpoint we recognize speech act pairs ('statement' – 'supportive statement' accompanied by supportive elements like yes, how annoying, yeah), hedges, gambits, discourse markers, collocations and tags (well, I mean, sort of, you know, come to think of it, I must admit, I feel somehow, the sheer fact, I wouldn't mind, for one thing). There is an abundance of cohesive means to the point where they add up to a rather high degree of redundancy. Hearers, however, who have to process
online, to interpret ongoing talk in actu (without the possibility to look ahead or the
time to recall what was said before in any detail) depend on a certain degree of redun-
dancy. Redundancy helps relieve their memory and gives them time to understand.
In everyday face-to-face discourse, at least, securing comprehension as a principle
ranks higher than avoiding redundancy. Occasionally, speakers may come up with
too many cohesive cues which add up to a degree of redundancy that is no longer
tolerable and can irritate or even annoy the hearer. Such cases of ‘cohesive overkill’
are triggered by the speaker’s misjudgement of the hearer’s interpretive competence
and range of knowledge.

While there is no direct correlation between (lack of) cohesion and (lack of) coher-
ence, to claim that cohesion is not a sufficient condition for coherence is much more
arguable especially if we accept that the speaker’s/writer’s primary motive for using
cohesive means is to help secure coherence. And indeed, the examples which are given
to prove that cohesion alone does not generate coherence, are not very convincing:

(5) The heads of the city’s uniformed services polished their contingency plans for
a strike. Queen Wilhelmina finalized her own plans for the evening. In a nearby
Danish town, two fishmongers exchanged blows. Anders, by far the stronger,
had a cousin in prison. Many criminals are in prison. (Samet & Schank 1984:63)
The authors claim that (5) is cohesive but not coherent because the utterances
“exhibit […] connections but ‘make no sense at all’” (Samet & Schank 1984:63). However, as we saw when we looked at Edmondson’s reading of the non-cohesive
sequence of utterances in example (2), judgements of coherence, or, for that mat-
ter, incoherence are not invariantly triggered by the text at hand for any hearer or
reader alike. If the text in (5) was authentic, i.e. an instance of naturally occurring
data such as a narrative, its hearers or readers would easily succeed in reaching a
plausible interpretation of coherence by resorting to the larger context, to the situa-
tion at hand, to the overall communicative goal, to their encyclopedic knowledge and
to other sources of supporting data. But even as a piece of constructed, context and
situation free text, (5) allows for a coherent reading. To ask people whether or not an
isolated sequence of utterances ‘has coherence’ is tantamount to asking whether or
not they have enough imagination to come up with a context in which the sequence is
indeed coherent. To reach coherence, they will then quite naturally rely on the cohe-
sive means given in the text. Hence, cohesion is normally a sufficient condition for
coherence because it serves as a powerful and suggestive guideline for the hearer’s/
reader’s interpretation.

4. Focus on meaning: Connectivity

It has been argued that text which is not cohesive can, nonetheless, be coherent provided
the propositions underlying its utterances are semantically related to each other. In
this view, coherence is a semantic notion resting on (a net of) semantic relations. The variety of semantic or connectivity relations that have been described in the literature so far can be categorized into a few core classes. Among them we find causality, reference, coordination (parallel, contrastive), elaboration (example, generalization, paraphrase), overlap and contiguity (temporal, spatial, aspectual, referential) (cf. Samet & Schank 1984) as well as so-called scripts, schemata or frames which refer to socially defined activities and events and help “participants apply their knowledge of the world to the interpretation of what goes on in an encounter” (Gumperz 1982: 154). Viewing coherence as a semantic notion usually leads to the assumption that it is a feature of, or rather in the text. It is ‘there’, ‘in’ the text for people to ‘find’ it. Returning to example (2) with its interpretation in (3), we can now argue that its coherence rests on the semantic relations of causality and coordination, which do not only link the propositions of the two utterances but also two additional though latent, i.e. not realized propositions; here is a possible paraphrase: We will have guests for lunch – because – we want to celebrate – because – it is Calderón’s birthday today – and because – Calderón was a great Spanish writer. The connectivity of (2) is only partly reflected on the surface level of cohesion by the linear ordering of the two utterances. To make a clear distinction between connectivity and cohesion (with coherence resting on either or both of these), is justified on theoretical grounds. In practical discourse analysis, however, the two concepts are not always easy to keep apart.

5. Semantic connectivity as a condition for coherence

From the fact that coherence is frequently based on semantic connectivity we may conclude that the latter is both a sufficient and a necessary condition for coherence. It has been argued, however, that this is too strong a claim. Basically, the argument is supported by five observations. Firstly, adjacent utterances can be semantically related without being coherent. In (5) there is connectivity (resting on the semantic relations of contiguity, time and coordination) but not coherence. Samet & Schank point out that “our ability to render certain elements of a text understandable by using these [semantic] connections cannot itself make a text coherent to the point of making sense” (1984: 64). Secondly, semantic relations can involve utterances which are not adjacent as, e.g., in enumerations where they are related to a superordinate topic but not to each other. Thirdly, utterances can be semantically related in ways that are not clearly identifiable or which allow for alternative identification. Thus, in authentic discourse or text it may be difficult or even impossible to figure out exactly which semantic relation is involved, as in (6):

(6) John bought a raincoat. He went shopping yesterday on Queen Street and it rained. (Morris & Hirst 1991: 25)
Each of several connectivity relations is a likely candidate for coherence: “The coherence relation here could be elaboration (on the buying), or explanation (of when, how, or why), or cause (he bought the raincoat because it was raining out)” (Morris & Hirst 1991:25). Fourthly, two adjacent utterances can be semantically related (and thus possibly coherent) for one hearer/reader but not for another, as in (7):

(7) S Well unless you’re not a member, if yer a member of TM people do, ah simply because it’s such a fucking high price to get in there (1.0 sec) its like thirty five dollars

C it’s like water polo (2.0 sec)

S Why, is it expensive

(Vuchinich 1977:246)

This exchange is part of an experiment. In order to test the reaction of his/her interlocutor the organiser C makes a deliberately incoherent contribution, i.e. one that is not semantically related to the preceding utterances. However, as is clear from his/her reaction, S does see a semantic relation (of comparison) between it’s like water polo and the preceding text and understands it as coherent (though not straight away, he/she needs more processing time than usual). Fifthly, two or more utterances can be connected by a semantic relation which, however, cannot be inferred from the linguistic or the non-linguistic context but only from previously acquired knowledge or from experience (as is often the case with allusions).

Of course, not one of these five lines of reasoning precludes connectivity from being at least a major condition for coherence. After all, connectivity rests on semantic relations of the kinds mentioned above rather than on transparence, adjacency or absoluteness.

6. Coherence: A general view

Coherence is a concept which in its complexity is still not fully understood and a matter of continuing debate. Though it has doubtless found its place as a key term in text and discourse analysis, its usage continues to vary to the extent that to give a comprehensive overview of even the major views advocated goes well beyond the scope of a handbook article. While after the publication of Halliday & Hasan (1976) the notion of cohesion was widely welcomed and accepted as a well-defined and useful category, coherence was often regarded or even occasionally dismissed as a vague, fuzzy and “rather mystical notion” (Sinclair 1991:102) with little practical value for the text or discourse analyst. This view was held by parts of the linguistic community with, however, some notable exceptions, prominent among them hermeneutic, context- and interpretation-based dynamic concepts of coherence (cf. below). Since the late eighties, there has been renewed interest in the intriguing
notion of coherence. The remarkable number of almost five hundred titles listed in a recent bibliography (Bublitz 2010) bears witness to this development and to a rapidly changing scene in coherence research which is moving away from reducing coherence to a mere product of (formally represented) cohesion and/or (semantically established) connectivity.

In her overview, Hellman (1995) distinguishes, *inter alia*, between approaches which see coherence (a) “as a formal property of texts” (p. 191ff), (b) “as a discourse processing concept” (p. 194f), referring primarily to work by Sanders & Spooren (who, in a 1999 paper, juxtapose the linguists’ view of coherence as a relational concept and the cognitivists’ view of coherence as a realisation of participant intentions manifest in each section of a discourse), (c) “as a result of computing referential, causal or other relations”, i.e. “of a complex problem-solving process in which the reader infers relations among the ideas, events and states that are described in the text” (p. 195), and (d) “as a result of computing”, i.e. recognising “the intention(s) of a discourse producer” (p. 196).

7. **A hermeneutic, context and interpretation based view of coherence**

Much recent work describes coherence as a mental notion which is interactively negotiated within a given socio-cultural setting and less dependent on the language of discourse or text itself (cf. the readers by Gernsbacher & Givón 1995; Bublitz et al. 1999). Such a hermeneutic approach describes coherence as a context dependent, user oriented and comprehension based notion. This view, which dominates work by Fritz (1982), Brown & Yule (1983) and many others, is in accordance with a fairly long interpretive tradition in Europe (represented by Ludwig Wittgenstein, Alfred Schütz, Harold Garfinkel, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Anthony Giddens and others) and the USA. Within a sociological and ethnographic framework, Dell Hymes, John Gumperz and others (cf. the reader edited by Bauman & Sherzer 1974) argue for analysing language within its sociocultural settings. Speakers and hearers alike come to an understanding of the ongoing communicative interaction by linking linguistic and non-linguistic cues with their background knowledge. They thus continually and jointly negotiate meaning by constructing a shared context. From such a contextualizing, interpretive viewpoint, speakers/writers are said to intend, anticipate and (overtly and/or covertly) suggest coherence while hearers/readers ascribe coherence to utterances within their linguistic, situational and socio-cultural context.

Because much recent research into coherence follows a context-, negotiation-, interpretation-dependent view of coherence, a snapshot account of it seems indicated. According to this view, coherence is not a discourse or text inherent property, i.e. it is
not given in discourse or text independently of interpretation. Consequently, one cannot say “a text has coherence” in the same way as one can say “a text has a beginning or an end”, or indeed, “a text has cohesion” (the latter being a text inherent property). We can only say “someone understands a text as coherent”. Of course, coherence is based on the language of the text in the same way as it is based on other information provided by the linguistic context, the socio-cultural environment, the valid communicative principles and maxims, the interpreter’s encyclopedic knowledge etc.

Since it is not texts that cohere but rather people who make texts cohere, we can say that for one and the same text there exist a speaker’s/writer’s, a hearer’s/reader’s and an analyst’s coherence, which may or may not match. Typically, different interpretations of the coherence of a text depend on its linguistic complexity, the temporal, local and social setting, the interpreter’s familiarity with genre and content as well as his/her knowledge of the speaker’s/writer’s background (motives, preferences, interests). Being dependent on interpretation means that speakers/writers can never produce coherence which is binding for hearers/readers. It is the latter who have to arrive at their own understanding of coherence. Normally speakers/writers are set to help create coherence by (more or less subtly) guiding their hearers/readers to a suggested line of understanding. Conversely, hearers/readers use these guiding signals as instructions to align their interpretations with what they take to be the speakers’/writers’ intentions. Hearers/readers assemble and subsequently test a view of coherence which they assume comes closest to that of the speaker/writer. Hence, coherence is rarely static but frequently dynamic, i.e. a process rather than a state. It can be tentative and temporary because it is continually checked against any new information which may make adaption and updating necessary. Of course, eventually, coherence (especially of written texts) can lose some of its provisional and temporary character and acquire a higher degree of permanence.

Coherence is the outcome of the language user’s gestalt creating power. People are driven by a strong desire to identify forms, relations, connections which they can maximize in order to turn fragments into whole gestalts, i.e. to ‘see’ coherence in strings of utterances. Coherence is also a cooperative achievement (in ongoing discourse more than in ‘petrified’ text) because it depends on both the speaker’s/writer’s and the hearer’s/reader’s willingness to negotiate coherence. Mutual understanding not only rests on the participants sharing the same socio-cultural background, the same range of knowledge and communicative assumptions, but also on their ability to figure out unshared experience, i.e. to adjust their own world-view to that of their interlocutors. Hearers/readers are constantly engaged in trying to re-create coherence as an equivalent of the speaker’s/writer’s coherence, but despite their efforts they can never succeed in coming up with an exact copy. Coherence is only approximate and a matter of degree and best described as a scalar notion. Any interpretation of coherence is restricted and, accordingly, partial to different degrees.
8. Coherence as a default assumption

As a rule, speakers/writers and hearers/readers alike operate on a standard or default assumption of coherence. This explains why despite the fact that ascribing coherence frequently involves making difficult and complex acts of inference, cases of disturbed coherence are not abundant, and why people try to understand coherence even though the data to go by may look sadly insufficient. As long as there is no evidence to the contrary, they proceed from the assumption that what they hear and read can be made coherent, even if this involves making extremely remote and unlikely connections. Speakers/writers likewise rely on the default principle and expect hearers/readers to assume that what they say or write is coherent. The default principle of coherence is accepted for two reasons. Firstly, it relates to a more general strategy according to which it is normally assumed by the interactants that hearers/readers “do as little processing as possible” (Brown & Yule 1983: 60), opting for the obvious and likely reading. Secondly, it follows from the general principle of cooperation (in the Gricean sense) and is therefore an essential normative basis of communication, which leads to rational behaviour as the only path to efficient communication. (Cf. also Linde’s observation that “the process of creating coherence” is “a social obligation” 1993: 16).

9. Perspectives

This overview can only touch upon a limited number of methodological and theoretical approaches to the description of cohesion and coherence, on the one hand, and of ways and means of (re-)creating them, on the other. For some time now there have been several common tendencies, among them the tendency to describe a far larger inventory of cohesive means than originally proposed by Halliday and Hasan, the tendency to refrain from accepting only one canonic definition of coherence, and the tendency to observe a basic stock of fundamental theoretical and methodological assumptions. Much recent work demands such descriptive principles as the need to rely on authentic data, to proceed in an interdisciplinary way, to assume a cultural and “common sense” basis for coherence (cf. Linde 1993: 192ff), to relate micro-linguistic to macro-linguistic (e.g. socio-cultural) issues, and to focus on the powerful coherence-securing role of such (sometimes long neglected) means as gestures (cf. McNeill & Levy 1993), discourse topics, collocational orientation.

Discourse topic and the various procedures of handling it (introducing, changing, shifting, digressing from it) are prevalent and strong means of (re-)creating coherence (cf. Geluykens 1999). In many societies, speakers/writers are expected to stick to a topic. Taking up social space is only justified if an utterance is evidently a contribution to the topic at hand, i.e. an acceptable answer to “the generic question […] ‘why that
The relationship between discourse topic and overarching communicative goals is one of the stubborn problems that future research has to address. Collocations based on shared polarity, following from the node’s negative or positive semantic prosody, contribute to coherence because they are likely to recur in the local as well as global environment. The semantic orientation of the individual collocation is then not regarded as a single occurrence with no bearing on context but rather as indicating the overall tenor of the discourse, i.e. its general semantic orientation. On account of such predictive force, they are regularly instrumental in dispersing meaning in discourse (cf. Bublitz 1996).

Future research will also have to deal with unsolved problems such as how means of securing coherence (and ways of describing them) vary from spoken to written language, from genre to genre, from text type to text type (cf., e.g., Fritz 1999 on coherence in hypertext), from one society to another, from earlier to later stages of a language (the diachronic perspective), and from earlier to later stages of acquiring a language (both as a native speaker and a foreign language learner).

References


1. Definitions

The terms Critical Linguistics (CL) and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) have been frequently used interchangeably. Recently, however, the term CDA seems to have been preferred and is being used to denote the theory formerly identified as CL. Thus, I will continue to use CDA exclusively in this paper (see Anthonissen 2001 for an extensive discussion of these terms). The roots of CDA lie in classical Rhetoric, Text linguistics and Sociolinguistics, as well as in Applied Linguistics and Pragmatics (see also Wodak & Meyer 2009; Fairclough 2003; Wodak 2004, 2007; Renkema 2004; Blommaert 2005).

Deconstructing the label of this research program – I view CDA basically as a research program, the reasons for which I will explain below – entails that we have to define what CDA means when employing the terms “critical” and “discourse”. Michael Billig (2003) has clearly pointed to the fact that CDA has become an established academic discipline with the same rituals and institutional practices as all other academic disciplines. Ironically, he asks the question whether this might mean that CDA has become “uncritical” – or if the use of acronyms such as CDA might serve the same purposes as in other traditional, non-critical disciplines; namely to exclude outsiders and to mystify the functions and intentions of the research. I cannot answer Billig’s questions extensively in this chapter. But I do believe that he points to potentially very fruitful and necessary debates for CDA.

It is necessary to stress that CDA has never been and has never attempted to be or to provide one single or specific theory. Neither is one specific methodology characteristic of research in CDA. Quite the contrary; studies in CDA are multifarious, derived from quite different theoretical backgrounds, oriented towards different data and methodologies. Researchers in CDA also rely on a variety of grammatical approaches. The definitions of the terms “discourse”, “critical”, “ideology”, “power” and so on are also manifold. Thus, any criticism of CDA should always specify which research or researcher they relate to. I myself would suggest using the notion of a “school” for CDA, or of a program, which many researchers find useful and to which they can relate. This program or set of principles has changed over the years (see Fairclough & Wodak 1997).
Such a heterogeneous school might be confusing for some; on the other hand, it allows for open discussions and debates, for changes in the definition of aims and goals, and for innovation. This heterogeneity of methodological and theoretical approaches that can be found in this field would tend to confirm Van Dijk’s point that CDA and CL “are at most a shared perspective on doing linguistic, semiotic or discourse analysis” (Van Dijk 1993b: 131). Below, I summarize some of these principles, which are shared by most researchers.

Most importantly, CDA sees “language as social practice” (Fairclough & Wodak 1997), and considers the “context of language use” to be crucial (Wodak 2000, 2008; Benke 2000):

“CDA sees discourse – language use in speech and writing – as a form of ‘social practice’. Describing discourse as social practice implies a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s) and social structure(s), which frame it: The discursive event is shaped by them, but it also shapes them. That is, discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially conditioned – it constitutes situations, objects of knowledge, and the social identities of and relationships between people and groups of people. It is constitutive both in the sense that it helps to sustain and reproduce the social status quo, and in the sense that it contributes to transforming it. Since discourse is so socially consequential, it gives rise to important issues of power. Discursive practices may have major ideological effects – that is, they can help produce and reproduce unequal power relations between (for instance) social classes, women and men, and ethnic/cultural majorities and minorities through the ways in which they represent things and position people.”

(Fairclough & Wodak 1997: 258)

Of course, the term “discourse” is used very differently by different researchers and also in different academic cultures. In the German and Central European context, a distinction is made between “text” and “discourse”, relating to the tradition in text linguistics as well as to rhetoric (see Brünner & Graefen 1994; Wodak 1996 for summaries). In the English speaking world, “discourse” is often used both for written and oral texts (see Schiffrin 1994). Other researchers distinguish between different levels of abstractness: Lemke (1995) defines “text” as the concrete realization of abstract forms of knowledge (“discourse”), thus adhering to a more Foucauldian approach (see also Jäger et al. 2001).

The shared perspective and program of CDA relate to the term “critical”, which in the work of some “critical linguists” could be traced to the influence of the Frankfurt School and Jürgen Habermas (Thompson 1988: 71ff; Fay 1987: 203; Anthonissen 2001). Nowadays this concept is conventionally used in a broader sense, denoting, as Krings argues, the practical linking of “social and political engagement” with “a sociologically informed construction of society,” (Krings et al. 1973: 808). Hence, “critique” is essentially making visible the interconnectedness of things” (Fairclough 1995: 747; see also Connerton 1976: 11–39). The reference to the contribution of Critical Theory
to the understanding of CDA and the notions of “critical” and “ideology” are of particular importance. (See Anthonissen 2001 and Chilton et al. 2010 for an extensive discussion of this issue)¹

Critical theories, thus also CDA, are afforded special standing as guides for human action. They are aimed at producing “enlightenment and emancipation”. Such theories seek not only to describe and explain, but also to root out a particular kind of delusion. Even with differing concepts of ideology, critical theory seeks to create awareness in agents of their own needs and interests. This was, of course, also taken up by Pierre Bourdieu’s concepts of “violence symbolique” and “méconnaissance” (Bourdieu 1989). One of the aims of CDA is to “demystify” discourses by deciphering ideologies.

In agreement with its Critical Theory predecessors, CDA emphasizes the need for interdisciplinary work in order to gain a proper understanding of how language functions in constituting and transmitting knowledge, in organizing social institutions or in exercising power (see van Dijk 2008; Graham 2002; Lemke 2003; Martin 2002; Gee 2004; Blommaert 2005; Wodak 2009).

An important perspective in CDA related to the notion of “power” is that it is very rare that a text is the work of any one person. In texts discursive differences are negotiated; they are governed by differences in power which is in part encoded in and determined by discourse and by genre. Therefore texts are often sites of struggle in that they show traces of differing discourses and ideologies contending and struggling for dominance.

Thus, defining features of CDA are its concern with power as a central condition in social life, and its efforts to develop a theory of language, which incorporates this as a major premise. Not only the notion of struggles for power and control, but also the intertextuality and recontextualization of competing discourses in various public spaces and genres are closely attended to (Iedema 1999, 2003; Muntigl et al. 2000; Wodak & Koller 2008). Power is about relations of difference, and particularly about the effects of differences in social structures. The constant unity of language and other social matters ensures that language is entwined in social power in a number of ways: language indexes power and expresses power; language is involved where there is contention over and a challenge to power. Power does not derive from language, but language can be used to challenge power, to subvert it, to alter distributions of

¹ In the 1960’s, many scholars adopted a more critical perspective in language studies. Among the first was the French scholar Pêcheux (1982 [1975]), whose approach traced its roots to the work of Russian theorists Bakhtin (1981) and Volosinov (1973), both of whom had postulated an integration of language and social processes in the 1930’s. The term itself was apparently coined by Jacob Mey (1974).
power in the short and the long term. Language provides a finely articulated vehicle for differences in power in hierarchical social structures.

CDA might thus be defined as being fundamentally interested in analyzing opaque as well as transparent structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control when these are manifested in language. In other words, CDA aims to investigate critically social inequality as it is expressed, constituted, legitimized, and so on, by language use (or in discourse). Most critical discourse analysts would thus endorse Habermas’ claim that “language is also a medium of domination and social force. It serves to legitimize relations of organized power. Insofar as the legitimizations of power relations, …, are not articulated, …, language is also ideological” (Habermas 1967: 259).

2. Historical note

In the 1960s and 1970s, many scholars adopted a more critical perspective in language studies. Among the first was the French scholar Pêcheux (1982), whose approach traced its roots to the work of Russian theorists Bakhtin and Vološinov, who had postulated an integration of language and social processes in the 1930s. In the late 1970s, a group of Hallidayan linguists at the University of East Anglia began applying the term ‘critical linguistics’ (CL) in their research on language use in different institutions (see e.g. Fowler et al. 1979; Kress & Hodge 1979). Kress and Hodge assumed strong and pervasive connections between linguistic structure and social structure, claiming that discourse cannot exist without social meanings. The authors reacted strongly against contemporary trends in pragmatics (e.g. speech act theory) and Labovian quantitative sociolinguistics. Since 1979, this general approach has been refined, broadened, changed and re-applied by other linguists coming from very different traditions, many of whom believe that the relationship between language and the social, because of its complex and multifaceted character, requires interdisciplinary research. Scholars from backgrounds including sociolinguistics, formal linguistics, social psychology and literary studies have contributed to the growth of the tradition, and have directed CL research into subject domains such as racism, ethnicity, gender studies, political oratory, etc.

3. Principles of CL

Some of the basic questions informing critical linguistic research include: How does the naturalization of ideology come about? Which discursive strategies legitimate control or ‘naturalize’ the social order? How power is linguistically expressed? How are consensus, acceptance and legitimacy of dominance manufactured? Who has access to which instruments of power and control? Who is discriminated against in
what way? Who understands a certain discourse in what way with what results? In order to be able to answer these very complex and broadly formulated questions, we might suggest the following general characteristics, aims and principles as being constitutive of CDA, in general.

1. *The approach is interdisciplinary.* Problems in our societies are too complex to be studied from a single perspective. This entails different dimensions of interdisciplinarity: the theories draw on neighbouring disciplines and try to integrate these theories. Teamwork consists of different researchers from different traditionally defined disciplines working together. Lastly, the methodologies are adapted to the data under investigation.

2. *The approach is problem-oriented, rather than focused on specific linguistic items.* Complex social problems are the items of research, such as “racism, identity, social change”, which, of course, are and could be studied from manifold perspectives. The CDA dimension, i.e. discourse and text analysis, is one of many possible approaches.

3. *The theories as well as the methodologies are eclectic,* i.e. theories and methods are integrated which are adequate for an understanding and explanation of the object under investigation.

4. *The study usually incorporates fieldwork and ethnography to explore the object under investigation (study from the inside) as a precondition for any further analysis and theorizing.* This approach makes it possible to avoid “fitting the data to illustrate a theory” and “cherry-picking”. Rather, we deal with bottom-up and top-down approaches at the same time.

5. *The approach is abductive: a constant movement back and forth between theory and empirical data is necessary.* This is a prerequisite for principle 4.

6. *Multiple genres and multiple public spaces are studied; intertextual and interdiscursive relationships are investigated.* Recontextualization is one of the most important processes in connecting genres as well as topics and argumentation patterns.

7. *The historical and broader socio-political contexts should be analyzed* and integrated into the interpretation of discourses and texts. The notion of “change” (see principle 6) has become constitutive for the study of text and discourse.

8. *The categories and tools for the analysis are defined in accordance with all these steps and procedures and also with the specific problem under investigation.* This entails some eclecticism, as well as pragmatism. Different approaches in CDA use different grammatical theories.

9. *Grand Theories might serve as a foundation; in the specific analysis, Middle-Range Theories serve the aims better.* The problem-oriented approach entails the use and testing of middle-range theories. Grand Theories result in large gaps between
structure/context and linguistic realizations (although some gaps must necessar-
ily remain unbridgeable).

10. Practice and application are aimed at. The results should be made available to
experts in different fields and, as in a second stage, be applied, with the goal of
possibly changing certain discursive and social practices.

4. Trends

4.1 Social Semiotics

As early as 1970, M.A.K. Halliday had stressed the relationship between the grammati-
cal system and the social and personal needs that language is required to serve. Halliday
distinguished three interconnected meta-functions of language: (1) the ideational func-
tion through which language lends structure to experience. The ideational structure
has a dialectical relationship with social structure, both reflecting and influencing it.
(2) The interpersonal function which accounts for relationships between the partici-
pants, and (3) the textual function which accounts for coherence and cohesion in texts.

Gunter Kress was heavily influenced by the Hallidayan school of thought. His
work serves as an example of the original tradition which first labelled itself CL. He
has developed his model and methodology ever since, shifting over the years to a
more social-semiotic mode of working. Kress is concerned with the central notion of
the sign as an indissoluble conjunct of meaning and form. In his own words, he wants
“to connect the specificities of semiotic forms, in any medium, with the specificities
of social organizations and social histories” (Kress 1993: 176f). This theory in turn has
the effect that language is seen as a semiotic system in which meaning is made directly,
rather than as a linguistic system and in which meaning is indirectly associated with
linguistic form. Kress’ work has displayed a growing interest in the description, analy-
sis and theorizing of other semiotic media, in particular visual media (e.g. Kress &
van Leeuwen 1990). Kress concentrated on the ‘political economy’ of representational
media: that is, an attempt to understand how various societies value different modes
of representation, and how they use these different modes of representation. A central
aspect of this work is the attempt to understand the formation of the individual human
being as a social individual in response to available ‘representational resources’. His
most recent position as part of an institute on educational research has oriented much
of Kress’ efforts into thinking about the content of educational curricula in terms of
representational resources and their use by individuals in their constant transfor-
mation of their subjectivities, the process usually called ‘learning’. One by-product of
this research interest has been his increasing involvement in overtly political issues,
including the politics of culture.
The theory on multimodality put forward by Kress & van Leeuwen (1996) should be mentioned here, as this provides a useful framework for considering the communicative potential of visual devices in the media. Van Leeuwen studied film and television production as well as Hallidayan linguistics. His principal publications are concerned with topics such as the intonation of disc jockeys and newsreaders, the language of television interviews and newspaper reporting, and more recently, the semiotics of visual communication and music. Van Leeuwen developed a most influential methodological tool: the Actors Analysis (1993, 2009). This taxonomy allows for the analysis of (both written and oral) data, related to agency in a much differentiated way. The taxonomy has been widely applied in data analysis.

Van Leeuwen also focused on other areas of visual communication, especially the semiotics of handwriting and typography and the question of colour. He is increasingly moving away from using a systemic-functional approach as the single model and feels that it is important for social semiotics to realise that semiotic discourses and methods are linked to semiotic practices, and that grammars are one type of semiotic discourse which is linked to a specific kind of control over specific kinds of semiotic practices. To give an example of a very different type of discourse, histories of art and design focus on the semiotic innovations of specific individuals in their historical contexts, rather than on a synchronous approach to semiotic systems. However, they, too, are linked to the ways in which production and consumption is regulated in that area. It is important for social semiotics to provide models of semiotic practice that are appropriate to the practices they model, and as different semiotic practices are very differently organised, it is not possible to apply a single model to all. All of this is closely related to the role and status of semiotic practices in society, and this is currently undergoing change as a result of the fact that it is increasingly global corporations and semiotic technologies, rather than national institutions, which regulate semiotic production and consumption.

This emphasis on regulatory practices has led to a research approach in three stages, starting with the analysis of a particular category of texts, cultural artefacts or communicative events, then moving to a second set of texts (and/or cultural artefacts and/or communicative events), namely those that seek to regulate the production and consumption of the first set, and finally moving to a third set of texts, namely actual instances of producing or consuming texts (etc) belonging to the first set. For instance, in a study of baby toys, van Leeuwen and his team analysed the toys and their semiotic potential, as objects-for-use and as cultural icons, then studied discourses seeking to influence how they are used, e.g. relevant sections of parenting books and magazines, toy advertisements, texts on toy packaging etc., and finally transcribed and analysed videos of mothers and babies using these same toys together (Caldas-Coulthard and van Leeuwen 2002). This type of work leads to a particular relation between discourse analysis, ethnography, history and theory in which these disciplines are no longer
contributing to the whole through some kind of indefinable synergy or triangulation, but are complementary in quite specific ways.

Jay Lemke and Ron and Suzie Scollon’s research also have to be mentioned in this context. In the last few years Lemke’s work has emphasized multimedia semiotics, multiple timescales, and hypertexts/traversals. He extended his earlier work on embedded ideologies in social communication from analysis of verbal text to integration of verbal text with visual images and other presentational media, with a particular focus on evaluative meanings. This work emphasizes the implicit value systems and their connections to institutional and personal identity.

The work on multiple timescales is an extension of earlier work on ecological-social systems as complex dynamical systems with semiotic cultures. It is very important in considering all aspects of social dynamics to look across multiple timescales, i.e. how processes and practices which take place at relatively faster rates are organized within the framework of more slowly changing features of social institutions and cultures. This is a promising practical approach to the so-called micro/macro problem, both theoretically and methodologically (Lemke 2000, 2001). His more recent work has combined both these themes to develop the idea that although we tell our lives as narratives, we experience them as hypertexts. Building on research on the semantic resources of hypertext as a medium, he proposed that post-modern lifestyles are increasingly liberated from particular institutional roles and that we tend to move, on multiple timescales, from involvement in one institution to another, creating new kinds of meaning, less bound to fixed genres and registers, as we “surf” across channels, websites, and lived experiences. This is seen as a new historical development, not supplanting institutions, but building up new socio-cultural possibilities on and over them.

In all this work, Lemke uses critical social semiotics as an extension of critical discourse analysis, combined with models of the material base of emergent social phenomena. His concern is with social and cultural change: how it happens, how it is constrained, and the ways in which it is expectably unpredictable.

The problem Ron and Suzie Scollon have addressed in their work (which Suzie Scollon is continuing after Ron’s death in December 2008) is to build a formal theoretical and a practical link between discourse and action. It is an activist position that uses tools and strategies of engaged discourse analysis and thus requires a formal analysis of how its own actions can be accomplished through discourse and its analysis. The problems in developing this framework are that action is always multiple both in the sense that there are always simultaneous parallel and interacting actions at any moment we chose to analyze as well as in the sense that these multiple actions operate across differing timescales so that it is not at all clear that we can see ‘higher level’ actions as simple composites of ‘lower level’ actions. The linkages are more complex. Jay Lemke’s work is, of course, also an important resource in studying this problem.
Ron Scollon’s work elaborates the idea developed in *Mediated Discourse: The Nexus of Practice* (2001). This suggests that practice in general is most usefully understood as many separate practices which are linked in nexus of practice. The relations between discourse and a nexus of practice are many and complex and rarely direct. He tried to open up and explicate these linkages through what could be called nexus analysis. This work was integrated in two projects. In the first which Ron and Suzie Scollon have written about in *Discourses in Place: Language in the Material World* (2002) is a kind of ‘geosemiotics’ which is the integration of social interactionist theory (including, of course, all forms of spoken discourse), visual semiotics, and ‘place semiotics’, especially the built environment. Their interest in this work has been to theorize the link between indexicality in language (and discourse and semiotics more generally) and the indexable in the world. This could also be understood as theorizing the link between producers of communications and the material world in which those communications are placed as a necessary element of their semiosis.

4.2 ‘Orders of discourse’ and Foucauldian poststructuralism

Norman Fairclough (1985, 1989, 1992, 2003) sees the value of CDA as a method to be used alongside others in research on social and cultural change, and as a resource in struggles against exploitation and domination (1993:133–134). Fairclough is mainly concerned with the study of power and institutional discourse, stressing the intertextuality of different forms of social practice, like for example the relationships between the social practices ‘education systems’ and ‘advertising’. In his view, language use is always simultaneously constitutive of social identities, social relations and systems of knowledge and belief. Like Kress and van Leeuwen, Fairclough also relies on Hallidayan linguistics for his analysis of discursive events.

Conventions underlying discursive events are termed *orders of discourse* (inter-discourse) in this framework. The order of discourse of some social domain is the totality of its discursive practices, and the relationships (of complementarity, inclusion/exclusion, opposition) between them. The order of discourse of a society is thus the set of these more ‘local’ orders of discourse, and the relationships between them (e.g. the relationship between the orders of discourse of the school and of home). The boundaries and insulations between and within orders of discourse may be points of conflict and contestation, open to being weakened or strengthened, as a part of wider social conflicts and struggles (1993:135ff). In his investigation of several examples of university discourses on the background of an extensive analysis of the contemporary ‘post-traditional’ society, Fairclough claims that a new discourse, a consumer culture discourse, influences many other domains, thus also the universities. Traditional genres, like the *curricula vitae* are suddenly created in the mode of advertisements
(the ‘marketization of public discourse’). These changes naturally have an impact on the institutions, on hierarchy structures and on the identities of scholars.

Later, Chouliaraki & Fairclough (1999) explain and elaborate some advances in CDA, showing not only how the analytical framework for researching language in relation to power and ideology developed, but also how CDA is useful in disclosing the discursive nature of much contemporary social and cultural change. Particularly the language of the mass media is scrutinized as a site of power, of struggle and also as a site where language is often apparently transparent. Media institutions often purport to be neutral, in that they provide space for public discourse, reflect states of affairs disinterestedly, and give the perceptions and arguments of the newsmakers. Fairclough shows the fallacy of such assumptions, and illustrates the mediating and constructing role of the media with a variety of examples.

Fairclough has also been concerned with the “Language of New Labour” (2000). His work has centered around the theme of “Language in New Capitalism” – focusing on language/discourse aspects of the contemporary restructuring and ‘re-scaling’ (shift in relations between global, regional, national and local) of capitalism. He has also worked with sociological theorists Bob Jessop and Andrew Sayer in theorizing language (‘semiosis’) within a critical realist philosophy of (social) science (Fairclough, Jessop & Sayer 2002).

Phil Graham elaborates the research on the problems of New Capitalism (Graham 2002, 2003a, b). The historical investigation of hortatory genres compares the emergence and struggles between Church, “Divine Right” Royalties, and secular forces over legitimate uses of the sermon form in Western Europe between the tenth and fourteenth centuries with contemporary struggles over genres that are used to motivate people on a mass scale. The main focus of the study is to explore and explain the relationships between new media, new genres, institutions, and social change at a macro level. The perspective is primarily historical, political-economic, relational, and dynamic. Genres are produced, textured, and transformed within institutional contexts over long periods of time. In turn, institutions invest years – in some cases, millennia – developing, maintaining, and adapting generic forms to changing social conditions in order to maintain or to gain power. Graham believes that at certain times in history, specific genres become very effective for motivating or manipulating large sections of society. Because genres are developed within institutions, and thus within the realms of vested interests, they display inherent axiological biases (since about 15 years, quite a few critical discourse analysts have become more and more concerned with the link between history, historical sources and discourse theory; see also Heer et al. 2008; Martin & Wodak 2003; Blommaert 2005; Ensink & Sauer 2003; Thiesmeyer 2004; Flowerdew 2002; Reisigl & Wodak 2001, 2009; Wodak et al. 1990, 1994, 1999, 2001 and below).
4.3 The socio-cognitive model

The main representative of this approach is Teun van Dijk, most of whose critical work focuses on the (re)production of ethnic prejudices and racism in discourse and communication. Thus, earlier studies examined the ways white Dutch and Californians talk about minorities (van Dijk 1984, 1987). Besides identifying various structures of such talk, the study also aimed at reconstructing ethnic attitudes and ideologies from everyday conversation. An analysis of ‘frequent’ topics, for instance, suggests what speakers ‘have on their minds’, or as he explains it, “what the hierarchies are of their personal mental models of ethnic events as well as the structures of ethnic attitudes”. The overall strategy of talk about “Others”, according to van Dijk, combines strategies of positive self-presentation with negative other-presentation.

In another study, van Dijk examined the role of the news media in the reproduction of racism (van Dijk 1991). Combining both quantitative and qualitative analyses of thousands of news reports in the British and Dutch press, van Dijk concluded that the most frequent topics on racism in the press corresponded to prevailing ethnic prejudices expressed in everyday talk: immigration as invasion, immigrants and refugees as spongers, crime, violence and problematic cultural differences. These pervasive topics were also reflected in the style, rhetoric, and the local semantic moves of news reports, ‘Op Ed’ articles and editorials, especially in the conservative and tabloid press.

In another book on discourse and racism, van Dijk investigated a hypothesis which increasingly suggested itself in the previous studies, namely, that the elites play a crucial role in the reproduction of racism (van Dijk 1993a). In an analysis of parliamentary debates, corporate discourse, textbooks and media, van Dijk claims that in many ways the elites preformulate and thus instigate popular racism. Among the many strategies of what he describes as elite racism are the consistent denial of racist beliefs and the attribution of racism to others: people in other countries, people from earlier times, or poor whites in the older cities.

van Dijk has also turned to more general questions of abuse of power and the reproduction of inequality through ideologies. In his view, which integrates elements from his earlier studies on cognition, those who control most dimensions of discourse (preparation, setting, participants, topics, style, rhetoric, interaction, etc.) have the most power. He argues that no direct relation can or should be constructed between discourse structures and social structures, but that they are always mediated by the interface of personal and social cognition. Cognition, according to van Dijk, is the missing link of many studies in CDA, which fail to show how societal structures influence discourse structures and precisely how societal structures are in turn enacted, instituted, legitimated, confirmed or challenged by text and talk.
More recently, Teun van Dijk has taken up a more detailed study of the role of knowledge in discourse. Another topic in his research is a new approach to the study of context. One of the main arguments of this research is that there is much interest in context and contextualization, but hardly any in theory of context. Van Dijk proposes to define context in terms of context models in episodic memory, that is, in terms of subjective, dynamic representations of the ongoing communicative event and situation. It is these context models that, in van Dijk's view, control all discourse and communication, and especially all dimensions of discourse that adapt it to the current situation – as it is understood by the participants – such as style and rhetoric. (Van Dijk 2001, 2008, 2009).

4.4 Discourse-Historical approach

Ruth Wodak (now Lancaster) and her group in Vienna base their model on sociolinguistics in the Bernsteinian tradition, and on ideas of the Frankfurt school, especially those of Jürgen Habermas. Wodak conducted studies on institutional communication and speech barriers in court, in schools and in hospital clinics (Wodak 1996), and later, she has focused on sexism, and contemporary antisemitism and racism in settings of various degrees of formality as well as on national and trans-national identity politics (Krzyżanowski & Wodak 2008; Wodak 2009). One of the group’s major aims is the practical application of critical research, e.g. in guidelines for non-discriminatory language use towards women, in guidelines for doctors on how to communicate more effectively with their patients, and in providing expert opinions for courts on anti-Semitic and racist language use by journalists in newspapers.

In an interdisciplinary study of post-war anti-Semitism in Austria completed in 1990, Wodak and her colleagues devised what they have termed the discourse historical approach. The distinctive feature of this approach is its attempt to integrate systematically all available background information in the analysis and interpretation of the many layers of a written or spoken text. The study in which and for which this approach was developed attempted to trace in detail the constitution of an anti-Semitic stereotyped image as it emerged in public discourse in the 1986 Austrian presidential campaign of Kurt Waldheim. The study addressed the problem of ‘anti-Semitic language behavior’ in contemporary Austria, in other words, linguistic manifestations of prejudices towards Jews. Wodak et al. (1990) were able to show that the context of the discourse had a significant impact on the structure, function, and content of the anti-Semitic utterances (see also Reisigl & Wodak 2001; Wodak & Reisigl 2002; Wodak 2004b; Pelinka & Wodak 2002; Heer et al. 2008).

Several other studies on prejudice and racism have led the group in Vienna to more general and theoretical considerations on the form and content of racist discourse
about foreigners, indigenous minorities, immigrant workers etc. Although the forms of racist and prejudiced discourse may be similar, the contents vary according to the stigmatized groups as well as to the settings in which certain linguistic realizations become possible. In comparing anti-Semitic with racist discourse, for example, Wodak & Matouschek (1993) suggest that the norms and taboos controlling the utterances about foreigners and Jews differ, depending on the targeted discriminated group and the specific historical traditions and socio-political contexts of the speakers and discourses. In the anonymous contexts of conversations tape-recorded on the street, sexist, racist and anti-Semitic prejudice stories were interwoven and expressed in the same discursive event, whereas in official discourse (print and electronic media, speeches of politicians) explicit anti-Semitic utterances are taboo, yet explicit racist remarks towards foreigners are not. The discourse-historical approach is designed to enable the analysis of indirect prejudiced utterances, as well as to identify and expose the codes and allusions contained in prejudiced discourse. Wodak & Van Dijk (2000) were able to study and compare parliamentary discourses in six European countries on issues of immigration (see also Blommaert & Verschueren 1998; Krzyżanowski & Wodak 2009). This study illustrates overriding discourses in the European Union on the one hand, and context-dependent, historically rooted arguments on the other, when immigration and Human Rights issues are discussed.

More recently, Wodak has been concerned with investigating identity politics and patterns of decision-making in EU organizations (Wodak 2009). Fieldwork in European Union organizations and at the European Convention have allowed insight in “doing politics” “behind closed doors” (Muntigl et al. 2000; Wodak & Weiss 2005; Krzyżanowski 2005; Oberhuber 2005; Oberhuber et al. 2005; Wodak et al. 1999). In this research, together with sociologists and political scientists, models were proposed to explain the context-dependent tensions and contradictions which necessarily arise in such a historically complex “entity” as Europe. EU officials were interviewed, policy documents analyzed, political speeches on “a vision of Europe” collected, and media reporting on EU events confronted with the in-side view of EU organizations. The analysis of various genres illustrates the recontextualization of salient arguments, metaphors, and slogans in transnational and national contexts.

4.5 Lexicometry

The combination of political science and political philosophy (predominantly under a strong Marxist influence) on the one hand and French linguistics on the other hand is typical of French critical discourse analysis. Basically, two different approaches may be distinguished.
The first is ‘political lexicometry’, a computer-aided statistical approach to political lexicon, developed at the École Normale Supérieure at Saint-Cloud. A text corpus (e.g. texts of the French Communist Party) is prepared. Texts are then compared on the basis of relative frequency (cf: Bonnafous & Tournier 1995). One study shows, for example, how the relative frequency of the words ‘travailleur’ and ‘salarié’ varies significantly between French trade unions, reflecting different political ideologies, and how the frequency changes over time. (Groupe de Saint-Cloud 1982; Bonnafous & Tournier 1995).

Althusser’s theory on ideology and Foucault’s theory were major points of reference for the second tendency in French discourse analysis, notably the work of Michel Pêcheux (1982) (see above). Discourse is the place where language and ideology meet, and discourse analysis is the analysis of ideological dimensions of language use, and of the materialization in language of ideology. Both the words and the meanings of words vary according to the class struggle position from which they are used – according to the ‘discursive formation’ they are located within. For instance, the word ‘struggle’ itself is particularly associated with a working class political voice, and its meaning in that discursive formation is different from its meanings when used from other positions. Pêcheux’s main focus was political discourse in France, especially the relationship between social-democratic and communist discourse within left political discourse. Pêcheux stresses the ideological effects of discursive formations in positioning people as social subjects. Echoing Althusser, he suggests that people are placed in the ‘imaginary’ position of sources of their discourse, whereas actually their discourse and indeed they themselves are effects of their ideological positioning. The sources and processes of their own positioning are hidden from people. They are typically not aware of speaking/writing from within a particular discursive formation. Moreover, the discursive formations within which people are positioned are themselves shaped by the ‘complex whole in dominance’ of discursive formations, which Pêcheux calls ‘interdiscourse’ – but people are not aware of that shaping. Radical change in the way people are positioned in discourse can only come from political revolution.

Pêcheux and his colleagues changed their views on this and other issues in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Pêcheux 1988; Maingueneau 1987). The influence of Foucault increased, as did that of Bakhtin. Studies began to emphasize the complex mixing of discursive formations in texts, and the heterogeneity and ambivalence of texts (see, for example, Courtine 1981). Some other French researchers investigate detailed rhetorical patterns, for example in the presidential campaigns of 1988 and 1995 (Groupe de Saint Cloud 1995). Also the influence of Anglo-Saxon pragmatics is prominent, and that of the French linguist Benveniste (1974), whose work on ‘énonciation’ focused on deictic phenomena. In this framework, Pierre Achard produced detailed accounts of the political functioning of a very wide range of text types (Achard 1995). (See Wodak & de Cillia 2006 for more details).
4.6  “Lesarten” approach

National Socialist language first became the object of critical philological observations by Viktor Klemperer (Klemperer 1975). Utz Maas, however, was the first linguist and discourse-analyst to subject the every-day linguistic practice of National Socialism to an in-depth analysis: he used NS texts to exemplify his approach of “Lesweisenanalyse” (Maas 1984, 1989a, 1989b). His historical “argumentation analysis”, based on the theories of Michel Foucault, demonstrates how NS discourses were determined by the German society and NS ideology, i.e. in what may be termed “a social practice”. In his analysis of language practices during the National Socialist regime between 1932 and 1938 he illustrates how the discursive practices of society in Germany were impacted by the NS discourse characterized by social-revolutionist undertones. Nazi discourse had superseded almost all forms of language (practices), a fact that made it difficult for an individual who did not want to cherish the tradition of an unworldly Romanticism to use language in a critical-reflective way.

Discourse is basically understood as the result of “collusion”: the conditions of the political, social and linguistic practice impose themselves practically behind the back of the subjects while the actors do not guess the rules of the game (cf. also Bourdieu’s ‘violence symbolique’). Discourse analysis identifies the rules, which make a text, for example, a fascist text. In the same way as grammar characterizes the structure of sentences, discourse rules characterize utterances/texts that are acceptable within a certain practice. The focus is not on National Socialist language per se, but the aim is to record and analyze the spectrum of linguistic relations based on a number of texts dealing with various spheres of life. These texts represent a complicated network of similarities, which overlap and intersect. Therefore it is also important to do justice to the “polyphony” of texts resulting from the fact that societal contradictions are inscribed into texts. Texts from diverse social and political contexts (cooking recipes, local municipal provisions on agriculture, texts by NS politicians, but also by critics of this ideology, who are ultimately involved in the dominant discourse) are analyzed in a sample representative of NS discourse.

The method of “reading analysis” proposed by Maas may be described as a concentric hermeneutic approach to the corpus in five systematic steps. (A) Statement of the self-declared content of the text, (B) description of the “staging” (Inszenierung) of the content, (C) analysis of the sense and meaning of the “staging”, (D) provisional summery of the analysis, and (E) discussion of competing readings. (Maas 1984: 18) In this context it should be stressed that competing readings of texts may result from disclosing the difference between self-declared and latent content. Applications of this method (Titscher et al. 1998: 232) can be found in Januschek’s analysis of Jörg Haider’s allusions to NS discourse (Januschek 1992) and in Sauer’s analysis of texts of the Nazi occupation of the Netherlands (Sauer 1989, 1995).
The Duisburg School of CDA (Jäger 1993, 1999, 2001) draws on Foucault’s notion of discourse. According to (Jäger 1999:116) discourse is “materiality sui generis” and discourse theory is a combination of the “materialistic cultural theory”, on the one hand, and Alexej N. Leontjev’s “speech activity theory” (Leontjev 1984) and Jürgen Link’s “collective symbolism” (Link 1988), on the other hand. As institutionalized and conventionalized speech modes, discourses express societal power relations, which in turn are influenced by discourses. This “overall discourse” of society, which could be visualised as a “diskursives Gewimmel” (literally: “discursive swarming”), becomes comprehensible in different discourse strands (composed of discourse fragments on the same subject) at different discourse levels (science, politics, media, and so on). Every discourse is historically embedded, and has repercussions on current and future discourse. In addition to the above levels, the structure of discourse may be dissected into: discursive events and discursive context, discourse position, overall societal discourse and interwoven discourses; themes, bundles of discourse strands, history, present and future of discourse strands. Discourse Analysis makes a contribution to (media) impact research, as it analyzes the impact of discourse on individual and collective consciousness. Individual discourse fragments are selected from the archived material for concrete analysis. These fragments are analyzed in five steps (institutional framework, text “surface”, linguistic-rhetorical means, programmatic-ideological messages, and interpretation), for which a range of concrete questions regarding the text is formulated (Jäger 1999:175–187). The uniformity of the hegemonic discourse implies that analysis requires only a “relatively small number of discourse fragments”.

5. Conclusion

The field of CDA is developing fast, and the ‘critical’ perspective is penetrating into many fields of investigation of language usage. The critical dimension of linguistic pragmatics was forcefully advocated by Jacob Mey (1985), and the lack of critical awareness in traditional sociolinguistics exposed by Williams (1992). In the meantime critical approaches to specific topics in language studies have emerged (see e.g. Meeuwis ed. 1994 on intercultural communication) and more and more researchers are arguing that the study of language should be based on a sound socio-political intellectual basis allowing for better analyses of power in language and language usage (see Chilton et al. 2010; Heller 1988; Woolard 1985; Rickford 1986; Meeuwis & Blommaert 1994). CDA is also developing into interdisciplinary research domains par excellence, and thus offers interesting perspectives for integrated research on language in society.
References

Critical Linguistics and Critical Discourse Analysis


Énonciation

French pragmatic approach(es)

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1. Introduction

French enunciation¹ theory is not a unified theory, but represents several different diversified approaches to pragmatic questions. It developed out of French structuralism, from the heritage of Saussure and grammatical traditions, whereas pragmatics in the Anglo-American tradition grew out of analytical philosophy and logic (Fuchs 1981). It bears resemblances to other pragmatically oriented theories (see, for instance, Banks 2004), but presents an original view on language use. First of all, énonciation is not a modern discovery, but rather a rediscovery of old problematics of language concentrating mainly on issues that concern language-internal systems, such as deixis and modality (Fuchs 1981: 35). Basically, enunciation deals with utterance-level meaning from the perspective of different linguistic elements. In other words, the activity of the speaker is the focus: on the one hand there are traces or indices left by the speaker in the utterance; on the other hand there is the relationship the speaker maintains with her/his interlocutor (Dubois 1969). Enunciation is understood as an act of producing an utterance as an individual instance of language use in a specific situation (Benveniste 1974: 80).

In this article, the terms enunciation theory and enunciation linguistics are occasionally used. They reflect the French tradition and are literal equivalencies of French terms. But since our perspective is a pragmatic one, we consider it appropriate to also use the terms enunciative pragmatics and French pragmatics.

The term énonciation itself derives from Latin enuntio, which means disclosing, verbal expression or more concretely a phrase. In logic it refers to assertion and in

¹ Most of the translations of the French linguistic terminology used in this article are based on the recent literature or articles on the subject. However, in some cases this has not been possible and the authors have decided on a different type of translation or created a new equivalency in their use of translated terms. All the examples have been translated by the authors.
grammar to pronunciation. There are three basic concepts: *enunciation*, the act of producing an utterance, or for short, the act of uttering; *énoncé*, the product of an act of uttering, i.e. an utterance; and *enunciator*, speaker, locutor or utterer depending on the theoretical approach to enunciation. In other words: an act, its product and its producer. In this theory, the basic view of language is that it is communicative: its object of study is *language in use* from the point of view of the *speaker* – how the speaker, or rather, the speaking subject expresses her/his subjectivity in spatio-temporal situations and how the speaking activity leaves traces in the utterance. Enunciation theory is also a theory about subjectivity, the speaking subject being in the centre of interrogation, not as a unified subject, but a heterogeneous one. This speaking subject is not autonomous, but depends on the situation of communication. In enunciation theory, different trends in the study of language use and its explanation depend on whether description is based on actual language use as documented in corpora, or whether theoretically oriented linguistics is the starting point. Moreover, depending on the theoretical premises, approaches or schools in French pragmatics can vary considerable: from cognitively oriented to sociolinguistic ones.

In this article, we first trace the context in which French enunciation theory has developed, and we survey its traditions and the formulation of its main concepts from a historical point of view up to the present day. This is done in order to examine the basic theoretical claims and assumptions the theory makes more generally, and to see how it is situated vis-à-vis neighbouring disciplines. Secondly, we present its main concepts from the point of view of their basic features and as they are used in research today.

2. **Historical overview – from the pre-theoretical to the present phase**

2.1 **Origins and the pre-theoretical phase**

In the development of the theory of enunciation, chronologically, a pre-theoretical phase and three different rather fragmented phases can be distinguished. During the pre-theoretical phase the term ‘*enunciation*’ itself is not introduced, but the underlying notion shows up in ways of pragmatic thinking that led to the theoretical concept of enunciation (Nerlich & Clark 1996). The origins of enunciation theory can be found in various directions and its roots go back to rhetoric, grammar and logic (Fuchs 1981; Groupe Relpred 1989). In the development of its pre-theoretical phase, French

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2. We thank Jyri Vahtera, Professor of Ancient Languages and Culture at the University of Turku for this information.
pragmatic thinking was influenced by Cartesian philosophy and the Port-Royal grammar as well as by Locke’s philosophy (Nerlich & Clark 1996: 62). In the 19th century, several linguists in Europe became occupied with problems that were essential to the development of French pragmatics, i.e. problems linked to the presence of the speaker, as in Bühler’s work. Also awareness of the interrelatedness of linguistic forms and their functions grew stronger in the protopragmatic phase in Europe (Nerlich & Clark 1996). In France, it was Ernest Renan who noted the relation between the meaning of words and their sounds (Groupe Relpred 1989), but this pragmatic thinking emerges most clearly in the work of Michel Bréal who tried to establish a theory of signs:

The fact is that most linguists have directed their attention to the form of words: the laws which govern changes in meaning, the choice of new expressions, the birth and death of phrases, have been left behind or have been noticed only in passing. Since this subject deserves a name as much as does phonetics or morphology, I shall call it semantics (…) that is, the science of meanings. (Bréal 1991: 137)

The new science of semantics was developed in the Essai de la sémantique published in 1897 in which Bréal’s pragmatic and historical perspective on language can be traced (Desmet & Swiggers 1995: 292–327). Bréal was interested in the meaning that could be called, from our contemporary perspective, ‘contextual’: he considered the spatio-temporal changes as well as the sociolinguistic factors such as professional context in the meaning of words (Bréal 1991). He also considered the subjectivity that can be seen in words or phrases, in grammatical forms and in language in general (Desmet & Swiggers 1995: 313). In fact, he shows that the language a speaker uses reflects his or her impression of the world (Bréal 1991: 174); subjectivity is also coded in language expressing the speaker’s evaluation (Desmet & Swiggers 1995: 313–319). The examples Bréal uses are interesting: in order to show how the speaker expresses different degrees of certainty, she or he can use adverbs like certainly, maybe, possibly (ibid.) – a type of analysis reproduced later by several linguists in enunciation theory.

In the following section, we discuss the main phases in the development of enunciation theory. The two first phases are easily distinguishable. According to Joly (1987), there are two generations: the first enunciation linguistics (première linguistique de l’énonciation) is the generation of linguists like Charles Bally, Gustave Guillaume, grammarians Jacques Damourette and Edouard Pichon, and Ferdinand Brunot; the second generation (seconde linguistique de l’énonciation) is that of modern enunciation theory. In other words, the first phase in enunciation pragmatics (linguistics) is that of forerunners of the theory such as Charles Bally and Gustave Guillaume. The second phase is the stage of the main theoretical foundation that was laid by Emile Benveniste over a long period of time, from the end of 1930’s up to the 1970’s. The main contribution to the development of enunciation theory is to be found
in the two volumes *Problèmes de linguistique générale* I–II (1966,1970), a collection of articles by Benveniste. In a third phase, there have been several modern developments by linguists like Antoine Culioli, Oswald Ducrot and Jacqueline Authier-Revuz who have either developed their own approach to enunciation or redefined some concepts that are essential to this theory. Theoretical thinking has developed ever since in several, often different directions.

2.2 First phase: Forerunners

2.2.1 Charles Bally (1865–1947)

Charles Bally, a disciple of Saussure and one of the editors of Saussure’s *Cours de linguistique générale*, is today considered one of the early predecessors of enunciative pragmatics even though his influence was not really recognized until the 1980’s (Chiss 1985; Lala 2006), probably because he was closely identified with Saussurian structuralism and its emphasis on *langue* (system) at the expense of *parole* (discourse) which led to the study of linguistic forms and to the elimination of the speaking subject (*sujet parlant*) from serious linguistic research. However, Ducrot himself, for example (cf. infra), acknowledges his debt to Bally for the development of his theory of polyphony (Ducrot [1986]1991). There are four aspects which relate him with enunciative pragmatics: (1) the emphasis on the synchronic study of ordinary language, (2) the inherent subjectivity in all language use and hence the inscription of the subject/s in discourse, (3) the role of interlocutors in the construction of discourse (the concept of *co-énonciation* developed later by Culioli, cf. infra), and (4) the relationship between language and discourse, i.e. the question of how entities belonging to the level of language (virtual entities) are actualized in discourse, or questions related to the reference of linguistic signs. In the following we will only discuss the first three, omitting the question of reference which will shortly be taken up when we discuss the insights of Gustave Guillaume (cf.infra).

Bally may be best known for his early work on stylistics (*Traité de la stylistique française* 1909). It must immediately be pointed out, however, that his conception of stylistics is quite original since he deliberately excluded literary stylistics from his study. In fact, he makes a distinction between literary and linguistic stylistics. According to Bally, linguistic stylistics observes and asserts whereas the aim of literary stylistics is to learn to use language for aesthetic reasons. In fact, Bally considers literary language to be a result of several individual styles used for aesthetic reasons. He also compares literary language to special languages:

3. More recent research has shown that this is not true. The interpretation must be attributed to F. Bopp (Valette 2004)
Literary language has first of all a social value, it is a symbol of distinction, of high intellect and high education; stylistics cannot but consider it (literary language) as a special language [...]. As such it has its place – a place of honour – beside administrative and scientific language as well as that of sports. (Bally 1952:28)

Instead of literary stylistics, Bally is interested in the language ordinary people use when communicating orally in everyday situations. He stresses the importance of studying the ‘stylistic’ usages of a speech community instead of individual styles.

The language of ordinary people reflects, not pure ideas, but emotions, feelings, desires, impulses, in short, it is a means of expression and action. (Bally 1952:133)

From the above citation it becomes evident that Bally considers language as a pragmatic phenomenon – it is a means of expression and action but as we will see below, it is also a means of expressing thoughts.

He replaces the term stylistics by ‘theory of enunciation’ in the first edition of *Linguistique générale et linguistique française* (1932) and by ‘general theory of enunciation’ in the second edition (1944). According to Chiss (1986:165), Bally’s theory of enunciation makes it possible to relate the principles of general linguistics with the theory of the linguistic specificity of a given language. As Chiss and Puech point out (1997:162), enunciation in the sense used by Bally includes all the elements that make a language a language different from any other (its specific syntactic, lexical phonetic and gestual dimensions) i.e. “all the means by which a language gives form to communicated thought”. Bally works with the linguistic resources of language (the French language), not with the actual discourses produced. Chiss and Puech propose to interpret Bally’s enunciation as semantics, which broadens the field of general linguistics integrating into it the logical, psychological and linguistic conditions of all communication (énonciation) of thoughts by means of language (ibid).

It is not always clear whether Bally’s énoncé refers to utterance as a pragmatic phenomenon or as a phenomenon belonging to the level of language structure (cf. Ducrot [1986]1991:3). For example, when defining the process of actualization he says that “in order to become an element of a sentence a concept has to be actualized” (Bally 1944:77) or when discussing the relation of utterance and thought he affirms that “the sentence is the simplest possible form of communication of thought” (Bally 1944:35).

In accordance with a long and well-established philosophical tradition (cf. Ducrot [1986]1991:4, Chiss & Puech 1997:159), Bally is concerned with the relation of language and thought. To him, language is put into operation in order to express thoughts or rather representations.

To think is to react to a representation by asserting it, by appreciating it or by desiring it. Thought is thus not just pure and simple representation without any active participation by the thinking subject. (Bally 1944:35)
For Bally there are two kinds of mental representations, that is, ideas and feelings (sentiments). According to Bally, ideas reflect the intellectual component of representations, but they are nevertheless not the primary aspect in language use. The main function of language would, according to Bally, be the expression of feelings (Gouvard 2005). For Bally, language is a two-level system of communication composed of (1) expressions of ideas and (2) expressions of feelings, the latter being divided into individual (sentiments individuels) and collective (sentiments sociaux). The aim of stylistics is, in Bally’s view, to describe the emotive, subjective, dynamic and fugitive nature of language.

Nearly all representations of reality are subjectively coloured and deformed as they penetrate language; furthermore language deforms itself constantly. What do you expect to remain of reality in an image that has gone through such a double prism?

(Bally 1952: 155)

Since the function of language is to express thought (representation of reality) it necessarily implies that the speaking subject is engaged in the activity either explicitly or implicitly (Durrer 1998: 109). Bally emphasizes the relation of the speaking subject to his utterance (énoncé) since an utterance is not a true representation of the extra-linguistic reality but a reaction of the speaking subject to a representation. The reaction may be intellectual, affective or volitional. One does not necessarily exclude the other, and it is not a question of dominance but of degrees (Durrer 1998: 115). It follows from this, according to Ducrot (1991:4) that “all thought breaks down into an active or subjective element – the reaction – and a passive or objective element – the representation”. This brings us to the dichotomy of modus and dictum. According to Bally, every utterance contains a content (dictum) and the attitude of the speaking subject towards this content (modus).

An explicit sentence consists of two parts: the first one corresponds to what constitutes the representation (for example the rain) and this we call in accordance with the logicians, the dictum. The other is the master piece of the sentence, without which there would be no sentence, in other words the expression of modality, corresponding to the operation of the thinking subject. The modality has as its logical analytic expression a modal verb and its subject, the modal subject. The two together constitute the modus.

(Bally 1944:36)

According to Ducrot (1991:5), Bally’s meaning of a sentence can be expressed in the form, “X has this particular reaction to this particular representation” where “X has this particular reaction” is the modus and the type of reaction is expressed by the modal verb. The dictum is the representation of the object of the reaction. The modal subject is the subject to whom the communicated thought is attributed, but it is not necessarily identical with the speaking subject even if the speaking and the modal subjects coincide in most cases like in the following examples:
(1) I want you to leave (Je veux que vous sortiez)

(2) I think that the accused is innocent (Je crois que l'accusé est innocent)

But the modal subject can also be different from the speaking subject, it can encompass several subjects, or remain vague:

(3) We don't think it is going to rain (Nous ne croyons pas qu'il pleuvra)

(4) Galileo and astronomers think that the earth rotates (Galilée, les astronomes pensent que la terre tourne)

(5) They think that the king is dead (On croit que le roi est mort) (Bally1944:37)

The distinction between modal and speaking subject makes it also possible to describe negation as a dialogic phenomenon, even if Bally does not develop this line of thought further. According to Bally, negation is a refusal to accept an assertion. The meaning of a negative utterance such as “The sun does not rotate around the earth” is, according to Bally, equivalent to “I deny, it is false (to say) that the sun rotates around the earth” (1944:219). Such an assertion comes close to the concept of polemic negation developed by Ducrot much later (cf. infra and Ducrot 1984).

But even in cases where the thinking subject is identical with the speaking subject, care must be taken not to confuse personal thought (pensée personnelle) and communicated thought (pensée communiquée). This distinction is of utmost importance and it can be explained by the nature and function of the linguistic sign itself. In fact, the subject can communicate a thought that he pretends to be his own even if it is not (bien qu'elle lui soit étrangère (1944:37)). Bally calls this split personality (dédoublement de la personnalité) a concept that bears some resemblance to Authier-Revuz's dédoublement énonciatif (cf. infra). As examples of such instances, Bally mentions deliberate lies and irony.

Since utterances are bound to express subjectivity inherent in all language use, it is obvious that what Bally considers most worthy of analysis is the modus. Not all utterances, however, are explicitly modalized, but there is a continuum from explicit to implicit marking of modality. Even the implicit marking of modality is, however, not a problem since “the spirit (l'esprit) can easily complete the insufficiencies of expression and thus nothing essential is left out of the utterance” (1944:41). Such a line of thought seems to anticipate speech act theories, especially those of indirect speech acts, their illocutionary force and the interferences made by interlocutors.

In Bally’s view, an utterance is, in the first place, the result of the intentions of the speaking subject but at the same time it is the result of interaction between the speaker and his interlocutors, be they real or imagined.

One can hardly speak without speaking to someone. [.....] Language should be seen as expression of a thought communicated to someone else or having in mind the
representation of someone else. It is of no importance whatsoever whether the other be an individual, a crowd or everyone.

(Bally, *Traité de la stylistique française*, vol.2 1909: 8)

This means that an utterance, or rather the meaning of an utterance, is co-constructed in interaction, but at the same time it is a means of acting upon the interlocutors (Durrer 1998: 123), that is to say that utterances contain always an argumentative (implicit or explicit) dimension too.

When we say that it is hot or that it is raining, it is very rarely just an affirmation of the state of affairs but rather an affective impression or a judgement which is likely to determine an action.  

(Bally 1952: 17)

Here again the affinities with modern pragmatics are striking: there is a general agreement in pragmatics that the informative function of the language is never the only one operating in any discourse.

2.2.2  **Gustave Guillaume (1883–1960)**

Gustave Guillaume, a contemporary of Bally and a disciple of Antoine Meillet, can be regarded a representative of a psycho-cognitive orientation of the first phase of enunciative pragmatics, especially in his early scholarly production, whereas his later work can rather be associated with cognitive linguistics à la française (Joly & Roulland 1981; Valette 2003). Being a representative of his time, Guillaume is obsessed with the relationship of language and thought. He tries to give thought a linguistic status which would establish the thought/language relation permanently. According to Guillaume, thinking takes place in time. In other words, the conception of ideas is an intellectual process which requires a certain, even if at times a minimal lapse of time. To think about a notion means to construct it and the time needed for it is called operative time (temps opératif). This process is characterized by a twofold activity which moves from the maximal to the minimal extension of a concept and then again from the minimal to the maximal extension. The maximal extension corresponds to universality and the minimal extension to a singular case. The movements in operative time serving to construct a notion are generalization and particularization. (Ducrot & Schaeffer 1995: 59–60). From the enunciative point of view the following elements are essential in Guillaume’s reflexion: the use of language is an act, language is dynamic, and the relation of language and thought is intrinsic.

4. Antoine Meillet (1866–1936) was one of the leading linguists of his time. He was a specialist in the history and structure of Indo-European languages. He seems also to have been one of the first to use the concept of grammaticalization.
According to Guillaume (1912), language is on the one hand always an act, motivated by the speaker’s will to influence the other, and, on the other hand, it is a means by which the human thought changes and evolves in time (Valette 2006: 61).

[...] language (parole) is a force, a means to act upon others. This action upon other human beings who are like us, foreseen before the act of speaking, guides our thought, gives it a form and at certain moments becomes so imperious that it can break ancient moulds and create new ones which are more suitable for our purposes. (Guillaume 1912: 4)

Guillaume rejects Saussure’s opposition between synchronic and diachronic. According to Guillaume, language can only be understood as a system that is dynamic and in constant evolution. The system of language is also dynamic because of the relation of language to discourse (a term analogous to Saussure’s parole). The linguistic phenomena to be explained (diverse uses of a grammatical form, polysemy, ambiguity, etc., in short, everything that has to do with actualized meaning (effet de sens)) manifest themselves in discourse, whereas the operations which lead to such usages are psychomechanic in nature and thus belong to the level of the language system. They cannot be directly apprehended but have to be discovered via methodological reflection (cf. Culioli’s model of enunciative operations infra). In other words language preexists discourse, but the linguistic analysis is based on an ascending description, from discourse to language (Valette 2006: 24).

At the beginning of the 20th century the concept of actualization (cf. Bally supra) is one of the key theoretical notions in the first phase of enunciative pragmatics (linguistique de la parole). It seems as though it was invented by Bally and Guillaume almost simultaneously. Bally uses it for the first time in 1922 and Guillaume in 1929 (Valette 2004). As we have seen, Bally defined actualization as a process that converts a virtual linguistic entity belonging to language to an actual entity of discourse. For Guillaume, actualization is necessary in order to produce discourse. In both cases actualization necessarily implies an activity instantiated by the speaking subject. There is still a marked difference between Bally and Guillaume. Guillaume’s psychomechanic approach is confined to the level of the word; actualization is consequently a process that concerns the word which, by virtue of the article, is activated in discourse; its status changes from puissance in posse (potential meaning) to effet in esse (meaning in discourse) (Valette 2006: 40). He had developed a similar line of thought already in 1919, in Le problème de l’article et sa solution en langue française, but instead of mentioning actualization, there he proposed the hypothesis of “fundamental kinesis” (cinétisme fondamental), the way in which thought creates the specific/universal relation by moving from the maximal extension of a notion to the minimal, and then from the minimal to the maximal extension again. Such a movement (kinesis) explains the different referential meanings (effets de sens) actualized by French indefinite and
definite articles *un/le* ranging from universal to particular. *Un/le soldat français* (a/the French soldier) in its universal, generalizing meaning encompasses all French soldiers (*un/le soldat français ne connaît pas la fatigue* – a/the French soldier is never tired), whereas their particularizing function refers to a specific individual (*un/le soldat français que je connais* – a/the French soldier I know).

As for Bally, the minimal unit is not the word but the sentence and hence for him the concept is actualized in order to become a term of a sentence.

As pointed out by Valette (2003), the notion of transcendental subject, i.e. the speaking and thinking subject, gradually loses weight in Guillaume’s theoretical reflection, it no longer is a concept with the help of which the linguistic operations might be explained. On the contrary, it becomes a problematic concept. Language is seen as invading the subject, it interferes with the subject who has to speak and takes control over him. Slips of the tongue, reformulations, self-repairs, different versions of a text or of a definition are examples of the interference of language in the communicating subject. The power of language tends to expand inevitably at the expense of subjective control, but, paradoxically, to the benefit of the subject. Thus, the focus in Guillaume’s work changes from the speaking and thinking subject to the study of language systems (*psychosystématique*) or as Valette (2006:72) puts it, he abandons the speaking subject for language. This is to say that Guillaume’s psychomechanic model would not really include a theory of enunciation as proposed by Joly et Rouland (1981) but rather that it deals with some of the problematics of enunciation (Valette 2006:75).

### 2.3 Second phase: Main theoretical foundation

There are several linguists and other theorists who are closely linked to enunciation theory or who have influenced it a great deal. Three names come to mind in particular: Roman Jakobson, Mikhail Bakhtin and Michel Foucault. As pointed out by Normand (1985a), the notion of *shifters* developed by Jakobson as early as 1957 had a remarkable influence on the linguistic scene in France. In fact, the work of Jakobson was much more frequently cited in the sixties than that of Emile Benveniste (cf. *infra*), considered the founder of the theory of enunciation (Normand 1985a: 8–10). Likewise, the ideas put forward by Bakhtin had a great impact on the theory on enunciation, especially his conception of the social and dialogical nature of all language use even if these notions did not spread among French linguists until the late seventies with the first translation of Bakhtin’s work (*Le marxisme et la philosophie du language* 1977).

From an epistemological point of view, the philosophy of Michel Foucault is an entirely separate theory of the pragmatics of enunciation. However, Foucault has been so influential for quite a few French linguists, especially in the field of discourse
analysis, that some of his theoretical conceptions need to be mentioned. His focuses on instance d'événement énonciatif – the instance of uttering event. His conception is not structural, grammatical or pragmatic, but rather social. The social subject produces an utterance that is not independent but contextual, existing only in the discourse (Foucault 1969).

In the following, we will concentrate on some of the main theorists of the second phase of enunciative pragmatics.

2.3.1 Emile Benveniste (1902–1976)
The main theorist of enunciation theory is Emile Benveniste even if the expression theory of enunciation does not appear anywhere in his writings. Benveniste grew up in the structuralist tradition and his work overall was remarkably influenced by Saussurian thinking (cf. van Hecke 2002) and apparently he, too, considered himself an heir of this line of thought by positioning himself as linguiste sémioticien (Fontaine 1986: 213). However, his elaboration of the theory of enunciation differs from the structuralist emphasis on language excluding the level of parole and consequently the speaking subject as a serious object of linguistic study (cf. however, Normand 1985b: 5 “an object of study not scientific yet”, and Brunet 2004 suggesting that the problem of subject was never really totally excluded from linguistics). It is only in the 1960’s that aspects related to enunciation are systematically taken into account in linguistic analysis in France. This is largely due to the succes of Benveniste’s reflection presented in his Problèmes de linguistique générale (1966). As Ducrot points out (Encyclopedia Universalis), the fifth section of the book has an emblematic title: L’homme dans la langue (Man in language). In the sixties, the ideas of Benveniste spread more rapidly among French philosophers who saw in his reflexion a way out of rigid structuralism whereas in linguistic circles Benveniste was largely ignored or, if mentioned, he was always closely related to structuralism (Normand 1985a). In what follows we will only deal with aspects of Benveniste’s work related to enunciative pragmatics omitting other aspects of his ambitious scholarly work already well documented by van Hecke (2002).

Even though an heir of Saussurian thinking, Benveniste does not approve of the dichotomy langue/parole but argues quite the opposite: “Nothing is in language that has not been before in discourse” (1974: 80). As we have seen, the term enunciation had already appeared in the writings of Bally in the early 1930’s but the definition of the term must be attributed to Benveniste. He writes: “Enunciation means activating a language in discourse by an individual usage act. […] This is the act of a speaker who mobilizes a language for his own use” (“L’énonciation est cette mise en fonctionnement de la langue par un acte individuel d’utilisation” (1974:80). And he continues by saying that “before enunciation, language is but the possibility of language. After enunciation language is realised in an instance of discourse which has its origins in the speaker”
By enunciation is meant the actual act and circumstances of producing an utterance.

Two of the most important articles in which Benveniste develops his theoretical thinking on enunciation are *La nature des pronoms* [1956]1966), where he already sketches the milestones of the concept of enunciation (the notion of shifters, third person as a non-person, different elements of deixis) without calling it enunciation, and secondly, *L’appareil formel de l’énonciation* [1970]1974), where he explicitly lays the foundations of the theory of enunciation.

One of the questions Benveniste problematizes is: what does *I* signify? And he answers: *I* refers to the individual speech act (*acte de discours*) where it is pronounced, and it designates the locutor (1966:261). For Benveniste there are two kinds of language usages: cognitive and enunciative. Whereas the utterance “Socrates is a man” has a universally valid meaning, the meaning of the utterance: “I am a woman” is dependent on the person saying so precisely because it contains the first person singular *I*. Thus, in language there are elements whose meaning is more or less stable but in contrast there are others, like *I*, the meaning of which is dependent of the situation of enunciation in which they are uttered.

Utterances produced by individual speakers bear traces of how language is mobilized in discourse. This means that the use of certain grammatical constructions, words and expressions entails or contributes to creating specific relations between the interlocutors. Enunciation can be seen from the individual’s point of view as a process of appropriation. The speaking subject appropriates the formal apparatus of language and utters his position as a speaking subject by resorting to specific linguistic signs. These are traces (*indicateurs* in 1956) that translate the subjectivity of the speaker, for example when designating himself *I*, the speaker appropriates, makes his own the formal apparatus of language.

The individual act of appropriating a language inserts the speaker into his speech act. […] This situation is evidenced by specific forms whose function is to place the speaker in a constant and necessary relationship with his enunciation. (Benveniste 1974:82)

The forms are anchored in an utterance situation of which the constitutive parameters are: speaker, interlocutor, place and time of interaction, i.e. person deixis and spatio-temporal deixis. But as the subject positions himself as the speaker/locutor he necessarily implants the other in his discourse since all enunciation is explicitly or implicitly interactional: it postulates an interlocutor. Furthermore, reference is an integral part of enunciation since enunciation is used to express a certain relation to the world. According to Benveniste (1974:82), the prerequisite for mobilizing and appropriating language is the need for the locutor and his interlocutor to refer to extra-linguistic reality by means of discourse in an identical way.
The interpretation of first and second person pronouns is entirely dependent on the situation of enunciation.

In the case of the first and second person pronouns there is always a person implied and a discourse about him. *I* refers to the person speaking and it implies at the same time an utterance on his account. When I am saying *I*, I cannot but speak of myself. The 2nd person (*tu*) is necessarily designated by *I* and it cannot be conceived of outside a situation created by *I* (*je*).

(Benveniste 1966: 228)

What characterizes the first and second person is their uniqueness (*unicité*), whereas the reference of third person is vague.

The *I* who speaks and the *you* (*tu*) to whom *I* addresses himself are always unique. But he (*il*) can be anyone or nobody. He as such does not refer to anything or anybody in particular. You (*tu*) could be defined as a non-subjective person opposed to the subjective person *I* and these two together are in opposition to the form of non-person designated by he (*il*).

(Benveniste 1966: 232)

This leads to the conclusion that first and second person singular pronouns do not have any fixed semantic meaning, they are but discursive entities anchored in the discursive reality of enunciation. In addition to first and second person pronouns, there are other pronouns (demonstratives – *this*), adverbs (*today, now, here*) and adverbial expressions (*the year before*) of time and place which organize spatial and temporal relations in relation to the speaking subject, taken as the point of reference, and which can only be identified through the instance of discourse i.e. the utterance situation where they have been uttered, in other words under the dependence of *I* who expresses himself (Benveniste 1966: 262).

Benveniste also applies the idea of the subjectivity and circularity of the meaning of sui-referential linguistic entities to the verbal system. The present tense coincides with the moment of uttering (*instance du discours*) in relation to which other temporal determinations can be situated. A certain organisation of the notion of time is, according to Benveniste, a universal feature of languages irrespective of their formal structural or typological properties. And in all cases the demarcation line is the present tense coinciding with the instance of discourse which it describes.

[...] there are no other criteria nor any other expressions to describe the moment where one *is* but to consider it as the moment when one speaks. The present tense is eternally present but it never relates to the same event of objective chronology because it is defined in relation to every instance of discourse and every locutor. Linguistic time is sui-referential. In the last resort, the human conception of temporality with its linguistic apparatus reveals the inherent subjectivity operating in language.

(Benveniste 1966: 262–263)
In his article *Relations de temps dans le verbe français* in *Problèmes de linguistique générale I* (1966), Benveniste proposes two levels of discourse (*plans d’énonciation*) according to whether the verbal system (among other indicators of subjectivity) expresses the presence of the speaking subject or not. When the engagement of the locutor is heavily marked in his discourse, it is called discourse (*discours*), whereas utterances without the presence of the speaking subject belong to the level history (*histoire*). As far as the verbal forms are concerned, discourse is characterized in particular by the use of the present, future and perfect tenses, whereas history is characterized by preterit and aoristic tenses and the present tense expressing general truths. Discourse belongs to speech and is also characterized by the presence of all pronominal forms but especially of the first and second person and deictic markers. History is the domain of writing, characterized by the third person singular or absence of pronominal reference and it is devoid of deictic markers. Since the term history was not transparent, it was later replaced by *récit* (see for example Maingueneau 1994). The dichotomy *histoire* or *récit* vs. *discours* has in recent years met with much criticism as the title of an article by Adam et al., *Pour en finir avec le couple récit/discours* (‘To put an end to the couple récit/discours’; 1998), indicates. Maingueneau (1994) proposes instead a dichotomy of deictic (*embrayé*) and non-deictic (*non-embrayé*) discourse.

Since enunciation is characterized by subjectivity but also by inter-subjectivity, the speaking subject uses language not only to convey the propositional content of utterances but also in order to act upon his interlocutor. This leads Benveniste to account for what he calls *grandes fonctions syntaxiques* (1974:84), the kind of relation the speaker wants to establish with his interlocutor. We would today call them speech acts and their illocutory force such as the function of interrogation, assertion, imperative and vocative. Furthermore, the speaker’s attitude as to *dictum* (the content of his utterance) realized through the use of a large variety of modalities (*cf. infra*), some of which are related to the category of verb and others to lexical entities belonging to “phraseology” (ibid:85), can be accounted for in relation to the speaking subject – *I* indicating the subjectivity inherent in language use. But this manifestation of subjectivity is only effective in the case of the first person singular.

When I say *I suppose that*, *I presume that*, it indicates an attitude taken, not a description of an operation [...] I imply that *I* have a certain attitude towards the proposition to follow.

(Benveniste 1966:264)

Benveniste has been considered as the *père-fondateur* of the theory of enunciation. But as already mentioned, neither the theory of enunciation nor the subject of enunciation (*sujet d’énonciation*) are explicitly mentioned in his texts. This has animated two kinds of critical re-evaluation.

First, even if Benveniste repeatedly refers to the subjectivity inherent in discourse, he does not specify what he means by subject. Either he uses traditional grammatical or
psychological terminology such as subject of a verb, ego, subject as the home of sentiments, of intentions, or a-theoretical concepts taken from everyday language to describe subjects such as individual, locutor, participant, oneself… (Normand 1986: 201). This contradiction, absence of a well-defined subject of enunciation and recurrent references to subject and subjectivity in discourse, has given rise to the question as to whether Benveniste really intended to create a theory of the subject. Or was the attribution of the concept sujet de l’énonciation to Benveniste rather an over-interpretation of those who in the 1960’s were engaged in the debate concerning the subject – investing the notion with psychoanalytic, marxist and linguistic assumptions? A second epistemological problem is the fact that Benveniste was in essence interested in the meaning of linguistic signs (the domain of semiotics), but also in meaning in discourse (the domain of semantics) – hence the necessity of the concept of subject. There can be no meaning, no predication, without a subject which he, however, did not succeed in defining except in an unsatisfactory and vague manner (Normand 1986: 202).

The second re-evaluation is related to the absence of the term theory of enunciation in the writings of Benveniste. Ever since the 1990’s it has been suggested that Benveniste did not really propose a unified theory of enunciation but rather a questioning around enunciation, a beginning of a theory to be completed by his successors (Valette 2006: 43).

2.4 Third phase: Modern developments

The third phase starts at the end of 1960’s when scholars such as Antoine Culioli and Oswald Ducrot take up the structuralist heritage in their work (Ducrot 1968) and develop it further, in rather different directions based on the theoretical thinking of that time. In this section, we discuss the work of Antoine Culioli, Oswald Ducrot, and Jacqueline Authier-Revuz and their connection to enunciation theory.

2.4.1 Antoine Culioli (born in 1924)

The starting point for all linguistic investigation is according to Culioli “symbolic activity, which is by nature cognitive and affective, language activity apprehended through the diversity of languages, texts and situations”. Texts in Culioli’s sense include both written and spoken texts. Consequently, linguistic research should not limit itself to one language or even to a language family in order to avoid hasty and simplistic conclusions. Culioli is looking for invariants through a theoretical framework that would take into account both the diversity and resemblances between languages. Secondly, all linguistic research should be based on an analysis of authentic empirical material validated by native informants. Thirdly, Culioli’s conception of language is holistic: there is no need for a separate analysis of production and reception. Furthermore, all observable facts should be accounted for (slips of the tongue, ambiguity…), and
finally, Culioli does not separate syntax and semantics but claims that “we can provide a unified theory which will integrate phenomena which at present are treated separately in different sectors” (Culioli [1978] 1990:73).

Culioli’s main preoccupation is the mechanism underlying the production of enunciation, i.e. the uncovering of operations through which the meaning of utterances is constructed. Enunciation as understood by Culioli is the metalinguistic restitution, based on utterance (énoncé) of the meaning construction (construction du sens) (Valette 2004). For Culioli, enunciation is not a question of appropriation of the apparatus of language as it is for Benveniste, but a work of reconstruction performed by the linguist. For Culioli there is no subject a priori in enunciation, it has to be reconstructed through the analysis performed by the linguist (Valette 2006: 42).

Culioli is probably best known for his theory of enunciative operations (Théorie des opérations énonciatives, TOE) which he started to elaborate as early as 1968 and which he has been developing until recent years. It is a cognitively oriented semantic theory of enunciation in which some of his commentators see resemblances with Guillaumé’s psychomechanic model (cf. supra), an influence he himself does not really acknowledge (Valette 2006: 258–260). The main hypothesis underlying the theory is the following: enunciative activity is based on the interpretative activity which takes place when producing and recognizing abstract forms (cf. Ducard 2006: 13).

[... ] we hope to construct an ensemble of formal operations in order to understand, through the diversity of languages and discursive phenomena, these fundamentally generalizable operations underlying enunciative activity, production on the one hand and comprehension on the other. (Culioli [1978] (1990:304)

In the following we will present the outlines of Culioli’s theory of enunciative operations very briefly. For the reader wishing to get a deeper insight into the theory we refer to a collection of Culioli’s texts in English, selected, edited and introduced by Michel Liddle (1995). The theory has three levels:

I. The epilinguistic level: which is unconscious and never directly accessible: the level of affective, cognitive and senso-motoric activities giving rise to mental representations which Culioli calls either physico-cultural representations or primitive properties. These are based on our experience of the world. Examples of primitive properties are animate/inanimate, male/female, discrete/continuous (Groussier 2000: 169).

II. The linguistic level: the level where we can observe textual traces (utterances as a system of markers that can be lexical and grammatical) of cognitive processes creating representations. There is no one-to-one correspondence between the terms of levels I and II. As a consequence, a marker can correspond to several notional values or several markers can correspond to one and the same notional value on level I.
III. *The metalinguistic level*: the level of theoretical schematization based on observations of phenomena belonging to level II. It follows from this that the metalinguistic representations of level III are representations of representations and not representations of level I (Normand 2005; Valette 2006:265–266).

Hence, the theory of enunciative operations is not a theory of cognitive operations of linguistic activity. Culioli’s enunciative operations are strictly theoretical, metalinguistic in nature. Nevertheless, Culioli hopes level III to be in such an adequate relation to level II that a simulation of the correspondence between the levels I and II would be possible (que le niveau III sera dans une relation d’adéquation (de correspondance) au niveau II, telle que, par le biais de cette relation explicite entre II et III, nous puissions simuler la correspondance entre I et II (1990:23)).

The term ‘enunciative’ in the name of the theory refers to the uttering situation (*situation d’énonciation*) composed of the utterer (*énonciateur*) and the circumstances of enunciation, i.e. time and place of uttering. Enunciator (*énonciateur*) should in Culioli’s model not be confused with the speaker/locutor. The locutor is the one who actually pronounces the utterance whereas enunciator is an abstract entity. The enunciator is responsible for all the discursive choices made in the text and he also assumes responsibility for the modal choices in the utterance. As we have seen (cf. Bally, Ducrot *supra*), the speaking subject may coincide with the enunciator, but this is not necessarily the case. *Co-enunciator* is equally an abstract entity, not to be mixed up with the concrete addressee. His presence and his relationship to the enunciator affects the construction of the utterance. In fact, this notion in Culioli’s work is slightly ambiguous. It can either refer to the interlocutor/s, to the enunciator as his own co-enunciator, or it can just be the theoretical counterpart of enunciator. As for *operations* (*opérations de réperage*), they relate to formalized processes by means of which utterances are constructed from notional representations that belong to level I (cf. Grousier 2000). The concept of *notion* is slightly problematic in Culioli’s theory.

We call ‘notion’ a complex system of representations which structure physico-cultural properties of cognitive order (lexical, grammatical) and in general every relation between notions. A notion precedes categorization into nouns, verbs etc. […]  
(Culioli [1982] 1999:100)

According to Grossier (2000:164), notions are not given phenomena but constructs. They are at the same time clusters of representations of primitive properties (cognitive representations) and the first phase of metalinguistic representation which can only be apprehended through specific realizations that are called *occurrences*.

One only encounters notions through occurrences. We do not study activity as it appears through non-verbal behaviour, but only through verbalized behaviour […].  
As we have seen, language (langage), in Culioli’s interpretation, is an activity which presupposes a continuous epilinguistic activity (unconscious activity) and a relation between a model and its actualization, of which we have phonic or graphic traces, that is texts (Culioli [1968]1999:19).

Language use (activité langagière) is significative (signifiante) i.e. it bears a meaning and furthermore, this meaning is co-constructed. But at the same time language is also reflexive:

[...] because in communication there are two-ended operations by virtue of which utterances receive their meanings (the operations are complex because the sender is at the same time receiver and vice versa). (Culioli [1968]1990:19)

This means that when speaking we are simultaneously monitoring what we are saying and anticipating what we have not yet uttered. The enunciator is thus also his own co-enunciator, “a mirror of himself as enunciator” (Culioli 2002:67).

When we talk about subjectivity, we should always talk about inter-subjectivity, of which the relation to oneself is one special case, a subject in relation to himself. (Culioli 2002:208)

Culioli’s theory of enunciative operations is very formal, combining linguistic concepts and concepts from other disciplines such as mathematics, logic and topology. The emphasis is on the formalization of his model of mechanisms underlying enunciation. Nevertheless, the following citation reveals the importance of enunciation as a pragmatic concept for Culioli:

[… to utter (énoncer) is to construct a space, to orient, to determine, to establish a network of referential values, in short a system of location (système de repèrage). Every utterance is located in relation to the uttering situation (situation d’énonciation), which in turn is defined in relation to the enunciator, or to be exact to the first enunciator and to the time of uttering. (1973)1999:49)

2.4.2 Oswald Ducrot (born in 1930)

The theoretical work of Oswald Ducrot is to be situated centrally in the field of semantics and partly in pragmatics in France. His approach is not clearly a pragmatic approach, but one that combines a strongly semantic approach with a pragmatic one, called integrated pragmatics (pragmatique intégrée). Ducrot has worked on several pragmatic issues, for instance, on presupposition (Ducrot 1972, 1984) and argumentative particles (Ducrot 1980a), and has developed several different theoretical approaches, such as a theory of argumentation in language (Anscombe & Ducrot 1983), the theory of argumentative scales (Ducrot 1980b) and more recently, the theory of semantic blocks (Ducrot 2004), to name just a few (for an elaborate
introduction on these issues, see Moeschler 2006). Here we take up the perspective Ducrot offers on enunciation theory, more specifically on enunciative polyphony.

The theoretical view of enunciation created by Ducrot focuses on understanding the utterance meaning from a very specific semantic perspective. This view is based on an internal view of language and it analyzes utterance-level meaning. Even though he sees that the situation attributes a meaning to an utterance (Ducrot 1980a: 8), Ducrot’s approach is not based on the analysis of the situational context, but rather on the cotext or the linguistic context present in an utterance. In his view, enunciation is a momentary apparition of an utterance and therefore a historical event and it is in the utterance that the enunciation describes its act of uttering (Ducrot 1984: 179). Therefore, every utterance contains a commentary about how it has been uttered by the speaker. Ducrot distinguishes three levels of description: phrase, that is a theoretical object, an object of grammar, utterance, a particular manifestation of the spatio-temporal nature of a phrase, a linguist object, and discourse, a linear string of utterances (Ducrot 1984: 174). He also distinguishes phrase-level meaning (signification) from utterance-level meaning (sens) that is a description of the act of uttering.

Created to contest the views by structuralism and generative grammar about the unity of the subject, the theory of enunciative polyphony (Ducrot 1984) is inspired by the Bakhtinian notion of polyphony. However, Ducrot presents quite a different interpretation of Bakhtinian multivoicedness, placing polyphony at the utterance level. Ducrot (1980a:44) claims that at the utterance level, polyphony is created by the simultaneous presence of voices. According to Ducrot (1980a:44), at the utterance level, there is a plurality of voices, or opinions expressed that are not those of the speaker. In order to describe this, Ducrot introduces the notion of split subject. In an utterance, one can distinguish the speaking subject (sujet parlant), the locutor or speaker (locuteur) and an enunciator or utterer (énonciateur): the first one is the empirical being in the world producing the utterance, the second is present in the discourse uttering the act and the third is the “voice” that has responsibility over the opinion, the attitude etc. of the utterance. Therefore, an utterance can have several meanings that can be opposing, as in cases of polyphonic negation or irony shown in the following example (Ducrot 1984: 215):

(6)  Pierre is not nice (Pierre n’est pas gentil)

In this utterance, there are two different opposing enunciators, utterers who produce the utterance meaning:

Enunciator 1: Pierre is nice. (Pierre est gentil)
Enunciator 2: the contrary meaning to the first enunciator’s

In the utterance, the meaning is a result of the combination of the meanings produced by two enunciators. In the case of irony, an utterance is presented from the perspective
of one enunciator who does not take responsibility for the utterance, does not commit her/himself, but instead distances her/himself from it as in the next example:

(7)  What a disaster! (In quite the opposite situation)

In this view, the speaker can commit her/himself to the utterance meaning or distance her/himself from the utterance meaning and leave the responsibility for the utterance meaning to somebody else. In the case of first person marking, the commitment is clear:

(8)  I think that X (Je pense que X)

In the following example, the speaker shows a different enunciator who takes the responsibility for the utterance meaning:

(9)  It seems that the weather is going to be nice (Il paraît qu’il va faire beau)

By using an impersonal pronoun (il) in a impersonal verbal construction (il paraît que) that introduces a subordinate clause, the speaker distances her/himself from the responsibility that the meaning “the weather is nice” is produced by him.

This split subject has as its counterpart the split hearer: the listener (auditeur), who is hardly mentioned by Ducrot, the hearer (allocutaire), present at the discourse, and the addressee or receiver (destinataire) of the enunciator’s opinion and the act of utterance. Speaker and hearer are the ones who can use the first and second person pronouns. To Ducrot, polyphony can be described with the help of a theatre metaphor: in the enunciation, the speaker gives a certain kind of representation in the utterance (cf. Ducrot 1984: 231).

2.4.3 Jacqueline Authier-Revuz (born in 1940)

Quite a different theoretical approach is developed by Jacqueline Authier-Revuz, who also takes not only Bakhtinian polyphony as an inspiration, but also Jacques Lacan and his conception of the division of the subject. In her earlier work, Authier-Revuz introduces one basic conception about the nature of enunciation which she sees as enunciative heterogeneity (hétérogénéité énonciative). This means that the production of utterances, speech, parole, is essentially heterogenous as the subject is divided. The use of language is fundamentally polyphonic and the production of discourse is a result of interdiscursivity (Authier-Revuz 1984: 100–101). Furthermore, Authier-Revuz (1982) makes a distinction between two types of heterogeneity, namely constitutive and shown heterogeneity. The constitutive heterogeneity is that of the unconsciousness and the way it traces itself in language: therefore the subject is an effect of language, divided, split, decentralized; the subject cannot be a center, but what is central is the encounter of the subject with the Other (Authier-Revuz 1984: 101). However, it is the shown heterogeneity that allows a linguist to see how the Other is inscribed in the discourse. In other words, these are the phenomena found on the metadiscursive or metalinguistic
level in which certain types of linguistic forms encode the presence of the otherness. In practice, this means that linguistic forms are either non-marked forms or marked forms (Authier-Revuz 1984:98, 1992:41). The former are to be found in irony and free indirect speech, the latter are those of reported direct speech, quotation marks, italics or mentioned fragments or words. An example of the latter would be:

(10) according to Z (selon Z)
(11) the term X (le terme X)

In these examples, there is a mention of the fragment according to and the term Z which creates in both cases a reflexive reference. One of the linguistic terms Authier-Revuz (1992:41, 1996) introduces is that of textual islet (îlot textuel), which is a word placed in quotation marks that refers to itself:

(12) John said that his “villa” was in bad shape.
     (Jean a dit que sa “villa” était en mauvais état.)

This is a type of discourse frequently used in journalism, but as a metalinguistic phenomenon it is indirect discourse reporting another enunciation, or a production of utterance with what is preserved from the original utterance in quotation marks (1992 :41).

In her main work, Authier-Revuz examines the shown heterogeneity as a reflexive loop (boucle réflexive). By this term, Authier-Revuz means the kind of forms that show the representation of speech in the making (Authier-Revuz 1995a, b) for instance from what is said, to ensure a logical progression in speech, to demonstrate a phase in a conversation (Authier-Revuz 1995b: 23). In Authier-Revuz (1995) these cases are divided into four categories: (1) the relationship of the co-enunciators.

(13) what you call (ce que vous appelez)
(14) if you like (si vous voulez)

(2) something that has been already said.

(15) as is said (comme on dit),

(3) a non-coincidence between words and things.

(16) the word is not appropriate (le mot ne convient pas),
(17) that is the word (c’est le mot)

and (4) the meaning is affected by other meanings:

(18) in the sense of p (au sens p),
(19) in all the meanings of the word (dans tous les sens du mot).
These examples show different types of metadiscursive utterances: it is also called enunciative “dedoubling” (dédoublement énonciatif) as the enunciator takes a position which is that of an observer who comments on the enunciation. This means that in the production of the utterance there is something that “does not go by itself”, that is not automatic or transparent in the language; this is described by Authier-Revuz in the following way: non-coincidence of saying, a non-unity (non-un), auto-representation of saying in the making (auto-représentation du dire en train de se faire). In sum, Authier-Revuz’s enunciative linguistics is an explanation of the metasemantic and metapragmatic use of language in a speaker’s (single) utterance.

3. Some basic notions

3.1 Enunciation and enunciator

The main concepts are enunciation, act of uttering, énoncé, utterance, a linguistic object that is the product of the act of uttering, and énonciateur, enunciator, the one who produces utterances – or utterer (see above) or speaker depending on the theoretical approach in which the terms are used. In order to consider a situation communicative, the counterpart of the speaker is either receiver or addressee. These notions reflect the communication scheme developed by Jakobson and the unilateral model of communication. In more recent accounts, this explanation of the relationship between the enunciator and the addressee has been given more broad meanings. A dialogic view of enunciation has produced the concept of co-enunciation which takes the co-presence of two or several speakers in the speaking situation and assigns them as co-enunciators or co-speakers. However, in the framework of different enunciation theories, the last distinction between speaker and utterer is a fluctuating one between the utterance level (Ducrot) and the discourse level. The adjective enunciative (énonciatif, -ive) refers to enunciation.

One of the basic distinctions of enunciation theory is between restricted enunciation (énonciation restreinte) and extended enunciation (énonciation étendue). The former analyzes only the speaker and the traces she or he leaves in the utterance (Kerbrat-Orecchioni 2006: 35–36), whereas the latter perspective takes into consideration the participants, the situation, the spatio-temporality and the general conditions of the production and reception of the message (Kerbrat-Orecchioni 2006: 35).

3.2 Situation/Context

Since the terms situation and context have acquired so many different meanings in the linguistic literature, the following classification is an attempt at clarification (cf. Charaudeau 2002: 535–536).
1. Communicative situation refers to the extra-linguistic situation where interaction takes place.

2. Utterance situation (situation d'énonciation) refers to the situation in which language is actualized by an individual act of usage characterized by deictic and illocutionary markers.

3. Discursive situation refers to inter-discursive knowledge and to institutionalized ways of thinking and speaking. It sets the limits of what can be spoken and, more importantly, how something may be spoken of (cf. Maingueneau 1997)

3.3 Subjectivity and deixis

Enunciation theory can be considered as the theory of the speaker, or the speaking subject. The notion of subjectivity is one of the most central notions that appear in the writings of several theoreticians during the development of this approach and also in contemporary writings (Vion 1998). It was Benveniste who noted how subjectivity is the speaker’s capacity to position her/himself as subject:

It is in and through the language that the human being becomes a subject; because it is language alone that provides a foundation for the concept of “ego” in reality, in his reality which is that of existence.

C'est dans et par le langage que l'homme se constitue comme sujet ; parce que le langage seul fonde en réalité, dans sa réalité qui est celle de l'être, le concept d’« ego ».

(Benveniste 1966: 259)

One of the main axes of investigation is the personal deictic system by which the subjectivity and the relationship of the speaker becomes manifest intersubjectively. Accounts concerning deixis consider person, place and time and what their grammatical forms and their meanings are (Cervoni 1987; Morel & Danon-Boileau 1992; Maingeneau 1994; Kerbrat-Orecchioni 2006). Deictics refer to the way in which they take the spatio-temporal environment (entourage) into consideration when describing an occurrence: indexical meaning is given to the referent by the contextual information (Kleiber 1986: 19).

In accounts deriving from Bühler, the speaker’s point of view is seen as the deictic origo or centre; in deictic accounts, the main criteria in identifying the referent of the person form are the time and the place of the situation. The focus is on the varying reference of pronouns or other type of shifters, or embrayeurs as they are also called (Jakobson 1963). From the point of view of subjectivity in enunciation theory, the person form je is the one who speaks; it is also the name of the speaker when she or he leaves a trace in her/his utterance. According to Benveniste (1966: 253), the present situation of producing an utterance is the one from which the je derives its meaning. In the French tradition, the referential nature of first and second person personal
pronouns has been studied as marking the subjectivity of speech. This refers to the way in which the speaker stages her/himself as a subject (Benveniste 1966: 259). According to Danon-Boileau (1994:162), the personal pronoun of the first person functions in propositions as an indicator of subjectivity or point of view, especially when associated with the verb. The subjectivity or objectivity of the discourse has also been described in terms of a dichotomy: speakers may stage themselves or make themselves manifest in utterances, or on the other hand may decide to distance themselves from it, leaving no explicit signs of their presence or manifesting their attitude in utterances. Reflections on deictics also consider time and place.

3.4 Reported speech

The linguistic phenomena of voices and of reported speech has a long history in enunciation theory from Bally to Benveniste, from the third generation to the present day (see for instance Rosier 1999). It is an extremely heterogeneous field, where the terminology concerning the phenomena varies considerably, reflecting the differences in explanation among the analytical approaches. The ways of conceptualizing this linguistic phenomenon can be divided into the traditional approaches that take into consideration the internal characteristics of reported speech, and those that discuss the external qualities (Johansson 2000:67). The former approach stems from the lexico-grammatical tradition and its analysis of the different forms of direct, indirect, free (in)direct speech and the relationship of the reporting and reported parts, the use of different verbal and deictic forms. In enunciation theory there are also considerations about how the speaker takes distance from or adheres to the reported utterance. In the modern approaches there are several new forms that are linked to the analysis of this phenomenon, such as the verb form in the conditional as well as prepositional groups such as according to X (selon X) and their capacity to mediate information from other contexts (Rosier 1999). The latter approach based on the logical and philosophical tradition of oratio obliqua and oratio recta discusses how reported speech is reflexive, how it keeps fidelity when reproducing the speech (Johansson 2000:67). Several theoreticians discussed above give their own definition and description of reported speech. However, in the modern accounts there are several approaches in which the nature of reproduction is problematized and in which different sequential dimensions are taken into consideration, whether cognitive, textual, interactional or discursive, in which the relationship to the enunciation varies (Waugh 1995, Vincent & Dubois 1997; Marnette 2005).

3.5 Modality and modalization

The notion of modality in French linguistics is a complex one. This is due to its origins (cf. infra) and to the many different usages it has in the French linguistic
literature. As Vion (2001:213) points out, it is a concept closely related to enunciative pragmatics and hence very little used in the Anglo-American literature. We will first trace the origins of the concept and then look at some more contemporary approaches to modality.

The concept of modality has a long history dating back to Greek antiquity (cf. Aristotle's modalities of the sentence: assertive, interrogative, optative, predictive and imperative). Modality is a recurrent topic whenever the problem of thought and language is dealt with. Thus, for example, Arnauld and Lancelot state in their *Grammaire générale et raisonnée* (1660): “The verbs are the kinds of word that signify the way we think and the form of our thoughts, of which the foremost is affirmation” (Seconde partie, chapitre XVI: *Des divers Modes ou Manières de Verbes*).

Traditionally, the concept of modality was used to refer to the construction of a sentence around the verb but also to the production of a sentence as an utterance. It is in this sense that Ferdinand Brunot treats issues related to modality inherent in utterances in his book *La pensée et la langue* even if the speaking subject does not yet explicitly appear in his definition:

> An action uttered, be it a question, a positive or a negative utterance, presents itself for our judgment, our sentiments, our will and this utterance has extremely varied properties. It is presented as certain or possible, as desirable or doubtful, it expresses an order or it dissuades etc. These are modalities of ideas (*modalités de l'idée*). [...] There is modality in all kinds of elements of the sentence. (Brunot 1922:507–508)

The definition of the term modality which explicitly mentions the speaking subject is attributed to Bally who defines it as:

> Modality is the soul of the sentence; just as thought, modality is mainly realized through the action of the speaking subject. Thus one cannot attribute the value of a sentence to an utterance unless one has discovered the expression of modality of the utterance. (Bally 1932 § 28)

Bally includes among signs that mark modality a great variety of markers such as intonation, mimic, gesticulation, modus of verbs, adverbs and adjectives.

As for Benveniste, the range of explicit modal expressions is much more limited. He includes only modal verbs expressing desire, necessity, volition, and above all, obligation and permission. The latter two he considers as modal verbs *par excellence* whereas the others are only occasionally modalizing verbs according to Benveniste (Benveniste 1974:188). However, when speaking of the *grandes fonctions syntaxiques* (cf. *supra*) Benveniste deals precisely with categories related to modality.

For Culioli [1968] 1999:24), there are four types of modality, each of which expresses a particular attitude of the subject to the predication: (1) positive, negative, injunctive and fictive (hypothetic); (2) certainty, probability, necessity etc., i.e. epistemic modality; (3) judgemental (*appréciative*) (how sad, luckily..) and (4) pragmatic
or inter-subjective, the principal markers of which are deontic auxiliaries, voicing the relation between the subjects, i.e. the interlocutors.

Modality can be seen as a subcategory of a wider process, that of modalization which according to Coquet (1976:64) means the attribution of modalities to an utterance, by which an enunciator expresses an attitude towards his interlocutor and towards the contents of his utterance (cf. also Culioli [1968]1999:24: “to modalize is to assign modalities to an utterance [...].”) But as Vion (2001:219–220) points out, definitions of modality do not radically differ from those of modalization and the concept of modalization is used fairly seldom in French linguistics. Vion himself defines modalities as the linguistic markers signalling the subjective attitude of the locutor in discourse whereas modalization, according to Vion, refers to the process of expressing a subjective attitude (ibid:214).

Since the seventies, the concept of modality in the French linguistic literature has been divided into modalities of enunciation (modalités d’énonciation) and utterance modalities (modalités d’énoncé). This division is attributed to Meunier (1974). A more recent definition is Nølke’s (1993), according to which the modalities of enunciation express the way in which the speaker looks at his own enunciative activity (« Ce sont les regards que le locuteur jette sur son activité énonciative »). With the help of the modalities of enunciation the speaker can in fact make commentaries which directly concern illocutionary acts or the act of enunciation in which he is engaged (Nølke 1993:85). As for utterance modalities they express the way the speaker looks at the contents of his utterance [...]. He can in fact evaluate in different ways the argumentative and truth values of his utterance (ibid:143).

3.6 Modalities of enunciation (modalités d’énonciation)

Modalities of enunciation in their traditional sense correspond to the Aristotelean division of modalities – they deal with the relation the speaker wants to establish between himself and his interlocutor/s and the way in which he wants to act upon them. Meunier’s classification includes the assertive, interrogative, injunctive and exclamative modalities. Following Nølke (1993) one should also include what he calls modalisateurs d’énonciation, a heterogenous class of illocutionary markers which give instructions as to how to interpret an utterance, such as illocutionary adverbs (finally – a metatextual marker; if I may say, unless I am mistaken – commenting on the enunciative activity; or no joking (sans rire) excluding the possibility of humorous or ironic interpretations (Nølke 1993:114–115).

3.7 Utterance modalities (modalités d’énoncé)

Utterance modalities express the attitude of the speaking subject (modus) towards the contents of his utterance (dictum). Bally adopted this distinction between modus
and dictum from the medieval philosophical tradition (cf. *supra*). Depending on the point of view adopted, utterance modalities can include logical modalities, appreciative modalities (Kerbrat-Orecchioni 1980) and subjective vs. objective modalities (Le Querler 1996). The typologies resemble each other to a certain extent and are partly overlapping. Still other categories have been suggested (cf. Vion 2001), but in the following we shall discuss very briefly logical modalities and in more detail the appreciative and subjective vs. objective modalities.

The classical logical modalities can be divided into (1) *alethic modalities* which deal with necessity, possibility and contingency, the latter designating a state of affairs that is not necessarily true but not necessarily false either, a limited case of possibility; (2) *deontic modalities* which are related to either moral or social norms and express permission and obligation; and (3) *epistemic modalities* related to knowledge and beliefs, dealing with the certainty of propositions (Cervoni 1987:74–77).

The *appreciative modalities* (Kerbrat-Orecchioni 1980) express the subjective evaluations and judgements of the speaker. According to Cervoni (1987:177–178), there is no reason why evaluative modalities, of which the appreciative modalities are a subcategory, should not be included in the category of modal expressions since they too refer to a certain norm, social or individual. Appreciative modalities are expressed via axiological expressions which, according to Kerbrat-Orecchioni (1980: 82), are in an implicit relation with the speaker. This means that unlike other subjective elements, such as modal verbs and deictic expressions, axiological expressions allow the speaker to take a stance without explicitly revealing himself as the source of the judgement expressed (ibid). Appreciative modalities can be expressed via nouns, adjectives, adverbs and verbs.

Nouns expressing the appreciation of the speaker can be pejoratively or melioratively marked (Pierre is an *idiot*, He is a *genius*), be negatively marked by virtue of suffixes (*-asse, -ard* in French-* flemmard, blondasse*) or be nouns derived from inherently subjective verbs and adjectives (*corruption, beauty*). Furthermore, nouns may be marked because of the register they belong to (*flic, cop vs. police*).

As for adjectives, they are first divided into *objective* and *subjective* adjectives, secondly the subjective ones into *affective* (splendid, funny) and *evaluative* adjectives, which in turn can be further subdivided into *non-axiologic* adjectives, which express neither evaluation nor personal engagement of the speaker (expensive, big, hot) and *axiologic* adjectives (beautiful, good) which express either positive or negative evaluations of the speaker (Kerbrat-Orecchioni 1980:85–86).

Verbs expressing the appreciation of the speaker must, according to Kerbrat-Orecchioni (1980: 101), be considered from three different points of view:

1. *Who* expresses the evaluation: the speaker (Helene is screaming, Pierre *pretends* that Paul never came) or an actor of the process (Paul *wishes* that...).
2. What is evaluated: the process (to brawl) or the object of the process (Pierre hates Paul)
3. The type of evaluation: axiologic evaluation as in good/bad or modal evaluation such as true/false (uncertain).

Furthermore, some verbs are occasionally subjective, when used in the first person singular (I hope, I regret), whereas others are inherently subjective, expressing an evaluation made by the speaker (He stinks, he admits …).

Le Querler’s typology (1996) consists of a continuum ranging from subjective via inter-subjective to objective modalities. Her subjective modalities express the speaker’s attitude to the propositional content of his utterance. They include epistemic modalities (cf. logical modalities supra) and appreciative modalities. In the case of epistemic modalities, the locutor expresses the degree of certitude towards what he is saying (I do not know if that is true, That is certainly, probably, maybe true, He might be in his sixties …) In case of appreciative modalities, the locutor expresses his evaluation or judgement (Unfortunately, it is not at all clear, I do appreciate your presence here today …) When resorting to inter-subjective modalities the speaker indicates directly or indirectly, the illocutory force of his utterance. The inter-subjective modalities correspond to deontic modalities and have to do with order, permission, request, advice…). (I would like you to close the window, you can close the window, close the window…). Objective modalities (called also implicative modalities) do not, according to Le Querler, depend on the volition or the judgement of the speaker. The speaker subordinates the propositional content of the utterance to another proposition (Le Querler 1996:64). The speaking subject only asserts that $p$ implies $q$ (In order to grow, one must eat, The door has either to be closed or to be left open).

Especially the subcategory of objective modalities has met criticism. It is difficult to accept the idea that the relationship between propositions would be independent of the speaking subject (Vion 2001:218). Vion also points out that the propositional content of an utterance does not reflect any objective reality or state of affairs since the dictum is always a result of subjective choices made by the speaker (Vion 2001:220). Consequently, modus as well as dictum should be taken into account when analyzing modality. This leads Vion to propose the term double enunciation (double énonciation) which implies that modalization should be seen as a phenomenon taking place at two different levels, that of content and that of modal attitude, or as Vion expresses it: “the speaker stages his utterance from two enunciatively different positions” (ibid).

Note: Eija Suomela-Salmi is responsible for the Sections 2.2.1, 2.2.2., 2.3.1, 2.3.4 and 3.5. Marjut Johansson is responsible for the rest.
References


1. Introduction

Figures of Speech (= FSP, also called “rhetorical figures” or “figures of rhetoric”; the term FSP will be used in its broadest sense, including both tropes and FSP in the narrow sense, that is, figures of diction and figures of thought) can be briefly defined as the output of discourse strategies for creating communicatively adequate texts (cf. below Section 3.1. for a more detailed definition). From antiquity onwards, they have been studied as one of the main branches of rhetoric. In ancient rhetoric, FSP were mainly characterized as a kind of ornament. Moreover, a detailed typology of FSP was developed. In recent times, various theories of style have been developed which present quite different definitions and characterizations of FSP. Several authors have tried to establish standards of classification and demarcation of FSP which are more satisfactory than those of ancient rhetoric. There also have been attempts to extend the concept of FSP to nonverbal domains (e.g. FSP in the visual arts: painting, cinema etc.). Not very surprisingly, metaphor has attracted far more interest than any other FSP; therefore, studies on metaphor will be mentioned more frequently than work on other FSP.

In the following sections, I will first present an outline of the description of FSP in ancient rhetoric (Section 2). Then I wish to deal with contemporary attempts to define (Section 3.1.) and classify (Section 3.2.) FSP in disciplines like rhetoric, speech communication studies, linguistics, literary criticism, philosophy and psychology. Finally, the important cognitive and communicative roles of FSP and their treatment in different disciplines will be discussed (Section 4).

2. Ancient rhetoric

In ancient rhetoric, FSP were characterized as a kind of ornament added to plain speech to improve its persuasive impact. Thus FSP are conceived of as a kind of ‘clothing’, an ‘ornament’ which makes ordinary speech, which is merely clear and plausible, more attractive and efficient (cf. Quintilian Inst.Orat. 8.3.61). Further metaphorical characterizations of FSP in ancient rhetoric are ‘flore’ (‘flowers’), ‘lumina’ (‘highlights’) and ‘colores’ (‘colours’) (cf. Cicero or. 3.19, 3.96, 3.201; Knappe 1996: 303). More specifically, tropes (cf. Greek tropos ‘turn’, from the verb tropein ‘to turn’) are characterized
by Quintilian as a kind of semantic change or deviation, where the proper meaning of a word or phrase is replaced by a new meaning which enhances the quality of speech (cf. Quintilian Inst.Orat. 8.6.1). FSP in the narrow sense (cf. Latin figura < Greek schema ‘form, shape’) are defined as some artistic innovation of speech (cf. Quintilian Inst.Orat. 9.1.14). The Greek origin of most rhetorical terms and the following translation into Latin (and, later, into English, French and other languages) is not without problems concerning the accuracy and adequacy of the respective translations and the resulting terminology.

From antiquity onwards, FSP have been classified according to the trichotomy of (1) tropes (e.g. metaphor, metonymy, hyperbole, irony), (2) figures of diction (e.g. anaphor, parallelism, climax, ellipsis) and (3) figures of thought (e.g. rhetorical question, exclamation, persuasive definition, personification) (Quintilian Inst.Orat. 9.1.4–7, 9.1.17, Cic. or. 3.52.101).

Already Quintilian, however, conceded that there is no consensus as to the number of tropes and the delimitation of certain other FSP (Inst.Orat. 8.6.1). Moreover, the traditional typology offers no clear demarcation of linguistic levels, apart from the problematic dichotomic distinction of figures of diction and figures of thought (cf. Knape 1996: 310ff.). According to this dichotomy, figures of diction are fundamentally changed if the specific wording of a figure is altered. Figures of thought are said to remain the same even if the formulation is (slightly?) modified (cf. Cicero or. 3.200). Furthermore, Quintilian’s (Inst. Orat. 1.5.38) promising attempts to classify all FSP according to four basic linguistic operations which are used to realize FSP were not carried out consistently. These four linguistic operations are: addition, subtraction, substitution, permutation.

As far as particular FSP are concerned, already Aristotle treated metaphor in some detail, defining it (Poetics 1457b) as a transfer of a noun from its proper species or genus to another one, or as an analogical transfer. The art of creating metaphors is greatly appreciated by Aristotle, who also recognized the cognitive dimensions of metaphors when he writes that they lead to a kind of intellectual pleasure in the audience: metaphors offer some cognitive surprise, but this surprise is soon followed by a growth of knowledge which is easily achieved (cf. also below Section 4).

The classical treatment of FSP appears, for example, in the catalogue of 65 FSP in the ‘Rhetorica ad Herennium’ (1st century B.C.). It served as a model for many treatises on FSP and remained more or less unchanged in medieval and early modern times, although occasionally additions, reductions and slight modifications were made. In the Middle Ages (cf. Murphy 1974) FSP were a part of treatises on the art of making poems (‘artes poetriae’) and grammars (e.g. Alexander de Villa Dei’s highly influential ‘Doctrinale’, 12th century). Petrus Ramus (16th century) was highly influential for the further development of rhetoric when he suggested that the art of rhetoric should be reduced to a theory of style and presentation. In the year 1572 his friend
Audomarus Talaeus was the first in a series of rhetoricians who published rhetorical
treatises dealing mainly or exclusively with style and FSP. In this respect, Talaeus was
followed by French authors like B. Lamy (17th century), C. Dumarsais (18th century)
and P. Fontanier (19th century).

The classical typology of FSP survives even into our times: despite some modifica-
tions, the classification of FSP in the neo-classical handbook by Lausberg (1990) still
resembles the ancient doctrine and the treatment in Ueding & Steinbrink (1986:264ff.)
is even closer to the ancient typology (on ancient and modern theories of FSP cf. also
Bradford 1982; Bacry 1992:9ff.).

However, the strong influence of the ancient tradition did not prevent a num-
ber of attempts to replace the classical trichotomy of tropes, figures of diction and
figures of thought by different classifications. For example, Fontanier (1968:66ff.),
called the 'Linné of Rhetoric', suggested a division of all FSP into seven classes
(1. figures of signification (= the tropes), 2. figures of expression, 3. figures of diction,
4. figures of construction, 5. figures of elocution, 6. figures of style, 7. figures of thought).
Nash (1989:112) distinguishes two classes of FSP: (1) schemes (figures involving word
order and syntactic patterning) and (2) tropes (subclassified into a. figures involving
distinguish schemes (‘a deviation from the ordinary pattern or arrangement of words’)
and tropes (‘a deviation from the ordinary and principal signification of a word’).

3. Contemporary treatments of FSP

3.1 Definition of FSP

The ancient perspective concerning FSP has been taken up and refined by some mod-
ern linguistic theories of style and poetic language (cf. Freeman 1970 and Enkvist

Within some of these frameworks, FSP are conceived as deviations from everyday
language. In his classical article on poetics and linguistics, Jakobson (1960:356) has
tried to formulate a general semiotic framework for a deviational perspective where
“‘The set (Einstellung) toward the MESSAGE as such, the focus on the message for its
own sake, is the POETIC function of the language’. This specific focus on the message
for its own sake is realized by ‘the principle of equivalence’ (ibid. 358): “The poetic
function projects the principle of equivalence from the axis of selection into the axis
of combination”. Semantically equivalent or similar linguistic units are selected from
a paradigm in a way that phonetically equivalent or similar units are established on
the syntagmatic level. For example, the adjective horrible is selected from a lexical
paradigm also containing the synonyms disgusting, frightful, terrible etc. to produce
the alliterating noun phrase horrible Harry.
Following the basic semiotic principles outlined by Jakobson, linguists and literary critics have developed detailed and sophisticated deviational approaches, for example Leech (1966), Todorov (1967), the Belgian ‘groupe m’ (Dubois et al. 1974) and Plett (1975, 2000). I will return to these approaches when dealing with the classification of FSP (cf. Section 3.2.).

Despite its intuitive appeal, deviation theory has had to face severe criticism (e.g. by Coseriu 1994: 159ff.; Spillner 1974: 39ff.; Ricœur 1975: 173ff.; Knape 1996: 295ff.). This criticism is basically justified. It is true that modern deviation theory has developed much more sophisticated standards of explicitness and consistency than ancient rhetoric. But still, the following weak points remain:

1. It is hardly possible to isolate a zero-variety of language which could serve as the basis from which figurative language is derived via the principle of equivalence and more specific linguistic operations (cf. Ricœur 1975: 178: “le langage neutre n’existe pas”, that is, “neutral language doesn’t exist”). That a zero-variety is difficult to establish is conceded even by deviation theorists (cf. Todorov 1967: 97ff.; Dubois et al. 1974: 59). FSP occur – and are sometimes even extremely frequent – in many instances of everyday language: in conversations, political speeches, advertising texts, fairy tales, slogans, idioms and proverbs (cf. Kloepfer 1975). Moreover, empirical studies provide frequency counts of metaphors within different types of text. These studies show that speakers use 1.80 creative and 4.08 dead metaphors per minute of discourse (cf. Gibbs 1994: 123f.; Aitchison 1994: 149). Finally, recent publications on metaphor stress the crucial role of metaphor even in languages for specific purposes, for example, in scientific and philosophical language (cf. McCloskey 1983; Kittay 1987: 9; Piepen 1993: 76ff., Gibbs 1994: 169ff.; Debatin et al. 1997).

2. Quite often FSP are not even replaceable by a ‘proper’ expression because such a proper expression simply does not exist and we have to rely on figurative language (cf. Weydt 1987; Coseriu 1994: 163). This was already acknowledged by ancient deviation theorists like Quintilian (cf. inst.orat. 8.6.6.; cf. also Aristotle poet. 1457b 25–26). This is not to deny the fact that in many cases we can distinguish proper and figurative language. As far as metaphor is concerned, even ‘dead’ or ‘frozen’ metaphors, which have almost become ‘literal’ expressions, can be recognized as such at a given synchronic moment in a given language community (cf. Kittay 1987: 22). Moreover, the psycholinguistic evidence referred to by Gibbs (1994: 80ff., 399ff.; cf. also Aitchison 1994: 150) provides reasons to assume that conventionalized FSP are processed as naturally and quickly as ‘proper’ expressions. Thus, this evidence challenges the view that figurative speech requires special or additional mental processes for it to be understood.
3. Deviation theory could imply the assimilation of FSP with mistakes, which are indeed ‘deviations’. However, unlike mistakes, FSP are the result of intentional operations. It would be most implausible to assume that we first choose ‘proper’ but less adequate expressions from a zero-variety, then recognize that they are not adequate and then substitute them with figurative expressions. It is more plausible to assume that we directly select the most suitable verbal tool from the available paradigms in our language. Therefore, deviation theory should be replaced by a selection theory of style (cf. e.g. Marouzeau 1935: Xff., Spillner 1974: 64, van Dijk 1980: 97) or, on a more general level, by a pragmatic theory which describes language use as a process of selective adaptation to context (cf. Verschueren 1998).

4. FSP are phenomena occurring at the textual level of language. Traditionally prevailing views of sentence grammarians (which reappear in modern rhetorical studies like, for example, those of Dubois et al. 1974: 260f.) claimed that the text level does not belong to the language system proper. However, textlinguists have amply demonstrated in the past few decades (cf. e.g. van Dijk 1980; Coseriu 1994) that the text level, too, is at least partially organized according to language-specific rules. FSP are realized by verbal strategies which form an essential part of our textual and/or communicative competence. Therefore, they are not merely secondary phenomena of ‘parole’ or linguistic performance, but partake in a definition of language as a creative, communicative activity (cf. Coseriu 1956; Ricœur 1975: 87ff.).

From these arguments the following conclusion can be derived: FSP are not merely ornamental or aesthetic devices. Many FSP are linguistically and cognitively basic. Therefore, they inevitably shape our cognition and culture-specific views of reality. This has been especially stressed in recent studies on metaphor: “Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature” (Lakoff & Johnson 1980: 3; cf. similarly Ricœur 1975: 25; Kövecses 2002: viii). In this respect, also conventionalized tokens of FSP are particularly important because unlike newly created instances of FSP they have ceased to attract our attention and have thus become unnoticed cognitive background phenomena.

Against this conclusion, deviation theorists could still argue that a restricted version of deviation theory is correct under the following conditions: (1) Its claims are restricted to poetic literature in the narrow sense of the word; (2) the difference between everyday language and poetic language is no longer seen as a qualitative deviation but as a quantitative deviation: truly poetic texts like poems usually contain more FSP than, say, editorials or parliamentary speeches; (3) it is restricted to creative FSP, which have not (yet) been conventionalized (cf. Fontanier 1968: 64).

While these arguments are relevant and important, they can still be refuted. It is true that there is a clear statistical difference between the frequency of FSP in
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poetic texts and everyday language. However, this difference does not justify considering poetic language as a deviation from everyday language. As FSP partake in the definition of language as a creative activity and FSP are present in all kinds of language varieties, the difference of frequency simply does not justify seeing poetic language as a deviation from other varieties of language. Rather, everyday language or scientific language could be seen as ‘deviations’ from or ‘reductions’ of poetic language. Only the latter fully exhausts the creative potential of language by using all available verbal strategies (cf. Coseriu 1994:159ff.).

In this respect, conventionalized FSP are not substantially different from creative FSP (cf. Kövecses 2002:44ff.). In both cases, figurative patterns are used to produce texts for some communicative purpose, only that in the case of creative FSP, new ways of formulating meaningful texts are recognized and implemented. Conventionalized FSP are verbal strategies used to repeat these original creations, to “re-create” tokens of utterances according to stylistic patterns which are already accepted and widely used in a speech community. But this is only a difference of degree, because new realizations of FSP can gradually spread to the whole speech community and sooner or later also become conventionalized. It is in this context that Spitzer (1961:517ff.) rightly characterized syntax and grammar as ‘frozen stylistics’.

In the light of the preceding discussion, the weaknesses of ancient and recent attempts to define FSP as deviations from a neutral variety of language (cf. Quintilian Inst.Orat. 9.1.11: ‘figura’ = “any rational deviation, either in thought or expression, from the ordinary and simple method of speaking, a change analogous to the different positions our bodies assume when we sit down, lie down, or look back” or Corbett & Connors (1999:379): “We will use ‘figures of speech’ as the generic term for any artful deviations from the ordinary mode of speaking or writing”) should be avoided by the following definition of FSP (cf. also Ricœur 1975:10):

FSP are the output of discourse strategies which we use to select units from linguistic paradigms of different levels (phonetics/phonology, morphology, syntax, semantics) to create texts (in the sense of both written and spoken genres of discourse) which are adequate as far as their communicative purpose in some context is concerned.

From the perspective of the audience, the same process can be conceived of as an infinite sequence of the interpretations of texts. This time, the FSP in a text are used as interpretive clues or hints for the attentive hearer/reader. Again, most of the time we repeat or “re-create” standard interpretations of these texts. But the list of standard interpretations can be creatively extended by detecting new FSP in the text or by detecting non-traditional interpretations of well-known FSP. In this way, non-standard interpretations can be found. The use of FSP can thus be defined as an open-ended, creative communicative activity by both speaker and hearer.
3.2 Classification of FSP

Typologies of FSP in ancient rhetoric suffer from a variety of weaknesses. Therefore, it is not surprising that recent typologies (cf. Leech 1966; Todorov 1967; Dubois et al. 1974; Plett 1975, 1985; Bacry 1992) try to overcome the deficiencies of the traditional typology. Most of these typologies use two basic principles for the classification of FSP: (1) a distinction of linguistic levels at which the FSP are situated; (2) a distinction of several basic operations which realize particular FSP. These principles of classification are highly valuable even if one does not want to accept the deviational framework underlying such typologies.

To illustrate these typologies, Plett (1975, 2000) will serve as an example. Plett starts from a deviational perspective, but refines it considerably, distinguishing between ‘rule-violating’ deviation and ‘rule-strengthening’ deviation (cf. also Todorov 1967: 108). In this way he avoids part of the criticism against deviation theory mentioned above (cf. Section 3.1.): at least some FSP are rightly classified as operations which enforce rules of everyday language rather than violating them. Rule-violating deviation is based on the four elementary operations of addition, subtraction, permutation and substitution, which are executed at all linguistic levels, from the phonemic/morphemic level to text level.

Some examples of FSP derived by these four operations are: prosthesis, parenthesis, tautology (addition); syncope, ellipsis, oxymoron (subtraction); metathesis, inversion, hysteronsproteron (permutation); finally, substitution of sounds or syllables, exchange of word classes, metaphor, metonymy, irony (substitution).

Rule-strengthening deviation is based on various kinds of repetition, which concern either the position of linguistic elements or their size or their degree of similarity, frequency and distribution. Examples of FSP resulting from rule-strengthening deviation, again taken from various levels, are: alliteration, assonance, anaphor, parallelism, synonymy, simile, allegory (position); rhyme (size); partial equivalence of vowels/consonants, puns, parison (similarity); the same FSP can be studied as to their frequency and distribution in a text.

From the perspective of a selection theory of style, one could see the four operations as an implementation of selection strategies, as a means to transform linguistic units of a paradigm into other units of the same paradigm (at the same level) and vice versa. Therefore, unlike deviation theorists, one need not assume that one of these linguistic units (phonemes, morphemes, phrases, clauses, word meanings and sentence meanings) is part of a zero-variety of language and all the others are derived from it. Rather than assuming a unidirectional transformation of linguistic elements, the four operations could be better conceived of as multilateral transformations which operate in all directions.
Plett classifies all FSP according to the respective operations and levels of analysis. The following display shows a summary of Plett’s typology (1975: 148; 2000: 22, 50ff.). Note that ‘rule-strengthening’ deviation is a further operation (‘equivalence’) which has to be added to the 4 basic ‘rule-violating’ deviations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Linguistic levels</th>
<th>Operations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phonology</td>
<td>I. Rule-violating deviation:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morphology</td>
<td>1. Addition: a+b+c → a+b+c+d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syntax</td>
<td>2. Subtraction: a+b+c → a+b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semantics</td>
<td>3. Permutation: a+b+c → a+c+b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graphemics</td>
<td>4. Substitution: a+b+c → a+z+c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>II. Rule-strengthening deviation:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Equivalence: a+b+c → a+b+c+a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1.

Plett illustrates his typology with examples which are mainly taken from German and English poetic texts (cf. Plett 1975: 252ff.). Below, some of these examples are quoted:

I. Rule-violating Deviation at the semantic level:

1. Addition: ‘Tautology’ (with the help of synonymic expressions, the same semantic content is predicated twice):

(1) Hamlet: There’s ne’er a villain dwelling in all Denmark
            But he’s an arrant knave

(W. Shakespeare, Hamlet I.5: 123f.)

2. Subtraction: ‘Oxymoron/Paradoxon’ (antonymic semantic properties are ascribed to the same object simultaneously, within the same noun phrase or sentence):

(2) Romeo: Why, then, o brawling love! O loving hate!... O heavy lightness!... cold fire, sick health! Still-waking sleep, that is not what it is!

(W. Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet I.1: 182–187)

3. Permutation: ‘Hysteronproteron’ (a clash between temporal succession and linear word order: a chronologically later event 1 is presented earlier in the text and followed by the chronologically earlier event 2 later in the text):

(3) Ihr Mann ist tot und läßt Sie grüssen.
    (W. v.Goethe, Faust I: 2916)
    (‘Your husband is dead and sends you his regards’)
4. Substitution: ‘Metaphor’ (expressions containing semantic features like [+abstract] or [+visual] interact with other expressions containing semantic features like [+concrete] or [+acoustic] within the same phrase, clause or sentence):
   - [+abstract] → [+concrete]:
     (4) …hands/ That lift and drop a question on your plate
     (T. S. Eliot, The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock: 29f.)
   - [+visual] → [+acoustic]:
     (5) Pyramus: I see a voice
     (W. Shakespeare, A Midsummer Night’s Dream V.1: 194)

Apart from its deviation-theoretical background, Plett’s typology is to be praised for the following reasons: (1) the principles of classification are much more transparent than in traditional classifications; (2) standards of explicitness and demarcation are thus raised considerably; (3) the cross-classification based on basic operations and linguistic levels is carried out much more consistently than in traditional typologies following the classical tripartite classification.

Important points of criticism still remain. First, a high degree of intersubjective reliability has apparently been realized only at the phonological, morphological and syntactic levels. Here, a comparison of the typologies by Plett and the Belgian ‘groupe m’ (Dubois et al. 1974: 80ff.; Plett 1975: 150ff.) shows that different typologies classify in much the same way. But at the semantic level there are considerable discrepancies. For example, Plett defines ‘oxymoron’ as a FSP derived via semantic subtraction (cf. above), whereas Dubois et al. (1974: 200) derive it via semantic substitution:

   (6) Cette obscure clarté qui tombe des étoiles
       (‘This dark brightness which falls from the stars’)
       (P. Corneille, Le Cid IV.3: 1273)

There are more examples for discrepancies at the semantic level: Dubois et al. consider only a small part of the classical tropes to be semantic figures (‘Métasémèmes’, 1974: 152ff.), while they treat most of them as extra-linguistic logical figures (‘Métalogismes’, 1974: 204ff.). Plett, however, treats all tropes as figures of semantic deviation. The view of Dubois et al. could be criticized as a problematic equation of semantic phenomena of natural languages with semantic phenomena of formal logic.

Another example is provided by problematic attempts to reduce semantic FSP like metaphor, metonymy and synecdoche to one basic type (e.g. metaphor to a double synecdoche, cf. Dubois et al. 1974) or one dimension of language. Jakobson (1971) tried to associate metaphor with selection (the paradigmatic dimension of language) and metonymy with combination (the syntagmatic dimension of language). Moreover, he extended this dichotomy to the description of types of aphasia, literary traditions and nonverbal codes (painting and cinema). These attempts are highly interesting, but
have plausibly been criticized as instances of reductionism (cf. Ricœur 1975: 222ff.; Eggs 1994: 188ff.; Eco 1985: 169ff.).

Second, a great part of the traditional ‘figures of thought’ has not been systematically integrated into recent typologies (cf. the relatively short remarks in Todorov 1967: 110; Dubois et al. 1974: 218ff.; 260ff.; Plett 1975: 302; Plett 2000: 31ff., 236ff.). Take, for example, ‘praeteritio’ (‘faked omission’), where the speaker mentions a fact which is harmful to his opponent while pretending at the same time not to refer to it. In the following example, Cicero pretends to omit the financial problems of his enemy Catilina while at the same time mentioning them:

(7) *Praetermitto ruinas fortunarum tuae.*

(‘I omit the ruin of your fortune’) (Cicero, In Catilinam 1.6.14)

Or see the following example of another important ‘figure of thought’, namely, rhetorical question (‘interrogatio’):

(8) *What use is a smoke alarm with dead batteries?  
Don’t forget it, check it.*

(The Observer, 3.3.1991, quoted after Ilie 1994: 103)

The neglect of ‘figures of thought’ in modern typologies may be due to the fact that unlike other FSP they cannot easily be classified with the help of formal and structural features.

Finally, structural typologies have to be criticized because they tend to neglect the fact that FSP should be considered as linguistic elements having certain communicative functions like clarification, stimulation of interest, aesthetic and cognitive pleasure, modification of the cognitive perspective, intensification or mitigation of emotions etc. (cf. Knape 1996: 320ff.) Ideally, each structurally identified FSP should be assigned one or more functions as a complementary part of its description (for a first attempt cf. Plett 1985: 77, quoted after Knape 1996: 340). This is also important because one and the same FSP can have different functions according to the type of text in which it is used. From a functional perspective, FSP have been studied and defined as verbal means expressing the specific way in which a speech act is performed (cf. Sandig 1986).

4. **Across the lines of discipline: The cognitive and communicative role of FSP**

Some philosophers have postulated that rational discourse has to avoid all kinds of FSP. Take the example of John Locke (1975: 508; in: *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, 3.10.34):

But yet, if we would speak of Things as they are, we must allow, that all the Art of Rhetorick, besides Order and Clearrness, all the artificial and figurative application of Words Eloquence hath invented, are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong Ideas,
move the Passions, and thereby mislead the Judgment; and so indeed are perfect cheat:
And therefore however laudable or allowable Oratory may render them in Harangues
and popular Addresses, they are certainly, in all Discourses that pretend to inform and
to instruct, wholly to be avoided.

As the big problems of isolating a zero-variety of language have already made clear, it
is simply not possible to refrain from using FSP. Even Locke in his severe criticism uses
dead metaphors like to move the passions and to mislead judgment (cf. Kittay 1987: 5).
Nor would it be desirable to speak or write without using FSP. A postulate to present
the ‘naked’ facts and nothing else – note that the postulate, too, makes use of a meta-
phorical expression! – is not only completely unrealistic, it also obscures the fact that
FSP can make a positive contribution to the rationality of argumentation by making
good arguments even stronger (cf. van Eemeren 2010).

It is also impossible to ban or stigmatize specific types of FSP unconditionally. A
prominent example is metaphor. Aristotle (together with other distinguished authors)
is often quoted as an authority for the prohibition of metaphors in rational discourse
(Topics 139b, 34f.: “metaphorical expressions are always obscure”). However, Aristo-
tle supports a much more sympathetic view of metaphor in his Rhetoric and Poetics,
where he acknowledges its positive cognitive role (cf. Rhetoric 1410b 10–15; Poetics
1459a 5–8; Ricœur 1975: 49; Eco 1985: 151; Kittay 1987: 2ff.):

To learn easily is naturally pleasant to all people, and words signify something: so
whatever words create knowledge in us are the pleasantest…Metaphor most brings
about learning, for when he calls old age “stubble”, he creates understanding and
knowledge through the genus, since both old age and stubble are [species of the genus
of] things that have lost their bloom.

Even in the Topics, Aristotle recognizes the fact that metaphors can make a certain con-
tribution as to the better recognition of an object (Top. 140a 8–10). Modern linguists,
philosophers and psychologists (e.g. Black 1954; Ricœur 1975; Lakoff & Johnson 1980;
Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1983; Pielenz 1993; Gibbs 1994; Kövecses 2002) have
gone beyond this and stress the argumentative function of metaphors and their highly
important cognitive role: they shape our experience of reality, creative metaphors even
restructure our vision of the world; moreover, they are not isolated entities, but com-
plex cognitive networks.

Moreover, it has to be made clear that “metaphorical thought, in itself, is neither
good nor bad; it is simply commonplace and inescapable” (Lakoff 1991: 73; cf. also
Lakoff 2005). The same metaphors can be used in a more or less rationally accept-
able way, for example, ‘light’ and ‘darkness’ as metaphorical symbols for more or less
respectable ideological concepts. Furthermore, different metaphorical domains, only
some of which are rationally acceptable, are applied to the same concept: ’love’ can be
portrayed metaphorically as ‘war’, ‘madness’, but also as a ‘collaborative work of art’
or a ‘journey’ (Lakoff & Johnson 1980:139ff.). Likewise, ‘anger’ can be linguistically portrayed in many different ways, for example, as ‘boiling liquid in a container’, ‘fire’, ‘explosion’ or ‘madness’ (Lakoff 1987:397ff.; Kövecses 2002:184ff.).

The same holds for other FSP like metonymy, irony, personification, anaphor, parallelism, climax, rhetorical question etc., which can be used for enhancing clear, plausible and honest forms of communication, but also for producing confused and/or aggressive and/or manipulative texts (of course, most uses of FSP in everyday communication fall in between of these extremes).

Therefore, it seems to be impossible to stop using FSP; rather, their inevitable use should be critically evaluated according to standards of cooperative communication and argumentation, that is, they should not be used to make texts inadequate as far as their communicative purpose is concerned. More particularly, they should not be used to formulate (1) overly aggressive or (2) manipulative or (3) highly obscure texts (cf. Kienpointner 1996:185ff.). Of course, these general standards have to be interpreted in relation to specific text types and speech situations. For example, the last criterion only holds for everyday communication in standard situations, but certainly not for certain literary genres (cf. Weinrich 1976:295ff.; Eco 1985:176ff.).

FSP also are highly important communicative tools as far as the interpersonal dimension of language use is concerned. They are often used for expressing communicative intentions indirectly. Therefore FSP like tautology, metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, irony, meiosis, hyperbole etc. are compared with indirect speech acts in speech act theory (cf. Searle 1979); or FSP are discussed as means for flouting maxims of conversation and as triggers for various kinds of ‘conversational implicatures’ (cf. Grice 1975). They are amply treated also in studies which criticize and/or elaborate and modify Grice’s framework (cf. relevance theory (Sperber & Wilson 1986); Kerbrat-Orecchioni 1986; Fogelin 1987; 1988). Leech (1983) deals with FSP as part of the ‘interpersonal rhetoric’, which is used for verbalizing maxims and strategies of politeness. Therefore, FSP like irony, understatement, metaphor etc. frequently appear in empirical studies of politeness (cf. Brown/Levinson 1987). As far as text comprehension is concerned, FSP can make it easier to recall what has been said or written. Therefore, attention to figurative structures can enable better retrieval of the information. This has also been confirmed by the results of comprehension tests (cf. van Dijk & Kintsch 1983:92ff.; 253ff.). In this context, the different functions of FSP in spoken and written discourse have to be mentioned. The distinction between orality and literacy can also be based on the different functions of FSP in oral discourse, where they are functional as mnemotechnic devises, and literary texts, where they have primarily aesthetic functions (cf. Ong 1982).

Goatly (1997) provides a good example for a fruitful integration of a number of pragmatic frameworks for a comprehensive description of metaphor. Goatly positions metaphor on a continuum between literal and figurative uses of linguistic
expressions. Using relevance theory (cf. Sperber & Wilson 1986), Goatly (1997: 137ff.) distinguishes creative (‘active’) metaphors from ‘sleeping’ (‘inactive’) metaphors: the former require more processing efforts, but also trigger far more contextual implications and in this sense are optimally relevant. However, he also criticizes relevance theory’s lack of social dimension and uses Halliday’s (1994) functional grammar to distinguish between ideational, interpersonal and textual functions and a corresponding classification of a variety of communicative functions of metaphor. Moreover, he uses Hallidayan concepts like register to explain the use of metaphors within specific genres. Fairclough’s (1989) model of text interpretation is used to combine relevance theory and functional grammar within an integrated model of text interpretation (Goatly 1997: 283ff.).

As far as cross-cultural communication is concerned, on the one hand FSP can be considered as universals, which occur as discourse strategies in all languages and cultures; on the other hand, there exist a number of language-specific or culture-specific contrasts as far as the use and the frequency of particular FSP are concerned (cf. Kövecses 2000). In this context, studies comparing the use of FSP in Indo-European and non-Indo-European languages are especially interesting (cf. e.g. Jakobson 1977: 89ff. on parallelism; Jakobson & Waugh 1979, ch. 4, on onomatopoeia; Yu 1998 on metaphor in Chinese; Kienpointner 2004 on metaphor in German, English, Turkish, Chinese and Native American languages such as Hopi, Navaho, Tohono O’odham).

The ubiquity of FSP calls for an interdisciplinary approach: their use in literary texts, in visual codes, their relationship with slips of the tongue and other speech errors and language disorders, the problems of their treatment in machine translation and studies on artificial intelligence cannot be studied other than by a joint effort of disciplines like linguistics, literary criticism, the graphic arts, psychology, computer science etc. The following remarks can only provide a few illustrative examples of research in these areas.

Of course, FSP are highly relevant for the production of literary texts. This is why they have been amply discussed in literary criticism. In the last few decades, FSP have been used as descriptive tools for the linguistic interpretation of literary texts by authors using a variety of differing frameworks, among them quantitative approaches, linguistic structuralism, generative grammar or text linguistics (cf. e.g. Kibédi Varga 1970; Freeman 1970; Spillner 1974; Plett 1975; Jakobson & Lévi-Strauss 1977; Coseriu 1994). More recently, postmodernist approaches have studied Nietzsche’s rhetorical deconstruction of classical metaphysics (cf. especially Nietzsche 1969: 314) and problematized the interpretation of (literary) texts with the help of classical typologies of FSP (cf. e.g. De Man 1979, quoted after Kopperschmidt (ed.) 1991: 170ff.; Cahn 1989; Sexl 2004: 178ff.). Research on oral narratives in languages and cultures all over the world suggests that these instances of ‘ordinary’ talk resemble poetry in many respects: they are organized according to Jakobson’s principle of equivalence (cf. above Section 3.1),
contain many FSP and have structural patterns similar to the verses and stanzas of poems (cf. Hymes 1998 on Native American and African-American narratives).

Many researchers have followed Jakobson's pioneering work in extending the analysis of FSP from verbal to visual codes. They use traditional and modern treatments of FSP for studying ‘rhetorical figures’ in music, painting, cinema, advertising and architecture (e.g. Spencer 1957; Eco 1972: 184ff.; Dubois et al. 1974; Aldrich 1983; Schmitz 1990; Becker/Kibédi Varga 1993; Kennedy/Kennedy 1993). There are also recent attempts to extend concepts of argumentation theory like ‘argument’ or ‘fallacy’ for explaining and evaluating ‘visual arguments’ (cf. Groarke 1996, 2002, 2009).

Furthermore, the connection of elements of the doctrine of FSP (e.g. FSP like metaphor, irony or puns; the distinction of four basic rhetorical operations like addition, deletion, substitution, permutation) with psychological and psycholinguistic studies should be mentioned. In this context, research on speech errors (slips of the tongue), schizophrenic discourse, the mental lexicon, and (Freudian) psychoanalysis provides examples for the fruitful application of classical rhetorical concepts to still further disciplines (cf. e.g. Hopper 1992; Reinsdorf 1993; Aitchison 1994; Gibbs 1994; Freud 1975; Todorov 1977: 285ff.; Jaffe 1980; Lacan 1983; Springfellow 1994; Levelt 1999).

Finally, FSP are a challenge for computer science. They pose specific problems for their treatment in studies on computer-aided lexicography, machine translation and artificial intelligence. There are several suggestions how these difficulties could be overcome and a description of FSP like metaphors or metonymies could be integrated into computer programs designed for simulating the human capacity of understanding and creating figurative utterances (cf. e.g. Carbonell 1982; Fass 1988; Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 1993; Behrens 1993).

References


1. Introduction

Genre is a concept used in many disciplines, ranging from linguistics, literary studies, cultural and film studies to rhetoric, folklore and educational research. Its roots are in Greek antiquity, but in language studies the concept has gained salience only in the past few decades.

The notion of genre is closely associated with the idea that texts (and other cultural products) can be grouped into types or classes according to formal and/or functional similarities. However, classification is not all there is to genres. Genre interests scholars across disciplines because it allows looking at products of culture not merely as forms, but as social and symbolic action. Genres are increasingly perceived not as normative formulas, but as sets of socially situated and variable conventions and expectations regarding textual form. Thus, in contemporary genre research, descriptive and taxonomic approaches coexist with studies on genre use in different settings and change and variability in genre repertoires.

The concept of genre is complex and even controversial, in part due to differences in how genres are conceptualised, modelled and analysed in different disciplines and schools of genre research. The metaphors through which genres are viewed are illustrative: while some talk about genres as species or classes, drawing on biological models, others prefer to think of genres as families or prototypes, and yet others as blueprints or labels (Frow 2006: 52). What most approaches have in common, however, is the assumption that genres as forms of semiotic practice are socially based. The concept encourages analysts to look for shared conventions, typification, recurrence and standardisation. Following Devitt, “genres require multiplicity, multiple actions by multiple people” (2004: 33).

In the following, I will review different approaches to genre research within language studies. I will begin, however, with a brief outline of the historical roots of the concept and particularly the work of Mikhail Bakhtin, which has been instrumental in the emergence of the concept in language studies.

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1. It is notable that cognitive approaches to genre have been far less prominent than sociocultural ones in recent years (but see Paltridge 1997).
2. Historical precedents

The term genre derives from the Latin genus, which refers to kind or class. Applied to literary texts, classification goes as far back as Aristotle’s Poetics, where distinctions are drawn between epic, tragedy and comedy. Subsequently, renaissance scholars were influenced by classical models to produce listings of genres. These lists did not provide any comprehensive coverage of existing literary genres, but rather a “prescriptive taxonomy” of valued forms (Frow 2006: 26). Classificatory approaches to genre were common also in rhetoric and the study of folklore.

The concept of genre began to be widely used in linguistics only in the 1970s. Influences were drawn from the study of registers, begun in the 1960s (e.g. Halliday et al. 1964; see also Dittmar 1995), sociolinguistics and linguistic anthropology (e.g. Hymes 1974), as well as from folklore and literary studies. Perhaps the most important theoretical influence for genre research in linguistics has been the Russian philosopher and literary scholar Mikhail Bakhtin (see Björklund 2005). In his now classic essay “The problem of speech genres” (1986, originally published in 1953), Bakhtin makes the claim that all language use is necessarily framed within generic types: genre is a precondition for communication, for the creation and interpretation of texts. It is therefore impossible to communicate outside genres: “We speak only in definite speech genres, that is, all our utterances have definite and relatively stable typical forms of construction of the whole” (1986: 78, original italics).

Bakhtin defines genres as “relatively stable thematic, compositional and stylistic types of utterances” (1986: 64). Due to their stability, they act as a normative influence, in the same way as grammatical systems. However, this stability is variable: some generic forms are rigid and standardised to the extent that their use amounts to mechanical reproduction while others are “flexible, plastic and creative” (1986: 78).

That generic stabilities are only relative has become a central theme in contemporary genre research: texts are perceived as being shaped by both centripetal (unifying and centralising) and centrifugal (stratifying, decentralising) forces (Bakhtin 1981: 270–72). Every genre is influenced at the same time by normative forces, seeking to standardise generic expression, and forces which bring out a “multiplicity of social voices” (Bakhtin 1981: 263).

Another key element of Bakhtin’s discussion of genre is that texts are established as dialogical in nature: they form links in “chains of speech communion” (Bakhtin 1986: 76). That is, texts are not self-sufficient, but are always to be regarded as responses

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2. An example is Sir Philip Sidney’s The Defence of Poesie (1595), which lists “Heroick, Lyrick, Tragick, Comick, Satyrick, Iambick, Elegiack, Pastorall, and certaine others” (1595: 10).

3. The term “speech genres” refers to both spoken and written genres.
to previous texts in the same sphere. The notion of *addressivity*, the “quality of being directed to someone”, emphasises that texts are constructed with such responses in mind (1986:95). Thus, genre as a concept directs attention not only to the stability and organisation of individual types, but to interaction between types and interaction between producers and consumers of texts.

3. Genre research in language studies

Contemporary genre research in language studies focuses in particular on professional and disciplinary communication (e.g. research writing, business and technical writing) and genre literacy. In the past two decades, genre has become an influential concept particularly in the teaching of writing. Genre research has also gained increasing visibility on the conference scene: the first conference devoted to genre research in language studies was held in 1992 in Ottawa, with new editions in Vancouver (1998) and Oslo (2001). Currently, a series of conferences is being organised in Brazil under the label SIGET.

In the following, I will review three established approaches to genre research (cf. Hyon 1996): the Australian-based “Sydney School”, the North American New Rhetoric paradigm and genre research within English for Specific Purposes. These three approaches form relatively homogeneous schools with specific and identifiable research agendas and interests. In addition, the concept of genre is drawn on in a number of other traditions of linguistics; for example, linguistic anthropology (e.g. Bauman & Briggs 1992; Bauman 2001), conversation analysis (e.g. Levinson 1992; Linell 1998) and critical discourse analysis (Fairclough 2003; Wodak 2006). These will, however, not be discussed further here.

3.1 Sydney School

This approach to genre builds on systemic-functional linguistics (SFL), pioneered by Michael Halliday (see e.g. Halliday 1994). It has developed a coherent research programme as well as pedagogical applications in the field of genre literacy, both of which have been explicitly articulated and exemplified in an extensive literature. The school derives its name from its main institutional base, the Department of Linguistics at the University of Sydney in Australia. Studies of genre in SFL developed from early research on register, which examined how language varies according to situational

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4. Genre research is also a vibrant field in Brazil (see SIGET 2007) and in the Nordic countries (see e.g. Berge & Ledin 2001; Berge & Maager 2005). For a review of genre research in German speaking countries, see Muntigl and Gruber (2005).
context. It was noted that linguistic features (such as particular types of lexis) are not spread evenly across texts; language users make different linguistic choices in different phases of a text or interaction. This gave rise to an examination of generic staging (Ventola 2005).

The key scholars associated with the Sydney School are Jim Martin, Frances Christie and Joan Rothery (see e.g. Martin et al. 1987; Rothery 1996; Christie & Martin 1997). In broad terms, genres are defined by their function or purpose, in relation to a particular sociocultural context: “different genres are different ways of using language to achieve different culturally established tasks” (Eggins & Martin 1997: 236). Sydney scholars have developed, in particular, analyses of the schematic structure of genres, as staging is assumed to be “the major linguistic reflex of differences in purpose” (Eggins & Martin 1997: 236). Thus, the classic Sydney definition of genres is that they are “staged goal-oriented social processes” (Martin 1997: 13). The argument is that texts unfold through stages, since social action usually takes more than one step to accomplish. The stages are goal-oriented in the sense that when they do not unfold as expected, there is likely to be a sense of incompleteness.

Another important characteristic of Sydney genre research is close analysis of the linguistic realisation of generic stages: different stages are assumed to draw on different lexico-grammatical resources. Eggins (2004) gives the example of a recipe: while lists of ingredients tend to be realised as noun phrases including numbers and measurements, “methods” sections often contain clauses in the imperative mood, linked by temporal conjunctions (then, next) and including action-oriented verbs (such as slice, fry, heat). Thus, the identification of stages is not an interpretive process, but a descriptive one. Here SFL work on genre differs significantly from many other approaches to genre research: genre identity is defined by recourse to text-internal, linguistic criteria.6

This emphasis on lexico-grammatical description is related to one of the principal motivations of genre research in the Sydney School: contributing to genre literacy education. The modelling of genres in terms of stages was developed in the 1980s as a response to debates around the teaching of writing in schools and to support new literacy programmes (see Reid 1987; Cope & Kalantzis 1993; Kress 2003).7 Thus,

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5. In Sydney genre theory, genres are modelled on the level of “context of culture”, while register variation is related to the “context of situation” (see e.g. Martin & Rose 2008: 10, 16; the two terms are derived from Bronislaw Malinowski’s work).

6. A similar argument has been proposed by Ruqaiya Hasan, who has developed a model where genres are analysed in terms of obligatory and optional elements, constituting a “generic structure potential” (GSP; Hasan 1989; see also Hasan 1996). The obligatory elements are seen as constitutive of a genre: they condition whether a genre text is complete or not.

7. The genre literacy programmes were a response particularly to process writing curricula then popular in schools.
besides academic analyses, Sydney genre scholars have produced textbooks and other teaching materials for literacy teaching.

Kress (1993: 28) notes that Australian models of genre pedagogy formed “both a pedagogical and a political project”. The key notion was access: it was assumed that explicit teaching of a number of key genres to migrant and working class students would help them gain access to educational and career opportunities, and indeed to full citizenship (Cope & Kalantzis 1993).8

Such pedagogical agendas have significantly influenced the selection of genres for analysis. The early focus was on primary and secondary school genres, and later migrant English education and workplace training programmes. Six key example genres were report, explanation, procedure, discussion, recount and narrative. The recount genre, for example, contains the stages “orientation” and “record of events” with an optional stage “reorientation”, while narratives consist minimally of “orientation” and “resolution”, with the possible addition of “complication” and “evaluation” between these two stages (Macken-Horarik 2002).

These examples suggest that genres are often described on a different level of abstraction compared to many other schools of genre research. Genre labels such as exposition and narrative in fact resemble labels given to text types in typologically oriented text linguistics (e.g. Werlich 1983; Biber 1989; see also Pilegaard & Frandsen 1996). In such models, text types may be seen as constituent elements of genres. Similarly, Martin (1997, 2002) suggests that reports, narratives, expositions etc. may be treated as “elemental genres” which combine into “macro-genres”.

3.2 New Rhetoric

This approach to genre research, sometimes also referred to as Rhetorical Genre Studies, developed in North America mainly within the fields of rhetoric and composition studies in the 1980s and 1990s. To date, most of the work has focused on written genres and L1 writers. The approach differs from the Sydney School in many respects. Instead of treating genres as broadly available cultural resources, genres are analysed as socially situated, often within particular professional or disciplinary communities. Besides looking at textual products, researchers examine the settings in which genres are used, focusing on institutional, cultural and historical factors influencing writing practice (see e.g. Freedman & Medway 1994; Coe et al. 2002). Analysts have looked at the writing of, for example, tax accountants (Devitt 1991), biologists (Myers 1990) and workers at a central bank (Smart 2006). Unlike in Sydney genre research, there tends to

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8. Models of SFL genre literacy have also been widely criticised (e.g. Luke 1996; Freedman 1994; see Kress 2003 for a review).
be little close analysis of textual structures or lexicogrammatical choices. Nonetheless, the approach has been very influential in language studies.

A key text by Carolyn Miller elaborates on the conceptualisation of genres as social action: “a rhetorically sound definition of genre must be centred not on the substance or the form of discourse but on the action it is used to accomplish” (Miller 1984: 151). Miller argues that typification of rhetorical forms such as genres is linked to typification in rhetorical situations. When situations recur they prompt similar responses, and these similarities come to be understood as types.

Following Bakhtin, genres are perceived as dynamic forms. Despite appearing stable, they are likely to change when rhetorical situations change (Berkenkotter & Huckin 1995). In an oft-cited formulation, genres are not fully fixed but “stabilised-for-now” (Schryer 1994: 108). There is therefore a concern to theorise genres as socially grounded but yet not deterministic of language use: the notion of genre is not meant to imply that writers have little agency or creative freedom. The themes of genre evolution and change have been examined in a number of monographs, for example Bazerman (1988) on the experimental article and Yates (1989) on the emergence of organisational genres.

Again following Bakhtin, genres are perceived as intertextually related to other genres, both diachronically and synchronically. New Rhetoric scholars have developed a number of concepts to account for such intertextual relations, notably genre repertoire and genre system (see Devitt 2004 for a review). Genre repertoires are sets of genres that exist within a particular sphere of activity or community and which are routinely used to conduct interaction (see e.g. Orlikowski & Yates 1994). The term genre system refers to interlinked genres, often organised in sequence, which work together to fulfil a common purpose; examples include the genre system of job search or organising a wedding (for analyses, see Bazerman 1994; Berkenkotter 2001; Tardy 2003). Importantly, since genres are dynamic and variable, so are genre repertoires and systems.

The conceptualisation of genres as dynamic forms of social action has important methodological consequences: it demands close contextualisation of genre texts through the use of ethnographically oriented methodologies. Analysts often rely on some form of fieldwork, including interviews and observation, in order to gain insights into the community being studied. For example, Tardy’s (2003) study of grant applications and Schryer’s (1994) research on genres in veterinary medicine draw on writer interviews and observation of local discourse practices.

A final issue where New Rhetoric scholars diverge from their Australian colleagues regards the feasibility of the explicit teaching of genre forms. Few researchers in this field advocate explicit teaching. For example, Berkenkotter and Huckin (1995) argue that genre learning is a process of situated acquisition through apprenticeship,
analogous to second language acquisition through immersion (see also Beaufort 2000). The most forceful statement against explicit teaching is Freedman (1994). She argues that in most cases explicit teaching will not result in genre acquisition, owing to the complexity and context-dependence of genres. Freedman argues that if genres are perceived as rhetorical action, rather than as aggregations of formal features, it is doubtful whether an explication of textual features is helpful in supporting genre acquisition: “if genres are responses to contexts, can they be learned at all out of context?” (Freedman 1994: 194; see also Freedman & Richardson 1997).

### 3.3 English for Specific Purposes

Genre analysis has been a very prominent approach also in applied linguistics, and particularly in the subfield of English for Specific Purposes (ESP), mainly through the influence of John Swales. However, the agenda of ESP genre research is not as distinctive or theoretically elaborate as those of the Sydney School and New Rhetoric. Researchers have been influenced both by systemic-functional models of analysis and by the ethnographic orientation of New Rhetoric genre research.

A key feature of ESP genre research is its pedagogical agenda: to assist non-native English speakers in mastering academic and professional genres. Published genre studies often have implications for teaching practice, and many scholars in the field have taught genre-based writing courses for L2 students and produced teaching materials (see e.g. Swales & Feak 2004). Indeed, Swales states in his influential monograph *Genre Analysis* that the aim of the book is “to offer an approach to the teaching of academic and research English” (1990: 1). However, Swales’ work is frequently drawn on also outside applied linguistics. Scholars interested in genre have taken on, in particular, the emphasis on defining genres through their communicative purposes rather than their forms, as well as the contextualisation of genres as the property of “discourse communities”.

In contrast to Sydney genre theory, Swales establishes communicative purpose as a “privileged criterion” of genre identification:

> A genre comprises a class of communicative events, the members of which share some set of communicative purposes. These purposes are recognised by the expert members of the parent discourse community and thereby constitute the rationale for the genre. This rationale shapes the schematic structure of the discourse and influences and constrains choice of content and style. (Swales 1990: 58)

Here, a relation is established between communicative purpose and language choice, via the notion of “rationale”: the rationale of the genre constrains topic-related, structural and linguistic choices.
Swales (1990) further argues that genres belong to discourse communities. Such communities are defined by common goals rather than the shared social background of community members. Established members of discourse communities are familiar with the key genres used in the community, while new members are seen as “apprentices”, in the process of becoming socialised into the relevant discoursal expectations (Swales 1990: 21–32). The communities analysed are typically professional or disciplinary ones.

As in Sydney genre research, most ESP analysts focus on the overall structure of genre texts, modelled by Swales in terms of moves and steps (cf. SFL “stages”). Swales’ own analyses have mainly concerned academic genres, but move analysis has also been applied to a host of other professional genres (typically business and legal genres). Individual genres that have been analysed for rhetorical moves include legal case reports (Bhatia 1993), business faxes (Louhiala-Salminen 1997), fundraising letters (Bhatia 2004) and personal statements (Samraj & Monk 2008).

Moves and steps are not linguistically but rhetorically defined. Perhaps the most famous move-step model is that proposed by Swales on the rhetorical organisation of introductions in research articles (1990: 140–161). The CARS model (“Create a Research Space”) suggests that successful introductions consist of three moves with a number of obligatory and optional steps in each. For example, the first move, “establishing a territory” consists of three optional steps: “claiming centrality”, “making topic generalisation” and “reviewing items of previous research”.

While moves are functionally defined and labelled and “flexible in terms of … linguistic realisation” (Swales 2004: 229), it is often assumed that they are associated with specific realisations. Unlike in SFL stage analysis, such realisations are usually not analysed systematically, nor do ESP studies draw on any one grammar model. Typically those grammatical and lexical features are commented on which are deemed frequent or important by the analyst.9

The analysis of linguistic realisations is often motivated by pedagogical concerns, but as in New Rhetoric thinking, ESP scholars tend to emphasise variation and advise against putting forward prescriptive models of generic structure (see e.g. Flowerdew 2002). The key issue here is that of rhetorical success. A common aim of ESP studies is to establish what kinds of structural and linguistic choices lead to rhetorical success (e.g. the publication vs. rejection of a research article), in order for teachers to be able to pass on such information to their students.

9. For instance, Swales (1990) outlines a number of linguistic features typically found in move 2 of the CARS model, i.e. “establishing a niche”. Writers in his data often use adversative connectors such as “however” and “yet” as well as lexical and grammatical negation to introduce a discussion of gaps in previous research. However, Swales does not comment at all on possible linguistic realisations of the step “claiming centrality”.
Genre research in ESP is not solely based on text analysis, however. In line with work in New Rhetoric, there is increasing interest in analysing writers and communities, sometimes using ethnographically oriented methodologies (Swales 1998 is a prominent example). Many studies use specialist informants in order to gain access to normative views and expert understandings of the genre analysed, for example through text-based interviews or an analysis of manuals relevant to genre production (see e.g. Paltridge 2002; Samraj & Monk 2008).

The above review has illustrated a great deal of variation in the ways in which scholars conceptualise and analyse genres. In the following, I will address two issues which arise from the review and which particularly trouble the field of genre research.

4. **Issues and debates**

The first debate regards classification and its role in the study of genres, an issue which the three schools approach differently. The second and related issue is that of stability: again, there are significant differences between those who analyse genres as essentially stable and those who focus attention on variability and change in the forms and uses of genres.

4.1 **Genre as class**

The notion of genre is often associated with the classification of texts into types. This involves asking questions such as how many genres there are in a given field, whether a text belongs to one genre class or another and what the identifying features of a genre are. Criteria used in assigning individual texts into genre classes are often formal ones (similarities in lexico-grammatical choices and schematic structure), but as noted above, also the communicative function of a text has been used in defining genre identity (as in Swales’ work). The Sydney School, in particular, tends to favour a taxonomising approach: analysts take as their objects not only individual genres, but how genres relate to each other and form systems. Thus, Martin and Rose (2008: 44) state that “Our ultimate goal has always been to map cultures as systems of genre”.

However, classification as an aim has been widely problematised in recent genre research. Commentators note, for instance, that it is doubtful whether individual texts can be seen as “members” of genre classes or as “belonging to” classes, if genres are conceptualised as dynamic and variable and their boundaries as indeterminate. Frow (2006: 2) argues that “texts – even the most simple and formulaic – do not ‘belong’ to genres but are, rather, uses of them”. For example, individual texts may draw on a
generic template only partially, or they may mix genres. Frow adds a further perspective in suggesting a focus on texts as “performances of genre”, rather than analysing texts as reproductions of a class:

Texts are acts or performances which work upon a set of generic raw materials. The relationship is one of productive elaboration rather than of derivation or determination. (Frow 2006: 23–24)

The issue of classification is closely related to the question of whether generic identity, and thereby genre classes, can be established by recourse to shared formal features. The key question is whether the relation between genre identity and form is a relation of association (genre A is typically realised using forms x, y, z, and therefore such forms act as traces of the genre) or definition (members of genre A are defined by the presence of forms x, y, z, without which they must be defined as non-members or incomplete).

Devitt (2004) expresses a widely held view in rhetorical genre studies when she claims that formal features cannot be the basis of genre identification or classification. While the identification of recurrent forms may be useful, “formal features do not define or constitute [genres]” (2004: 11; original italics). In contrast, Sydney genre theorising subscribes to a formalist assumption in the sense that generic stages are understood as constitutive of genres. Particularly in the genre models devised for literacy programmes, generic stages are identifiable through the presence of particular sets of lexicogrammatical features (cf. also Hasan’s generic structure potential; Hasan 1989).

A number of commentators have criticised what they perceive as an overprivileging of form in Sydney genre research. For example, Bex (1996: 141) notes that only considering formal features makes it impossible to distinguish parodic texts from “sincere” ones, since parodies work precisely because they closely imitate (some of) the formal elements of the texts they parody, while subverting their communicative function. A second criticism is that a formal model fails to account for genre evolution and change over time; the formal features of genres might change while the genre name and the practice it designates might not (see e.g. Devitt 2004).

Classification on the basis of communicative purpose has also been questioned. Fairclough (2003: 71) argues that not all genres are purpose-driven: focusing on purposes emphasises stable genres with a determinate structure, which are part of “instrumental social systems”. He notes that many analysts associate a contemporary tendency towards purpose-driven genres with genre in general, and suggests giving the notion of purpose a less central place in genre definitions.

Swales himself has also later problematised the status of communicative purposes as genre defining. Askehave and Swales (2001) in fact suggest abandoning communicative purposes as a method for grouping texts into genre categories. This is because “the
purposes, goals, or public outcomes [of genres] are more evasive, multiple, layered, and complex than originally envisaged” (2001: 197). However, they suggest retaining the notion of communicative purpose, but as something that can only be established after considerable research (a long-term outcome of the research), not as an initial stage of genre identification.

4.2 Stability of genres

A related issue which is intensely debated in genre research is the question of whether genres are essentially stable and classifiable forms or entities which are variable and dynamic to the point of escaping definition. The issue revolves around the tension identified by Bakhtin (1981) regarding the unifying and stratifying forces at work in the production of texts. While genres provide constraints for the production of texts, they are never fully fixed. For Bakhtin, stability is thus always relative: with each new instantiation or performance, a genre enters into interaction with new contexts and demands.

While the dynamicity of genres is a central assumption in New Rhetoric theorisations, the situation is less clear in the ESP and Sydney models. The bulk of both ESP and systemic–functionalist genre analyses have been concerned with stable, institutionalised genres, and have had relatively little to say about genre emergence, instability and hybridity. Kress (1993: 35) notes that the Martin model has tended towards “the reification of types”, with an emphasis on “the linguistic system as an inventory of types”. The pedagogical programmes offered by the Sydney School have also been criticised for suggesting a static, deterministic interpretation of genres.

It should be noted, though, that Sydney School theorising increasingly addresses questions of variability and change. For example, Martin and Rose (2008) emphasise that genre evolution should be understood in terms of “metastability”:

As system, genre functions as a kind of inertia… As process, genre allows for gradual change, as texts unfold in relation to both recurrent and divergent material and social conditions; as divergence recurs, innovative configurations of meaning stabilise, and new texts become familiar genres. (Martin & Rose 2008: 259)

Some disparity is still in evidence, however, between theoretical models (which tend to agree that genres are dynamic entities) on the one hand and models of genre pedagogy on the other. The ambivalence about stability seems to be a genuine source of tension. Many writers in the field of genre literacy espouse dynamicity in principle and are happy to cite Bakhtin’s writings as informing their work, while at the same time describing pedagogical applications in terms which suggest that genres can be presented as static formulae; that, for teaching purposes, it is possible to establish “what works” in specific settings. For example, Hyland writes about the need for “clear and explicit genre descriptions” to support L2 writing (2004: 11) and the need for “clear guidelines for how to construct the different kinds of texts [students] have to write”
In the same volume, he reminds the reader that “The dangers of a static, decontextualised pedagogy are very real” (2004: 19).

Divergent views of stability also come to the fore in the ways in which the different schools approach the analysis of hybridity, or different forms of “mixing genres”. While all three schools subscribe to the assumption that texts may mix genres or form hybrids in other ways, they differ in terms of whether hybrids are seen as being constituted of relatively stable elements, or whether the mixtures defy description.

Martin (2002: 264) sees hybrids as constituted of established generic resources: “In order to mix genres, we need something “canonical” to mix”. This suggests that there exists a stable and identifiable set of genres from which mixtures are constructed. Martin (2002) and Martin and Rose (2008) distinguish between different types of mixing, including “shifting gears” (shifting to a new genre in the middle of a text), contextual metaphor (one genre being used to stand for another, as in parody) and genre embedding (one genre functioning as a stage in another). An additional form of hybridity is multimodality, the way in which texts combine verbal and visual resources (see e.g. Kress 2003; Kress & van Leeuwen 2006).

In ESP genre research, the scholar who has written most actively about genre mixing is Bhatia. His analyses concern in particular the mixing of communicative purposes in texts (e.g. academic and promotional, or legislative and diplomatic; see Bhatia 1997, 2000). He refers to the mixing of “two or more established forms to create new hybrid forms” (2000: 148). Thus, the focus here too is on the mixing of existing generic resources, whose traces can be descriptively mapped in individual texts.

Medway (2002), in a collection of articles on rhetorical genre studies, takes a contrasting approach. He examines a “fuzzy” set of texts, architecture students’ sketchbooks. These texts form an unusual object of analysis since there are hardly any textual regularities evident in the data. The sketchbooks Medway analyses are all widely different structurally, linguistically and visually. There is also great variation in the functions which the texts seem to serve; these include “recording and preserving”, “thinking and learning” and “preparing action” (Medway 2002: 131).

The hybridity of the texts is not describable in any simple way. The texts combine verbal and visual elements; writers seem to switch from sketching to writing and vice versa in a casual manner. Medway also notes that the texts form intertextual relations to a wide array of generic resources, such as lecture notes, calendars and confessional journals. However, such models are not constitutive elements of the genre, nor does their description exhaust the analysis of the texts’ hybridity.

Medway’s analysis is illuminating because it forces a consideration of whether stability, in the form of textual regularities, is a necessary precondition of genre status. Medway notes that if similarities in form or function are the principal criterion of genre status, his data do not count as manifestations of a single genre. However, he also argues that the sketchbooks are a “recognised and significant cultural item”
within the community of architecture students, a format students learn from their peers when entering the community (2002: 136). The critical question is then whether the recognisability of a genre as a form of action overrides the need for typification on the level of texts.

The above review suggests that there is increasing agreement in contemporary genre research that genres are not simply formal classes and that theoretical models must take account of issues like hybridity and genre change. It is notable, in particular, that representatives of the Sydney School, which has tended to take a taxonomic approach to mapping genres, also provide tools for the analysis of mixed texts. However, Medway’s questions regarding what determines genrehood also indicate that important differences remain, especially regarding the status of textual regularities as a marker of genre identity.10

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**Internet sources**

1. **Introduction and definition**

The conceptual field of ‘humor’ is broad and only few areas within it are well determined. Attempts at defining and subcategorizing areas within the field such as ‘humor’ vs. ‘comedy’ or ‘ridicule’ have by and large failed. Lexicographic studies have only highlighted the differences and fluidity of the classifications used by various languages (Attardo 1994:2–7). The term ‘humor’ has emerged as a technical term to be intended as covering anything that is (or may) be perceived as funny, amusing, or laughable. This does not preclude the possibility of establishing subcategorizations in certain specific areas, e.g. tendentious humor, or ‘genres’ such as puns, jokes, etc. It should be noted, however, that terms such as ‘pun’ and ‘joke’ are not technical terms and are ultimately fuzzy. On these grounds, some have challenged the possibility of providing a unitary account of humor (e.g. Ferro-Luzzi 1990). A case for an essentialist account of humor, and a refutation of the arguments against it, is presented in Attardo (1994). By and large, linguists (as well as scholars from most disciplines) have operated on the assumption that humor is universal (cf. Apte 1985).

The history of humor research has a long and prestigious gallery of scholars trying to describe and explain the phenomena surrounding humor. Going back to Plato, Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian, and including Kant, Schopenhauer, Freud, Bergson, and Pirandello, the history of reflection on humor looks surprisingly like the history of western culture itself. Certainly humor has been an open question for two millennia. Reviews of the history of humor research can be found in Keith-Spiegel (1972), Morreall (1983;1987), Raskin (1985), and Attardo (1994). The latter has a particular focus on linguistic issues.

2. **Referential and verbal humor**

Linguistics – and before it the reflection on language – does not contribute much to research on humor until the ‘80s. Before then, with few exceptions, puns and other wordplay were the only subjects deemed interesting to or treatable by linguistics. The distinction between referential and verbal humor (introduced by Cicero and rediscovered by more or less every scholar since then under different terminologies) captures
the difference between puns, which involve a reference to the surface structure of the linguistic expression, and other forms of humor which do not. The reference to the signifier can take many forms: the most common is similarity (paronymy) and its limit case identity (homonymy), other rarer forms include alliteration and syntactic ambiguity. What seems to have been lost on most researchers is that beyond this reference to the surface form of (part of) the text, verbal and referential humor share the same deep semantic and pragmatic mechanisms. Overviews of linguistic research about puns and related phenomena can be found in Sobkowiak (1991) and Attardo (1994).

3. Semantics

Psychologists and other cognitively oriented scholars elaborated a model of the cognitive processing of humor known as the ‘incongruity-resolution’ (IR) model (see Forabosco 1992 for a review of the research). The concept of ‘incongruity’ has a long history in the psychology of humor, where it is taken as basic. A typical definition (McGhee 1979:6–7) for example reads:

> The notions of congruity and incongruity refer to the relationship between components of an object, event, idea, social expectation, and so forth. When the arrangement of the constituent elements of an event is incompatible with the normal or expected pattern, the event is perceived as incongruous. The incongruity disappears only when the pattern is seen to be meaningful or compatible in a previously overlooked way.

The ‘resolution’ phase of the humorous perception has been called ‘justification’ (Aubouin 1948), ‘local logic’ (Ziv 1984), and ‘sense in non-sense’ (Freud 1905). All the works on the resolution phase of the IR model emphasize that the resolution is not ‘complete’ (i.e. the incongruity persists after the resolution) and often stress the playfulness or even the fallacious nature of the resolution. A common conceptualization is to view IR models as ‘two stage’ (Suls 1972) models. The two stages involve giving the text a first interpretation which is then rejected in favor of a second interpretation. The two interpretations must coexist, at least to the extent that they are to be judged incongruous.

3.1 The isotopy-disjunction model

An approach to humor which is entirely compatible with the IR model emerged from European structural semantics and narratology in the work of Greimas (1966) and Morin (1966). Widely influential in Europe (see a survey of its influence in Attardo 1988, 1994) it has been by and large ignored in the US (with few exceptions). The model, which Attardo et al. (1994) dub the Isotopy-Disjunction Model (IDM), is based on the concepts of isotopy and of narrative function. The text of a joke is seen as
developing one isotopy and then switching to a second isotopy. From a narrative viewpoint, the text of the joke is divided in three functions, which set up, complicate and resolve the narration, respectively. Within the text of the joke, the IDM distinguishes two significant elements: a connector, the (optional) ambiguous or paronymic element which allows the passage from the first to the second isotopy, and the disjunctor, which causes the passage from one isotopy to the other. The connector is present only in verbal humor. The IDM, in its original formulation, runs into several problems, due to the loose definitions of the central concepts of isotopy and (narrative) function.

### 3.2 The script-based semantic theory of humor

Quite independently from the IDM, in the late ‘70s, a new approach to the semantics of humor was presented by Raskin (1979, 1985), based on the concept of ‘script.’ Scripts are intended as a cover term for such AI originated concepts as ‘frames,’ ‘schemata,’ ‘daemons,’ and ‘scripts’; on script-based semantics see Raskin (1985, 1986), Fillmore (1975, 1985) and in general the papers in the roundtable published in Quaderni di Semantica (Raskin 1985b). The Semantic Script Theory of Humor (SSTH) advocated a new approach to humor theory and presented a falsifiable theory of humor based on two conditions: (1) the text be (at least in part) compatible with two scripts; (2) the two scripts are opposed, in a technical sense, i.e. they are local antonyms. A list of typical oppositions is provided, which include ‘actual vs. non-actual’ and ‘normal vs. abnormal’ and such subtypes as ‘good vs. bad’ ‘sex vs. no-sex,’ etc. The SSTH also introduces terminology to account for the linguistic element causing the switch from one script to the other (script-switch trigger). The SSTH’s rigorous presentation and theoretical baggage ensured its success and it has been widely applied to various forms of humor (although it was conceived as applying to jokes). A review of the SSTH’s applications can be found in Attardo (1994:195–229).

The limitations of the SSTH were immediately pointed out by Raskin himself in a series of papers and conference presentations (see Attardo 1994:214–219 for a review) and eventually led to its revision in Attardo and Raskin (1991). The General Theory of Verbal Humor (GTVH) is presented as an expansion of the SSTH which it accepts as a significant part of its theoretical apparatus. Essentially, the GTVH addresses three basic issues which the SSTH does not highlight: (1) the fact that the SSTH is explicitly limited to handling jokes; (2) the fact that some jokes are perceived as being more or less similar to others; and (3) the fact that verbal and referential humor differ (although not semantically). To account for these issues the GTVH introduces other Knowledge Resources (KR) beyond the basic script opposition/overlap (symbolized SO). These include, the LAnguage of the joke (i.e. its surface structure) significant for puns, but also for the placement of the punch line), the Situation, which includes the ‘subject matter’ of the narrative of the text, the TArget, (roughly, the butt of the joke), the Narrative Strategy,
corresponding to the ‘genre’ of the text (e.g. question and answer, knock-knock joke, etc.), and the Logical Mechanism, which is the mechanism whereby the SO is introduced and may correspond to the ‘resolution’ phase of the processing (see a suggestion to that effect in Forabosco 1992: 59). Most of Attardo and Raskin (1991) is dedicated to ranking the various KRs to determine which ones affect more directly the perception of similarity among jokes. The final ranking is (from most to least significant) SO, LM, SI, TA, NS, LA. Empirical support for the GTVH is presented in Ruch et al. (1993) and Forabosco (1994). Extensive debate and critical assessment of the SSTH/GTVH can also be found in the papers collected in Attardo (ed. 2004).

3.3 ‘Longer’ texts

The SSTH and GTVH have been so far primarily confined to jokes (with some exception, e.g. (1987). Attardo (1994: 254–270; 1996) presented some analyses and a call for further research, respectively. This area of research appears particularly difficult because of the intersection of fields of research as disparate as narratology, natural language processing, literary criticism and text linguistics, not to mention humor research. Recent work has seen the development of an extension of the GTVH directly tailored to the analysis of long humorous texts (Attardo 2001, 2002a; see also Tsakona 2003; an alternative approach is presented in Chlopicki 1997, 2001).

4. The cooperative principle and humor

4.1 Grice and Gricean analyses

All jokes involve violations of one or more of Grice’s maxims. The claim that jokes could be viewed in terms of flouting of conversational maxims dates back to Grice himself, who considers irony (as an example of implicature), and a (complex) pun. A review of the applications of Grice’s insight to humor analysis can be found in Attardo (1994: 272 ff.). An analysis of irony in Gricean terms would be out of place in this context (but see Attardo 2000 for a literature review), but puns fall squarely under the realm of humor.

4.2 Humor as non-bona-fide communication

Raskin (1985: 100–104) brought a new concept to the analysis of the pragmatics of humor: by defining humor as a non-bona-fide (NBF) mode of communication he excluded the possibility of accounting for it straightforwardly within the realm of ‘serious’ non-humorous language. Essentially, Raskin distinguishes, as does Grice, between a bona-fide type of communication, in which the speaker is committed to communicating in the most effective way, as clearly as possible, etc., in short follows
the CP. Humor, just as lying, involves a different mode of communication which does not abide by the CP (i.e. is NBF). In the case of jokes, the perlocutionary goal of the speaker is not to convey information but rather to elicit a humorous reaction in the hearer. It can be overt or consist merely of the hearer’s recognition of the speaker’s intention. Note that the use of ‘hearer’ and ‘speaker’ does not imply that these remarks are limited to spoken language(s).

Raskin, to better illustrate the difference between NBF modes (such as humor) and other modes governed by Grice’s CP, provided a set of ‘maxims for joke-telling’ directly paraphrased from Grice (“Give as much information as is necessary for the joke”). Raskin immediately proceeded to deny any theoretical interest in these maxims: they “do not really provide an explicit account of the semantic mechanisms of humor” (1985: 103–104). Despite this explicit warning, the four joking-maxims have been widely quoted at face value in the literature.

The fundamental insight of Raskin’s discussion is that jokes do not merely flout but violate a maxim. When the joke teller introduces a first script he/she deliberately misleads the hearer into believing that that script is central to the processing of the text, only to reveal again deliberately at the end of the text that the script was in fact incompatible with the one introduced by the script-switch trigger/disjunctor.

Attardo (1994: 271–286) has systematized this approach, for example by showing that violation of any maxim can produce a joke, and has argued against two possible strategies that deny that any ‘real’ violation of the CP takes place in jokes by arguing that the violation is only mentioned, and not actually performed in the text (cf. Yamaguchi, below).

This approach to humor as CP violation runs into an obvious problem: jokes are often perceived as not being totally devoid of communicative effect, while the violation theory would seem to predict that no communicative import could follow a violation of the CP (Attardo 1994: 274–275). The apparent paradox is solved when one considers that jokes communicate on the basis of the presuppositions that the text may have independently of its humorous nature, on the basis of metamessages (of the kind, “I think that it is an appropriate situation to be facetious”), or on the basis of the suppression of the incongruity (i.e. the hearer takes the joke at face value, refusing to interpret it as non-cooperative; this is common in teasing, cf. Drew 1987).

4.3 Relevance-theoretic approaches to humor

Sperber and Wilson’s (1986) Relevance Theory (RT) has been one of the most successful post-Gricean approaches to pragmatics. Relevance theoretic accounts of humor necessarily have to contend with the basic awkwardness of the postulate that the principle of relevance (RP) is exceptionless (Sperber & Wilson 1986), since humor is based on a violation of the CP or the RP.
For example, Yamaguchi (1988) acknowledges that jokes violate Grice’s conversational maxims. He then proposes the ‘Character-Did-It’ hypothesis, based on the ‘mention theory’ (Sperber & Wilson 1981), which places the responsibility for the violations of the CP (at least in part) on one of the characters in the text (Yamaguchi 1988: 327). This hypothesis has been refuted in Attardo (1994: 278–282), but Yamaguchi’s work is interesting in his elaborate description of the strategies used. Yamaguchi notes also that the violation of the maxims is hidden away in the text in a paradoxical attempt at dissimulation bound to failure, since the joke will inevitably foreground the violation so laboriously dissimulated in the text. In this respect, Yamaguchi joins the research on the ‘unsaid’ in humor (see below).

Jodlowiec (1991) presents an IR theory of jokes recast in relevance theoretic terms. While her model does not depart significantly from other IR models, she emphasizes that the interpretation of the second sense is done on the basis of the principle of relevance, just like the first one. She also emphasizes the fact that some jokes rely more than others on implicit information. Unfortunately, Jodlowiec’s work is uneven and some of her claims are patently incorrect (such as those that no ‘generalizations’ can be found about verbal jokes or that jokes do not ‘breach’ the CP). On Jodlowiec’s work see also Chlopicki (1994).

Curcó’s work (1995, 1996a, b, 1998) is much more carefully presented. She also presents a two stage IR model formulated in RT terms. In her terminology, the hearer entertains a ‘key assumption’ (essentially a proposition consistent with the first interpretation of the text) and subsequently a ‘target assumption’ (a proposition consistent with the second interpretation of the text). By noting that the target assumption “typically represents an attributable thought” (1996b: 62), Curcó manages to connect her theory of humor to RT’s ‘echoic’ (formerly known as ‘mention’) theory of irony. As mentioned above, Curcó’s theory is carefully hedged and she calls attention to the fact that in its present state it is not meant to account for all humorous utterances.

A recent account of RT-based accounts of humor can be found in Yus 2003. Yus also presents his own IR approach, which is however general, i.e. applies to all types of humor. Yus is aware that RT cannot accept the idea of a violation of the princepe of relevance, which is axiomatically unviolable, he therefore claims that no violation of the principle of relevance takes place. This apparently contradictory claim (since incongruity could only follow by the presence of irrelevant – i.e. RP violating – material) is salvaged by the claim that the speaker of a joke, for example, first uses the RP to induce the hearer to interpret the joke in a given way and then again uses Relevance to bring about the second interpretation. With Yus’ account, any difference between RT accounts and other IR accounts based on pragmatic inferences (such as the SSTH – pace claims to the contrary) disappears. Yus’ work consists largely of numerous well-crafted analyses of how different types of assumptions can be retrieved in various contexts. His is by far the most accomplished RT account of humor.
Let us note that, as one would expect, all RT accounts place more emphasis on the process of interpretation than on the text itself. Finally, attention has been drawn on the ‘metarepresentational’ aspect of irony (i.e. the idea that irony involves a representation of another representation (Curcò 2000; Colston & Gibbs 2002).

4.4 Informativeness approach to jokes

De Palma and Weiner (1990, 1992), Weiner and De Palma (1993), Weiner (1996, 1997) have developed an account of humor (in riddles, but the model is extensible to many other types of humor), which is in part based on the SSTH, and assumes the basic IR model, but seeks to enrich it with the idea of ‘accessibility’ based on the notions of prototypicality (à la Rosch 1973), salience (for example, a salient feature of chairs is that they are used for sitting), and of parallelism (i.e. the tendency to continue in the same ‘frame’ be it semantic, syntactical or pragmatic once one has been activated). The first ‘script’ is highly accessible and based on a neutral context, whereas the second script is much less accessible and strongly context dependent. Once the first script has been activated the tendency to parallelism will tend to keep the hearer/reader within the first script until this becomes impossible because of the occurrence of the punch line. This account improves the SSTH’s ‘oppositeness’ requirement by making it more specific (high vs. low accessibility, neutral vs. specific context) and by dispensing with the list of ‘hardwired’ oppositions.

Independently from De Palma and Weiner’s work, and in part against it, since she is critical of the oppositeness requirement of the SSTH, Giora (1991) sets out to explain the ‘surprise effect’ of humor. Her theory states that a well-formed text should start with the least informative material and gradually introduce more informative material. Informativeness is defined in terms of reduction in the number of alternatives. Great informativeness will thus correspond to least predictability and hence surprise value. Furthermore, Giora introduces the concept of ‘marked informativeness’ to design the marked members of a set (those that fit less well a particular category). Thus, if, after declaring that one has seen a bird, one specifies that one saw a penguin one is being not only informative, but markedly so.

Giora can then define jokes as texts that do not gradually introduce more informative material but that in fact end with a markedly informative element. The rest of Giora’s model corresponds more or less to the IDM, although Giora stresses the ‘abrupt’ passage from the first to the second sense/interpretation of the text (471). If one ‘fills in’ the gap between the two interpretations with information that gradually brings about the second one, the joke is no longer perceived to be funny (475).

This point has great significance because it may provide a tool to solve the notoriously complex issue of how to distinguish humor from other types of texts which also include a ‘punch line’ and the ensuing IR effect but are nor perceived as humorous
(e.g. detective stories, cf. Navon 1988: 209; Wenzel 1989; Giora 1991: 482–483; Weiner 1997). Also, this is clearly related to the issue of the ‘unsaid’ in humor (cf. Dascal 1985: 98–99; Dolitsky 1992). In order to preserve the element of surprise the text of the joke must not allow the second interpretation/script to become available until the punch line.

Giora’s analysis is also clearly compatible with the functional sentence perspective analysis of jokes punch line as the rheme of the last sentence of the text in which they occur (Attardo et al. 1994). In fact, Giora herself points out the similarities between her approach and FSP (Giora 1988: 550n). Recently, Giora’s approach has been fully articulated in Giora (2003). Besides Giora’s own psycholinguistic work, empirical support for her theory (and some aspects of the GTVH) has been provided by Vaid et al. (2003).

4.5 Two-stage processing of humor

It should be noted that the IDM, the SSTH/GTVH, the ‘violation of the CP’, most of the Relevance Theoretic, and the informativeness theory approaches to humor are (just like the IR model to which they ultimately subscribe) ‘two stage’ processing theories (Suls 1972). Recently, two stage approaches to implicature have come under attack by psycholinguistic research (cf. Gibbs 1994 and references therein). The approaches to humor theory presented in this discussion all would fall squarely under Gibbs’ attack to the notion of literal meaning.

In fact, Gibbs (1989) has presented (in a marginal discussion, to be fair) an attack against the two step processing of humor embodied in mainstream humor research, claiming that the humorous effect would not derive from the “shift from a ‘literal’ to ‘secondary’ (sic) meaning in the text” (1989: 249) but in the shifting of ‘speaker’s intentions’ (Emphasis in the original). It seems clear that Gibbs’ position is here in error, as the speaker’s intentions may be unavailable to the hearer/reader and are in all cases more or less irrelevant to the perception of humor (see for instance the so-called ‘unintentional humor’ which consists of the humorous interpretation of actions/utterances that were specifically not meant to be humorous). Regardless of Gibbs’ own position on the processing of jokes, one can construe a potential attack against the IR models based on the denial of the central tenet of the IR models that one sense is processed in isolation prior to the accessing of the second one. However, recent work by Giora (1995) and Giora and Fein (1996) has shown that Gibbs findings which led him to the rejection of two step theories can be analyzed in ways consistent with a two step theory of processing and thus consistent with the IR models. Gibbs has replied to these attacks in Gibbs (2002). It should be emphasized that Gibbs work is primarily centered around irony and other forms of non-literal meaning and thus is not directly relevant to humor.
5. Conversation analysis


When considering the CA of humor a distinction between canned and conversational jokes is often introduced: essentially, a canned joke is a joke that has less contextual ties than a conversational one and thus can be recycled more easily (see Attardo 1994: 295–299 for references). Canned jokes prototypically exist in written or oral ‘repertoires,’ while conversational jokes are improvised. It has been argued convincingly (Zajdman 1991) that the distinction is in fact a continuum that can range from (almost) total lack of contextual ties to the point where the joke is indistinguishable from the rest of the non-humorous discourse (in this case, obviously, the speaker does not signal that humorous nature of the joke).

5.1 Canned jokes in conversation

The most influential work in the CA of jokes is without discussion Sacks’. Sacks describes what he calls the ‘sequential organization’ (1974: 337) of joke-telling in conversation. He finds that it breaks down into three parts: the preface, the telling, and the reaction.

5.1.1 Preface

Canned jokes are (mostly) narratives and hence they need to be introduced in the flow of conversation, for example so that the narrator may be granted the floor for an extended turn. The preface has three main functions: securing the acceptance of the joke-telling form the audience, negotiating the acceptability of either the joke or the telling of one, and clueing the audience on the correct (i.e. humorous) interpretation of the text.

5.1.2 Telling

The telling being a narrative, consists of only one turn, by one speaker. Other turns within this part will generally be perceived as interruptive (although there are exceptions, e.g. interactive jokes, such as knock-knock jokes, which require the audience’s intervention). Sacks’ sees the telling of the joke as the setting up of a ‘puzzle’ for the audience,
a sort of ‘understanding test’. This idea, albeit widely accepted in the literature (e.g. Norrick 1993; Glenn 2003) seems to be in error (Attardo 1994: 305–307; 1995: 81–82).

5.1.3 Response
The literature in CA analyzes three classes of responses: laughter, delayed laughter, and silence. Of these, laughter has received by far the greatest amount of attention (see Attardo 1994: 307–309 for references). Significantly, laughter is not an uncontrolled reaction to the humorous text (Jefferson 1985) and can be used for a variety of purposes. For example, laughter is used to negotiate the humorous interpretation of the text by the speaker, who ‘invites’ laughter by laughing at the end of the telling (Jefferson 1979).

Delayed laughter is explained by the presence of two conflicting desires in the audience: display understanding of the text and check the rest of the audience’s reactions. Silence can manifest the audience’s disapproval of the materials in the telling or can be used by the joke teller to ‘keep in character’ with the narrative convention whereby a narrator should believe what he/she tells. In other words, the teller is giving his/her audience time to get the joke.

5.2 Conversational humor
Conversational humor has been the most active field of humor research in linguistics, since the mid-nineties to date. Two strands of research have emerged: quantitative and functional. Sacks’ original work tipifies the functional approach, which tries to describe the various functions to which humor can be put and emphasizes detailed analysis of single cases. More quantitatively oriented work, such as Tannen’s and Holmes’ (see below), relies on larger corpora and tends more toward generalizations. Needless to say, this distinction is purely classificatory and authors incorporate quantitative data as they are available (although see Schegloff 1993: 103–104 and Glenn 2003: 38–39 for an argument against quantitative data, or at least indiscriminate quantitative data).

5.2.1 Functional conversational analyses
As opposed to canned jokes, conversational humor is improvised and with great contextual ties. Puns have been the object of some research in CA. Sacks (1972) noted that puns may occur in ‘proverbials’ (i.e. formulaic expressions). Sherzer (1978, 1985, 1992, 1993) has much broadened the scope of analysis to include anthropological, psychological, and ethnological considerations that put puns in an area that includes speech play and verbal art (see Kirschenblatt-Gimblett 1976 and Sherzer 1992). Sherzer’s (1978) analysis is based on the idea that puns are ‘cohesive’ since they often sum up, or conclude a topic (given their occurrence in proverbials). While unintentional puns tend to be cohesive and do not imply linguistic manipulation, intentional puns will

Norrick (1993) analyzes a corpus of familiar conversations. His most interesting point is that “spontaneous joking serves many functions in our everyday talk” (129) and is thus an important and significant component of conversational interaction. Overall, his analysis of the social functions of humor follows the ‘humor as social facilitator’ and as ‘social corrective’ lines of thought (cf. Long & Graesser 1988; Bergson 1901). For a recent overview of Norrick’s work, which has developed steadily in the intervening decade, see Norrick (2003). Glenn (2003) departs somewhat from the typical perspective of humor research in CA because it focuses on laughter and not humor. Glenn embraces a social/communicative theory of laughter, i.e. that sees laughter as controlled, at least in part, by the laugher and exploited for communicative purposes. For example, shared laughter is initiated via an ‘invitation-acceptance’ sequence. The speaker may place laughter particles within or after his/her turn. The hearer, in turn can accept or decline the invitation to laugh. Shared laughter tends to be short lived and that speakers need to ‘renew’ shared laughter. Methods for doing so include, renewing laughter, repeating the cause of laughter, or saying something else funny (cf. Hay ‘humor support’, below). Turning to the more strictly functional approach, Glenn finds that “laughing along, while not outright affiliative, makes more of the same laughable (teasing or impropriety) relevant and may lead to clearer displays of affiliation” (131). However, laughter can also be used to resist affiliation (i.e. to reject the implicit offer of in-group membership extended by the joker). Analyses of humor along the functional paradigm have been performed also on German texts, see Kotthoff (1986, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2003), Branner (2003).

Along the same lines of inquiry, Everts (2003) introduces the idea of ‘family humor style’ (see below on ‘humor style’) in which family members are shown to share characteristics in humor, such as imitation and impersonation, to establish and foster intimacy. On the functions of humor in interactions, see also Priego-Valverde (2003), and also Attardo (1994: 322–330), Long and Graesser (1988) and Graham et al. (1992). A more sociological, but very significant work on the functions of humor is Mulkay (1988). Finally, it should be noted that Attardo (2002b) has claimed that all linguistically accessible functions can be performed by humorous means, except of course when prohibited by context, a conclusion also reached by Priego-Valverde (2003).

5.2.2 Quantitative conversational analyses
In contrast to Sacks’ analysis of one single occurrence of a joke in a conversation, Tannen (1984) records and analyzes all the humorous occurrences in the conversations held at a Thanksgiving dinner (it should be noted, in passing, that humor was not her central focus). Tannen (1984: 130) claims that “One of the most distinctive aspects
of any person’s style is the use of humor” and provides a detailed analysis of the style of humor of each of the dinner guests.

Quantitative analyses of the Thanksgiving conversation reveals that humor has a larger role than expected in conversation. It appears that two speakers had 11% of their turns counted as humorous. The lowest figure, i.e. the speaker with the least humorous conversational turns, was 2%. These results are somewhat surprising, as it seems that the presence of humor in conversation has been downplayed in analyses of humor as a ‘deviation’ from a ‘serious’ norm. The use of humor in conversation is found to ‘stand out.’ Tannen sums up by saying that “humor makes one’s presence felt” (1984: 132).

The most significant development in the field has been the work of the New Zealand-based sociolinguists, associated with the work of Janet Holmes. Both Hay’s work and Holmes’ are based on large corpora consisting of hundreds of instances of spontaneous humor and many hours of recordings. Hay (1994) is one of the few studies that deals with failed humor, but most analysts merely ignore the issue or when they are aware of it, dismiss it for simplicity’s sake (cf. Holmes 2000: 163). Hay (2000) finds women more likely to use humor for solidarity than men; men use humor to solve conflicts. Hay (1995, 2000, 2001) has investigated ‘humor support’ i.e. conversational strategies used to acknowledge and support humorous utterances, among which figures prominently the production of more humor.

Holmes’ work on humor revolves around a large study of conversation in the workplace (see Holmes & Stubbe 2003, for an overview). Her approach is functional, for example she concludes that “in work contexts humour can be used by subordinates as a subtle (or not so subtle) license to challenge the power structure, as well as by those in power to achieve the speaker’s goal while apparently de-emphasizing the power differential.” (Holmes 2000: 176). The same ‘subversive’ function of humor, along with the more conventional expression of friendly feelings and positive politeness is found in another study (Holmes & Marra 2002). However, because of the quantititive focus Holmes can make extremely significant generalizations: “the overall amount of humour produced by the women is greater than that produced by the men” (Holmes 2001: 93). This finding flatly contradicts folk humor theorists and two decades of feminist research which both contended that women produce less humor (since there is no reason to believe that New Zealand women are funnier than their American or European counterparts). Similarly significant findings concern to social status: “the chair [of a meeting] makes a disproportionately high contribution to the humour in most meetings” (2001: 96) (32% of instances, overall) This is true also of multi-turn humor.

Strangely, CA of humor is largely unaffected by the research in humor studies, including in linguistics. Exceptions are Antonopoulou and Sifianou (2003) a particularly interesting study, based on spontaneous humor in Greek telephone conversations, which is informed by recent theoretical work in humor research, and Norrick (2003) which attempts a synthesis precisely of CA and humor research.
6. Sociolinguistics of humor

As Gasquet-Cyrus (2004) rightly argues, the relationship between sociolinguistics and humor research can be characterized as “having mutually missed the boat.” It is only very recently that research aware of the advances of humor research has begun to appear and that competence (in the Chomskian sense) theorists have begun to take notice of ethnomethodological and sociolinguistic work. In fact, one could argue that before Norrick (1993) and Attardo (1994: ch. 10) the interplay had been virtually nonexistent (with the obvious exceptions of anthropological work, e.g. Basso 1979; Beeman 1981a/b; see also Beeman 2000). The situation is however changing fast. However, things are beginning to change, witness Gasquet-Cyrus’ own work on urban dialectology in Marseilles, in which humor is central (2004), Crawford’s work on gender (1989, 1995, 2003) and a recent crop of researchers (Georgakopoulou 2000; Rutter 2000; Liao 2001) whose work is beginning to appear.

6.1 Gender differences

Lakoff’s provocative claim that “women have no sense of humor” (1975:56) opened the way for serious study of gender-related differences in humor appreciation and production. Most of the research on gender-based differences on the use of humor in conversation seems to converge on the idea that the type of language used by women directly influences the type of humor that they use and appreciate.

An excellent synthesis of research on humor and gender comes from anthropology. Apte (1985:67–81) argues that women are prevented from engaging in the same range of humorous exchanges by men, who thus “emphasize their need for superiority” (1985:81) and that “restrictions on the kinds of humor in which women can engage offer an important avenue to social control” (Ibid.). Crawford (1989, 1995:129–169) reviews the scarce literature on the subject and presents an interesting discussion criticizing the bulk of psychological research on the gender-based differences in humor and advocating the use of CA (among other tools) as a way to overcome the androcentric approach of much psychological research on humor and gender.

Jenkins (1985) and Ervin-Tripp and Lampert (1992) have noted that women are more likely to create cooperative humor (“stacked humor”) and that both male and female speakers change their joking styles in mixed-gender groups. Specifically, women decrease the number of self-targeted humor (Ervin-Tripp & Lampert 1992:116). Kothoff (1986) and Tannen (1986, 1990, 1994) report various examples of gender-based differences in the use of humor. For example, women tend to tell less jokes than men in mixed-gender groups and prefer smaller audiences than men (Tannen 1990:89–90). There is a growing literature on humor and gender from a feminist – but not necessarily linguistic – perspective, collected and reviewed in
Nilsen (1993:23–28). A recent review of the research on gender and humor can be found in Crawford (2003), which is however unaware of the findings in Holmes (2001), discussed above. A re-evaluation of these theoretical approaches based on these data has yet to take place.

### 6.2 Ethnicity and humor

Under this heading we can classify two strands of humor research: one that investigates the ‘targets’ of humor (and this is the common understanding of the phrase ‘ethnic humor’) and one that investigates the differences in sense of humor across cultures.

The study of ethnic humor is the province of folklorists, anthropologists, and sociologists. Beyond the synthesis in Apte (1985:108–148), the classical reference is Davies (1990) which presents the stimulating hypothesis that ethnic humor is targeted at ‘geographical’ outsiders, i.e. groups of people who live at the boundaries of whatever happens to be the ‘homeland’ of the group doing the joking (e.g. in France the jokes about Belgians, in Canada about Newfoundlanders, etc.). Apte notes that ethnic humor is the result of urbanization, since prevalently rural societies do not have enough contacts with other ethnic groups to make such humor possible, for example because the necessary stereotypes will be missing. Incidentally, it should be noted that the stereotypes on which ethnic humor is based are entirely mythical (on the concepts of ‘ethnic group’ and ‘stereotype’ see Apte 1985).

The study of cross-cultural variation in sense of humor is largely anecdotal and consists of isolated descriptions of the humor of a given society. Ziv (1988) presents a collection of articles covering mostly European states. Morain (1991) describes a study contrasting ESL students’ and American students’ ratings of New Yorker’s cartoons and underscores the necessity to possess a given cultural script to be able to understand the humor, let alone appreciate it. To date there are no large scale cross-cultural comparisons of humor available. This state of affairs is regrettable, as the claim of universality of humor (and of its mechanisms) could be verified by such a study. An exception is the study of puns, which are widely documented in a great variety of languages (cf. Hausmann 1974 and Sobkowiak 1991 for a bibliography). However, the universality of puns has recently been challenged (Sherzer 1996:134).

### 7. Computational humor

A very recent development is the emergence of research in the computational treatment of humor. A (critical) bibliography of early efforts in that direction can be found in Raskin and Attardo (1994). For the time being, it appears that little significant ‘artificial intelligence’ is used in any of the systems.
The best defined and implemented system is JAPE, a system that can generate a type of punning riddles (Binsted & Ritchie 1994, 1997). An attempt has been done at integrating JAPE in a real-life on-line communicative situation with mixed results (Loehr 1996). The papers presented at the first conference on computational humor (held in 1996 at Twente University in the Netherlands) are collected in Hulstijn and Nijholt (1996). It is too early to determine in what directions the research in this area will engage and if the results will be theoretically significant. An interesting issue, which caused already some debate, is whether it is necessary to have a full-fledged natural language processing system before attempting the generation of humor. Raskin and Attardo (1994) have taken a positive stance on this point, while Binsted and Ritchie take the opposite stance.

Recent work in the field has seen further conferences (Stock et al. 2002) and significant publications (Stock 1996; Stock & Strapparava 2003; Ritchie 2003).

8. Cognitive linguistics and humor

Recently, work in cognitive linguistics has begun to appear which seeks to challenge the traditional linguistic analyses of humor, from the standpoint of cognitive linguistics (see Brône and Feyaerts [2004] for discussion). For example, blending, a recent development of cognitive linguistics (see Coulson & Oakley 2001), has been used to analyze humor (Coulson 1996, 2001, in press). It is clear that blending, i.e. the creation of a new ‘mental space’ (domain, idea) out of existing, and not necessarily related, other mental spaces, can account for some aspects of some types of humor (insofar as it corresponds to the script overlapping aspect of the SSTH). However, it is not clear, and no claims have been made to that effect, that it can provide a general account of humor. Relatedly, neurological analyses have been used to argue for and against the IR models, with the evidence seeming to support IR models (e.g. Derks et al. 1997; Goel & Dolan 2001; Coulson & Kutas 2001). The problem for cognitive linguistic approaches to humor is to show that they are making claims that are empirically and/or theoretically distinguishable from those of the previous theories they seek to challenge.

9. Conclusion

While humor research has accomplished much in the last 30 years, it is clear that there is still much to be done and that, while some of the central questions have been tackled, we are still far from having a complete, let alone satisfactory, view of
the problem. But if we look at how much new research has appeared in the ten years that have passed between the writing of the first version of this entry and its update, which has seen, for example, the emergence of the cognitive linguistic and variationist sociolinguistic approaches, the challenging of some deeply entrenched beliefs in the gender differences of humor, and some significant results in the broadening of the linguistic approaches to texts other than jokes, it becomes clear that the field of humor research is definitely taking a pragmatic perspective and that significant findings can be expected in the future.

References


Intertextuality

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1. From ‘literature’ to ‘text as a productivity which inserts itself into history’

Intertextuality has been one of the most popular and influential concepts in language, literary and discourse-oriented research of recent decades. The term was coined in the 1960s by Julia Kristeva, who assigned it a pivotal role in the formulation of a semiological project in which ‘text’ becomes the primary object of literary enquiry. Kristeva (1968: 300) defines the text as:

[S]ans vouloir réduire le texte à la parole orale, mais en marquant que nous ne pouvons pas le lire en dehors de la langue, nous définirons le texte comme un appareil translinguistique qui redistribue l’ordre de la langue, en mettant en relation une parole communicative visant l’information directe, avec différents types d’énoncés antérieurs ou synchroniques. Le texte est donc une productivité ce qui veut dire: (i) son rapport à la langue dans laquelle il se situe est redistributif (destructivo-constructif), par conséquent il est abordable à travers des catégories logiques et mathématiques plutôt que purement linguistiques, (ii) il est une permutation de textes, une intertextualité: dans l’espace d’un texte plusieurs énoncés pris d’autres textes se croisent et se neutralisent. (Kristeva 1968: 300)

The introduction of the term ‘intertextuality’ marked one of the key moments in the post-structuralist arrival through its challenge of text-immanism and, with it, the irrevocable politicization of literary production and critical reception. The literary text as an autonomous, bounded unit became a textual moment in a longer chain of antecedences and simultaneities, a result of transformation accomplished within textual spaces. In the background is also a distinction between ‘discourse’ (the exchange of meanings) and ‘text’ (the production of meaning). ‘Text’ is what links an instance of language use (une parole communicative) to the system (langue). Kristeva is keen here to avoid that the analysis of signifying practice collapses into a study of parole (said to be the object of the study of communication within structural linguistics). Instead, it is a historical-materialist perspective which invites a premium on the production

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1. However, this did not mean the end of structuralism as such. For instance, Kristeva continues to define literature as a type of linguistic structure.
of meaning. ‘Intertextuality’ is thus seen as a processual state which is reflected in a
text. It is multi-directional, unresolved (hence, a preference for ‘structuration’ over
‘structure’) and it indexes how that text inserts itself into history. One relevant history
is that of successive, never-ending redistributions in the order of language, but that
history cannot ultimately be dissociated from the history of society itself.2

Étudier le texte comme une transformation sur l’axe diachronique signifie que
nous l’abordons comme une structuration plutôt que comme une structure. La
méthode consisterait à considérer les différentes séquences (ou codes) d’une struc-
ture textuelle précise comme autant de ‘transformations’ de séquences (codes) prises
à d’autres textes.

Ainsi la structure du roman français au 15e siècle peut-elle être considérée comme
le résultat d’une transformation de plusieurs autres codes: la scolastique, la poésie
courtoise, la littérature oral (publicitaire) de la ville, le carnaval. La méthode trans-
formationnelle nous mène donc à situer la structure littéraire dans l’ensemble sociale
considéré comme un ensemble textuel. Nous appellerons intertextualité cette
inter-action textuelle que se produit à l’intérieur d’un seul texte. Pour le sujet con-
naissant, l’intertextualité est une notion que sera l’indice de la façon dont un texte lit
l’histoire et s’insère en elle. La mode concret de réalisation de l’intertextualité dans un
texte précis donnera la caractéristique majeure (‘sociale’, ‘esthétique’) d’une structure

2. Text linguistics on ‘textuality’

Concepts with a wide appeal often fall flat when generalized and made to serve
elsewhere. This was also the case with early text linguistic uses of ‘intertextuality’ in
the 1980s. De Beaugrande & Dressler (1981: 10ff.) see intertextuality as one of the
seven constitutive features of textuality which can be used to define a text as a
communicative occurrence. The other ‘standards of textuality’ are: cohesion, coher-
ence, intentionality, acceptability, informativity and situationality. Intertextuality,
for de Beaugrande & Dressler, concerns “the factors which make the utilisation of
one text dependent upon knowledge of one or more previously encountered texts”
(p. 10) – especially texts from the same type or stemming from the same domain (e.g.
a traffic sign which reads ‘resume speed’ presupposes a previously encountered and
interpreted sign of the kind ‘slow – children at play’). Intertextuality is also behind
the evolution of text types, the reproduction of classes of texts with typical patterns of

2. Not surprisingly, then, the question how limited/limitless intertextual productivity is will con-
tinue to haunt debates between advocates and opponents of the post-structuralist ‘turn’ in the
social sciences.
characteristics, and within certain text types (e.g. parodies, critical reviews, reports), intertextuality may be more prominent as the text producer must consult the prior text continually and actively. Intertextuality here becomes a cognitive condition in the production and reception of actual texts. Its link with the evolution of genres is one which favours continuity within text types, rather than seeing the development of genres or text types as also originating in hybridity and creative assemblage of conventions and sayables with diverse ancestry (in Kristeva’s work, intertextualities are multi-directional in pointing to antecedences across received fields of social activity or societal domains). Finally, with de Beaugrande and Dressler’s generalized use of the term, explicit indications that a text’s state of intertextuality is instrumental to an understanding of its positioning vis-à-vis the social and the historical-in-discourse have also largely disappeared from view. Their evolution of text types is a functionally-motivated history of forms, not one of ideologically-disposed sayables. Ironically, in the course of their reception of the term ‘intertextuality’, Kristeva (1968) is literally moved to a footnote. Hers is said to be “a narrower use” of the term (1981: 13).

3. **Dialogism and heteroglossia in a social-diachronic theory of discourse**

If Kristeva is to be accredited for having coined a term and developed a concept which stresses the accumulative, partly self-disguising and transformative nature of discourse throughout history, and, by doing so, situates the literary irreplacibly among the more mundane discourses that populate our lifeworlds, then she is also to be acclaimed for guiding us to the discovery of the writings of Mikhail Bakhtin and his circle. With the growing popularity of the term and concept of ‘intertextuality’ came also the growing importance of a set of other concepts which accompanied Bakhtin’s belated admittance to the halls of social scientific fame: ‘dialogism’, ‘heteroglossia’, ‘double-voicedness’, ‘polyphony’, ‘the carnivalesque’.

With critical discourse analysis, language research ‘restored’ the link with Kristeva, but much more than that, it embraced the writings of Bakhtin (and Vološinov) – with considerable debt to mediation by M. Foucault. Fairclough (1992b: 193–194) sees intertextuality as quintessential to a discourse analysis which seeks “to map systematic analyses of spoken or written text onto systematic analyses of social contexts”. He develops the argument in detail in a review article which focuses on recent studies published in a leading discourse analytical journal. For Fairclough, textual analysis subsumes two complementary types of analysis: linguistic analysis (used here in an extended, functional sense, in which content/meaning-dichotomies have been dissolved) and intertextual analysis. Three imperatives follow: (i) Intertextual analysis shows how texts draw upon

3. Bakhtin (1986) uses the term ‘trans-linguistic’ but never used the term ‘intertextuality’.
orders of discourse, the particular configuration of conventionalized practices which text producers and consumers have available in particular circumstances. (ii) Intertextual analysis draws attention to how texts depend upon society and history in the form of the resources made available within an order of discourse. Here Fairclough echoes Bakhtin in viewing genres as ‘the drive belts from the history of society to the history of language’. (iii) Intertextual analysis also draws attention to how texts transform the social and historical resources, how texts mix and ‘re-accentuate’ genres (discourses, narratives, registers).

Earlier, in Fairclough (1992a), the author introduced a distinction between ‘manifest intertextuality’ (when specific other texts are drawn upon in a text) and ‘constitutive intertextuality’ (how a discourse type is constituted through a combination of elements of orders of discourse; Fairclough renames this type as ‘inter-discursivity’). This distinction results from a certain ambiguity in Kristeva’s writings (indeed, one must pose the question at what level exactly does one situate “les différents énoncés que notre analyse retrouve a posteriori dans les différents discours antérieurs ou synchronique” which Kristeva (1968:313) talks about). The distinction also echoes different uses of ‘dialogism’ in Bakhtin’s own writing – as the concept occurs a number of times to signify different but related phenomena at different levels of generalization. The first lead (that of manifest intertextuality) surfaces within linguistic enquiry in analyses of ‘local’ utterance-based phenomena such as irony, presupposition, appraisal, reported speech, etc. as intertextual or double-voiced\(^4\) in nature, whereas the second lead (constitutive intertextuality) points in the direction of an impersonal history of generic constitution with different degrees of ‘naturalization’ (which keep intertextual traces from view). One may be tempted to conclude that the second variant is better attuned to Kristeva’s definition of the text. It is also the one which, as I discuss in greater detail below, returns in critical discourse analysis as instrumental to an understanding of the dynamics between hegemonic struggle, crises in socio-cultural values and forms of social linguistic creativity at the level of genre conventions. However, a one-sided concern with constitutive intertextuality comes with a risk of underestimating the heuristic condition that the dynamics of discursive heterogeneity is studied through actual instances of discourse and that, as Fairclough notes, texts “differ in the extent to which their heterogeneous elements are integrated, and so in the extent to which their heterogeneity is evident on the surface of the text” (1992a:104). Additionally, the erasure of the traces of *hic et nunc* assemblage is

\(^4\) The synonymous use of the term ‘polyphony’ is a post-Bakhtinian extrapolation. As Björklund (2000:9–10) points out in detail, Bakhtin borrowed the term ‘polyphony’ from Dostoevsky to refer to a particular type of dialogism found in some novels when character voices are on an equal footing with the authorial voice. As in music, polyphony is an effect of entirety.
intrinsic to certain social processes and to history, more generally, as ‘visibly creative mixings’ become ‘established traditions’ and institutions have an active interest in maintaining perceptions of stability in practice.

Lemke (1995: 23), in my view, observes correctly that the dialogic conception of the utterance “for Bakhtin is a bridge between the linguistic and social, the event-meaning and the larger social systems in which that event has its meaning for us”. Bakhtin does not give up the idea of signification (meaning-making) as understood against the background of language,\(^{5}\) only he saw (and stressed) diversity in language in such a way that it renders a homogeneous version of it as a grammatical abstraction which one can only arrive at by suppressing the occurrence of a multitude of ‘bounded verbal-ideological belief-systems’ which fill it (‘codes’ in Kristeva’s diction). It is this heteroglossia (raznorechie, translated literally: ‘varied-speechness’) which necessitates a continual analytical return to the level of dialogic relationships between actual utterances and, not surprisingly, the uptake of Bakhtin’s work has been characterized by constant slippage from ‘heteroglossia’ as a societal state of being to ‘heteroglossia’ being used to refer to the heterogeneic make-up of a specific piece of text or discourse. Bakhtin lists as examples of heteroglossia the co-occurrence of:

- social class dialects, languages of special groups, professional jargons (…), genre languages, the languages of generations and age groups, of the authorities, of literary and political movements, historical epochs, etc. (Bakhtin 1981: 262–3)

Heteroglossic relationships are ultimately sociological relationships in that they are about

- specific points of view on the world (…) each characterised by its own objects, meanings and values. As such they may all be juxtaposed to one another, mutually supplement one another, contradict one another, and be interrelated dialogically. (Bakhtin 1981: 291–2)

It is this kind of fusion of the social and the linguistic which informs Kristeva’s definition of the idéologème as the intertextual function.

que l’on peut lire “matérialisée” aux différents niveaux de la structure de chaque texte, et qui s’étend tout au long de son trajet en lui donnant ses coordonnées historiques et sociales. (Kristeva 1968: 313–314)

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5. Similarly, Kristeva continues to see langue as the explanatory backdrop but redefines it in the course of her formulation. For her, the question how a communicative occurrence inserts itself into history cannot be dealt with in isolation from its constitutive effect on langue. The two views are by no means identical: inasmuch as Bakhtin rejects the Saussurean linguistic project, Kristeva’s formulation of intertextuality counts as a reformulation of it.
It takes just a small step now to see how for Fairclough argues the importance of linking up intertextuality and hegemony:

The combination of hegemony theory with intertextuality is particularly fruitful. Not only can one chart the possibilities and limitations for intertextual processes within particular hegemonies and states of hegemonic struggle, one can also conceptualise intertextual processes and processes of contesting and restructuring orders of discourse as processes of hegemonic struggle in the sphere of discourse, which have effects upon, as well as being affected by, hegemonic struggle in the wider sense.

(Fairclough 1992a: 103)

Two points deserve mention here. My first point is explanatory. Fairclough’s specific appropriation of Bakhtin is one in which the state of play of heteroglossia (in a specific social, cultural, historical, institutional context) is viewed as ordered hierarchically in what he calls ‘orders of discourse’ (these may be local, institutional, domain-based, or more widely societal, cultural) and, in Bakhtinian fashion, orders of discourse are necessarily social orderings. This picture informs for instance explanations of ‘commodification’, ‘conversationalization’, etc. in terms of the permeability of domain-specific orders of discourse by practices and discourse conventions which originate in other domains (one example is: public authorities who resort to advertisements on hoarding posters to bring home essentially bureaucratic messages, say, to combat tax fraud; another example is the widespread adoption of informal conversational modes of communication in the workplace which accompanies transitions to post-Fordist models of economic production). In this view, ‘hybridization’ helps explain language users’ ‘creative’ responses to crises in social outlooks. My second point is that the addition of hegemony theory, while underscoring the sociological (Bakhtin) or ideological (Kristeva) nature of heteroglossia, seeks to lend a systematizing framework to the analysis and weighting of ‘competing voices’ and their social outlooks: for instance, does conversationalization lead to more democratic working relationships or is it just an apparency which seeks to enhance worker motivation but leaves power relationships untouched because it banks on the managerial group’s capacity to adjust their speech strategically? One of the interesting questions indeed now is how far a (singular, unitary?) hegemonic framework of social analysis will actually take us in charting out the possibilities and limitations of intertextual processes.

6. Part of the attraction is no doubt that the application of the concepts of ‘intertextuality’ or ‘heteroglossia’ can be repeated at various levels of analysis. This is also true for the concept of ‘orders of discourse.’ This repeatability comes with a risk of vagueness.
4. Vološinov, pragmatics and conversation analysis: Sequential implicativeness and the translation of the other’s perspective

The detection of dialogisms at different levels of enquiry also helps us understand dualities in the reception of Vološinov (1929, trnsl. 1986). When Vološinov proposes in his ‘Exposition of the Problem of Reported Speech’ that

the productive study of dialogue presupposes (…) a more profound investigation of the forms used in reported speech, since these forms reflect basic and constant tendencies in the active reception of other speakers’ speech.

(Vološinov 1986: 117, the italics are the translators’)

then he is using the problem of reported speech as a vehicle for developing an argumentation about the priorities of language study itself, one with consequences for preferred sites of enquiry. For him, language does

not reflect subjective, psychological vaccinations, but stable social interrelationships among speakers (…) Everything vital in the evaluative reception of another’s utterance, everything which is of ideological value, is expressed in the material of inner speech (…) The context of this inner speech is the locale in which another’s utterance is received, comprehended, and evaluated, it is where the speaker’s active orientations take place. (…) Lines of reception find their expression, are objectified, in the “authorial context” which is surrounding the reported speech. (Vološinov 1986: 117)

Thus, the focus of enquiry should be the various linguistic forms of these interrelationships which prevail in different periods, in different languages, within different social groups and under the effect of different contextual aims. What’s more, in Vološinov’s book we arguably come very close to the formulation of a kind of conversation analytic project and it is in this direction that one can see a further extension of the relevance of intertextuality for language study.

Vološinov (like Bakhtin) takes the dialogic to the most general level of positing an ontology of language: for him, the utterance is always a reception of and a response to another, previous utterance, and this happens along fundamentally social horizons of reception. At the basis of this is fundamentally a pragmatic, utterance-oriented\(^7\) and context-sensitive theory of language. His proposal is to examine how regularities in parole (systematic tendencies in reception and response as revealed in reported speech) are grounded in the socio-economic being of a community of

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\(^7\) Note how the disclaimer, language does “not reflect subjective, psychological vaccinations”, alludes to the Saussurean view which saw parole as chaotic, unsystematic, individual, and therefore not worthy of linguistic attention. For Vološinov, parole is social.
speakers. Indeed, one can only speculate about how orientations and objects of enquiry in this type of linguistics would have evolved, had the socio-technological means of the time afforded traditions of field work and the use of a tape recorder and, with these, opportunities to access dialogisms in a form that could be made to ‘stand still’ for detailed examination other than those of reported speech and dialogue in the context of the novel (and a handful of other, written text types). It is fascinating to observe how Vološinov (very briefly, though) touches on the distinct teleologies of reporting activities such as courtroom proceedings, newspapers, etc., whereas in fact most of the book deals with reported speech in the novel (but then, reported speech is the primary means available to display the conversational in a novelistic context). It is also interesting to observe how Bakhtin’s essay on the problem of speech genres opens with a wide perspective on non-literary genres, but returns to the literary – out of necessity, because literature was the best/only data around?

One is tempted to push this speculative discussion even a little bit further. Vološinov’s definition of the utterance reveals a conversational principle, arguably a very early definition of the adjacency pair – ‘the utterance is always a response to a previous utterance’. To begin with, note the immediately apparent affinity with the conversation analytic concept of ‘sequential implicativeness’ (Heritage 1997), which reads: each move in a conversation is essentially a response to the preceding talk and an anticipation of the kind of talk which is to follow; in formulating their present turn, speakers show their understanding of the previous turn and reveal their expectations about the next turn to come. Note also how Sacks’s claim that ‘it takes two turns to have a conversation’ (Sacks et al. 1974) is equally a claim with axiomatic implications for preferred methods and sites of enquiry: his aim is to arrive at an understanding of how social order is brought about through the detailed actions accomplished by interactants engaged in everyday talk. Despite the obvious differences in what is meant by an understanding of ‘the social’, it is not difficult to see how this strikes a chord with Bakhtin’s claim: “two voices is the minimum for life, the minimum for existence” (Bakhtin 1973: 213).

Aiming at a ‘fusion’ between the two senses of dialogism – utterance-within-utterance and turn-following-turn, one can detect a complementarity of perspectives which can be expressed in a layered definition of sequential implicativeness: when the present turn involves a quotation of what somebody else said on a different occasion, then the speaker shows his/her understanding of the interlocutor’s immediately preceding turn by displaying his/her understanding of another turn distant in place, time and occasion. This ‘other turn’ can shade over into two directions.

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8. Note how Vološinov’s proposal redefines grammar as an effect of language/ideology, i.e. grammars of reported speech count as crystallizations of prevailing receptive orientations.
One: it can be located in the immediately preceding turn. This is the case in echoic turn design, where literally part of the previous utterance is being repeated. Things can also go in the other direction: there is no reason why ‘another turn’ should not be equated here with ‘any piece of discourse’ and it can come with various degrees of explicit attribution (or go entirely unnoticed in that respect). For instance, a pupil who repeats parts of a teacher’s question while responding to it, and, in doing so, positions herself vis-à-vis a received way of talking about knowledge in a specific area, arguably accomplishes the three possibilities at the same time – if one accepts that the utterance belongs both to this particular teacher and to a transpersonal history of practices (cf. Maybin 1999). It is this double orientation toward other voices of speakers ‘co-present and not’ and voices ‘individualized and not’ which is behind for instance Wetherell’s (1998) suggestion that a conversational analytic concern with local sequential dynamics must be complemented with a post-structuralist orientation to the effectuation of ‘interpretative repertoires’ (read: discourses of…). This double-orientation provides an obvious way in which conversational analysis can reclaim the social-cum-ideological, looking for sequential implicativeness, as it were, ‘by raising their eyes from the immediately previous/next turn’⁹ – to the other voices, and, with it, towards the social perspectives which these index. Participation in interaction takes place in rapidly evolving situations of co-presence. In the course of these, talk by other people, or social outlooks, more generally, may be reported, commented upon, presupposed, etc. and become part of the current and transient here/now. At the heart of the theoretical ‘fusion’ just outlined is indeed another bridge from event-meaning to larger social systems – though with equal sensitivity to the production of frames/activity-types (Goffman, ethnomethodology) and ideological outlooks (Bakhtin, Vološinov).

The suggested combination of perspectives also brings into view the social transformative functioning of discourse, or, put differently, it is through socially-situated activities that the dialogic-in-discourse can become consequential for individuals. Let me give a couple of examples here: a decision to grant asylum in Belgium to an economic refugee from Kazachstan which is based on a condensed, word-processed and translated report of an oral interview with the applicant conducted in a language which counts as ‘non-native’ for both interviewer and interviewee; a language dictation in a classroom as a regularly instituted educational activity where each instance counts as one of the many steps on the road to the legitimate acquisition of an educational qualification; the social worker who quotes the voice of a 16-year-old client of the social services to justify before a policy reviewer why in this particular case foster care was not preferred over residential care (the written

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files help to freshen up his memory); etc. In all of these cases we are dealing with ‘social facts’ which involve the intertextually-mediated reception of (and a positioning reply to) discourse along fundamentally social horizons – but the positioning that goes on is just as much activity-type oriented (as part of an institutional set of procedures, accomplished sequentially) as it is about social outlooks embedded at various levels of double-voicedness. In each of these instances, the events are quite ordinary, but they are consequential for the participants involved. In each case, the intertextualities involved are of considerable complexity and they defy a reduction to received themes and traditions of enquiry: reported speech, conversational exchanges, translation, interpretation, etc. By inviting us to tease out its various dimensions, intertextuality can help us to take the dialogic beyond the boundedness of recognized domains of language study.

5. Synoptic and participatory views of human activity: Bakhtin, Bourdieu, sociolinguistic legitimacy (and the body)

For Maybin (1999), the accomplishment of local interactional intentions through a speaker’s positioning vis-à-vis the repeated, appropriated and reported voices of others forms part of an explanation of how children in primary school contexts manage institutional frames while being dialogically induced (in the two senses described above) into institutional roles, procedures and discourses. In this respect, it is important to remind ourselves of the difference between positioning being inevitably intertextual in nature and situated struggles to make the words of the other one’s own – in the many different senses that may apply: ‘learning how to … by adopting…’, ‘getting others to adopt…’, ‘stopping others from continuing to adopt…’. So, if ‘to quote’ or ‘to translate’ equals to ‘make one’s own’, then it will also mean: to render something legitimate – or to dispell it. Note (in passing) that when language users contest the ways in which they have been quoted between inverted commas, this is hardly ever so because the wording was changed but because their social outlook has been ‘misrepresented’ (the wording is usually the evidential ground on which the quotation will be disputed). I think this is an appropriate point for a digression which ventures into the work of Pierre Bourdieu.10 This should not surprise my reader, if one recalls for a moment that it is not just ‘variedness-in-language’ (and ‘dialogic contact’) which separated Bakhtin and Vološinov from de Saussure but also a radically different view on the essence of the linguistic sign:

10. I am grateful to Lemke (1995:25ff.) for putting me ‘on track’ here in developing a number of parallels between Bourdieu and Bakhtin. See also Footnote 1 in Bourdieu (1977:17).
A single, concrete utterance is always given in a value-and-meaning context, whether it is scientific, artistic, poetical, etc., or in the context of a situation from everyday personal life. Each separate utterance is alive and has meaning only within these contexts: it is true or false, beautiful or ugly, sincere or deceitful, frank, cynical, authoritative, etc. – there are no neutral utterances, nor can there be. (Bakhtin 1990:292)

This quotation can just as easily be read as a preamble to a treatise on the relevance of language study for a domain-based sociology of taste and distinction. Let me draw up this parallel more fully. As any situation in which language is used is defined as a linguistic market (e.g. in Bourdieu 1984: 132), Bourdieu leaves little doubt over how and where speaker legitimacy is being (re)produced: it happens in the situation of contact between forms of symbolic capital and with variable effects – e.g. a profitable return in social capital (such as improving one’s positioning in a prestigious network of social relationships), enhancing solidarity in the case of ‘le franc parler’ (in situations where the laws of the linguistic market are temporarily put between brackets, “un îlot arraché aux lois du marché”), self-censured and respectful silence (when popular speech is made to confront official diction, “condamnés au silence, a silence que l’on dit respectueux”). In the background here is not only the shift from a primary concern with communicative understanding to the need to recognize that speakers are driven by a desire to be believed, but also a view in which the production of legitimacy or symbolic violence are effects of situations of ‘enacted heteroglossia’ (contact between discursive dispositions in a ‘transactional’ space which is never value-free). Bourdieu’s outline of a theory of linguistic practice which avails itself of the concepts of ‘capital’, ‘habitus’ and ‘market’ is arguably a project of linking an analysis of participant-oriented event-meaning with an analysis of objective conditions and relations between social groups as indexed by constituents of heteroglossia:

La description interactionniste des rapports sociaux, qui est en soi très intéressante, devient dangereuse si l’on oblie que ces relations d’interaction ne sont pas comme un empire dans un empire; si on oublie que ce qui se passe entre deux personnes, entre une patronne et sa domestique ou entre deux collègues ou entre un collègue francophone et un collègue germanophone, ces relations entre deux personnes sont toujours dominées par la relation objective entre les langues correspondantes, c’est-à-dire entre les groupes parlant ces langues. (Bourdieu 1984:127)

In this way, a market presupposes both a situated activity and a set of ‘objective conditions’ which entail a number of price-determining mechanisms which will bear on any situated transaction and its outcomes. Similarly, the concept of habitus will receive a number of definitions (Bourdieu 1984:133–136): it is discourse adjusted to

11. Note how ‘îlot’ can be translated into English both as ‘island’ and as ‘hotbed of resistance’. 
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a situation (a market, a field) but it is also transsituational capital. Habitus brings out the dimension of the speaker as a strategic player, but it is also being defined as a set of internalized bodily dispositions, acquired over time and in response to the sanctions and prohibitions of the market. Habitus is schematic knowledge which generates practices as well as the evaluative perception of these practices. It encompasses ethos (this underscores both the depth of conflict or the extent of solidarity in situated contacts between different/identical ideological viewpoints; “dès que nous disons blanc ou noir, nous disons bien ou mal”). Finally, habitus is hexis – it indexes an overall positioning of the body. There are three types of consequences from this which I would like to highlight.

One obvious area of application lies in analyses of sociolinguistic contact – inviting full attention to the diversity of local dialogisms of contact between strictly separated languages, between class dialects, as entailed in forms of code-switching and code-mixing. These are all very much part of an established sociolinguistic agenda, but one can also add to this agenda (encouraged by Bakhtin): the role of playful or derogatory citations, parody, mimicry and fantasy-displays of multilingualism and sociolectal diversity. For instance, by marking off a phrase as cited from another class dialect, speakers may draw normative boundaries around their own speech and that of absent and excluded others, even when the cited phrase appears to mark a temporary adherence to a value embodied in the other group (borrowing a perspective while drawing a boundary). Conversely, in some conditions of contact, a failure to mark off a phrase as cited from someone else’s habitus may be earmarked as evidence of a lack of competence.12

Secondly, for Bourdieu, issues to do with the nature of sociolinguistic contact cannot be dealt with separately from issues to do with domain-based legitimacy (the domain of professional or institutional processes). Remember in this respect, that Bakhtin, in a very similar fashion, mentions ‘professional languages’ in the same breath as ‘social languages’ when defining heteroglossia. Bourdieu will time and again draw attention to the role of ‘speaking correctly’ in the production of legitimate speech, but he equally cautions that it cannot exhaust ‘le bien dit’. As a result, it cannot tell the whole story of ‘dominance’ or ‘legitimacy’. Consider for instance Heller’s (2001) point that the production of legitimate language in the Franco-Ontarian schools which she studies is not just a matter of ‘French versus other languages’ or ‘what sort of French’, it also depends on the implicit recognition of distributional values and the structuring that is inherent in competing models of turn-taking: there is the official, on-record, French floor of orderly classroom talk controlled by the teacher and there

12. In Vološinov’s terminology, one could start talking about the sociolinguistics of ‘high’ and ‘low boundary maintenance’.
is the competing multivocal and nonconsequential floor which usually takes place in a language other than French and where many people can talk at once, overlap and where the teacher exercises no control.

Thirdly, Bakhtin’s and Bourdieu’s programmes both mark a return to the body – seeing posture as embodying a social and a moral position. One definition of ‘linguistic habitus’ is that of ‘hexis’: a set of internalized, bodily dispositions (both ‘eidos’ and ‘ethos’). The penultimate section of Bourdieu (1978: 31) opens as follows:

Mais il faut encore dégager les conséquences du fait que le capital linguistique est un capital incorporé et que l’apprentissage de la langue est une dimension de l’apprentissage d’un schema corporel global qui est lui-même ajusté à un système de chances objective d’acceptabilité. Le langage est une technique de corps et la compétence proprement linguistique, et tout spécialement phonologique, est une dimension de l’hexis corporelle où s’exprime tout le rapport au monde social. (Bourdieu 1977: 31)

He continues with a set of observations which underscore the extent to which the social reinterpretation of biological determinisms affects linguistically gendered practices (and their representations) in a way which is structured along a homology of oppositions which shapes the image of the sexes and the classes.


Bourdieu here pinpoints some of the ‘pains’ that come with class and gender: social mobility is received in compensation for docility in the relationship to the body: unlike men, women can identify with the dominant culture without cutting themselves off from their class and without the risk of their transformation being interpreted as a change in social and sexual identity; the dominant properties also entail a double
denial of virility: their acquisition requires docility which is imposed on women in the gendered division of labour (and the division of sexual labour), while docility is required particularly in the domain of feminine dispositions.

This rather long and detailed digression is worth making because it evokes a comparable dimension in Bakhtin’s work, viz. his writings on the carnivalesque, which equally point in the direction of a need to take analyses of heteroglossia to the level of relations between body-image and collective identities. This is perhaps a dimension of Bakhtin’s writings which is rarely thematized in sociolinguistic and pragmatic enquiry (with notable exceptions, see below) but it has been picked up more elaborately in cultural studies – for instance, in Stallybrass & White’s (1996) seminal enquiry into the politics and poetics of transgression.

Carnival in Bakhtin’s study of Rabelais is characterized as heteroglot exuberance; it is full of transcodings and displacements effected between the high/low image of the physical body and other social domains. According to Stallybrass & White (1996), a set of oppositional correlations can be derived from this, between ‘high’, ‘official’ and the ‘(desembodied) classical body’ with its associated values of reason and contextual distance, on the one hand, and ‘low’, ‘popular’ and the ‘grotesque body’ with its associated values of ‘mobility’, ‘physical needs and pleasure’, ‘impurity’ and as well as a refusal to close the body off from its ecosystem. Stallybrass & White interpret the carnivalesque as an instance of a wider phenomenon, transgression, and this can be developed into what they call, a political anthropology of binary extremism in class societies. Their claim is that the “underlying structural features of carnival operate far beyond the strict confines of popular festivity and are intrinsic to the dialectics of social classification as such.” (1996:26). For them, the history of contact between high and low is not just one of constant scrutiny, erasure and suppression, it is also one of fascination and desire and this is a premise which can be used fruitfully to explore the nature and functioning of situated forms of hybridity, inmixing and boundary transgression in language use (and other behaviours). For instance, Rampton (2003) observes in his data, encounters in the London area, how teenagers reflexively play out gradations between and exaggerations of perceived points of language/class-contrasts:

ultra-posh and Cockney emerged at moments when in one way or another, participants were attending to issues of sexuality, territory, reason and emotion, demeanour and deportment; they featured in sound play, self-talk, response-cries, greetings, taunts, commands, rebukes, and summonses; they were used to address, mock and caricature teachers, to fetishise particular individuals and to portray a variety of social types. (Rampton 2003:40)

These apparent flexibilities in conduct (ranging from pretty stable style-shifts to loosely performed stylizations) foreground “social class as a frame relevant to the flux of experience” (2003:46). Here what is traditionally perceived as a macro-issue
(language/class) which is traditionally examined through large-scale quantifying variationist research is being explored through the nitty-gritty interactional analysis of local, turn-based mini-citations. This is more than just a valuable addition to macro research, because it simultaneously raises questions of objective positionings and subjectifying perceptions of these (with partially denaturalising enactments in interaction), and in doing so, takes us to the very heart of some of the key questions posed by late modern conditions: e.g. do the growing diversity, apparent contradictions and apparent transcience which characterize contemporary discourse forms mark a breakdown or instead an intensification of old hierarchies, binarisms and social oppositions?

Concluding this section, note that Bourdieu, who tends to be associated somewhat too easily with a one-sided analysis of symbolic violence and silencing, concludes 'l'économie des échanges linguistiques' with the observation that all linguistic phenomena lie between the poles of highly-censured discourse which reaches its limit in the silence of those who do not possess the resources of euphemization and the unbridled language use of the revolutionary crisis or the popular festivity as described by Bakhtin:

On voit qu'il est à la fois vrai et faux de réduire l'opposition entre les classes à l'opposition entre la distinction, censure devenue nature, et le franc-parler, qui ignore les interdits de la langue commune, règles de grammaire et de la politesse, et les barrières hiérarchiques (usage du tutoiement, de diminutifs, de sobriquets, d'épithètes injurieuses, d'injures affectueuses), et qui se définit par « le relâchement de la tension articulatoire » (comme dit Guiraud) et de toutes les censure que la bienséance fait peser, en particulier sur le corps taboué, ventre, cul et sexe, et surtout, peut-être sur le rapport au monde social qu'il permet d'exprimer, renversement des hiérarchies (cul par-dessus tête) ou rabaissement de ce qui est élevé (bouffe, tripes, merde).

(Bourdieu 1977:33)

6. **Natural histories of discourse: Recontextualization/entextualization and textual ideologies**

There is one remaining, ‘loose thread’ in this overview – one not unimportant for pragmatic theory. It is that of the speaker, or rather, what is left of him/her. If Maybin's (1999) argument above means the end of the ‘individual communicative intention’, then she is only repeating an exercise performed about 20 years earlier, when the rapid ascent of ‘intertextuality’ meant a further challenge to the Romantic concept of the author as a source of meaning and signification. The implications of this for the

13. Structuralism had already replaced the author as a source of meaning by structural relationships in an autonomous, bounded textual space.
ways in which institutions work reach further than one would imagine at first sight. Arguably, they take us beyond Kristeva’s proclamation of the centrality of the text. There are also metadiscursive implications for the study of language use. To develop these points, I will make use of the examples of literary translation and institutional self-reporting. Both are intrinsically bi-focal and dialogic activities, but so far I have not talked about this as raising questions about ‘originals’, ‘derivations’ and their ‘authorship’. Developing the implications of intertextuality in this direction will again lead us to address issues to do with communicative legitimacy but with more of an explicit focus on institutions. What’s more, what follows is a necessary venture into (re)contextualization and ideologies of linguistic and textual reproduction.

Consider first a few ‘practical details’ about the workings of one or two institutions. For all purposes of parliamentary activity (future references to earlier debates, political history, etc.), the *Hansard* report counts as the source of what happened in Britain’s House of Commons. It is the printed report which is the institutionally-endorsed, and hence also the authoritative account of ‘what happened’. In that sense, much more than its antecedent spoken debates, it counts as an ‘original’. Similarly, Flemish literary audiences reading *Les fleurs du mal* in the Dutch translation by Petrus Hoosemans, will say they are reading ‘Baudelaire’ – not ‘Hoosemans’. They may not even remember the translator’s name. Insofar as a user is in a position where s/he cannot access the source text (because it is not available or accessible or its authority cannot be endorsed publicly), intertextually-established re-enactments function as an ‘original’. It is the widespread but counterfactual belief in reproduction accomplished through a verbatim rendition or translational equivalence which makes it possible for a derived version to function as an original. Such can only happen at the expense of the intertextual transformation itself, denying its relevance and impact (and with this, translators’ names and the names of Hansard scribes and editors are forgotten or thought of as irrelevant). Note that this is more than an ‘imaginative leap’ which neutralizes and suppresses inevitable conditions of intertextual mediation which are traceable in textual practice (e.g. when one compares the literary text and its translation; when one compares the printed Hansard with audio-taped recordings). Without this suspension of disbelief, the very claims to institutional authority and legitimacy collapse: the *Hansard* becomes a systematically distorted rendering, newspapers can no longer be called ‘factual’; translators become co-authors and become likely to sue publishers in demand of

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14. I am taking the example of the British Parliamentary records here because it is a case I have studied in detail (Slembrouck 1992).
a greater share in royalties. In this sense, it is probably more accurate to observe that intertextuality stands for the ‘death’ of some authors/speakers and that, detecting the details of its workings, also entails the rediscovery/unearthling of other authors/speakers, whose visibility can ultimately become quite threatening to institutional legitimacy itself (invisible as they ideally must remain when performing adequately in the service of authors/speakers more important). Having said this, something else will also become apparent to my reader: the need to understand intertextualities as contextualities. (a) Intertextual transformation always comes with recontextualization. (b) Translation and direct quotation entail (often) divided loyalties to two (or even more) contexts. (c) Contexts of intertextual mediation are being shaped by (and help shape) cultural, societal, institutional, etc. ideologies of language, text and textual practice (Schieffelin et al. 1998; Collins 1996).

This is an appropriate point to refer to linguistic anthropological traditions, in which the concept of ‘intertextuality’ itself appears to be rather absent as a key term, whereas most of the processes I have been engaged with so far are dealt with through such concepts as (re)contextualization, (de)contextualization and (re)entextualization. A benchmark publication in this respect is Silverstein & Urban’s (1996) edited volume on ‘natural histories of discourse’. Programmatically, the perspective of natural histories of discourse amounts to an enquiry into the make-ability of text – text as an artefact for analysis and cultural transmission, text as a reified category – attached to which is the fundamental consideration that the student of culture’s engagement with texts forms no exception to these processes. In their editorial introduction, Silverstein and Urban connect the concept of ‘natural histories of discourse’ to a focus on contextually contingent semiotic processes involved in achieving text – and culture. These are recoverable in some measure only by analytically engaging with textual sedimentations. Each chapter in our collective natural history thus focuses on certain analytic moments in the entextualising/co(n)textualizing process.

(Silverstein & Urban 1996: 2–3)

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15. Note at the same time how translation studies has failed to take intertextuality to its full socio-political consequences. While Hatim & Masin (1990) do devote a complete chapter to intertextuality, they fail to take on board the consequences of an obvious (but politically risky) observation: translation is intertextual practice.

16. Even though the impact of the work of Bakhtin and Vološinov is quite considerable within linguistic anthropological enquiry, the term ‘intertextuality’ (unlike the concept ‘heteroglossia’) does not appear among the keywords of language and culture in Duranti (ed. 2001a), in the same author’s linguistic anthropological handbook (Duranti 1997), in Hanks (1996) or in the authoritative reader (Duranti ed. 2001b). Significantly, Silverstein & Urban (1996: 6) in their editorial introduction refer to ‘intertext’ only once, at a point where they mean ‘co-text’.
Natural history of discourse takes issue with the anthropological idea of 'text-as-culture' to the extent that such a view encourages the analyst of culture to extract a portion of ongoing social action and draw a reifying boundary around it, before enquiring into its structure and meaning (compare with the rather common perception of culture in terms of texts handed down from generation to generation). To equate culture with its resultant texts is to miss the point that the thingy-ness of texts is but one stage in ongoing cultural processes and although on the surface that thingy-ness may appear to have a quasi-permanent shape (which is by no means always the case), it travels from context to context and as a result, it will not only enter into new differential orderings between textual artefacts and be surrounded by changed conditions of response, uptake, commentary and explanation; its textuality itself will at the same time be contextually contingent (for instance, a textual artefact may be a set of anticipatory notes awaiting performance and therefore 'not really a text'; one and the same textual artefact may enter into different contexts accompanied by different scripts for performance).

From this point of view, then, text is a metadiscursive notion, useful to participants in a culture as a way of creating an image of a durable, shared culture immanent in or even undifferentiated from its ensemble of realised or even potential texts. It is a metadiscursive construct (...) that grows out of and refers to actual cultural practices, which themselves are presumably to be studied ethnographically, in addition to constituting the essence of ethnographic method itself. (Silverstein & Urban 1996: 2).

The 'natural histories' perspective invites attention to the full range of strategies and modes of (re)entextualization (e.g. transcription, copying, dictating, editing, enacting, translating, commenting, etc.) and seeks to examine the specific ways in which such performative operations connect with particular 'textualities' which are constitutive of social processes. For instance, Mertz (1996) examines how overtly authoritarian forms of classroom interaction and interrogation in US law schools play a role in inducing students into a pragmatic ideology of text in which past cases are no longer read as narratives but as defining an anticipatory space for pragmatic leeway, promoting an ideology of text which is characteristic for an elite professional ethos. Collins (1996) draws attention to how the differential insertion of textual materials into low-ranked and high-ranked reading classes goes together with conceptions of the text as containing a set of phonetic instructions or, semantically, as containing a narrative; he also explores the links with the conclusions about literacy which pupils draw for themselves as a result of sustained exposure a particular type of recontextualization practice and its embeddedness in routine forms of classroom management by the teacher.

In Kristeva's original article, intertextuality represents an impersonal state-of-play and it is central to a definition of what is a text. Although essentially dealing with the same phenomena (but twenty or more years later), (re)contextualization/entextualization stresses the contextual dynamics of what is text in relation to intertextual spaces.
(inter)text is a contextually grounded process, publicly recognized textualities count as by-products of situated practice and cannot be divorced from language ideologies. On top of that, the very idea of text is exposed as ethnocentric (and inadequate), unless it is itself recognized as a stake in social and cultural processes and studied ethnographically, as linked to the metadiscursive orientations of actual discourse participants. Interestingly, the concept of (re)contextualization/entextualization then does not demolish or bypass the concept of the author/speaker.

Intertextuality is about how history is inscribed into situated practice. As I hope to have demonstrated in the course of my explorations, it suggests a kind of historicity that calls for inter-disciplinarity.

References


Manipulation has a bad name, unless you are a physiotherapist by profession. In English the word was not current in even its basic sense (‘to fashion something, to change its shape by hand’) until the middle of the nineteenth century. But it soon developed a more abstract sense – the sense of ‘treat unfairly, by skilful means to one’s own advantage’. The ‘skilful means’ came to include, perhaps predominately, verbal means. I take it that our notion of verbal manipulation is closely related to what we also call ‘persuasion’. Persuasion was directly associated with the teaching and practice of ‘rhetoric’ – whether it was regarded as ‘manipulation’ depended on how you viewed rhetoric and on your theory of rhetoric itself. Most people assume that verbal manipulation exists and that it works. In this paper I want to present some of the ways in which manipulation and persuasion have been viewed, but also to ask whether there is such a thing as manipulative persuasion that is intrinsically verbal.

1. The ancient technique of rhetoric

The art of persuasion is traditionally said to have been founded by Gorgias, in Sicily, in the fifth century BC. It is said to have been subsequently developed in Greece by Isocrates, whose successors, not least Aristotle, bequeathed the discipline to the Roman rhetors, best known of whom are Cicero and Quintilian. Gorgias is said to have had an attitude akin to that of a modern publicity agent – persuasion is a transferrable technique, morality or truth irrelevant. Isocrates on the other hand is credited with the opposite approach, an approach transmitted to the culture of Renaissance Europe. Until the eighteenth century at least, schoolchildren in Europe were taught the art of persuasion. Rhetoric was a detailed, prolifically classified collection of tricks for professional persuaders, politicians and lawyers. It offered linguistic devices – for example, how to remember your speech, what gestures to use and how to project your voice. Rhetorical manuals gave instructions for thinking up topics for speeches and for different parts of speeches. It provided recipes for different patterns of lexical repetition, for ‘trope’ or semantic manipulations such as irony, hyperbole and, most notoriously, metaphor. And the manuals told you which ones were best for which type of speech or occasion of use – legal, political, ceremonial, and so
on – and how to distribute different tricks throughout the speech, so that, for instance, 
you could conclude with a rousing verbal finale (or ‘peroration’).

We do not know for sure if, or how, people’s minds were indeed persuaded. At 
any rate, rulers were prepared to employ professional persuaders, and people were 
prepared to spend time and money learning their secrets. Rhetoric did not, how-
ever, always have an easy ride. It seems that Gorgias, and his teachers Corax and 
Tisias, made their names defending and prosecuting legal cases. Gorgias acquired 
a reputation for highly decorated and specious language, while having no concern 
whatever about the truthfulness of its content. Persuasion was all, and the client’s 
interest paramount. Isocrates is credited with higher moral standards in the verbal 
arts, and his high-minded verbal ethics was continued centuries later by the famous 
orator Cicero.

When empirical science, and the first shoots of modern democracies began to 
appear in eighteenth-century Europe, the art of rhetoric fell from its pedestal. Philoso-
phers such as Hobbes and Locke regarded rhetoric as a threat to right thinking. In Eng-
land, the Royal Society – the newly founded scientific academy – equally condemned 
ornamental, emotive and persuasive uses of language.

### 2. The twentieth-century nightmare of ‘thought control’

It would be absurd to think that oratorical skills and linguistic persuasion then 
dwindled and died. Indeed, rhetoric may have done no more, all along, than crudely 
record the natural devices used by individual speakers, with lesser or greater degrees 
of skill. Anyone who has brought up children will suspect that verbal manipulation 
is a part of the linguistic interaction engaged in by all human individuals. The social 
proscription of lying, and the fact that lying itself is not a hard-and-fast category but a 
spectrum of ‘distortions’ and ‘twistings’ and (as one English politician has put it) ‘being 
economical with the truth’, shows that the use of language to get people to do or believe 
what you want them to do or believe has a natural life of its own.

One factor is of high significance as the age of rhetorical pedagogy ends and the 
industrial and post industrial ages begin: the huge and increasing size of the public 
forum. At the same time, the transport networks develop and the communication 
networks explode. The first mass circulation newspapers appear to create a public 
sphere that could in principle encompass a mass citizenry. Face-to-face persuasive 
communication becomes, relatively speaking, a thing of the past. Mediated mass com-
munication – the mass media – becomes central to social and political functioning. The 
use of language to manipulate thus becomes qualitatively and quantitatively different 
from anything that had preceded it.
The theoretical question at the bottom of the topic of manipulation is: does or can language determine the thoughts you have? In looking at questions formulated with the word ‘language’ in them, one needs to be careful. One needs to decide whether we are talking about language in use – used by someone to someone in a definite situation. Or are we talking about language in general, or about a language in particular? Since these are complicated matters all we can say here is the following. Language and thought can be separated. A particular language (Welsh, Hopi, Korean…) may lexicalize and to a lesser extent grammaticalize thoughts differentially, though this does not prevent speakers thinking thoughts not so lexicalized or grammaticalized. And, with respect to speaker–hearer communication, a speaker may, or at least so one tends to think from informal practical evidence, persuade a hearer to change their thoughts – but if so there are many ancillary conditions required for effective persuasion to take place.

Twentieth-century writers, however, took harder positions on such questions, a fact that explains the emergence of the notion of linguistic manipulation. Perhaps unfairly Sapir, and perhaps less unfairly Whorf, became associated by linguists with the notion of linguistic determinism. The particular language you happen to speak (Welsh, Hopi, Korean…) determines the way you think: you think Welsh, Hopi, Korean thoughts. This claim – the Sapir–Whorf hypothesis – is notoriously difficult to define, let alone demonstrate experimentally. Its key feature is that it denies the separability of language and thought. The importance of this extreme form of this fantasy for the present exposition is that it lays the foundation for George Orwell’s nightmare. In Nineteen-eighty-four, Orwell gave us a novelistic, albeit unusually detailed, story of linguistic mind control.

Orwell’s nightmare was that in some future dystopia the rulers would be so powerful that they would be able to engage in a form of language planning that would make the entire population speak a new variant of English – ‘Newspeak’. This new language would be identical with a set of thoughts, the thoughts of the approved political ideology (which Orwell called ‘Ingsoc’):

The purpose of Newspeak was not only to provide a medium of expression for the world-view and mental habits proper to the devotees of Ingsoc, but to make all other modes of thought impossible.

(Orwell 1949: 305, in ‘The Principles of Newspeak’, the appendix to his novel)

Whether this should be read as fanciful fiction or not, Orwell clearly considered that thought could be determined by substituting one word, or set of words, for another word or set. His position represents a limiting case for the theory of linguistic manipulation that haunted theorists who came from the academic world of linguistics in the second half of the twentieth century.
3. Manipulation is not inherent in language structure

Taking their cue from Orwell, Fowler, Kress and Hodge adopted theoretical perspectives that come very close to equating, if they do not entirely equate, language on the hand and thought on the other. The titles of their books have an Orwellian cast – *Language and Control* (1979) and *Language as Ideology* (1979, 1993). The theoretical perspectives came mainly from the version of generative grammar prevailing at the time, although later they were to espouse Halliday’s functional-systemic grammar. Generative grammar provided the apparatus of ‘transformation,’ which in Chomsky’s formulation was an entirely syntactic operation – thus actually *divorced* from thought and meaning. What it gave the Critical Linguists – as this group came to be known – was a tool for arguing the claim that syntax could be used for manipulation.

The argument, schematically speaking, runs as follows. A transformation takes an input structure, known at that time as ‘deep structure,’ and gives as its output another grammatical form, its ‘surface structure.’ For the Critical Linguists, the input structure could be seen not as a mere syntactic form (a string of syntactic elements) but as a *meaning*. Typically, such a meaning would be an explicit representation of an action: X does Y to Z, for example. Such a meaning structure could be transformed. And such a transformation could be ideologically motivated. This motivates the notion of language as ideology: language *is* ideology. Two transformations were and continued to be frequently mentioned: passivization and nominalization. Consider (cf. Trew 1979):

(1) The army destroyed the house.
(2) The house was destroyed by the army.
(3) The house was destroyed.
(4) The destruction of the house by the army...
(5) The destruction of the house...

Sentences (1) and (2) are transformationally connected (passivization). The affected participant (‘demonstrators’) could be said to be manipulated into subject position. The speaker's or writer’s motives for doing this might be not at all ideological; they might be to achieve consistency of discourse perspective, if, for example the theme of the paragraph is a particular house. But (3) lent itself more to the claim that something was being suppressed – namely, the identity of the agent of the action, the identity of the person or persons responsible for an action. A similar argument can be applied to nominalization, illustrated in (3) and (4). Deverbal nouns are in parallel with verb phrases in that agentive role players may be left unmentioned. Prima facie, we have a clear case of linguistic manipulation here: an action is being represented linguistically with part of the story missing.
The trouble with these analyses is that one cannot be sure that the hearer or reader is incapable of inferring the identity of the agent. Is the claim that syntax is inherently ideological because it enables speakers to manipulate by omission? This cannot be the case because agent-less passives often seem to occur precisely because the agent is manifest in the context or can reasonably be expected to be inferred. We are left with the possibility that these constructions *may* be used, given certain, circumstances to exclude, or occlude, the agent. But this is far from identifying language and thought and requires many circumstantial factors to explain how a hearer may be ‘taken in’. This kind of criticism, and others, has been made by Pateman (1987).

A framework that does bring into play some of these other factors is Critical Discourse Analysis, best represented in the work of Fairclough (e.g. 1989) and also Wodak (1996). The extra factors are political and social. This is not to say that such factors are absent in the earlier work, merely that in the later work, the emphasis is less on linguistic mechanisms, and more on underlying frameworks of political analysis. Fairclough, for example, has as his starting point concepts of power and exploitation, and the critical involvement in language analysis is wider and more diffuse. In particular, it involves Foucault’s concept of discourse and discourse formations. The point is that, manipulation is seen now as part of a complex web of interacting loci of discourse – forces of power and resistance in different settings, with varying degrees of institutional sanction. An important distinction (Fairclough 1989) is that between power *behind* discourse and power *in* discourse. Power *behind* discourse includes, for example, the physical sanctions underpinning an order (itself an *linguistic* act) given by a policeman. Power *in* discourse might be instantiated in the use of an agent-less passive, as described above, in circumstances (a) where the hearer could not possibly identify the identity of the agent and (b) where the same hearer had a significant (social, political, economic, ethical…) interest in the identity of the agent. But it could equally be claimed to be instantiated in a whole range of ‘manipulative’ devices. For example: alliteration, intonation, regional or class accent switching, passivization, nominalization, pronouns, metaphors, antonymy, tripartite co-ordinated noun and verb phrases, presupposition. And then there are strictly pragmatic phenomena: interruption, back-channelling, body language, latching, questioning, irony, rhetorical questions, evasive responses in question-answer pairs, defocusing by syntactic and semantic selections as in presupposition and accommodation, etc.

However, linguistic structures are not in my view *inherently* deceptive or manipulative, though there have been evolutionary psychologists who claim that the origin of language, like that of social intelligence itself, is essentially ‘machiavellian manipulation’ (Knight 1998). Linguistic structures are just linguistic structures. Human users can manipulate them (like one manipulates a lump of clay, for example) with goal-directed intentions. Examples of such intention might be to deceive a hearer as to physical or social facts, which might involve getting a hearer to form new thoughts about
social and physical facts. But there are many other possible intentional deployments of language. All this being so, it is more logical to investigate strategies (i.e. goal-directed plans of action, here verbal action) directed at deception or at changing a hearer's representation of social and physical reality. An example of such an approach is Habermas's notion of strategic communicative action (e.g. Habermas 1979, 1981). Within the context of language and politics Chilton & Schäffner (2002:1–41) propose ‘strategies’, recognisable as ‘political’: legitimization of the self, delegitimization of others, coercion, and dissimulation. To realise such strategic ends speakers may use a variety of linguistic structures in interaction with context; there is no necessary correspondence between strategy and structure. Moreover, whether an utterance is strategic or not is dependent upon the ability of human language users to detect and metarepresent strategic intent.

4. So let’s look at thought and social action

In all approaches to manipulation the key ideas appear to be as follows. (1) A person’s thoughts and possibly actions are changed as a result of some controlling use of language. This includes getting people to accept a representation of states of affairs that are different from what they really are. (2) Some information may be omitted or partially obscured. (3) The manipulator intends (1) and/or (2). And (4), the person manipulated is not aware of what the manipulator has done to their thoughts. I consider key aspects of these assumptions below. In particular, what it might mean to have one’s thoughts changed, whether that change involves the modification of existing thoughts, the elimination of existing thoughts or the addition of thoughts not before entertained? I shall consider not simply the individual case but how it might be possible for a population to be ‘manipulated’ into changing its mental representations.

4.1 Drumming it in

Perhaps a linguistically formulated idea can be repeated so often that the mind stores it as self-evidently true? According to such a view, repeated activation of mental representations – especially those that are connected with basic (innate or at least early

1. I do not wish to deal with epistemological issues here, but I should mention that when I use the term ‘reality’ here, I am indicating a group-coordinated mental representation of perceptions.

2. We might also consider the case where the person believes consciously that their change of mind is reasonable and justified. But have they been ‘manipulated’ into that conscious belief? I do not pursue the implications of this question in this paper.
acquired) cognitive representations, including metaphor structures, can lead to change in people's minds. Such changes may be similar across a population under the appropriate conditions. Appropriate conditions here will include exposure of a population to a repeated 'message' – that is, a repeated mental representation stimulated by a linguistic expression that sufficiently large numbers of individuals are mentally processing. However, while repetition may be a necessary condition for the widespread fixing of a mental representation in a population, it surely cannot be sufficient. For example, to process the incoming linguistic stimulus into a mental representation, and then to store it into long-term memory, the receiving mind must, in the first place, find that representation 'relevant'. This is a factor that can be further understood in terms of Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson 1995), the core idea being that individuals expend processing effort in order to construct meaning on the basis of incoming linguistic material – but they will only do so to the extent that the processing cost is worth the meaning benefit. What determines the benefit will, of course, depend on individual circumstances and, for populations, the socio-historical contingencies of the context.

4.2 Ideas that spread

These considerations suggest that it is not possible to predict easily how and when thought manipulation by means of language could occur. The question can in fact be viewed the other way round: how likely is it that thoughts change without manipulation? Here we can think of change in spatial terms, as well as temporal, as the spreading of mental representations. This is precisely what Dawkins (1976) has mooted with his notion of memes, and Sperber (1996) with his notion of epidemiology. Dawkins thinks that ideas can be regarded as – not just compared to – genes which replicate themselves and sometimes mutate. He also compares some memes (the ones he especially dislikes, such as religious ideas) to viruses. Because Dawkins thinks of genes as replicating themselves 'blindly', it should follow that he also thinks of ideas as replicating themselves blindly, without human deliberation, the successful ones just reproducing themselves because it is their property to do so. But the odd thing about Dawkins's exposition of this theory is that it frequently seems to involve what he regards as wicked indoctrinators – manipulators of the mind (e.g. Dawkins 1982, 1993). The problem with this is that manipulators must be presumed to have intentions, whereas the meme idea seems to imply that people are merely the medium for the self-replicating memes.

At the end of his book, *The Selfish Gene*, Dawkins says (1976: 200) that “we have the power to defy [...] the selfish memes of our indoctrination”. Dawkins’s idea has inspired so-called ‘memetics’, whose proponents see it as their mission to diagnose and treat invading thought viruses. Note too that if Dawkins happened to be right in his claim that memes replicate themselves, like genes, for no one’s advantage but their own, then they cannot originate in the minds of human manipulators for the purposes of the manipulator.

Dawkins gives examples of human manipulation: advertisements, nuns, teachers, brainwashing of prisoners, hypnotism, electrical stimulation of the brain. It is important to note that these examples involve forms of non-linguistic control by powerful persons over contextually weak persons – readers of adverts cannot easily check claims in a hurry, nuns and teachers (according to Dawkins) have direct access to undeveloped young minds, hypnotists have by one means or another persuaded their subjects to suspend their consciousness. Human agents are certainly involved in such examples, as are complex social institutions within which they work. This means that there is more to manipulation than memes blindly self-replicating. The idea of memes is in fact self-contradictory: memes cannot be both blindly self-replicating and deliberately deployed by human beings. The jump from genetics to “memetics” is not scientifically warranted and is used to disparage, on pseudo-scientific grounds, a range of targets that should not be lumped together.

Sperber’s (1996) use of the Darwinian metaphor leads down a slightly different path. Considering culture rather than manipulation, he sees (linguistic) communication as the means by which (cultural) ideas spread through a population, resulting in stabilization of ideas across its members and over generations. But for Sperber (2000) this is not necessarily a pathological process, though it is like an epidemic. More to the point, his view of communication not only builds on relevance theory, as outlined above, but also the notion of a 'logico-rhetorical module', an evolved mental mechanism which enables addressees to check for internal and external consistency of incoming language. Why should such a biological adaptation have evolved? Sperber’s claim belongs to a background of thought that has direct bearing on the notion of manipulation. According to Byrne & Whiten (1988) human communication, bound up with social intelligence, is inherently machiavellian, and thus manipulative. Communication necessarily involves the possibility of lying and deceiving, and so a consistency-checking device is a natural adaptation that is part of the human communicative set-up. Sperber draws in particular on Cosmides (1989), who postulates a 'cheater detection' device in the human mind-brain. Communication has to be co-operative or no one would want it – it would not evolve. If it does evolve, some people might still want to cheat – manipulate the co-operative folk. But a point would be reached where everyone would end up being cheaters, so humans must have acquired some cheater-detection...
ability. This is consistent with what Dawkins (1982) and Dawkins & Krebs (1978) call an adaptive ‘arms race’ in evolutionary time.³

What Sperber proposes is that because humans are so communication-dependent, evolution has given humans a ‘consistency-checking’ module – to check the internal logical consistency of what people say and to check the consistency of its content with their existing beliefs about what is true or real. Of course, here the persuasion-counter-persuasion – war escalates… Quite likely we leave innate endowments and enter the cultural. The ability to check arguments and rhetoric through scrutiny of the linguistic sits on top of an innate cheat-detection disposition. But its phenotypes are, or can be, culturally honed through education, critical discourse analysis and such cultural forms.

The implications of this story for the notion of manipulation are considerable. If everyone has a consistency checking device, then nobody need be manipulated. This is an extremely important principle. However, one might add a proviso: nobody need be manipulated if their device is functioning, and functioning well.

5. What might override the cheat-checker?

Relevance theory can supply some of the answer. For example, what is relevant to a hearer will be affected by the degree of trust in the speaker. If you trust the speaker you are more likely to process what they tell as being true. This is an extremely complex matter, for it involves factors external to the hearer as well as the interests of the hearer herself in believing that what the speaker says is true. This is as much as to say that her consistency-checking device might be swamped by para-linguistic and extra-linguistic factors (stirring music, promises, handsome appearance…), and, more seriously for manipulation theory, it is as much as to say that she may be deceiving herself in her own interests. In short, I am suggesting that the responsibility of the hearer for being manipulated could be considerable. The issue of manipulation is rarely turned back-to-front in this fashion, but it provides a heuristic for probing further.

What then are the factors that might override the natural functioning – assuming that such is the case – of the consistency-checking module? This question provides us with the shape of a whole research programme, but there are three paths we might think worth going down. One is psychological, specifically cognitive. We need of course to

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³ Another important line of argument is that manipulative deception is closely bound up with the basic human ability to detect symbolic fictions with a ‘deeper meaning’ that are distinct from truth claims about physical and social reality, such symbolic fictions having the adaptive advantage that they underpin collective representations of group identity (Knight 1998).
know whether the hypothesized ‘logico-rhetorical’ or ‘consistency-checking’ module actually exists and eventually what are its neuroanatomical substrates. Psychological and psycholinguistic experimentation might establish this and reveal something of its workings. In particular, we need to know what factors interfere with its operations. If conscious inattention is involved, for example, we need to know what distraction factors can lead people to accept representations without checking them. As suggested above, these might be linked to the nature of trust, to interference with the reception channels by such means as musical or pictorial stimulation (cf. O’Keefe 2002). The limiting case of manipulation is perhaps torture. Does it work? Although Nineteen eighty-four tells the tale of one man’s mental representations being changed in this way, it is by no means obvious – or acceptable – that they can be changed as distinct from verbally disavowed.

The second type of override could be sociological. Habermas, for example, has asserted that the distribution of power distorts communication in line with the strategic interests of powerful communicators (cf. Habermas 1998), and has imagined the counterfactual (‘ideal’) communicative situation in which manipulation would not be possible because all interlocutors had equal rights and powers of expression and understanding. We might re-interpret this in the light of our earlier discussion: the ideal situation would be one in which everyone’s machiavellian intelligence and logico-rhetorical modules were equally free to function. To be concrete, what this might mean is that everyone has the freedom to develop their communicative skills. Most people can do this, one might guess, in everyday micro-settings, perhaps within some gullibility range, but human needs in large-scale societies are not well served by innate mental abilities evolved in small-scale communities.

The third, and the most obvious and controllable extension of these ideas is physical and political limitation and control of the means of communication. There are two ways in which we can pursue this. On the one hand, there is what Fairclough (1989) calls power exercised in discourse. Particularly skilful or trained speakers can use language in such a way that hearers’ critical consistency-checking modules do not work well. At the most obvious, such speakers can lie or withhold information. They may also use techniques that induce hearers to incorporate unspoken assumptions in their mental representations without being aware of it. Such claims are, however, difficult to sustain. They may be able to use emotive means through language to induce the acceptance of propositions. These last two claims, though attractive, and traditional, are difficult to demonstrate and in all probability cannot work without the sort of overrides mentioned in connection with the first path.

On the other, there is a manifestly obvious form of manipulation – controlling the channel of communication. This may involve social and economic control – limiting access to education, limiting education, banning TV sets or restricting opportunities to speak or write in public media. If access in some degree is granted, then what is
uttered may be restricted. These are forms of negative control: essentially, censorship. The positive (not good, of course) face of channel-control is propaganda – that is the reservation of the right to speak in public to certain spokespersons and to constrain their utterance-meanings within certain semantic and pragmatic limits. Both dimensions of channel-control are manipulative in the sense that mental representations can – perhaps somewhat crudely – be confined. This holds in particular for representations of states of affairs that are not witnessable, such as government deliberations behind closed doors, events in remote regions, events that have taken place in the past. If people do not have multiple sources of empirical knowledge, if their only source is provided by, say, a government office of information, then their ability check for consistency has nothing to work on. A further significant form of channel-control in this sense would be the denial of language rights: if a community in a polity cannot understand the broadcast language it is in the worst possible situation.

6. Conclusion: Manipulation and counter-manipulation

The core question is this. How can a speaker control the meanings that ‘enter’ the mind of a hearer? Of course they do not go into the mind from outside the hearer’s head – they are not put there by the speaker. They are made in the mind-brain of the hearer and by the mind-brain of the hearer in response to the speaker’s utterance – but this is not to say we are looking at a determinate causal stimulus-response effect. Rather, what happens is that the speaker’s utterance prompts the hearer’s mind to access her own knowledge bases in order to build an integrated conceptual representation out of the incoming linguistic material, and perhaps respond emotionally in the process. This is a very complex process and it is beyond the control of the speaker. But, we have asked, how far is it beyond the control of the hearer? Well, it is doubtless true that human brains do automatically process linguistic input, at least to some degree. But if that is so, then it applies to all communication and not just to some particular kind of communication that we call manipulative. The general point is that speakers cannot be sure about the precise mental representation their words may lead to in their interlocutor’s brain; they can be sure enough for social co-ordination to take place, but there is a margin of unpredictability. If “meaning escapes the control of speaker intention” (Lee 2001: 207), we need to be circumspect regarding the question of manipulation, or thought-control-by-linguistic-means.

If representations (call them ideas, notions, beliefs, attitudes, if you wish) are not chosen by individuals, or indeed by groups of individuals then the individuals are not responsible for holding them. So it might seem. Note that if individuals do not choose to have the representations they have, then they cannot, according to our usual ethical
calculus, be held responsible for them. So it might seem. But is it really so? For, while it may be the case that people may grow ideas, beliefs etc. without their being aware of it, it remains the case that the human mind has the capacity or the potential to inspect or introspect their beliefs, etc. Broadly, this idea corresponds to what are called meta-representations in the cognitive science literature; language systems themselves have metalinguistic mechanisms that support the evaluative representation of truth claims.

Taking the key points of this line of thought further, and considering the utilizations of the unconscious knowledge of language, i.e. utterances produced and processed in contexts of human interaction, human language-users might have a tendency to assume the truth of what people tell them, but that does not intrinsically absolve them from the responsibility of checking for veracity – indeed, humans do have this capacity, and use it more or less automatically, though there may be limitations on their tendency to do such checking under certain social or psychological conditions.

Now, we can look at the spread of representations the other way round, focusing not on the receiving minds but on the hypothetical sending mind and communicator. If it is the case that representations in some sense reproduce themselves – by being attracted to cognitive formats already existing in the mind-brains of individuals and groups, then is it the case that communicators communicating such adaptable representations are responsible for that fact? I guess, they would be if they knew what they were doing. Let us consider what ‘knew what they were doing’ might mean. It seems implausible that a communicator passing on some ‘infectious’ representation has calculated the process in detail. Did Hitler, for example, say consciously to himself, ‘I will call Jews parasites because that conceptual chunk will attach itself to a natural pre-existing mental schema in the minds of my listeners’? This is not of course the same as saying that such a communicator does not know, from empirical experience of the effectiveness of such communications, that he is likely to promote the representation in question, and his purpose may indeed be to change recipients’ beliefs, ideas, attitudes, etc.

There remains a problem, however, if one now asks how such representations actually ‘spread’. One possibility is that they are ‘planted’ simultaneously in the minds of a population of individuals receiving a particular broadcast communication, or series of broadcasts. This cannot be the whole picture, because people talk to one another. If then, their linguistic communications express the ‘infectious’ idea (say, ‘Jews are parasites’), it can be picked up by many hearers in the communicative networks of the speech community – without the spread of the idea being the express purpose of the communicators. Even if it is not their express purpose, however, would one hold them responsible for a manipulative act? Here is perhaps the nub of the matter. As already noted, human mind-brains certainly have the capacity to reflect on their unconscious cognitions, communicative behaviour and physical action. It is arguable,
however, that the tendency is not to do so (it would not be helpful to be always introspecting while out hunting, for example), unless trained, educated or encouraged by a whole variety of complex factors.

Having said that, does any more follow? Probably. Introspections of all kinds take time and technique: one way to acquire the technique of critical introspection is through education. Public education may not provide it, either because a priest or dictator, or for the matter of that a teacher, wishes to suppress such critical techniques, or through sheer force of circumstances and lack of opportunity. Critical Discourse Analysis, which is less a linguistic discipline than a social movement, seeks to do just this (cf. Fairclough & Wodak 1997). The material point, for making sense of the term ‘manipulation’ is that it does not occur if communicative receivers evolve and hone their checking devices. A key implication of this point is that manipulation will take place not merely by way of deceptive use of language or infective distribution of ideas that take hold in the mind: it is necessary also for the target individuals to be bereft of critical defences.

There is not much that is novel in this line of argument, which has existed since the Enlightenment, but is now out of favour since technical training of various kinds has replaced education as an ideal – education in the sense of drawing out innate abilities, including critical abilities. At least the teaching of rhetoric potentially gave some small purchase on the operations of verbal manipulation.

References


Narrative

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1. Narrative as a mode of communication

Narrative is viewed by numerous linguistic and non-linguistic disciplines as inescapably fundamental in human life, central to the (re)constitution and interpretation of personal, social, and cultural reality. As Bruner has asserted, “we organize our experience and our memory of human happenings mainly in the form of narrative – stories, excuses, myths, reasons for doing and not doing and so on” (1991: 4). The narrative texts which we are engaged in as part of our everyday life form an endless list that includes personal stories, comic strips, jokes, autobiography, personal letters, gossip, legal testimonies, novels, news reports, fairy-tales, retellings of plots of films and TV series, etc. These texts, popular or artistic (literary), not only crosscut the spoken, written and electronic modality, but are nowadays increasingly multi-modal (e.g. verbal-visual-musical).

The importance of narrative as a mode of communication has been eloquently put forth by Bruner who identifies (1986, 1990) two major ways of knowing and discursively interacting with reality: (a) the narrative mode, which encodes and interprets human reality, experiences, beliefs, doubts and emotions; and (b) the paradigmatic (logicosemantic) mode, which deals with natural (physical) reality, truth, observation, analysis, proof and rationality. If we consider discourse as a symbolic activity by which we relate to the world, we can rephrase Bruner by claiming that the narrative mode performs the symbolic function of recreating or reconstructing reality through a story (taleworld, Young 1987). Bruner has also contended that the paradigmatic mode has been privileged over narrative throughout centuries of ‘western’ rationality. The balance has, nonetheless, been redressed by the recent canonizing and sanctioning of narrative within numerous paradigms that advocate its primacy as an epistemology and a mode of communication. Specifically, narrative has emerged within personality studies, psychoanalysis, and psychotherapy as the main – if not the only – way of discovering and being ourselves (Kerby 1991). Similarly, numerous (mainly non-western) societies have been proven to encode their claims about knowledge and its sources (evidentiality) as well as their views about the world almost exclusively in narrative mode (see Maranhão 1993). Furthermore, narrative (or the lay term story) is widely held as a universal and archetypal way of applying an order and a perspective to experience. In its various forms and shapes, the making and appreciation of shared narratives is viewed
as a particularly crucial component for the cohesion of a culture (Lakoff 1997). Thus, within social and cultural anthropology, narrative has increasingly become an object of ethnographic analysis with much to contribute to a range of theoretical and methodological issues of interest (e.g. Moerman 1988). Finally, developmental studies have consistently emphasized socialization through the narrative mode, embracing the ways in which children are introduced into their parents’ culture through narrative as well as trained in the rhetorical skills needed for constructing coherent and culturally tellable narratives (e.g. Bamberg 1997a). In a post-Vygotskyan (1978) manner of locating developmental processes in the dynamics of social interaction, recent work has focused on children’s various forms and politics of participation in narrative events that occur within family life (e.g. Georgakopoulou 2002a; Ochs & Taylor 1992).

The current ‘fascination’ with narrative is in many respects a rediscovery: narrative has figured in all categorizations of communication on the basis of rhetorical mode (or stance) from Aristotle’s Poetics to modern day rhetorical theory. More importantly, it has been posited as a pre- or meta-genre that cannot be put at the same level as ‘ordinary’ genres (Swales 1990), or as a basic text-type (i.e. underlying or overriding structure instantiated by different surface, textual forms); this means that it realizes but is not realized by other text-types, such as argument, description, and exposition: e.g. we can tell a story in order to present an argument but the discourse function or goal of narrating cannot be realized by argumentative texts (Virtanen 1992).

In the light of the above, it is not surprising that narrative analysis is one of the best and most extensively researched areas of the multidisciplinary study of discourse (van Dijk 1993:121), embracing a wide spectrum of disciplines (e.g. linguistics, psychology, history, law, anthropology, semiotics, literary criticism, etc.) and theoretical and methodological approaches. There are, however, downsides to this diversity: first, there is the lack of cross-fertilization, even within linguistics; as a result, similarities in aims, method, and analysis are too frequently obscured. Similarly, the proliferation of theories on narrative has blurred boundaries, threatening to subsume all texts and discourse activities under an all-encompassing “narrative” which variously embodies a communicative mode, an epistemological perspective, a set of genres, a discourse meta-function, or a style (see Georgakopoulou & Goutsos 2000:65ff). All this has resulted in an idealization and essentialization of narrative that has hampered empirical research of the generic variability of narrative (idem). Any attempt to typologize narrative analysis is thus bound to be schematic.

On this understanding, following Mishler (1995:87–123), we can distinguish between models which focus on (i) reference (relationship between real-world and narrative events) and temporal order, (ii) textual coherence and structure (narrative strategies), and (iii) narrative functions (Mishler 1995:87–123). This distinction will be rephrased in the present discussion in terms of the following three configurations of narrative properties: referential, textual, and contextual. The referential properties
are concerned with the organization of the world that a narrative reconstructs, thus capturing the text’s external relations (Martin 1992). The textual properties refer to the organization of the text itself (i.e. text-internal relations); finally, the contextual properties refer to the interface between internal and external, that is, with the interaction between the text and its immediate (situational) and wider (sociocultural) context of occurrence. All three sets of properties will be tackled here on the understanding that there are inevitable overlaps, intersections and indeed cross-fertilizations amongst them; also that any critical enquiry into linguistic studies of narrative is a daunting task with a forbiddingly ample domain. The present discussion will be mainly concerned with sociolinguistic and discourse narrative studies. These have focused on oral, non-literary narratives, which are in turn either spontaneously occurring in conversations or elicited by the analyst; the latter mainly involve oral histories or life stories (e.g. Josselson & Lieblicht 1993; Linde 1993).1

2. Referential properties

The least controversial of the minimal definitions of narrative seems to converge on its chronological dimension (cf. Ricœur 1988), or in Chatman’s terms (1991:9), the ‘chrono-logic’, which involves the depiction of a temporal transition from one state of affairs to another. This temporal unfolding may concern past, present, future, hypothetical, or habitual events, everyone of which is defined as an “occurrence in some world

1. Literary narrative (cf. narrative fiction) has attracted an impressive volume of studies within (discourse) stylistics and literary pragmatics that has been informed by classic narratological preoccupations and concepts (e.g. see Barthes 1977; Genette 1980; Prince 1982). A main strand of research has analysed the devices which establish perspective or point-of-view; the focus here has been on the various textual roles or personae mediating between the authorial voice and the characters (e.g. implied author, narrator, focalizer), in particular as encoded in instances of speech and thought presentation (Leech & Short 1981). Tropes, figures, and generally, the ‘poetics’ (technical choices) or ‘rhetoric’ (technical choices and ends, Chatman 1991) of narrative fiction have also been systematically researched, mainly with reference to the distinction between surface and deep narrative structure (cf. histoire vs. discours, fabula vs. sjuzhet, Bal’s fabula-story-text, 1991), or between the presentational modes of mimesis (showing) and diegesis (telling, see Rimmon-Kenan 1983). The series of modifications to which narrative action is subjected at the discourse level have been investigated in relation to time structure (i.e. order and duration), informational selection and distribution, and point-of-view (see Genette 1980). The discussion of what constitutes the property of literariness and its relation with narrative fictionality, an ongoing preoccupation within narratology, has also penetrated linguistic studies of literature. Relevant approaches are increasingly pragmatically oriented, focusing on the contextualized functions, uses, and effects of textual choices within literary enunciation (cf. Fludernik 1996).
which is encoded in a proposition which receives an instantaneous rather than durative interpretation” (Polanyi 1982:510). In practice, it is the stories of past events that have come to be recognized as the prototypical data for narrative analysis. This may be related to the influence of Labov’s study of narrative, in which tellingly the sequence of past events is seen as being matched by a verbal sequence of (temporally ordered) clauses that make up a narrative’s skeleton (1972:359): in this way, the order of the telling recapitulates the order of the told. This question of representation, that is, the relation between the events represented and the structure of their representation, has been one of the most debated issues of narratology (cf. fabula vs. sjuzhet).

Central to this inquiry is the very relationship between narrative and reality: the extent to which we can perceive the world in anything else other than a narrative form or put differently, whether life is itself narratively structured or not, is a much debated issue (e.g. Carr 1986, MacIntyre 1981). The debate is based on the premise that narrative shapes experience, providing it with meaning, structure and perspective, in the process of constructing a plot (cf. Aristotle’s mythos). In this way, they make a point about “the world which teller and story recipients share” (Polanyi 1985:16). In Labov & Waletzky’s terms (1967), it is thus no accident that narratives tend to recount noteworthy events, that is, surprising, disturbing, interesting, or, otherwise, tellable events. In so doing, they can serve to highlight the restoration of a disrupted order (equilibrium) or “render the exceptional comprehensible” (Bruner 1990:52). The view of a series of discrete events (real or fictitious) as the “core” of a narrative which is elaborated on, embellished, and manipulated (i.e. perspectivized) has informed both textual and contextual narrative analyses, as we will see below. What is worth noting here is that earlier studies tended to assume a correspondence or mirror relation between narrative and extra-textual worlds, or, in the case of fictional narrative, a relation of verisimilitude (vraisemblance). This was, however, duly problematized by a constructionist view of narrative, heavily influenced by post-structuralism and, further back, by Bartlett’s seminal work on memory (1932), which saw stories as selective (re)playings and (re)constructions rather than as accurate reflections and representations of events. As such, their tellings are shifting, dynamic, and contextually grounded, rather than given and pre-determined. They are produced as part of social interactions in specific situations and for specific purposes.

3. Textual properties

3.1 Narrative organization

Aristotle’s view of plot as a linear (i.e. with a beginning, middle, and end), yet complicated (i.e. with a peripeteia) progression of events has inescapably influenced
Within story grammars, narrative organization consists of episodes (superordinate units) described in terms of spatiotemporal sequences of the following recursive categories: (i) setting, (ii) initiating event (marking some type of change in the protagonist’s environment), (iii) responses or reactions to it, (iv) attempt (a set of overt actions in the service of the protagonist’s goal), (v) consequence of the attempt (e.g. success or failure to attain the goal), and (vi) (protagonist’s) reaction to these consequences (Rumelhart 1975; Stein 1982). These categories are to be found in the canonical form or underlying story schema from which individual stories are generated (cf. Propp’s work on the Russian folktale, 1986). The schema is a goal-based structure, consisting of a setting, participants, including the protagonist, the desired goals, and the actions for achieving them. This episodic structure is postulated as a conceptual framework that enables addressers and addressees, in the course of the production and comprehension of stories, to retrieve and strategically employ information about story characters and events (Johnson-Laird 1983; van Dijk 1988). Experimental evidence has suggested that certain categories (e.g. protagonist’s goal-oriented attempts) as well as causal relationships between events are particularly critical for story comprehension and recall (Trabasso & Sperry 1985). It is, however, recognized that there is still a long way to go before fully documenting the universal properties of story grammars.

Unlike story grammars that focused on traditional tales and by and large disregarded narrative communication in real-world contexts, Labov’s narrative structure was developed for conversational – albeit elicited – personal stories (1972; revised in 1997). The study has been instrumental in legitimizing oral narrative as an object of study and bridging the gap between vernacular and non-literary narrative. Labov’s description of a fully-formed (or classic) narrative is as follows:

> It begins with an orientation, proceeds to the complicating action, is suspended at the focus of evaluation before the resolution, concludes with the resolution and returns the listener to the present time with the coda. (Labov 1972: 369)

Both orientation and evaluation were subsequently assigned a free position in the narrative structure. While Labov’s formal clausal analysis was rapidly seen as unworkable, the structural components, evaluation in particular, “have proved extremely robust and have had extensive use for many and varied purposes by researchers in a very wide range of disciplines” (Holmes 1997: 95). As such, they have formed the basis of various revisions and elaborations. The most important of those involves their situational and cultural context-dependency, as these have been attested to by the study

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2. It is notable however that after a longstanding tradition of temporality as the main organizing principle of narrative, the balance has been duly redressed and the vital role of space increasingly recognized (e.g. Georgakopoulou 2003b; Herman 2002).
of spontaneous conversational storytelling: e.g. the degrees of orientation and evaluation are widely variable; non-obligatory categories (abstract, coda) are dispensed with in conversational contexts more often than in Labov’s elicited stories. More importantly, stories—particularly in relaxed and informal settings—tend to be a joint enterprise, with the audience playing an active role in the shaping of the story’s structure (Duranti 1986).

While Labov’s narrative structure captures a story’s plot development, another influential line of enquiry into the schematic organization of oral narrative has posited units (e.g. episodes, stanzas, verses) which rest on a combination of thematic, syntactic and intonational criteria (e.g. Chafe 1987; Longacre 1989). It is generally conceded that these units are delineated by shifts in action, time, location, and participants: the higher-level the units, the more salient the shifts and their linguistic signals. Suprasegmental features of pause, stress and pitch are also important demarcatory signals. Work on American Indian narratives within ethnopoetics has attested to rhythmic, poetic patterns in narrative organization, shaped in the ‘magic’ numbers of each community (i.e. twos and fours or threes and fives, e.g. Hymes 1981, Sherzer & Woodbury 1987). In this way, narrative structure reflects sociocultural modes of interpreting the world and making sense of experience. Similar rhythmic patterns have been found in narratives of other cultures with a strong oral tradition. Gee’s (1990) comparative analysis of narratives from black working-class and white middle-class children in America demonstrated that a poetic structure is very evident in the former by way of relatively short and quite evenly balanced segments across the text as a whole; these segments are interlocked through numerous poetic patterns such as sound play, repetition, parallelism, and prosodic changes.

Research into the organizational aspects of storytelling has gone hand in hand with developmental studies of linguistic forms (e.g. markers of tense/aspect, connectivity) and their corresponding discourse functions as part of the ability to organize a narrative. Berman’s & Slobin’s (1994) volume has produced a fine-grained developmental map of linguistic forms and functions across languages (English, German, Hebrew, Spanish, Turkish) whilst demonstrating the impact of typological features of a particular language on the development of rhetorical options for narrativization.

Last but not least, another line of research sees narrative structure as emergent in the moment-by-moment unfolding of talk, rendering the notion of an abstract narrative structure the forms and functions of which can be posed a priori of actual narratives-in-interaction problematic (e.g. Schegloff 1997). This conversation-analytic work places emphasis on how stories come about in the process of other conversational activities and how they both orient to prior talk and shape upcoming talk. Endpoints (i.e. entry into and exit from a story) are very important in this respect (Jefferson 1978). There is still much scope for research here: how do storytelling participation roles (i.e. contributions by various participants) shape narrative structure? How do the different
types of entry into a story relate to subsequent tellings? Finally, it is remarkable how little explored the part(s) in-between a story’s entry and exit are from a sequential point of view.

3.2 Narrative evaluation

Research on narrative text properties has focused not only on the devices which provide a story’s structure, but also on signals of a story’s point, of its worthiness of telling or tellability. As suggested, stories discursively construct and evaluate experience; they encode the storytellers’ selection and interpretation of what happened, their feelings, attitudes, and emotional interest in the tale, telling, and/or audience. Subjectivity encodings are thus pervasive in narrative. Consequently, their study has been marked by a diversity of approaches and a proliferation of terms, with various degrees of resemblance and overlaps but, nonetheless, little dialogue between them. Such terms include involvement strategies (Tannen 1989), performance devices (Bauman 1986; Wolfson 1982), tellability, affect (Ochs & Schieffelin 1989), expressivity (Fleischman 1990), and, last but not least, evaluation (internal vs. external, cf. showing vs. telling). All of them have been confusingly used to capture teller’s intentions, linguistic (textual) strategies, and/or audience response/effects (Caffi & Janney 1994). Their study has, however, made apparent that a universal definition and postulation of subjectivity devices is a problematic enterprise. Those should be discovered empirically and ethnographically, i.e. linked to specific stories and their contexts. It is nonetheless notable that certain devices are recurrent in cross-cultural studies of narrative subjectivity. These are as follows:

- Repetition in its various forms
- Narrative present
- Characters’ direct speech/thought, and dialogues
- Proximal deictics
- Imagery
- Details
- Ellipsis
- Paralinguistic devices (e.g. intonational variation)

All the above devices have been time and again put forth as displays of the teller’s verbal artistry aimed at involving the audience in the storytelling. In terms of categories of emotive communication, they tend to be described as markers of iconicity, proximity, or less frequently, intensity. Their common denominator thus seems to be the emphasis on the experiential element of storytelling, which involves (emotional, perceived) proximity between teller, audience, and events. This prominence of the properties of immediacy and vividness is traceable to the concept of verisimilitude (vraisemblance) as the essence of literature, which has preoccupied literary scholars since Aristotle. These properties also typify the concept of narrative performance that has sprung out of
ethnographic work on the verbal artistry of oral literature. According to Bauman (1986), for a narrative to qualify as a more or less sustained performance, the teller needs to assume responsibility to an audience for display of communicative skill and efficiency. Bauman also postulated that the constellation of devices that define performances are culturally variable and are to be discovered empirically. My own study of Greek storytelling (1997) has attested to the cultural specificity not just of the actual performance devices but also of the participation modes and local functions of performances. The following story from my data exemplifies the use of performance (cf. evaluative, involvement) devices:

_Imaste tora me ton Gosta Focionos Neyri
eci sto δromo me tis kafeterias._
Now we're on Fokionos Negri with Kostas
the street with lots of cafeterias right?

_Lipon mesimeraci peripu_
_piname kafe ekso tora.. jati ekane zesti_
_araymena taftocinita mas ce ta lipa._
So it was some time in the afternoon
we were having our coffees outside … 'cos it was hot
the cars parked in a row and so on..

_Ce se kapça fasi skai miti apo to δromo eci.. apo ti yonia_
ena fortiyo … kocino
_vameno olo kocino_
And at some point there shows up out of the sidestreet
a lorry … red
painted all red

_Içe vali meyafoona pano_
c'içe vali ena trayudi_
_afto pu lei pa ra tu ru ru ru rum (sings)_.
it had speakers on top
and it was playing this song
the one that goes pa ra ra ra tu ru r rum (sings).

_Zu yanelis tandos cólos o thiasos_
_sto cemurjo cedro pu ða trayudusane_
_ce perasane apo ci ja kapça diafimisi._
Anyway (it was) Zuganelis and the whole troupe
at the club where they were doing the show
and they'd passed for some free publicity.

_Ce stamatane brosta sáfto to δromo_
brost a i kafeteria to Sale_
_ynosto.. poli ynosto._
And they stop in front of us at the street
in front of the cafeteria (street coffee-place) the “Chalet”
well-known.. very well-known.

*Ce to me yafono na lei afts to trayudi*
*para ra ra ta tu ru ru rum*
*co Zuγanelis apo to mikrofono na lei papa::res ... ipokofa*
A(udience): heh heh
And the (lorry’s) loudspeaker (na) playing this song
“para ra ra ta tu ru ru rum” (humming the tune)
and Zuganelis (famous Greek satyrist) saying over the mike papa::res (word-play on the previous tune: the word papares is slang for testicles) …in a deep voice.

*Ce na peftune i sokolates tora apo to forti yo*
*ce na tis petai kato se mas sta trapezaca.*
And now chocolates (were) being thrown off the truck
and he (was) throwing them at us at the tables.

*Ce perni enas tis sokolates*
*ce tis petai piso*
*emis imaste eci pera.*
And somebody takes the chocolates
and throws them back (at the lorry)
we (emphatic) were there.

*Ce na jinete tora enas polemos me tis sokolates*
*ce na vlepume tis sokolates na peftune sto fortioy*
*ce to Zuγaneli na lei afts to papa::res*
*ce mu:: sa voði.*
A: hehhhh hhhh
And (we) seeing a rain of chocolates falling on the lorry
and Zuganelis saying this ‘papa::res’ thing
and mooing like a cow.
A: hehhhhh hhhh

*Jeljo::! ti jeljo epese ecino to proi!*
Laughter::! That was a really good laugh!

(Story included in Georgakopoulou 1997: 217–218)

As can be seen, the story’s complicating action is rendered in narrative present and the climax in narrative *na* (a language-specific device, roughly equivalent to imperfect). Narrative *na* sets off the high point in performed stories thus marking heightened tension and enduring vividness (Georgakopoulou 1997: 124ff). In this case, its effect is reinforced by the use of the proximal deictic ‘now’. In addition, the story owes its dramatization to the animation of voices: thus, its humorous punchline is provided by an instance of direct speech. Finally, the story is delivered in short segments, mostly comprising three lines (see above visual display). These are interrelated by means of repetition patterns. For instance, the climactic scene is delivered in two similarly built segments: segment 1: chocolates falling off the truck, segment 2: chocolates being
thrown back; the comedian’s humorous punchline is uttered in both segments. The story’s segments are also brought together by rhythmic patterns based on expressive phonology. The teller puts on a visual and aural show by humming a tune, lengthening the pronunciation of vowels for emphasis, exploiting the word-play between the tune and the rude Greek word which provides the story’s punchline, and above all, by creating an intricate and consistent alliteration of /p/ combined with the assonance of /e/, which highlights the climactic scene (bold in the original):

Ce to meγafono na lei afto to traγuδi, para ra ra ta ru ru rum, c’o Zuγanelis apo to mikrofono na lei papa::res ... ipokofa. Ce na peftune i sokolates tora apo to fortιyo, ce na tis petai kato se mas sta trapezaca. Ce perni enas tis sokolates, ce tis petai piso, emis imaste eci pera. Ce na jinete tora enas polemos me tis sokolates, ce na vlepu me tis sokolates na peftune sto fortιyo, ce to Zuγaneli na lei afto to papa::res, ce mu:: sa voθi. Jeljo::! ti jeljo epe se ecino to proi!

Though devices are employed which have also been attested to in other communities, the above story’s display of subjectivity cannot be detached from its immediate context of telling, i.e. who tells it to whom and why, what precedes and follows (not looked at in the above example) and what larger (social, cultural) contexts may be relevant. As has been demonstrated (Georgakopoulou 1997), conversational narrative performances in Greece are inextricably bound to cultural concepts of sociability and intimacy (re)affirmation. They are also dependent on local definitions of and expectations about narrative functions and tellability. The culture-specificity of storytelling has been amply documented by numerous studies, one of the most influential of which has been Chafe’s (1980) edited volume on the retellings of a silent film, known as Pear Stories. Such studies have cast serious doubt on the Labovian intrinsic definitions of narrative reportability as well as the association of tellability with unexpectedness. Unexpectedness has thus been redefined as a contextual concept, relative to tellers, audiences, situations, and cultures. More importantly, it has been demonstrated that on occasion, it is the narration of the ordinary and/or the familiar which is called for and tellable (cf. family fables, Blum-Kulka 1997). In sum, studies of subjectivity displays in narrative have brought to the fore their individual, social, and cultural variability (e.g. Gee 1990; Heath 1983; Michaels 1981; Scollon & Scollon 1981). To draw on Blum-Kulka’s (1997) three interrelated but analytically separable dimensions of narrativity, subjectivity is ultimately dependent – as well as contingent – on the dimensions of teller-tale-telling.

A further revisiting of the Labovian evaluation involves its textual role. Evaluation is currently recognized as a text-building mechanism of vital importance for a story’s global discourse structure. As developmental studies of narrative have shown, evaluation points to the hierarchical perspective from which a narrative gains coherence (Bamberg & Damrad-Frye 1991) thus giving meaning to the individual events
and actions. Specifically, it was found that the ability to employ evaluation strategically in order to signal important events is lacking in younger children in favour of locally confined uses of evaluation. This view of evaluation as a mechanism for a story’s coherence is informed by multi-level discourse analyses, which postulate different levels in narrative (e.g. plot level, background information, commentary, evaluation) and shifts or moves between these levels as organizational strategies. Multi-level analyses are committed to the premise of form-function anisomorphism (i.e. one linguistic form more than one discourse function and vice versa). This means that instead of seeking simple, one-to-one associations between textual devices and evaluation, they bring to the fore how the same devices can be both organizational and evaluative (expressive). This multifunctionality has been amply demonstrated for the use of various devices, including narrative present (Fleischman 1990; Georgakopoulou 1997; Schiffrin 1981).

An important spin-off of the above reconceptualization of evaluation involves its relation with a narrative’s foreground. In Labov’s model, the underlying assumption was that evaluation belonged to a story’s background, as it was not part of the sequential series of narrative clauses (see Toolan 1988: 159). More recently though, the definition of foreground has been disassociated from the criterion of sequentiality (Reinhart 1984). Thus, as a textual pointer to how the parts relate to one another and to a story’s whole, evaluation gains a place in the repertoire of foregrounding devices. More importantly, within a contextual definition of foreground-background, evaluation is seen as a scalar category which assigns various degrees of prominence and different weights to various textual elements (Polanyi 1985: 22).

Finally, it is expected that studies of narrative as talk-in-interaction will increasingly move away from aesthetic and verbal artistry criteria in the definition of narrative evaluation towards viewing it as a process of the participants’ joint construction, negotiation and contestation of alternative interpretative viewpoints on the events related as well as on the local relevance of the storytelling activity itself (cf. Georgakopoulou 2001, Ochs & Capps 2001).

4. Contextual properties

As discussed above, the textual properties of oral narrative have been mainly studied through contextualized approaches. These have frequently employed narrative as a point of entry into the presentation of ‘self’: this involves the construction of personal and sociocultural identities, such as gender (Georgakopoulou 1995; Johnstone 1990), age (Georgakopoulou 1997; Hausendoff & Quasthoff 1992), peer
group membership (Georgakopoulou 2003b; Goodwin 1990; Shuman 1986), etc. In particular, personal narratives or life histories lend themselves to such an enquiry, as the prime discourse mode for identity constructions (Schiffrin 1996). Furthermore, identity displays through narrative are held to be very effective in recruiting audience alliances: the taleworld, deictically distinct from the moment of the story’s telling, is more shielded from testing, justification, debate, and proof than, for instance, an opinion or an argument (Schiffrin 1990). This is intimately linked with the prototypical functions of narration: we tell stories to move or convince through moving; in turn, our audience’s critical response and soliciting of proof for truth claims are deterred in favour of an emotive engagement in the narration (for a discussion see Georgakopoulou & Goutsos 2004: Ch. 2). The separation between the taleworld and the world of telling also serves self-presentation in another way: it allows the tellers to socialize aspects of their self, as defined by Goffman (1974), by appearing both as narrators and characters in the taleworld. The prime site for this self-lamination is the realm of reported speech. Goffman’s notion of footing (i.e. stances or alignments which tellers take up with regard to themselves and their audiences) is crucial in understanding this process. As Schiffrin (1990) has explicated it, storytellers can present themselves in the capacity of (a) *animator* (the aspect of self which physically produces talk), (b) *author* (the aspect of self responsible for the content of talk), (c) *figure*, the main character in the story, someone who belongs to the world that is spoken about and not the world in which the speaking occurs, and, finally, (d) *principal*, the self established by what is said, committed to what is said. Alternatively, they can delegate any of the aspects of author, figure, and/or principal to other characters in the taleworld. Through such manipulations of their kaleidoscope of selves, storytellers can diffuse their agency or responsibility in the social field, create a widened base of support for their views and beliefs, or, generally, cast positive light on them (e.g. see Hill 1995).

Bamberg (1997b) proposes a more explicit scheme for looking into a teller’s construction of identities through narrative. Building on Davies & Harré (1990), he locates a teller’s positioning, that is, the discursive practices for the teller’s construction of self, at three levels:

**Level 1**: positioning of the characters vis-à-vis one another in the taleworld (e.g. as protagonists or antagonists).

**Level 2**: positioning of oneself as the speaker with regard to an audience in the act of narrating, involving claims with regard to the teller’s identity, which are locally and situationally achieved.

**Level 3**: an achievement of levels 1 and 2, this is the positioning of tellers vis-à-vis themselves, involving claims that they hold to be true and relevant above and beyond the local conversational situation.
The interaction of these three levels indicates that self-presentation in narrative fully exploits subjective, deeply imaginative and affectionate processes to create alignments with the audience. Textually, positioning strategies mobilize a wide range of more or less routinized, patterned and nuanced resources, among which the presentation of characters’ speech. For instance, as we can see in the following anecdote (translated from Greek), the teller’s positioning is mainly constructed by means of his reported dialogue with a male friend who assumes the roles of the author, figure, and principal. These three capacities orchestrate to lend validity to the teller’s view that the dual goal of love and financial security in one’s marriage is feasible:

A: Look Nikos, you can’t have it all, you must get your priorities right=

N: you can’t say this. I have a friend, I’ve known him for years, and his dream was, well we were talking once, and he tells me, love is good, but the package is good too, the Delors package. //he he. Well I tell him, you can’t have your pie and eat it too Kostas, you will lose out somewhere, either in money or love. A week later he tells me, well you know something, only the package is good after all, if you have the package, you can have love too. Some time went by, he meets a girl, > without knowing anything about her <, they just met, accidentally, but it turns out she’s loaded. They got married, we have another chat after that, this is success he tells me, love and money at the same time.

The story’s main purpose is opinion-expressing and argumentative, as it is related in order to disprove an interlocutor’s view. Thus, the teller’s positioning with regard to levels 2 and 3 is chosen to be rendered in narrative rather than argumentative form. In particular, the main device for putting forth positioning 2 and 3 is positioning at level 1. This type of positioning construction is found in numerous Greek stories related by men, whereby a male friend of the teller is encoded as author, principal, and/or figure of the story: this is a device for validating the teller’s views or generally promoting a favourable self-presentation (i.e. self-foregrounding). By contrast, the same participation framework (i.e. reported speech of male friend or relative) is linked with different patterns of self-presentation in women’s stories (see Georgakopoulou 1995). In this respect, Greek stories show how the textual devices of positioning are not only multi-functional but also indexical of their context, that is, indirect pointers to social roles, stances, attitudes, and identities (in this case, gender, cf. Ochs 1992).

In addition to informal conversational storytelling, contextual studies of narrative have focused on storytelling in institutional contexts (Mumby 1993), such as clinical encounters (Aronsson & Cedeborg 1994; Hunter 1991), schools, experimental settings (Mishler 1995), police interviews, courtroom (witness testimonies), television shows, family interactions (Blum-Kulka 1997), etc. The emphasis in these lines of inquiry has varied from documenting narratives as alternative, counter-hegemonic epistemologies increasingly valued in domains that had been the stronghold of models of rational, legal,
and/or scientific reasoning (Abrams 1991)\(^3\) to a more micro-analytic focus on narrative as an orderly, social activity which situates, constitutes but also resists power roles, official identities, and institutional agendas and ideologies (e.g. Ochs & Taylor 1992).

In general, research on narrative and identities exemplifies the same tension as other analyses of discourse between fine-grained analyses on one hand and macro-analytic accounts on the other hand, both of which juggle in different ways and with a different emphasis the hugely complex and intricate connections between local instances and extra-situational processes. Another issue here concerns the monopoly of the life-story or, in more micro-scale terms, of the personal experience story, within identity analysis (see papers in Brockmeier & Carbaugh 2001). This type of narrative tends to be elicited in research interview situations and, as such, presents specific interactional features (e.g. one-teller accounts, high in tellability, relatively detached from its discourse surroundings, cf. Ochs & Capps 2001: 57ff). There is increasing recognition (papers in Bamberg 1997c, Georgakopoulou 2002b; 2003) however that this autobiographical in kind narrative is far from being the norm in ordinary conversational encounters. Its frequent use, however as the basis of numerous empirical studies in the social sciences in general and in linguistics in particular has had profound implications about the direction of narrative analysis, creating notions of a narrative canon and orthodoxy, i.e. what constitutes a story, a good story, a story worth analysing, etc. that in turn dictate a specific analytic vocabulary and an interpretive idiom. It is hoped that future research will legitimate a wide range of “a-typical” stories by documenting the contexts which encourage their occurrence and by seeking out the analytical tools appropriate for them.

In conclusion, narrative research has been shaped by three – even if overlapping – preoccupations with the referential, textual, and contextual properties of narrative. The quest of what is specific or unique to narrative along with an overarching assumption about its primacy as a mode of communication have been central to these focal concerns. The reification of narrative has nonetheless increasingly been shied away from, as attention has shifted from narrative as text to narrative as social practice. It is hoped that this line of inquiry will lead the analysis to more flexible and elastic models that will be fit for the inquiry into micro-lived instances of narrative in diverse contexts. At the same time, it is imperative that the baby is not thrown out with the bathwater and that the analytical apparatus of narrative is not compromised in favour of macro-accounts that are not empirically grounded. Finally, the search of

\(^3\) It is, however, becoming increasingly apparent that access to institutional domains through narrative does by no means automatically lead to the overturning of an inequitable socio-political order. Future work in the area will need to illuminate the role of narrative as a resource for ideologies in a variety of institutional contexts, taking into account the complexities and idiosyncrasies of, among others, the participation frameworks and roles involved.
how the richness and diversity of existing approaches can be creatively filtered into new transdisciplinaries and give rise to inclusive research strategies is a *desideratum* of discourse analysis in general and narrative analysis in particular. To what extent this enterprise will come to fruition remains to be seen. For scholars of narrative at least, it rests on putting to good use the premise that every story is not just a creation but also a joint creation.

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Narrative

The term polyphony is used in the field of discourse analysis and pragmatics in order to describe one important dimension of the organization of discourse, and also of utterances, i.e. the fact that they can express and combine different voices.

The notion of polyphony has a strange history. Early on, in the thirties, polyphony was identified as a major dimension of discourse by the Russian linguist Mikhail Bakhtin, in the frame of his dialogical approach to discourse, but compared to the large number of studies on speech acts or implicatures, the body of literature on polyphony is considerably smaller. This is probably due to a conjunction of different facts: first, for various political and personal reasons, Bakhtin’s texts were discovered and translated outside Russia only at the beginning of the seventies (see Todorov 1981); second, Bakhtin’s thought is often complex, elliptic and very difficult to translate; third, the paradigms which have dominated anglo-saxon pragmatics during the past thirty years (speech act theory, conversation analysis, relevance theory) ignored Bakhtin’s sociological approach.

Given this state of affairs, it comes as no surprise that, although the importance of the polyphonic dimension of discourse is not contested, few linguists have worked on it. The only one to have undertaken recently a systematic elaboration of the notion of polyphony is the French linguist Oswald Ducrot, in the frame of his enunciation theory, but he is more interested in the utterance than in the discourse level.

In what follows, we will first present briefly Bakhtin’s and Ducrot’s notions of polyphony and evaluate their contribution to our knowledge of this dimension of discourse, and then, describe the different aspects of the polyphonic organization which have to be taken into account in discourse analysis. Finally, we will present an analysis of the polyphonic organization of a short fragment of a letter.

2. Polyphony in Bakhtin’s work

The central notion in Bakhtin’s conception of discourse is dialogism (cf. Discourse in the novel, henceforth DIN: 279). He thus takes a clear position against what he calls ‘the one-sided monologism of linguistic science’ (cf. Marxism and the philosophy of
Bakhtin's dialogism, if we refer to DIN, has to be understood in a very broad sense of the word, which covers at least four different notions:

a. it first refers to the constant interplay between socio-ideological languages in discourse and society, what Bakhtin calls 'dialogized heteroglossia' (273);

b. it also refers to the fact that any discourse is related 'by a thousand dialogical threads' to all existing discourses of the same type on the same subject (276); this is what we today call intertextuality (cf. Kristeva 1969);

c. it refers to the fact that any discourse, even a monological written text, is reacting to preceding discourses and anticipating further discourses (280); this is dialogism in the narrow sense of the term, corresponding to the sequentiality of actual or potential exchange structures, as they are described in dialogue analysis (cf. Roulet et al. 1985);

d. finally, it may refer to the fact that the discourse of other persons occupies an important place in the discourse, or even in the utterances, of any speaker (339); this is what we today call polyphony (cf. Ducrot 1984; but Bakhtin’s use of polyphony is sometimes broader, covering not only the different voices, but also the different language varieties, styles and ideological representations displayed in a novel).

Bakhtin then considers polyphony as a case of dialogism, in the broad sense of this term, i.e. an instance of multi-voiced discourse. But in the narrow, compositional use of the term, the discussion in MPL clearly distinguishes dialogism from polyphony. Referring to what we have defined as polyphony under (d), Bakhtin specifies:

This phenomenon is distinctly and fundamentally different from dialogue. In dialogue, the lines of the individual participants are grammatically disconnected: they are not integrated into one unified context. (MPL: 116)

In other words, one has to distinguish clearly between two levels of multi-voiced discourse: dialogues, produced by two or more speakers, and monologues, produced by one speaker, and the notion of polyphony, as defined above, has to be restricted to the latter.

Bakhtin has approached the notion of polyphony, without systematically using the term, mainly in three texts written between 1929 and 1935, and through two different entries. The first entry, which is certainly the most familiar to linguists, is the description of reported speech, a well-known case of double-voiced structure, in the third part of Marksizm i filosofija jazyka (MPL, first published in 1929 under the name of his colleague Vološinov). The second entry, which has more to do with literary theory (see Fowler 1981, chapter 8), is the study of discourse in the novel, in Problemy tvorchestva Dostoevskogo (Problems of Dostoevski's creative art, first published in 1929) and in
Slovo v romane (DIN, written in 1934–1935 and first published in 1975 in Voprosy literarury i éstetiki (The dialogic imagination)).

As far as reported speech (or, as we should rather say today in terms of discourse analysis, reported discourse or discourse representation) is concerned, Bakhtin shows that it is not only a grammatical or a stylistic problem, as it is usually dealt with (see, for example, Banfield 1982), but a discourse phenomenon, which he defines in the following way:

Reported discourse is discourse within discourse, utterance within utterance, and at the same time also, discourse about discourse, utterance about utterance. [...] The true object of inquiry ought to be precisely the dynamic interrelationship of these two factors, the discourse being reported (the other person’s discourse) and the discourse doing the reporting (the author’s discourse) (MPL: 115, 119; following the French translation, I have deliberately replaced speech in the English 1973 translation by discourse).

Bakhtin thus asserts the necessity of going beyond the syntactic problem of the combination of two sentences in order to describe the interrelation between different discourses (or utterances), particularly the different forms of permeation between the discourse of the speaker and the discourses of other persons, and “all the changes in meaning and accent that take place [...] during transmission” (DIN: 340).

The third part of MPL is devoted to a revised analysis in a discursive perspective of direct, indirect and quasi direct discourses, but for Bakhtin polyphony, as defined above, is not restricted to these different types of reported discourse, as we will see below.

Bakhtin finds numerous examples of polyphonic utterances in the novels of Russian, German and French authors of the nineteenth century. In his book on Dostoevskij, he describes the phenomenon as follows:

An author may utilize the speech of another in pursuit of his own aims and in such a way as to impose a new intention on the utterance, which nevertheless retains his own proper referential intention. Under these circumstances and in keeping with the author’s purpose, such an utterance must be recognized as originating from another addresser. Thus, within a single utterance, there may occur two intentions, two voices (180).

But Bakhtin goes beyond this general characterization of the notion of polyphony and he tries to define it more specifically from a linguistic and discursive point of view as what he calls a hybrid construction:

What we are calling a hybrid construction is an utterance that belongs, by its grammatical (syntactic) and compositional markers, to a single speaker, but that actually contains mixed within it two utterances, two speech manners, two styles, two ‘languages’, two semantic and axiological belief systems. (DIN, 304)
See the following example, from Dickens’ novel *Little Dorrit*:

(1) But Mr. Tite Barnacle was a buttoned-up man, and *consequently* a weighty one.

and the commentary by Bakhtin (*DIN*: 305):

If judged by the formal markers above, the logic motivating the sentence seems to belong to the author, i.e. he is formally at one with it; but in actual fact, the motivation lies within the subjective belief system of his characters, or of general opinion.

Two chapters of *DIN* are dedicated to the study in various novels of different types of those hybrid constructions, which mainly correspond to quasi-direct discourse.

Bakhtin brings thus a major contribution to the study of polyphony in the novel, but he also makes insightful remarks on polyphony in everyday conversation; this type of polyphony differs from the former in the sense that a major role is here attributed to the voice of the addressee, a person who, unlike others, is a direct partner in the interaction:

In any actual dialogue the rejoinder also leads such a double life: it is structured and conceptualized in the context of the dialogue as a whole, which consists of its own utterances (‘own’ from the point of view of the speaker) and of alien utterances (those of the partner). One cannot excise the rejoinder from this combined context made up of one’s words and the words of another without losing its sense and tone. It is an organic part of an heteroglot unit. (*DIN*: 284)

This observation brings him to analyze a specific hybrid construction, which he characterizes as follows:

The intentional double-voiced and internally dialogized hybrid possesses a syntactic structure utterly specific to it: in it, within the boundaries of a single utterance, two potential utterances are fused, two responses are, as it were, harnessed in a potential dialogue. It is true that these potential responses can never be fused into finished utterances, but their insufficiently developed forms are nevertheless acutely felt in the syntactic construction of the double-voiced hybrid. (*DIN*: 361)

He thus describes a form of utterance which is current in verbal interaction and which, although clearly monologic, embodies a kind of ‘crystallized dialogue’ (to use Ducrot’s expression (1984: 8)), as in the following examples:

(2) You say that you have finished your work, but I don’t believe you.

(3) You have finished your work, I don’t believe you.

This double-voiced and internally dialogized hybrid construction is a good example of what Bakhtin calls the ‘internal dialogization of discourse’, “as contrasted with the external, compositionnaly marked, dialogue” (*DIN*: 283).
As can be seen from this brief presentation, Bakhtin’s seminal work leads to new approaches to the study of multi-voiced discourse and sketches insightful analyses, mainly devoted to literary examples, but it does not propose any systematic description of external or internal dialogic structures. In fact, Bakhtin, like Saussure, is foremost a visionary, i.e. a scholar who is able to radically modify our conception of language, to raise new problems and to create new fundamental concepts. Among the latter are dialogism and polyphony, which occupy a major place in present research on verbal interaction and discourse. Bakhtin is more interested in speculative reflexions on discourse in the novel than in the empirical description of everyday, face-to-face interaction. But his numerous and rich insights in the notions of dialogism and polyphony have deeply influenced research on discourse, mainly in the fields of dialogue analysis (see Roulet et al. 1985), critical discourse analysis (see Fairclough 1992) and the theory of literary discourse (see Fowler 1981).

3. Polyphony in Ducrot’s work

Ducrot, following Bakhtin, rejects the postulate of the unicity of the speaking subject which is dominating the language sciences, but he affirms that Bakhtin has worked only on the polyphony of discourse and that one has to go beyond his approach in order to describe the polyphony of utterances (Ducrot 1984: 171). In fact, as we have seen above, Bakhtin did work on the polyphony of utterances, but he does not go as far as Ducrot toward a systematic description. We will here succinctly present Ducrot’s polyphonic theory of enunciation (Ducrot 1984). It is important to specify that, beyond their common interest in polyphony, the two linguists work within two very different frames, the sociology of verbal interaction for Bakhtin and what he calls ‘ideal discourse structuralism’ for Ducrot (229).

Ducrot’s first objective is to analyze, in the framework of an instructional conception of meaning, how an utterance indicates the superposition of different voices. He shows that it is necessary to distinguish the following entities:

a. the speaking subject, i.e. an empirical being who is the physical agent of the utterance;
b. the speaker, i.e. a discourse being, who can say I and who is the author of the illocutionary acts; Ducrot makes an additional distinction between the speaker as such and the speaker as referent (or human being) (199); see the difference between the first and the second I in the following utterance:

(4) I do assure you that I didn’t make any error;

c. the enunciator, i.e. a discourse being corresponding to a certain point of view which has not necessarily been expressed by a speaker (193).
According to Ducrot, the meaning of an utterance can enact two distinct speakers as such, which may be identified by traces like I and me and which may be subordinated to each other. In the following example:

(5) Paul told me: “I am sick”.

we can identify one speaking subject and two speakers, at two different levels, with the speaker of the whole utterance as main and actual speaker.

The meaning of an utterance can also enact enunciators, expressing different points of views which are not attributed to speakers. In the following examples:

(6) It is sunny this morning, but it is very windy.
(7) (uttered in a situation of evident failure) What a triumph!

there is one speaking subject and one speaker, who echoes voices of one or two enunciators (i.e. points of view which are not attributed to any speaker). The speaker can manifest his own position by identifying himself or not to one of the enunciators (205). In (6) the speaker evokes two points of view characterized by but as argumentatively opposite, and he tends to identify himself to the second one, if we take into consideration another instruction given by but. In example (7), the speaker echoes a point of view which he manifestly does not assume. In other words, the speaker can assume responsibility for his utterance, without necessarily assuming responsibility for the attitudes it expresses (208).

Ducrot applies his conception of polyphony to various pragmatic problems, such as irony, negation and negative polarity, some uses of discourse markers, and presupposition.

a. irony

According to Ducrot, “to speak ironically is, for a speaker S, to present an utterance as expressing the position of an enunciator E, a position that the speaker cannot assume and which he considers as absurd” (211). See example (7) above. The enunciator E may be identified with the addressee, in which case we have a kind of aggressive irony (211).

b. negation and negative polarity

According to Ducrot, most negative utterances express a clash between two opposite attitudes, one, positive, attributed to an enunciator E1, the other, negative, attributed to an enunciator E2 to which the speaker identifies himself (215). Ducrot bases his hypothesis on the observation of the following facts. First, the use of the French connective au contraire (‘on the contrary’). If one looks at the following example.
(8) Paul is not hard working; on the contrary, he is lazy.

the only opposition is not between “not hard working” and “lazy”, but between “hard working” and “lazy”, which, for Ducrot, is a clear indication of the presence of the positive attitude in the negative utterance (216). Second, cases of negative polarity, as in the use of French connective *pour autant*, which is different from the use of its near synonym *pourtant* (‘yet’), as can be seen, in the following examples:

(9) Paul est grand; pourtant, il n’est pas fort (Paul is big; yet, he is not strong).

(10) Paul est grand, pourtant, il est faible (Paul is big; yet, he is weak).

(11) Paul est grand; il n’est pas fort pour autant.

(12) *Paul est grand; il est faible pour autant.

For Ducrot, expressions with negative polarity, like *pour autant*, are characterized by the fact that they imply the rejection of a positive attitude, and thus require the use of an explicit negation (219–220).

c. different uses of discourse markers

Ducrot explains the different uses of discourse markers like *mais* (‘but’) by showing that they relate utterances which are attributed to distinct enunciators, which may be assimilated in different ways to the speaker, the addressee, or to other points of views (229–230).

Thus, he hypothesizes that utterances constructed with *mais* enact two successive enunciators E1 and E2, who argue in opposite directions, and that the different uses of those constructions, as illustrated in the following examples, depend on the assimilation of those enunciators with different persons:

(13) [Paul wonders if he should go out for a walk and says:]  
It is sunny, but very windy.

In this case, the speaker identifies himself successively with E1 and E2.

(14) Mary: Let’s go out for a walk. It is sunny.  
Paul: It is sunny, but very windy.

In this case, the speaker assimilates E1 to the addressee and identifies himself with E2.

(15) Mary: — Let’s go out for a walk.  
Paul: — It is sunny but very windy.
The answer may have two different interpretations. Either the speaker assimilates E1 to the addressee and thus attributes to him a point of view he did not express, or, as in example (13), he identifies himself successively to E1 and E2.

d. presupposition

The notion of polyphony also allows Ducrot to explain in a simpler way instances of presupposition which he had already described in earlier work. He would explain a classical example like.

(16) Pierre has ceased smoking.

by saying that this utterance enacts two enunciators E1 and E2 who are respectively responsible for what is presupposed (Pierre used to smoke) and what is asserted (He does not smoke), and that the speaker identifies himself with E2 whereas E1 would be the expression of a collective voice (231).

Ducrot's proposals have made the concept of polyphony more precise and enlarged the range of linguistic and discursive problems to which it may be applied, but the French linguist is working more on enunciation than on dialogue and, like Bakhtin, he is not primarily interested in the empirical description of everyday discourse. So his contribution has to be reexamined in the light of present researches in dialogue analysis and critical discourse analysis.

4. The description of the polyphonic organization of discourse

It is premature to give a systematic description of the polyphonic organization of discourse, which is very complex and which interferes with many other more or less well-known dimensions, like the social, interactional, topical, hierarchical and relational dimensions, as we will see later. But it is possible, if we refer to Bakhtin's and Ducrot's work and if we take into account the contribution of recent research in dialogue analysis and critical discourse analysis, to sketch the more important features of this organization (in what follows, I will not be dealing with the kind of multi-voiced discourse which is characterized by a direct exchange structure between two speakers; it belongs to dialogism in the narrow sense of the term, not to polyphony; see Roulet et al. 1985).

As it is difficult to render words like énonciateur et énonciation in English, I will restrict the technical vocabulary to the minimum in this presentation. In other words, I will keep to the notions of speaker (and addressee), and voice (a voice may transmit the discourse of any speaker or express a point of view which is not related to a specific speaker).
Any description of the polyphonic organization of discourse should take into account at least the ten following points:

a. the discourse, or even a single utterance, of a speaker can enact different voices, corresponding to different discourses or points of view: the actual discourse of the speaker, past or future discourses of the speaker, of the addressee, or of other people, and points of view not related to specific speakers;

b. one has to distinguish the voices which are verbally manifested in the discourse of the speaker from those which are implicit. See the difference, in the following example, between two possible reactions to a proposal:

(17)  
  – Let’s go out for a walk. It is sunny.
  a.  – It is sunny, but very windy.
  b.  – But it is very windy.

In (a) before expressing his own voice, the speaker echoes the voice of the addressee, whereas in (b) he just refers implicitly to it by the use of but (according to the instructions given by this discourse marker); discourse markers, when they open a move, play a very important, and usually neglected, role in the implicit reference to other’s discourse;

c. among the voices which are manifested verbally in the speaker’s discourse, one has to distinguish between the one which is presently produced (the present voice of the speaker), and those which are only an echo of other discourses or points of view (including past discourses and points of view of the speaker). If we consider the answer (a) in example (17) above, we can analyze the discourse of the speaker in two segments bearing two voices: the first segment is an echo of the addressee’s voice, the second produces the present voice of the speaker;

d. one has to distinguish two different ways to echo other discourses or points of view: the speaker can reproduce or express them, as in the preceding examples, or he can just point at them, as in the following examples:

(18) Your protest has been duly registered.

e. it is generally possible to analyze the discourse of the speaker in segments corresponding to distinct verbally manifested voices at different levels of polyphonic embedding; for instance, the following utterance can be analyzed this way (each segment is delimited by square brackets and the voice is indicated in front of it in bold types: S = speaker, A = addressee, etc.):

(19)  
  S[Paul has written to me that P[Maria had told him that M[she was ill]]]

(20)  
  S[You say that A[it is a bad paper], I think it is excellent]

As noted above, we have to make a distinction between the present voice (S) and past voices (S’) of the speaker, as in the following example:
As Bakhtin has shown in his work on quasi direct discourse, it is not always possible to delimit precisely the borders between segments belonging to different voices. Consequently, we must admit the possibility of different segmentations, corresponding to different interpretations, for the same discourse, or even of a complete superposition of the two voices. Thus, the following utterance.

(22) Max has told me that he unfortunately did not pass his exam.
    may be segmented in two different ways:
    S[Max has told me that M[he unfortunately did not pass his exam]
    S[Max has told me that M[he] unfortunately M[did not pass his exam]

In the first case, the adverb expresses Max's point of view, in the second, it is a commentary by the speaker.

f. as far as the source of the voice is concerned, it is not enough to distinguish the speaker's present voice from other voices. Bakhtin shows clearly that it is also important to make a distinction between the report of the voice of the present addressee and the report of any other voice, as they do not play the same role in discourse. For the speaker, to reproduce the discourse of his partner, who may then react to it, is a part of the actual interaction between them; that is not the case for the report of the discourse of persons who do not participate in the interaction, which is just an object of reference among others. That is the reason why we have introduced in Roulet et al. (1985:69–84) a distinction, that has been widely used since, between diaphony, which refers to the (re)production of the voice of the addressee, and polyphony (in a restricted sense), which refers to the (re)production of any other voices. In the case of diaphony, it is useful to make an additional distinction between immediate and differed reproductions of the addressee's discourse, which may have different functions, as we will see later.

g. In addition to the distinction between verbalized and implicit voices mentioned above, one has to make a distinction between actual and potential voices, if they are marked in the discourse. See the difference between

(23) You said that I am negligent, but I can't accept this accusation.

(24) You are probably going to say that I am negligent, but I can't accept this accusation.

In the first case, where the speaker refers to an actual discourse of the addressee, we speak of effective diaphony; in the second case, where the speaker refers to a potential discourse from his addressee, we speak of potential diaphony (one can make an analogous distinction between effective and potential polyphony).
h. the most important point in the analysis of polyphony, as Bakhtin already noticed, is the way in which the other's voices have been processed. So we have to describe

- how the discourse or the point of view expressed by the voice has been selected, i.e. what parts of the other's discourse or point of view, including the context, are reproduced or presented (it may be just an isolated word or a whole narrative);
- how it is (re)formulated, at the syntactic, lexical and phonetic levels;
- how it is qualified, by the use of different forms: intonation, speech verbs, modals or metadiscursive commentaries, etc.;
- how it is integrated in the speaker's discourse, as a lexical, grammatical or discourse constituent, and how it is linked to the other linguistic or discursive constituents of the speaker's discourse by the use of complementizers, discourse markers, intonation, punctuation, etc. As far as the syntactic integration of direct, indirect and quasi direct discourses is concerned, see Banfield (1982).

i. to describe the degree of the speaker's distance or adhesion to the other's voices in his discourse, which may vary from complete distance, in the case of irony (see example (7) above) to complete adhesion, as in the following example

(25) As Paul recommended, we should accept this project.

j. finally, one has to describe the various possible functions of dia/polyphony in different types of interactions: thus, the diaphonal reproduction of part of the addressee's discourse may be used by the speaker to mark the topic of his answer and to regain control of the dialogue, to inverse the argumentative orientation of the discourse of his addressee, to preface and attenuate a dispreferred answer, to restore the differed link between a question and an answer in an epistolary exchange or a parliamentary debate, etc. See the very interesting description by Fairclough (1988), in the framework of critical discourse analysis, of the representation of discourse in the news media, where he shows that it is linked with social determinants and social effects.

5. **The interrelations between polyphony and other dimensions of discourse structures**

This brief analytical presentation we have given of the main features of polyphony, which has been illustrated by fabricated examples, does not show the interrelations between the different aspects of polyphony, and between polyphony and other dimensions of discourse structures. Therefore I will complete it by presenting an analysis of a fragment of an authentic discourse which is very rich from a polyphonic point of view,
a letter written by George Sand [GS], when she was seventeen, to her mother. (See for a more detailed presentation and the analysis of other examples Roulet 1999, chap. 9 and 10, and Roulet, Filliettaz & Grobet 2001, chap.10).

Let us briefly comment on the context of the letter, as it is important to understand the functions of polyphony. GS’s mother, who is living in Paris, has sent her daughter, who is living in the countryside with her grandmother, a letter where she expresses several reproaches; these reproaches concern GS’s behavior, which, according to what some people have told her mother, seems to differ from the behavior expected from a girl at that time. In her answer, George tries to reach at least three partially divergent goals, without threatening her mother’s position and face too directly: first, to refute the reproaches, in order to reassure her mother; second, to be recognized as a mature person with an independent judgment; third, to assert the right for a young woman to adopt a different, more liberated way of life.

The following fragment, which addresses one of her mother’s reproaches, is quite representative of the way GS constructs her answer:

C’est une sottise, dites-vous, ma chère mère, que d’apprendre le latin. Je ne sais qui a pu vous dire que je me livrasse à cette étude, en tout cas on vous a trompée, car je ne le sais, ni ne l’apprends, mais quand je le serais j’éprouverais une extrême surprise que vous, ma mère, puissiez trouver mauvais que je m’instruisisse.

(Correspondance de George Sand, Paris, Garnier, 1964, 74–81)

Here is a translation of this fragment:

(26) It is foolishness, you say, my dear mother, to learn Latin. I don’t know who may have told you that I undertook such a study. Anyway you have been misled, because I neither know nor learn Latin. But, even if I did learn Latin, I am extremely surprised that you, my mother, might find it bad that I would improve my instruction.

The polyphonic structure of this fragment, a perfect example of this very elaborated structure Bakhtin called an internally dialogized hybrid, can be described as follows:

S[you say, my dear mother M[it is foolishness to learn Latin]. I don’t know who may have told you that X[I undertook such a study]. Anyway you have been misled, because I neither know nor learn Latin. But, even if M[I did learn Latin], I am extremely surprised that you, my mother, might find M[it bad that I would improve my instruction]].

This polyphonic structure must be related to the hierarchical and relational structures (see our brief presentation of the Geneva model in Roulet 1995). Those can be described as follows:

(where M = move, A = act, m = main, s = subordinate, as far as hierarchical constituents are concerned, and, as for the relations between those constituents: pre = preparation, arg = argument, c-arg = counter-argument, pot = potential, and reform = reformulation)
It must also be related to a feature of the interactional structure which is typical of epistolary communication, i.e. a situation of differed interaction which obliges the speaker and the addressee to connect series of initiative and reactive moves in their respective letters (see Roulet & al. 1985, 74–82, and Mulkay 1985). Finally, it must be related to power relations, as they are described in critical discourse analysis (see Fairclough 1992), here between a mother and a seventeen-year-old daughter, in a conflictual educational and sociological context.

Taking into consideration those different dimensions of the organization of discourse, we are now able to specify the role played by polyphony in that organization. The speaker starts with a subordinate act of preparation which reproduces one of the reproaches of her mother’s letter; the production of this diaphonal segment has a double function: first, to restore the direct link between an initiative and a reactive move which is broken in the differed interaction of an epistolary exchange; second, to introduce the discourse object that will be the topic of her move. GS then constructs a main move in order to reply to the reproach in three steps. First, as her mother’s reproach is evidently based on the saying of others, GS produces a polyphonic construction in order to question the validity of this unidentified source. This construction also functions as the preface which, according to work in conversation analysis, must precede any dispreferred answer, in order to save the positive face of the interlocutor (see Mulkay 1985, for an interesting analysis of this feature in a collection of letters written by biochemists). Second, as the reproach rests on a mistaken fact, GS firmly denies this fact in a main act followed by a subordinate act of argument. Third, as the mere denying of the fact might lead her mother to think that GS accepts the presupposition on which the reproach is based (learning Latin is bad), in a diaphonic act GS repeats the reference to the fact which is the object of the reproach, but as a potential counter-argument, to condemn, in the main polyphonic act that follows, the conclusion which her mother drew. Thus, GS also rejects the lower and dependent position
which is constantly attributed to her by her mother’s judgments and reproaches and she clearly takes a higher position by asserting her point of view and by criticizing her mother’s conception of education. It is interesting to observe how GS manages to do this without threatening too much her mother’s positive and negative faces, by strongly modalizing her utterance: *j’ éprouve une extrême surprise que vous puissiez*…

6. Conclusion

The conception of polyphony we have presented above refers to a speaker who consciously organizes the expression of different voices in his discourse. Although Bakhtin and Ducrot reject the unicity of the speaking subject, they do not seem to question the control of the speaker on the discourse he produces. But Authier-Revuz (1996), following work by Saussure (on anagrams), Freud (on play on words and psychanalytic discourse) and Kristeva (on paragrammatic discourse), suggests a more radical conception of polyphony, referring to a divided and conflictual subject, and thus to a speaker who may express unconsciously and simultaneously in the same discourse conflicting points of view.

As for other important dimensions of the organization of discourse, a lot of empirical research still has to be done in order to describe precisely the forms and functions of polyphony in different discourse types, and the interrelations between polyphony and other discourse dimensions, but thanks to the work of Bakhtin, Ducrot and recent research in dialogue analysis and critical discourse analysis, we get progressively a better picture of this still underdeveloped field of pragmatics and discourse analysis.

References

1. The tradition and the present state of research on pragmatic markers

Conversations in English contain a lot of small words such as well, you know, I mean, sort of which have been referred to as pragmatic markers. Although they have recently received a great deal of attention, our understanding of the class of pragmatic markers is still incomplete. To start with, it is difficult to choose among different approaches, terminologies and classifications. A recent monograph describes the state of art in this field of research as follows:

For a newcomer to the field, it is (…) often very difficult to find the bits and pieces that constitute an original model of the meanings and functions of discourse particles. Moreover, the studies available so far are hardly comparable; the approaches vary with regard to very many different aspects: the language(s) under consideration, the items taken into account, the terminology used, the functions considered, the problems focussed on, and the methodologies employed. (Fischer 2006:1)

In 1995 Jan-Ola Östman published an article called ‘Pragmatic particles twenty years after’ reminding us that the present upsurge of interest in pragmatic markers only goes back to the late 1960s and early 1970s, although we find some early landmarks such as Denniston’s The Greek particles (1934) and Arndt’s article ‘Modal particles in Russian and German’, published in 1960.

The real break-through in particle or pragmatic marker studies came with Weydt’s Abtönungspartikel (1969). Also other early works have a German focus and deal with modal particles rather than with what are known in the Anglo-Saxon tradition as discourse particles (or discourse markers). In another early work Elizabeth Gülich (1970) discussed French discourse markers, which she referred to as Gliederungssignale within the framework of ‘Macrosyntax’.

An impetus to study pragmatic markers came from articles showing that there were grammatical phenomena which seemed to be dependent on context rather than on rules formulated in syntax. For example Corum (1975) showed that certain pragmatic markers (adverbs in her terminology) could be inserted almost anywhere in the sentence depending on pragmatic factors. Another factor in the development of the field was the possibility to record and study authentic spoken language, an important locus for pragmatic markers.
From a slow beginning the study of pragmatic markers has exploded. Several publications have been influential in shaping our view of the nature of expressions variously referred to as pragmatic markers, discourse markers or discourse particles (see Section 3 below). The importance of Deborah Schiffrin's pioneering *Discourse markers* (1987) can probably not be exaggerated. It has been followed by other monographs such as Schourup (1985), Jucker and Ziv (1998), Lenk (1998), Hansen (1998), Andersen and Fretheim (2000), Fischer (2000), Aijmer (2002). Other monographs focus on specific markers, such as Erman (1987) on *you know, I mean, you see* and Östman (1981) on *you know*.

The study by Jocelyne Fernandez (1994) stands out from the other works because it deals with pragmatic markers (*particules énonciatives*) in the languages of the world. Independently of the European work on pragmatic markers there has also been research on particles with a modal or evidential meaning in non-European languages (Chafe & Nichols 1986; Aikhenvald 2004).

There are several new tendencies in the study of pragmatic markers which will be discussed below. Present-day research on pragmatic markers is characterised by a broadening of the field to include new phenomena, as well as by a wide spectrum of approaches. The number of elements which are treated as pragmatic markers is growing and there is more interest in pragmatic markers which are less prototypical. It is for instance not unusual to describe connectives and vocatives as pragmatic markers (Fraser 1996).

Research on pragmatic markers is expanding in different directions. Such markers are found in many languages and are therefore of interest to cross-linguistic and typological research. They are also studied diachronically, although natural spoken data is not available. Moreover, a synchronic analysis is often combined with a diachronic analysis focusing on the origin of the markers, to show how their pragmatic functions have evolved as the result of systematic semantic processes associated with the grammaticalization of lexical elements or constructions. Finally, there is more interest in considering sociolinguistic factors: who uses pragmatic markers and in what situations?

2. Defining the field

*Pragmatic marker* is an unclear term and many different definitions are found in the literature.

Schiffrin (1987) characterises discourse markers (her term) as deictic and suggests that they have indexical functions. What discourse markers or pragmatic markers generally do is to indexically point to features of the context. The context to which markers index utterances can be referred to as different discourse planes: the ideational structure (ideas and propositions), action structure (the way in which speech acts
Pragmatic markers relate to preceding and following or intended actions), exchange structure (turns), information state (management of knowledge and meta-knowledge) and participant framework (the speaker-hearer relationship). Ochs (1996) further mentions social identity (the social persona), social act (e.g. request, offer), activity (e.g. arguing) and stance (affective and epistemic) as crucial situational dimensions. In contrast with prototypical deictic elements such as pronouns, temporal and spatial expressions, however, pragmatic markers index elements which are less concrete and not yet fully understood in their full complexity (cf. Aijmer et al. 2006).

Another feature characterising pragmatic markers is reflexivity, in the sense that they comment on the utterance and thus assist in the interpretation of that utterance. The marker in that sense has a ‘meta’ status and an understanding of its functioning involves defining its metalinguistic or metapragmatic role (Aijmer et al. 2006).

Pragmatic markers can also be seen as heteroglossic, in the sense of the term as used by White (2003). Aijmer et al. (2006) argue that markers have the interactional and argumentative function in the discourse to signal the speaker’s position vis-à-vis the hearer’s, his or her expectations or contextual assumptions (see also Aijmer & Simon-Vandenbergen 2004 on an application to the semantic field of expectation).

Other scholars have suggested more features, some of which are different, although there is a great deal of agreement and overlap. Östman (1995: 100) refers to the class-identifying function of pragmatic markers as implicit anchoring: they are “windows” through which one can make deductions about the speaker’s attitudes and opinions.

Hölker (1991) focuses on four features defining pragmatic markers, of which the first two are negative. Pragmatic markers do not affect the truth conditions of an utterance and they do not add anything to the propositional content of an utterance. Moreover, they are related to the speech situation and not to the situation talked about. They can also be defined functionally: they have an emotive, expressive function rather than a referential, denotative, or cognitive function.

Rühlemann (2007) mentions five partly overlapping features in his definition of discourse markers: (1) they indicate how discourse relates to other discourse; (2) they do meta-lingual work; (3) they are discourse-deictic and indicate how the utterance containing them is a response to preceding discourse; (4) they create discourse coherence and (5) they are oriented to the hearer’s needs.

Another line of approach is to characterize ‘prototypical’ pragmatic markers as fully as possible using phonological, lexical, syntactic, semantic, functional, sociolinguistic and stylistic features.

The following list of features is based on Brinton (1996) and includes formal and functional criteria. The criteria also refer to the type of data where pragmatic markers are typically found (i.e. in speech – and particularly conversation – rather than in writing).
Phonological and lexical features:
  a. they are short and phonologically reduced;
  b. they form a separate tone group;
  c. they are marginal forms and hence difficult to place within a traditional word class.

Syntactic features:
  a. they are restricted to sentence-initial position;
  b. they occur outside the syntactic structure or they are only loosely attached to it;
  c. they are optional.

Semantic feature:
  a. they have little or no propositional meaning.

Functional feature:
  a. they are multifunctional, operating on several linguistic levels simultaneously.

Sociolinguistic and stylistic features:
  a. they are a feature of oral rather than written discourse and are associated with informality;
  b. they appear with high frequency;
  c. they are stylistically stigmatised;
  d. they are gender specific and more typical of women's speech. (cf. Hölker 1988; Jucker & Ziv 1998; Östman 1982)

3. **The terminology: Pragmatic marker or discourse marker?**

The question of terminology is important because the terms often reflect different perspectives on the functions and status of the markers and on what to include in and exclude from the class. It appears, though, that there is little consensus here, which is partly due to the fact that pragmatic markers are analysed from many theoretical perspectives. Not surprisingly, pragmatic markers have been called by many different names including *hesitation marker* and *filler* when describing specific functions that they can have in context. Some of the best known terms are *pragmatic marker* (used e.g. by Brinton 1996), *discourse marker* (used e.g. by Schiffrin 1987 and Jucker & Ziv 1998), *discourse particle* (Hansen 1998; Aijmer 2002), and *pragmatic particle* (Östman 1995).

*Discourse marker* is probably the most frequently used term and is therefore also found as a broad covering term (Lewis 2006; Jucker & Ziv 1998). However the term is tricky because it is also used narrowly to define markers which are 'sequentially
dependent elements which bracket units of talk’ (Schiffrin 1987). Cf. also Fraser (1990, 1996, 1999) for a similar definition of discourse markers.

Pragmatic marker is preferred to discourse marker when the markers have a pragmatic rather than a discourse-marking function. This is the case when markers serve to mark illocutionary force or have an interactional function, for instance taking the turn or yielding it.

Pragmatic marker is, however, most commonly used as a general or umbrella term covering forms with a wide variety of functions both on the interpersonal and textual levels. Here also there is a notable lack of agreement on what to include in this class. This is particularly the case with pauses and hesitation markers that do not seem to qualify as words (uhm, erm). In contrast, Stenström (1990a) has shown that both pauses and ‘verbal fillers’ serve as interactional devices in conversation with functions such as turn-taking, turn-holding and turn-yielding.

Both marker and particle have given rise to discussion. The term marker captures the fact that an element functions as a signpost or signal instructing the hearer how the message should be interpreted. It is used more broadly than particle, which is above all a well-established grammatical term for a part-of-speech. Marker also has the advantage of not suggesting the formal restrictions of the term particle, which tends to refer to short monosyllabic items (Andersen & Fretheim 2000: 1).

4. Classification

Pragmatic markers have little in common formally. Many elements which have been categorized as belonging to other word classes can be categorized as pragmatic markers when they are not part of the propositional content. As a result the class of pragmatic markers is large. It includes connectives, modal particles, pragmatic uses of modal adverbs, interjections, routines (how are you), feedback signals, vocatives, disjuncts (frankly, fortunately), pragmatic uses of conjunctions (and, but), approximators (hedges), reformulation markers (Güllich & Kotschi 1983; Rossari 1994).

We can expect pragmatic markers to function differently depending on their origin. It is therefore helpful to distinguish between different types. Fraser (1996, 2006) has proposed a taxonomy of pragmatic markers which distinguishes between basic pragmatic markers (signalling the illocutionary force of the utterance), commentary markers (signalling a comment on the basic message), parallel markers (including some vocatives) where the message signalled is different from the basic message, and discourse markers. Basic markers are illustrated by performative expressions (‘I promise that I will be there on time’) and by pragmatic idioms such as please. Commentary markers can be of several kinds. For example, frankly comments on the manner in which the message is conveyed. Fortunately is an assessment marker signalling the speaker’s evaluation of the
basic message. Evidential markers are illustrated by certainly and conceivably. On the other hand, after all would be a discourse marker since it signals the relationship of the utterance in which it is placed to the preceding utterance:

Mary has gone home. After all, she was sick.

Parallel markers can be illustrated by vocatives and by conversational management markers such as now or okay.

Many pragmatic markers do not fit easily into this framework. Fraser (1996) did for instance not include well or oh as pragmatic markers and there is no consensus about what to do with pauses or hesitation and reformulation markers, especially if they do not seem to qualify as words (uhm,erm).

5. Pragmatic markers and multifunctionality

Pragmatic markers have a number of different functions depending on the context. This raises the question whether they have one meaning or many meanings. The problem is accentuated by the fact that most items described as pragmatic markers also have uses which can be described in syntactic terms as clausal constituents, although there are differences between individual markers in this respect. Stenström (1990b:162) illustrates this by means of a comparison between yeah, which occurs as a pragmatic marker (Stenström's 'discourse item') in 100% of the examples in the London-Lund Corpus, of course which occurs as a pragmatic marker in 11% of the examples and well as a pragmatic marker in 86% of the instances. Furthermore, some items have clause-constituent and pragmatic marker functions which are clearly distinguishable from each other (compare the manner adverb well and the pragmatic marker well), while for other items the distinction is less clear-cut (compare the epistemic adverb surely and the pragmatic marker surely). To complicate the picture, even in their use as pragmatic marker most items are multifunctional.

What first comes to mind as a solution to the multifunctionality of the pragmatic markers is homonymy. Homonymy would imply that the number of markers is multiplied in order to establish a one form – one function relationship. In the monosemy approach, on the other hand, each pragmatic marker is associated with a single abstract meaning functioning as the common denominator for the different contextually determined meanings or functions of the marker (meaning minimalism rather than meaning maximalism).

An alternative to monosemy is to explain multifunctionality as the result of polysemy: different meanings or functions can be related as extensions from a core (prototype). Kroon (1995) and Hansen (1998) both advocate polysemy. The polysemy approach is often combined with or is a prerequisite for the diachronic analysis
of pragmatic markers in the framework of grammaticalization theory (Traugott & Dasher 2002; Schwenter & Traugott 2000 on the development of the discourse marker in fact).

A promising approach to describing the multifunctionality of pragmatic markers is to regard them as constructions. Constructions are pairings of form and meaning, including the pragmatic constraints associated with the form (Östman 2006).

Finally, it should be mentioned that the notion of a unitary meaning of pragmatic markers is also compatible with relevance theory. In this case relevance-theoretical principles are used to provide a unified account of the different functions of pragmatic markers. See e.g. Jucker (1993) on well, which is shown to serve the function of restoring a breach of common ground.

6. Theoretical approaches to the study of pragmatic markers

Pragmatic markers can have an almost infinite number of functions depending on the context. Moreover they can overlap with other markers in some of their meanings. Describing and constraining the multifunctionality of pragmatic markers is therefore a challenging task. This is reflected in the richness of theoretical frameworks which have been suggested. Pragmatic markers can be accommodated in speech act theory, as shown by Brown and Levinson's (1987) analysis of them as markers of illocutionary force (illocutionary force indicating devices 'ifids') or as speech act adverbials (Mittwoch 1976; Andersson 1976). In more recent descriptions the context has been extended beyond the utterance in which the pragmatic marker is situated and also includes social and contextual factors. Östman (1995) has for instance suggested that pragmatic markers can have meanings with regard to social and cultural parameters such as politeness, discourse coherence or involvement.

The importance of a deeper understanding of what goes on in discourse is illustrated by Schiffrin (1987). According to Schiffrin, we must go beyond a surface description of discourse and study the layers of meaning of which it is made up: exchange (turns, adjacency pairs), information structure (the speaker's and hearer's knowledge state), action (speech acts), participation framework (speaker, hearer). Pragmatic markers (discourse markers) achieve coherence by indexically pointing to and integrating these domains or meanings in discourse (See Section 2 above). Cf. also Redeker 1990 for a coherence approach to pragmatic markers.

The development of grammaticalization theory has led to many innovative studies of pragmatic markers. Diachronic research into the origin and development of pragmatic markers has tended to explain multifunctionality as the result of grammaticalization. In grammaticalization theory the focus is on the systematic semantic and syntactic developments of lexical elements into elements which have lost most
of their semantic content and gained pragmatic meaning, and have undergone grammatical changes at the same time. Traugott (1995) and Traugott and Dasher (2002) have for instance illustrated the different stages in the semantic development of *in fact, besides, indeed* into pragmatic markers and the conditions leading to their grammaticalization. The term used by Erman and Kotsinas (1993) and Aijmer (1997) to describe the development of lexical elements to pragmatic markers is *pragmaticalization*, which focuses on the semantic bleaching and pragmatic enrichment characteristic of the changes to pragmatic markers. The term *pragmaticalization* is also used in the model proposed by Dostie (2004). Degand and Simon-Vandenbergen (2011) takes up the issue of the connection between grammaticalization, pragmaticalization and (inter)subjectification.

Relevance theory also provides a useful framework for analysing pragmatic markers. In particular, this theory (see especially Sperber & Wilson [1986] 1995) draws attention to the role of pragmatic markers of facilitating the hearer’s task of decoding the message. Pragmatic markers are viewed as signals guiding the hearer’s utterance interpretation. They thus contribute to understanding by reducing the processing effort needed by the hearer to reach the intended interpretation. Examples of approaches using a relevance-theoretical framework to analyse pragmatic markers are Blakemore (1987, 1992), Watts (1988). Blass (1990), Jucker (1993), Ifantidou (2000), Andersen (2001), Ler (2006).

Conversation analytic approaches (CA) (see e.g. Tsui 1994) capture the fact that pragmatic markers need to be described in relation to the conversational or discourse context. In CA the relevant context is formed by the turn and the exchange (adjacency pair) as well as by larger sequences of action. A well-known study is Heritage’s analysis of *oh* as a change-of-state token marking a change of knowledge-state from uninformed to informed (1984). Cf. also Hakulinen’s (1998) analysis of the Finnish *nyt* (*now*) using conversation analytic notions. Pragmatic markers can also mark pre-closing in a (telephone) conversation. Schegloff and Sacks (1973) for example identified ways in which pragmatic markers such as *OK* and *well* can signal that the participants want to move to farewells and close the conversation. Another important function of pragmatic markers is to mark a response as dispreferred, for instance because it disagrees with a preceding assessment (Pomerantz 1984).

The multifunctionality of pragmatic markers has also been analysed in the framework of Natural Semantic Metalanguage (Travis 2006). The different meanings and functions of pragmatic markers are described by a set of definitions in terms of semantic components or features (cf. also Wierzbicka 1976, 1994; Goddard 1994; Fischer 1998).

Many approaches to pragmatic markers have been influenced by Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL), in particular by the distinction of three metafunctions: experiential, interpersonal and textual (see for instance Halliday 2004). In Halliday’s model pragmatic markers are textual or interpersonal (rather than experiential).
Pragmatic markers

They are typically placed in initial position in the clause, which is regarded in SFL as thematic, so that they form then, together with the experiential Theme, a 'multiple Theme'. Pragmatic markers with a textual function, which are called continuatives in SFL, are said “to signal a move in the discourse: a response, in dialogue, or a new move to the next point if the same speaker is continuing” (Halliday 2004: 81). Common continuatives are said to be yes, no, well, oh, now. Interpersonal elements, on the other hand, are modal comment adjuncts (e.g. certainly, in my opinion, frankly, honestly), which express “the speaker or writer’s judgement on or attitude to the content of the message” (Halliday 2004: 81). Also vocatives are considered as interpersonal elements, not contributing to the experiential content of the clause.

The distinction between interpersonal and textual has been used by Brinton (1996, 2008) to group pragmatic markers into two main classes. For example, discourse markers have a discourse-marking or textual function which relates to the structuring of discourse as text and an interpersonal function which relates to the expression of speaker attitudes. Among the textual functions are initiating and ending discourse, marking boundaries in the discourse, signalling topic shift and repairing discourse. The interpersonal function describes the use of pragmatic markers to express responses and attitudes as well as solidarity and face-saving.

7. Methodology

In studies of pragmatic markers the emphasis is on (preferably spoken) corpus data. Corpora make it possible to investigate the distribution of pragmatic markers in speech and writing and in different registers. English pragmatic markers have for instance been studied in the London-Lund Corpus (Aijmer 2002; Stenström 1990a and b; Svartvik 1980) and in the Bergen Corpus of London Teenager language (COLT) (Andersen 2001; Stenström & Andersen 1996). The MICASE corpus (Michigan Corpus of Academic Spoken English) has been used to study hedges (see e.g. Mauranen 1994). Van Bogaert (2009) relies on the spoken component of the International Corpus of English-Great-Britain (ICE-GB).

We are now also able to study pragmatic markers in earlier periods of the language thanks to the availability of historical corpora such as A corpus of English dialogues 1560–1760 (Kytö & Walker 2006). The dialogues come from such text types as trial proceedings, witness depositions, drama comedy, didactic works and prose fiction over a 200-year period. The corpus has for instance been used to study hedges in older English (Culpeper & Kytö 1999).

Pragmatic markers have been studied in a cross-linguistic perspective on the basis of parallel corpora, which allow one to set up inter-linguistic equivalents, going from source to target language and back to source. (For English-Swedish and English-Dutch, see e.g.
Aijmer & Simon-Vandenbergen 2003; Simon-Vandenbergen & Aijmer 2002/2003; further, comparative work is done on the basis of learner corpora (corpora of non-native speakers’ English, see below).

Recently the development of multi-modal corpus resources has made it possible to study the use of gestures co-occurring with linguistic elements such as backchannels which are used to mark ‘active listenership’ (Knight & Adolphs 2007).

8. Pragmatic markers in the languages of the world

The largest number of detailed studies deals with pragmatic markers in English. Some English markers have been researched extensively. For example, well has been examined by Svartvik (1980), Carlson (1984), Schiffrin (1987), Watts (1989), Schourup (1985, 2001), Jucker (1993), Greasley (1994), Norrick (2001), Aijmer & Simon-Vandenbergen (2003), Aijmer (2009), amongst others.

Regional and social varieties of English are a rich source for the study for pragmatic markers. Among the non-standard markers like has attracted a lot of interest (Romaine & Lange 1991; Miller & Weinert 1995; Andersen 2001), especially the sociolinguistic spread of the quotative be like (Dailey-O’Cain 2000). Like has been associated with non-standard varieties as well as with American English. Both like and innit are frequent in adolescent language (Andersen 2001; Stenström & Andersen 1996). In a number of studies Janet Holmes has investigated the use of several pragmatic markers by speakers of New Zealand English, with particular reference to gender differences (you know (1986), sort of (1988a), of course (1988b)). Vivian de Klerk has studied well in Xhosa English, a subvariety of Black South African English (2005) and shown that there are both similarities and differences with Standard English. The characteristics of pragmatic markers in Singlish (Singapore English) have been dealt with by Gupta (2006). According to Gupta, pragmatic markers can become stereotypes marking the group and hence be used in fiction and for humorous effects. Sebba and Tate (1986) have studied how agreement markers such as you know what I mean are used in British Black English.

French linguists have taken an interest in pragmatic markers for a long time. An early contrastive study involving French is Albrecht (1976), which looks at French equivalents of the German marker eigentlich. In French linguistics the focus has been primarily on connectives and reformulation markers, as exemplified by studies such as Roulet (1983, 2006) and Rossari (e.g. 1994, 2000, 2006), which deal primarily with connectives (‘connecteurs pragmatiques’) such as donc, après tout. Roulet adopts a modular methodology with modules restricted to information which can be interrelated in the discourse organisation (Roulet, Filliettaz & Grobet 2001). Drescher and Frank-Job (2006) is a theoretically and methodologically oriented study of discursive markers in the Romance languages.
Important research has been carried out on the so-called ‘ponctuants’ (Vincent 1993) in Canadian French. In Vincent’s mainly sociolinguistic study the markers are treated as discourse variables which are realised differently depending on the social context. Vincent (2005) discusses the non-standard *par exemple, genre* and *style* in their function to signal discourse relations. Within the same sociolinguistic tradition Dines (1980) and Dubois (1993) have written about so-called extension particles (e.g. *tout ça* ‘and all that’) in a corpus of spoken Montréal French.

Other pioneering work on pragmatic markers, both synchronic and diachronic, has been carried out by Hansen. In her 1998 monograph she discusses the markers *bon, ben, eh bien, puis, donc, alors*. Pragmatic markers are also characteristic of French dialects. Pusch (2000) discusses preverbal pragmatic markers in Gascon traditionally referred to as ‘enunciatives’ which have long been a puzzle to Romance linguists.

Schwenter (2001) discusses additive particles in Spanish. Moreover, much work on pragmatic markers in Spanish has been carried out by the research group Val.Es.Co (Valencia Colloquial Spanish) by Pons Bordería (2006), Briz (1993a and b), Martín Zorraquino and Portolés (1999), Ferrer and Pons Bordería (2001). Italian discourse markers have been discussed in several works by Bazzanella (e.g. 1990, 2006).

In the Swedish tradition pragmatic markers have often been referred to as speech act adverbials (Andersson 1976). Pragmatic markers are difficult to distinguish from modal particles and are often treated together. Pragmatic markers in Swedish have been discussed by Eriksson (1988), Öttesjö (2005), Lehti-Eklund (2003), Saari (1984). Erman and Kotsinas (1993) and Eriksson (1992) discuss the Swedish particle *ba* used by adolescents and a close functional correspondence to *you know*. Lindström and Wide (2005) are interested in pragmatic markers of the *you know* type and their derivation as pragmatic markers. Among lesser known varieties we can mention Östman’s study of pragmatic markers in Solv, a dialect of Finland Swedish (e.g. 2006).

Danish discourse particles have been described by Davidsen-Nielsen (1996). He distinguishes between grammatical discourse particles related to modality and evidentiality which can be regarded as modal particles and lexical discourse markers.

In the Finnish tradition the Conversation Analytic approach is strong. Hakulinen (1998) has studied the particle *nyt* (‘now’) in different sequential contexts and Sorjonen (1997) has devoted her doctoral dissertation to response markers in Finnish.


Among other studies of non-European languages we can mention Nicolle’s (2000) study of particles in Amharic and Swahili using the relevance-theoretic notion of ‘interpretive use’.
9. The diachronic study of pragmatic markers

Two tendencies can be noticed in the study of pragmatic markers in historical pragmatics. On the one hand, there is a lot of interest in pragmatic markers at earlier stages of the language. Culpeper and Kytö have for example studied hedges in Early Modern English (1999). Bertin (2002) looks at the emergence of the connector *en effet* in medieval French. On the other hand, researchers have taken an interest in the semantic evolution of pragmatic markers from diverse lexical and grammatical sources by processes such as grammaticalization (Traugott 1995; Traugott & Dasher 2002) or pragmaticalization (Erman & Kotsinas 1993; Aijmer 1997). Schwenter and Traugott (2000) have demonstrated how the development of *in fact* to a pragmatic marker can be explained by invoking the notion of (pragmatic) scalarity. Brinton (1996) has studied a number of pragmatic markers diachronically and more recently (2008) so-called comment clauses (comment clauses with *say, I mean, if you will, as it were*, comment clauses with *look, what's more and what's else, I gather and I find*). Historical analyses of individual pragmatic markers also include *well* (Finell 1989; Jucker 1997; Defour 2010) and *now* (Defour 2008). Diachronic analyses are furthermore found of markers in languages other than English. To give an example, Hakulinen and Seppänen (1992) discuss the Finnish verb *kato*’s path from a verb to a particle.

10. The contrastive study of pragmatic markers

From an intra-linguistic point-of-view pragmatic markers can be compared on the basis of similarities and differences. Smith and Jucker (2000) group together *actually, in fact and well* on the basis of their function to mark discrepancy between propositional attitudes. The subtle differences between the functions of *actually* and *in fact* are also the topic of Oh’s detailed study of these words in American English (Oh 2000). Another intra-lingual contrastive study is Jucker and Smith’s examination of *yeah, like, you know*. *Yeah* can be analysed from the addressee’s perspective as a reception marker, *like* is a speaker-oriented information-centred presentation marker and *you know* is an addressee-oriented presentation marker (Jucker & Smith 1998).

Cross-linguistic comparisons often concern cognates. Pragmatic markers may have cognates in other languages. The Germanic languages provide many such cases. An example is Swedish *alltså* (Aijmer 2007), Norwegian *altså* (Vaskó & Fretheim 1997), German *also* (Fernandez-Villanueva 2007). It is therefore of interest to compare them semantically and pragmatically. Cognates also exist across language families as a result of borrowing. Simon-Vandenbergen and Willems (2011) study the semantic-pragmatic development of English *actually ~ French actuellement*, and English *in fact ~ French en
fait/de fait/au fait. Such diachronic contrastive studies throw light on general principles furthering or hindering grammaticalization.

Also non-cognate words which are semantic-pragmatic equivalents have been the object of contrastive studies. Fleischman and Yaguello (2004) were interested in showing that French genre and English like had developed the same pragmatic functions although their lexical origin was different. That markers in different languages can develop in similar ways is also shown in a study by Fraser and Malmaud-Makowski (1996). They investigated pragmatic markers in English and Spanish and showed that the functions of denial and contrast corresponded closely.

Contrastive research in this area has shown that relationships between so-called equivalents (whether cognates or not) are complex, and that there is most often partial rather than complete overlap in semantic and pragmatic meanings. This is for instance the case with relational markers such as English on the contrary or French au contraire (Lewis 2006a). An early contrastive study of Italian infatti and English in fact based on the Italian speaker’s intuitions showed some similarities of function but mostly differences (Bruti 1999). Paul Takahara (1998) has studied anyway and its equivalents in Japanese. As demonstrated by Angela Downing (2006), etymological cognates are not a guarantee of functional similarities. The correspondences of English surely are not Spanish cognates such as seguro, seguramente but we need to look for equivalents which are not etymologically related (2006). While English actually and French actuellement have the same origin, the former but not the latter developed into a pragmatic marker (though there are signs of emergent pragmaticization in spoken French), as shown in Simon-Vandenbergen and Willems (forthcoming). Stenström (2006) has suggested English correspondences for the Spanish markers o sea and pues. Willems and Demol (2006) used a multilingual corpus (English, French, Dutch) to carry out a contrastive analysis not only of vraiment and really but also of their Dutch counterparts echt and welk€lijk.

Well has been the object of several contrastive studies: English-Swedish-Dutch, Aijmer and Simon-Vandenbergen (2003); English-Norwegian, Johansson (2006); English-Italian, Bazzanella and Morra (2000); English-Spanish, García Vizcaino and Martínez-Cabeza (2005), English-Spanish-Catalan, Cuenca (2008). For the study of well, Aijmer and Simon-Vandenbergen (2003) used the translations in the other language as ‘semantic mirrors’. The same methodology was used to investigate the comparisons of of course in Swedish and Dutch (Simon-Vandenbergen & Aijmer 2002/2003; Aijmer and Simon-Vandenbergen 2004; Aijmer et al. 2006). Comparisons between German and Dutch are for instance Westheide (1985) on German wohl and Dutch wel, and Foolen (2006) on German doch and Dutch toch.

The methodology may involve the use of parallel or contrastive corpora (Altenberg & Aijmer 2001). On the basis of the English-Norwegian Parallel Corpus Hasselgård (2006) compares English now and Norwegian nå using the framework of
Systemic Functional Linguistics. Celle (1999), on the other hand, contrasts now with the German nun and jetzt. Italian allora and French alors are studied in terms of convergence and divergence by Bazzanella et al. (2007). Romero-Trillo (2007) shows that involvement markers such as English I mean, you know and you see are used differently in English and Spanish and Matamala (2007) studies the functions of oh in English sitcoms and their translations into Catalan. For a contrastive study of pragmatic markers in English and Catalan oral narratives, see González (2004).

11. Pragmatic markers in translation studies

Pragmatic markers have also been of interest to translators. Because of their multifunctionality and context-boundness they are difficult to translate. Often they are not translated literally but are rendered by words or constructions from many different word classes. Moreover they are often omitted from the translation (Aijmer & Simon-Vandenbergen 2003; Altenberg & Aijmer 2002). Matamala (2007) has studied the strategies used to translate oh in English sitcoms in the versions dubbed into Catalan. Compare also Chaume (2004) on discourse markers in audiovisual translating. Bazzanella and Morra (2000) stress the specific problems of translating discourse markers, illustrating this with the translations of well into Italian. In the study by Cuenca (2008) the focus is on what we can discover about the multifunctionality of well on the basis of a contrastive analysis of the film Four weddings and a funeral and its translations in Spanish and Catalan.

12. Pragmatic markers in native versus non-native speaker communication

The study of pragmatic markers has entered a number of new fields such as second language acquisition (‘interlanguage pragmatics’). We can now take advantage of learner corpora to make comparisons between native and non-native speakers of English. One of the first studies was by Nikula (1996), who compared the use of pragmatic markers with a hedging function in conversations by native (English) speakers with non-native Finnish speakers. It is especially the existence of spoken learner corpora such as the LINDSEI Corpus (Louvain International Database of Spoken English Interlanguage) which invites scholars to make comparisons (de Cock 2004).

Simone Müller (2005; cf. also Müller 2004) has examined a corpus of German learners’ use of so, well, you know and like in comparison with native speakers’ use. Buysse (2007) examines how Belgian native speakers of Dutch use so in different types of question-answer sequences in an English interview setting. The results of such
studies show that learners use pragmatic markers differently from native speakers. A similar study by Romero-Trillo (2002) described the situation in non-native language as the pragmatic fossilization of discourse markers. Llinares-García and Romero-Trillo (2006) is a study of discourse markers in the EFL classroom. Another study by the same authors showed that native and non-native teachers used discourse markers differently in CLIL (Content and Language Integrated Learning) contexts and much more frequently than Spanish teachers in a native context (Llinares-García & Romero-Trillo 2008).

Hasselgren (2002) studied what she referred to as ‘small words’ as markers of learner fluency focusing on young Norwegian learners of English. Gilquin (2008) has shown that the frequency and distribution of hesitation markers (including like, I mean, you know) were different across native/non-native speaker contexts (see also Fuller 2003).

13. Pragmatic markers and sociolinguistic aspects

Social variation in the use of pragmatic markers is so far a fairly unexplored field. One of the earliest studies to draw attention to the social background (geographical region, education, rurality) of pragmatic markers is Ferrara’s (1997) study of anyway. Ferrara suggests that pragmatic markers should be studied from a variationist perspective in the social, historical and functional domains. Compare also Ferrara and Bell (1995) who show that ethnicity is an important factor explaining the spread of be + like.

Janet Holmes has shown in several studies that pragmatic markers are used differently by men and by women (cf. Holmes & Stubbe 1995 and the articles by Holmes mentioned in Section 5). Erman (1992) has focused on male and female usage of pragmatic markers in same and mixed-sex conversation.

Age is another important factor. Dailey-O’Cain (2000) found for instance that younger people use like more often than adults. Compare also Andersen (2001), who showed on the basis of a comparison of the material in COLT (the Bergen Corpus of London Teenager Language) with the BNC that adolescents rather than adults are responsible for the spread of like as a marker, and that like was particularly popular among teenagers from the highest social class. The use of be like as a quotative marker in the speech of British and Canadian youth was examined by Tagliamonte and Hudson (1999).

Social class can affect the use of pragmatic markers, as shown in Macaulay’s work along Bernsteinian lines. Macaulay (2002) found age, gender and social class differences in two sets of Scottish data that did not appear to be based on the role of shared information implied by you know. A similar study is Huspek (1989). Huspek discusses
both you know and I think with regard to social class. He shows that you know and I think have different functions for working-class speakers and power-holding speakers. Simon-Vandenbergen (2002) also verified Bernstein’s hypothesis (1974) that I think is a middle class expression on the basis of conversation data from the BNC. She found indications that there are social class differences in usage. More work on the link between pragmatic markers and social factors is called for.

Another sociolinguistic line of investigation is the usage of particular pragmatic markers in specific registers and genres. One genre which has received attention from this point-of-view is political discourse. Simon-Vandenbergen (1998, 2000) examines the use of I think by political speakers as compared with its use in casual conversation and Fetzer (2008) considers the use of cognitive verbs in general in political discourse. Fetzer has also studied politicians’ uses of hedges such as sort of and kind of (Fetzer 2009).

14. Pragmatic markers and the future

So far prosodic features of pragmatic markers have been largely neglected and recent approaches now explore the possibility of integrating prosody into the analysis in a more systematic way. Prosody plays an important role in distinguishing various uses of pragmatic markers. For instance, the temporal adverb now and the pragmatic marker now tend to be realised differently from a prosodic point-of-view (Aijmer 2002). Different uses of Swedish men (‘but’) have been shown to have different prosodic realisations (Horne et al. 2001). Ferrara (1997) has shown how the intonation pattern differs for the adverbial and the discourse marker use of anyway. A similar study has been carried out by Wichmann et al. (2010), which studies the prosody of of course in relation to its position in the clause and its function. An explanation is provided in terms of grammaticalization. It is clear that more work in this area is called for and will yield interesting insights in the connection between grammar and the role of intonation in expressing stance and structuring information.

From a variationist point-of-view we envisage a further expansion of the field to include detailed studies of pragmatic markers in various text types, studies in more languages as well as more studies comparing native and non-native usage. We also need more studies of the diachronic developments of pragmatic markers and studies of pragmatic markers at earlier stages of the language.

Another interesting avenue of further research is the investigation of semantic fields. Aijmer and Simon-Vandenbergen (2004) made a case for setting up a semantic field of ‘expectation’, based on cross-linguistic data (English, Swedish, Dutch) gathered from translation corpora. Lewis (2006b), looking at adversative relational markers (English and French) shows how semantic maps can be set up using comparable
corpora. More work in this area using more languages would deepen our insight into principles of semantic-pragmatic developments.

Finally, we need more theoretical reflection on the category of pragmatic markers and its place in the grammar. The concepts of grammaticalization, pragmatalization, (inter)subjectification need to be used only when the criteria under which they apply have been strictly defined. Such reflection involves defining not only the concepts themselves but also what we mean by grammar and grammatical categories. In the wake of increasingly more thorough research into natural spoken language data the traditional definitions may be in need of reconsideration.¹

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Public discourse

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1. Introduction

The title of this paper – public discourse – is inherently ambivalent, given the multiple use of both terms in scholarly work across disciplines. Of the two, the term ‘public’ is perhaps more problematic because of its everyday use (e.g. public notice, public lecture, public interest, going public). In light of this, my discussion here will mainly centre around the notion of ‘publicness’. To begin with, I define ‘public discourse’ as social processes of talk and text in the public domain which have institutionally ratified consequences. For instance, an interrogation of an airline passenger by a customs officer in a secluded space is institutionally grounded and would thus count as public discourse. Viewed from this angle, ‘public discourse’ is different from various versions of the private realm (e.g. family, inter-personal, inner-self etc.). Broadly speaking, the term ‘discourse’ can be taken to mean a stretch of talk or text (including semiotic icons) as well as a form of knowledge and the social processes of production and consumption of such knowledge in the Foucauldian sense. ‘Public discourse’, thus defined, includes what goes under the generic rubric of ‘media discourse’ and ‘political communication’ as well as discourse in organisational and professional settings (for a detailed discussion of the scope of ‘public discourse’ in communicative terms, see Scollon 1997). However, given the limited scope of this paper, I will link my arguments to media communication where necessary, and only, in passing, touch upon the communicative practices in the organisational and professional domain (see e.g. Alatis & Tucker 1979; Atkinson 1995; Atkinson & Drew 1979; Boden 1994; Clegg 1990; Labov & Fanshel 1977; Fisher & Todd 1983, 1986; Mishler 1984; O’Barr 1982, di Pietro 1982; Silverman 1987).

The rest of my argument is structured as follows: first, I spell out in detail various readings of the term ‘public’ and the shifting nature of its boundaries. In Section 2, I draw attention to the situation-talk dialectics in communication-oriented public discourse studies, followed by an outline of two dominant frameworks – Goffman and Habermas – concerned with the notions of public behaviour and public sphere in different ways (Sections 3 and 4). In Section 5, I offer a brief overview of the shifting nature of boundary marking between private and public domains with relation to the positioning of the state, pointing out particularly the leakages between these two types of discourse in the contemporary society (as evidenced in the tradition of media
and cultural studies). In Section 6, I focus on the mechanism of information exchange in the public domain, which is particularly relevant to pragmatics research. I briefly refer to the dominant models of ‘pragmatics of information exchange’, which then leads me to suggest that a model of social pragmatics (which shares an analytic trend with critical discourse analysis) can be a useful way of understanding the dynamic communicative practices in the public domain.

1.1 Multiple readings of ‘publicness’

As a way of steering a thematic focus, let me try and characterise the notion of ‘public’ by suggesting at least three possible juxtapositions, which are intricately intertwined: (i) private/public domains; (ii) expert/lay knowledge systems and (iii) micro/macro social order.

The private/public dichotomy – perhaps better conceptualised as a continuum – is a good starting point. It is worth pointing out that the Latin term publicus derives from pubes (meaning mature, adult as in puberty) rather than populus (meaning people), although ‘public’ as ‘people’ is reinforced when it is contrasted with the Latin word privatus which denotes individual affairs separate from the state. Generally speaking, all human conduct can be located along such a continuum, while recognising the fact that the boundaries between what constitutes ‘private’, ‘public’ or ‘semi-public’ (to use one of Goffman’s terms) are being constantly redrawn in any society. We can adopt a comparative perspective on the changing shape of the ‘public’ domain vis-à-vis the relationship between ‘state’ and ‘society’ in different periods in history. In the classical and medieval periods, theoretically speaking, the ‘society’ (i.e. ‘the public’ as opposed to the ‘private’) and the ‘state’ were inseparable. This absence of a state-society divide is also true of the Marxist tradition. State ownership of capital and labour amounts to public ownership: a case of the state being absorbed into society. In the post-industrial age, however, the state (as an impersonal locus of authority) is increasingly being seen as separate from the ‘public’.

A second reading of the ‘public’ (as in public discourse) bears on the juxtaposition of expert/lay knowledge systems (e.g. public understanding of science, risk etc.). In his study of environmental discourse in risk societies, Beck (1992) distinguishes expert perceptions (laboratory knowledge, scientific rationality) from lay perceptions (non-knowledge, social rationality). He writes: “The division of the world between experts and non-experts also contains an image of the public sphere. The ‘irrationality’ of ‘deviating public risk perception’ lies in the fact that, in the eyes of the technological elite, the majority of the public still behaves like engineering students in their first semester” (1992: 57–8). According to Beck, science “determines risks” whereas the public “perceives risks”. In a similar vein, Stehr (1994: 191), among others, characterises the rise of the ‘technical state’ in the post-industrial society “as the outcome of the dominance and authority of science and technology and, therefore, the
power of experts silencing all other voices and purposes, other than those given by
technical rationality itself”. He refers to this as a process of scintillating, which has
immediate consequences for social action, such as the need for knowledgeable citi-
zens, with a high level of institutional literacy. In his later work, Beck (1995) juxtaposes
expert opinion with counter-opinion. In doing so, he not only moves beyond the para-
digm of public awareness, but in fact challenges the very basis of scientific credibility
and technological rationality.

A third reading, although different in nature, involves the juxtaposition of the
microcosmic and macrocosmic social order within sociology: while the ‘micro’ deals
with social action and agency in the local, interactional sense, the ‘macro’ is geared
towards social structure. It may be tempting to equate the micro-macro distinction with
the private-public dichotomy discussed earlier, but such an attempt is unlikely to be
productive (for a discussion of the micro-macro problematic see Alexander et al. 1987;
Knorr-Cetina & Cicourel 1981). The micro-interactional turn in sociology, beginning
with the ethnomethodology project of Garfinkel (1967) is in some way to be contrasted
with the macro-social turn in linguistics (the critical linguistics tradition) and such
orientations have had a considerable impact on the conceptualisation and analysis of
public discourse.

2. The situation-talk dialectic: ‘public’ as a feature
of setting vs. ‘public’ as a feature of talk

It may be useful to impose a distinction between two types of public discourse studies
in communication-oriented research: one dealing with public talk/discourse in terms
of formal linguistic, stylistic and rhetorical features (in fields as diverse as sociolinguis-
tics, anthropology and politics); the other dealing with interactional strategies of com-
munication (in ethnomethodological, pragmatic and discourse analytic traditions).

2.1 (Socio)linguistic markers of public discourse

Over the last two/three decades scholars in sociolinguistics and discourse analysis
have developed a genre-based approach to study language in the public domain. Let us
look closely at one such study. In a rather formalist sense, Labov & Labov (1986) pro-
pose a contrast between public discourse and private/everyday discourse. They argue
that public language is characterised by “the restriction of the use of the universal
quantifiers to strict interpretation, the fixed use of non-restrictive attributes, and the
frequent use of numbers and percentages” (p. 243). According to them, “this particular
style of public discourse is based on logical argument and reasoning, and is governed
by strict rules of evidence and inference” (p. 231). The inconsistent use of linguistic
forms in public discourse, they maintain, “is regulated at the broadest level by moral predication, in this case related to the fundamental principles of social order” (p. 243) (there is a conflation here however of public/private and spoken/written forms with regard to the spontaneous and non-spontaneous nature of discourse). They conclude that “… a great deal of public discourse is oriented towards persuasion, and moving an audience to action” (p. 225), a point which I return to in our discussion of the public sphere in the work of Habermas (Section 4).

2.2 Interaction-based approach

Studies such as Labov & Labov (1986) can be contrasted with interactional studies of public discourse, especially in the media. A number of scholars in the conversation-analytic tradition have taken up this line of analysis, focusing on a wide range of issues: rhetorical strategies such as contrast and listing; elicitation of applause, specific turn-taking mechanisms, topic shifts, targeting talk at over-hearing audience etc. (Atkinson 1984; Atkinson & Heritage 1984; Clayman 1988, 1992; Greatbatch 1988, 1992; Greatbatch & Heritage [in press]; Heritage 1985; Heritage & Greatbatch 1986, 1991; Hutchby 1996). It is worth pointing out that media discourse has also attracted scholars from discourse-analytic and pragmatic traditions. There are, for instance, studies into news discourse dealing with socio-cognitive processes, ideology, power and relational aspects of identity constitution in the critical linguistic and semiotic traditions (e.g. Chilton 1985; van Dijk 1988a, 1988b, 1988c; Fowler 1991; Fairclough 1989, 1993, 1995; Hartley 1982; Kress 1983, 1986; Tolson 1996); audience design and news production in the tradition of sociolinguistics of style (e.g. Bell 1986). A pragmatic orientation raises, among other things, strategies of evasion (e.g. Harris 1991); the activity structure of news interviews (e.g. Jucker 1986); the use of implicature and presupposition (e.g. Wilson 1990); and the shifting roles of participants (Thomas forthcoming).

It becomes apparent that the language form/situation distinction suggested above is not a mutually exclusive one since the kind of public talk Atkinson (1984) and Labov & Labov (1986) analyse does take place in public settings – political or otherwise. This distinction foregrounds the linguistic and situational aspects of public discourse: ‘public’ counts as (i) a feature of talk/discourse (e.g. public documents which are a genre in their own right); and as (ii) a characterisation of setting/situation (e.g. a public demonstration by a campaign group or simply a gathering of people). For our purposes, “the discourse which takes place in the public” in the Goffmanian sense (see Section 3) can be distinguished from ‘the discourse of public consequence’ in the Habermasian sense (see Section 4). In both senses, public discourse is inherently constitutive of social identity (Scollon 1997).
3. **Goffman and the public order**

Following Goffman, it is useful to think of interaction in public settings – in relational terms – as a legitimate field of study. Goffman’s interest in ‘social situation’ – or what he (1964) refers to in his essay titled ‘the neglected situation’ – lies at the root of the interactional or micro-situational turn in sociology, later developed in the ethnomethodological and the conversation analytic tradition. ‘Social situations’ are defined as ‘an environment of mutual monitoring possibilities’ with ‘turns at talking’ as the unit of analysis – rather than social structure. Goffman points out: “rules of conduct in streets, parks, restaurants, theatres, shops, dance floors, meeting halls, and other gathering places of any community tell us a great deal about its most diffuse forms of social behaviour” (1963:3–4).

This brings about the issue of gatherings (in the sense of focused encounters) and aspects of co-mingling, territoriality and orientations in public life along two dimensions: constraints and social organisation (Goffman 1963, 1971). Goffman is concerned with the study of social organisation (including ‘total institutions’) via the interactional features within specific settings. The interaction order of everyday talk can form the basis for an understanding of behaviour in institutional settings. In Asylums (Goffman 1961), for instance, rather than studying deviance, he focuses on the underlying patterns of normal behaviour. Conversation is always a part of a larger frame of social interaction, and hence talk has to be analysed ‘from the outside in’. For Goffman, social interaction includes all aspects of verbal and non-verbal cues, dress code, limb discipline, situational improprieties (e.g. in terms of tightness and looseness of involvement) in behaviour in public and semi-public places.

The primacy of ‘social interaction’ is a foregone conclusion in Goffman’s framework: even ‘self-talk’ (e.g. outcries, mutterings) implies a certain kind of socialisation and a social audience (e.g. overhearers, bystanders). Goffman claims that “when in the presence of others, the individual is guided by a special set of rules, which have here been called situational proprieties. Upon examination, these rules prove to govern the allocation of the individual’s involvement within the situation, as expressed through a conventionalized idiom of behavioural cues” (1963:243). His work builds on etiquette manuals such as ‘The Laws of Etiquette’ by ‘A Gentleman’ (1836) (see also Schlesinger 1946). All gatherings have a concern for ‘fitting in’ and maintaining ‘interactional tonus’ or what Bateson (1936) calls ‘tone of appropriate behaviour’. Goffman draws on game metaphors to characterise the coordinating aspects of interactants: ‘come into play’, ‘stay in play’. He (1959) also extends the dramaturgical metaphors of backstage and frontstage to illustrate the discrepancy between public and private presentations of ‘self’. Rules of social interaction are thus intimately linked with self-presentation and face-management. For Goffman (1955:215), an individual’s face is the positive social value which is on loan from
society and “it will be withdrawn unless he conducts himself in a way that is worthy of it”. In sum, self-hood and face-management are inevitably intersubjective processes in a given socio-cultural space (for a reassessment of Brown and Levinson’s model of face-wants in public discourse settings, see Sarangi & Slembrouck 1997).

From a pragmatic angle, the notion of ‘participant roles’ is useful for analysing interaction in public life – organisational and bureaucratic settings (Sarangi & Slembrouck 1996; see Thomas [forthcoming] for a distinction between social roles, discourse roles and activity roles). A role-analytic perspective can easily link up with discourse representation, indeterminacy, responsibility and authority in public settings.

At a more specific level, Goffman indeed talks about participant rights and obligations which may be differentially distributed within an encounter (1963: 100). For example, children at a dinner table, minimal responses restricted to “Yes, sir” and “No, sir” for certain participant categories; denial of speaking rights in public meetings and stage performances. Levinson (1988) recasts the Goffmanian (1979) notion of ‘footing’ in terms of a complex set of ‘participant roles’ at the level of both production and reception – source, author, relayer, audience, overhearer, bystander etc. For him, the dyadic bias and the canonical characterisation of speaker and hearer in pragmatics research does not pay adequate attention to informational and attitudinal content. Taking utterance-event, as opposed to the speech event, as his unit of analysis, Levinson emphasizes the need for what he calls the incumbancy/role distinction in talk analysis. He offers useful insights about linkages between participant roles on the one hand and grammatical categories, especially personal deixis, social deixis and reported speech, on the other hand.

4. Habermas and the public sphere

There are striking differences between Goffman and Habermas with regard to the conceptualisation of ‘publicness’. Habermas’s (1989) account, unlike Goffman’s, is about the constitution and degeneration of the public sphere, as an ideal type. There seems to be a parallel between Habermas’s notion of the ‘ideal speech situation’ and his conceptualisation of changing nature of the ‘public sphere’ at a certain historical point. Habermas focuses on the rise of the bourgeois sphere in the western world, in particular, Germany, France and Britain in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Originating in literary circles, the public sphere is seen as being increasingly politicised during the French revolution.

In what is referred to as his linguistic turn, Habermas (1984) proposes a theory of communicative action as a form of coordinated social interaction oriented toward understanding (Verständigung) and consensus (Einverständnis). This theory of communicative action is intermeshed with his framework of the lifeworld (e.g. individual,
family, peer group) and the systems (e.g. state, market). For Habermas, communicative action (as distinct from strategic and instrumental action) is paramount to the lifeworld and its reproduction. In other words, the notion of the lifeworld (which means implicit assumptions, intuitive knowledge, moral values etc.) is the ‘horizon-forming context of communication’ as it makes understanding happen.

According to Habermas, the private and the public constitute two spheres in the lifeworld. The public sphere (in its political and cultural sense) is thus an extension of the lifeworld, or more appropriately, it functions as ‘mediator between state, market and individual, that is, systems and lifeworld’ (Fornäs 1995: 80). In the Habermasian sense, the ‘public sphere’ comes to be seen as distinct from organisational and bureaucratic state institutions. The institutional spheres or fields are, however, “dependent on the ordering principles of both systems, but also on communicative action based in the lifeworld” (Fornäs 1995: 74). In passing, it can be noted that Gramsci (1971), however, draws the line between private and public elsewhere: institutions such as churches, schools, newspapers are seen as part of the private domain and the State (of the ruling class) is neither public nor private. In his seminal work on ideology and ideological state apparatuses, Althusser (1994) maintains that it is unimportant whether the institutions in which ideological state apparatuses are realised are public or private; what matters is how they function (see Section 5.2 on the colonisation of the private domain through the adoption of surveillance procedures).

Staying within the political field, Habermas defines the public sphere as a ‘body of private persons assembled to form a public’ – to discuss matters of ‘public concern’ or ‘common interest’ (cf. Sennett 1977). There are resonances here with the Goffmanian notion of gathering, but the Habermasian project is strikingly different with its focus on rational argumentation as opposed to interactional order. The notion of ‘common interest’ allows for the bracketing of participants’ status, as the public sphere is regarded as a forum for public opinion formation. For Habermas (1989: 36), public discourse as “a kind of social intercourse, […] far from presupposing the equality of status, disregarded status altogether”. As Calhoun (1992: 13) points out, ‘the idea that the best rational argument and not the identity of the speaker was supposed to carry the day was institutionalised as an available claim’. The Goffmanian participant categories are hardly invoked here, but we can anticipate a link between available role-categories and production/reception formats in the public domain. According to Habermas (1989: 27):

The bourgeois public sphere may be conceived above all as the sphere of private people come together as a public: they soon claimed the public sphere regulated from above against the public authorities themselves, to engage them in a debate over the general rules governing relations in the basically privatized but publicly relevant sphere of commodity exchange and social labor. The medium of this political confrontation was peculiar and without historical precedent: people’s public use of their reason.
This sense of ‘publicness’ brings to the fore an opposition between state and society on
the one hand and the practice of rational critical discourse on political matters, on the
other hand (see Calhoun 1992 for an insightful account).

As we have seen, Habermas’s framework idealises the dimensions of rationality
and intentionality as forms of human action. One reading of Habermas’s rational
critical discourse suggests that all sections of the public have equal access to this
form of expression and that it is not affected by the power/status of the speakers.
His subsequent observation on validity and truth claims also builds on the ration-
nality dimension and has little to say about authority and responsibility claims,
thus keeping knowledge and power separate, unlike in the Foucauldian framework
(cf. Foucault 1980). Note, however, that in his later work on the speech-act model
of pragmatics, Habermas pays attention to the felicity conditions. It is also worth-
while to remind us of the language-ideology dimension since the public domain
is also a perceived phenomenon on which people project a number of ideological
beliefs and ideas. Such perceptions generate speech style choices, including ways
of speaking (e.g. “going on record”). The public domain is invested with ideologies
which have to do with textual hierarchies (e.g. written is more formal than spoken),
voices of authority, ‘entextualisation practices’ and ‘replicability’ (Silverstein &
Urban 1996).

Bourdieu’s (1991) notion of ‘legitimate language’ in relation to position of
speaking takes us to the strategic and symbolic aspects of collusion and hegemony.
Consider, for instance, how certain modes of action and talk (habitus), which are
fostered in the private domain of the middle and upper classes, become recognised
as having symbolic capital in the public domain. Children in school are disposed to
learn the know-how of ‘good’ behaviour, including speaking ‘properly’. As Althusser
(1994: 104) observes: ‘the school (but also other State institutions like the Church,
or other apparatuses like the Army) teaches ‘know-how’, but in forms which ensure
subjection to the ruling ideology or the mastery of its ‘practice’’ (cf. Bourdieu 1977).
The reproduction of norms, inequality and power in and through discursive prac-
tices can be captured in a model of duality (see Giddens’ [1984] notion of ‘duality
of structure’ with an emphasis on rules, which is similar to Bourdieu’s notion of
‘double structuration’ but with an emphasis on struggles and strategies). The ideo-
logical, rather than the intentional, dimension of language use becomes a key aspect
of public discourse.

Notice that the public debates Habermas refers to were carried out in the comfort of
private homes initially, thus marring the distinction between the public and the private
and further, excluding, in the Foucauldian sense, other groups from public participa-
tion. This means then that ‘public’ is no longer an open space accessible to all people, as
there are self-imposed boundaries. According to Fraser (1989, 1992), the Habermasian
notion of the ‘public’ is narrow as it only accommodates the male-dominated bourgeois,
thus privileging the gendered nature of social structure and social action. She argues for the notion of the public to be pluralised – to include other marginalised groups in terms of gender, class etc. – and lists the various ways in which ‘public’ and ‘private’ can be conceptualised:

‘Public’, for example, can mean (1) state-related, (2) accessible to everyone, (3) of concern to everyone, and (4) pertaining to a common good or shared interest. Each of these corresponds to a contrasting sense of the ‘private’. In addition there are two other senses of ‘private’ hovering just below the surface here: (5) pertaining to private property in a market economy and (6) pertaining to intimate domestic or personal life, including sexual life. (Fraser 1992: 128)

These terms ['private' and 'public'], after all, are not simply straightforward designations of societal spheres; they are cultural classifications and rhetorical levels. In political discourse they are powerful terms frequently deployed to delegitimate some interests, views, and topics and to valorize others. (Fraser 1992: 131)

In addition to the undifferentiated characterisation of ‘publicness’, Habermas’ public sphere has several shortcomings (see Thompson 1993 for a critique). As we have seen, there is a tendency to focus on the political domain, and as Ricœur (1986: 298) rightly points out, there is an “overestimation of the power of persuasion by discussion … the assertion that finally the extension of discussion will be enough to change things”. Such a view pays little attention not only to counter-cultures and institutionalised forms of resistance, but also to media communication and cultural practices in everyday life.

5. Transformation of the public sphere: Public discourse as mediated communication

For Habermas (1989: 171–2), “the world fashioned by the mass media is a public sphere in appearance only … the sphere generated by the mass media has taken on the traits of a secondary realm of intimacy”. A further transformation of the public sphere coincides with the rise of popular culture through mass media (Williams 1961). The media is gradually becoming the public sphere, in particular with the growth of political debates, chat shows (comprising expert and lay perspectives on issues of public interest).

In a media framework of the public sphere, the critical-rational debate has been substituted by emotional appeal to bring about changes in government policy. Negrine (1996), for instance, illustrates this with an extensive analysis of the miners’ strike in Britain (the same also holds for the media’s portrayal of the human suffering in the case of Zaire and Rwanda to mobilise international political action and, on a
different scale, the Snowdrop campaign for handgun ban following the Dunblane shooting in Scotland). Social constructivists would argue that social life is constituted in the public domain via exposure to media and thus media no longer simply represents social values and norms. With regard to information exchange, the media is taking on the role of educating the public – or what Negrine (1996) calls the ‘creation of an informed citizenry’ – rather than bringing about a rational debate on issues of public concern. This suggests that the media, with its own socio-political agenda, is not a substitute for the public sphere in the Habermasian sense. Public rights have been cast as individual needs and rational-critical debate has been replaced by consumption of culture.

The consumption of cultural identities in late modern society remains a key aspect of the public sphere (Featherstone 1994, Gabriel & Lang 1995, Keat & Abercrombie 1991). Advertisements, handbills etc. continue to reflect the cultural values of promotional culture (Wernick 1991; Nava et al. 1997), as simulation rather than representation is regarded as central to post-modern existence (Baudrillard 1988). This can be seen in chat shows where the emphasis is very much on accounting for ‘experience of x’ (e.g. being raped, being terminally ill) rather than on a public debate of what caused such a state-of-affair. We notice how private emotions and feelings are entering the public sphere, especially through the media institution. What was once secured in the private domain is increasingly being staged in the public (cf. various chat shows and political interviews, see Scannell [1991], in particular Tolson [1991], on broadcast talk as ‘informal and conversational’, which is to be seen as institutionalised variants of ‘casual conversation’). In other words, what we have here is a public celebration of private experience, in a rather non-political sense, which amounts to denigrating expertise, critical rationality etc. It should be pointed out however that such public displays of private experience can be interpreted as an appropriation of expert systems, thus contributing to new discourse technologies (Fairclough 1992).

The transformation of the critical-rational debate is partly a consequence of the democratisation process, offering people more open access to the public space. Underlying this is what Thompson (1990) refers to as ‘mediatization’. The mediatized public sphere is a convincing illustration of the transformation in the Habermasian sense: massification in favour of popular culture. The public sphere has very much become the popular culture (in the Bakhtinian sense of the carnivalesque), with tendencies of globalisation and regionalisation and calls for cultural citizenships. In contemporary terms, this has led to the emergence of sub-political campaign groups (Greenpeace, Anti-abortion, Friends of the Earth, Animal Rights etc.). These groups form political opinions through mobilising expert and lay perspectives on public issues and their main strength comes from globalisation tendencies – no longer constrained by the political climate of any particular nation-state – or what
Habermas characterises as the state’s ‘uncommitted friendly disposition’. Increasingly, we notice a convergence of rhetorical strategies as the state, the politicians, the pressure groups and the media claim to be speaking on behalf of the public.

5.1 The state’s role in the conflation of public and private discourses in contemporary societies

The consumption model of public discourse is a consequence of the arrival of the televisual media, but it is also the result of a shift from a political to an economic model of state’s relationship with its citizens. The culmination of this shift is noticeable in the privatisation of public utilities in welfare states. The public goods and public services are being replaced and transformed by privatisation programmes. This transformation has as much to do with the failing of the public services, as it has to do with the need for new markets for large multinational companies (Martin 1993). The state is taking on a regulatory role to monitor and facilitate the performance of the private sector. In other words, the state functions as a mediator and this has implications for mechanism of information exchange, accountability and sanctions.

We notice increasing privatisation of public sectors and growth of the enterprise culture (Keat & Abercrombie 1991), with a high premium placed on accountability. The private/public distinction gets blurred in the model of the free market economy, as can be seen in the competition between state and private sector to intervene with private lives as well as with the extension of services of institutions such as banks in areas of savings, loans, insurance packages and pension schemes all rolled into one. Citizens are being treated as consumers and the state is seeking to fulfil consumer needs/rights (Keat, Whiteley & Abercrombie 1994; du Gay 1996). The development of the contemporary consumer culture involves a distinctive mode of domination: “the new mode of domination distinguishes itself by the substitution of ‘seduction’ for repression, public relations for policing, advertising for authority, and needs-creation for norm-imposition” (du Gay 1996: 79; see also Bauman 1987; Baudrillard 1988).

The creation of what Negrine (1996) calls ‘next step agencies’ (Benefits Agency, Child Support Agency etc.), which fall outside the domain of ‘public accountability’ as do state government departments, also marks a shift from a model of public sphere (characterised by collective rational debate) to a model of public relations (characterised by the proliferation of the service industry dealing with information exchange based on individual needs and eligibility criteria). Among other things, this is realised discoursally in what Fairclough (1992) refers to as ‘conversationalisation’ – the simulation of equality and informality in the public sector. As Sarangi & Slembruck (1996) point out, on the one hand conversationalisation can be seen as a reaction to bureaucratisation of public life, but on the other hand, we should not overlook how institutional power in the bureaucratic sphere is being sustained through methods of
surveillance, of which conversationalisation is an intimate part. A further trend here is
the prevalence of ‘promotional discourse’ in all aspects of social life, including the uni-
versity sector (Fairclough 1993; Sarangi & Slembrouck 1996; Wernick 1991).

The transformation of citizens into consumers in the bureaucratic field can be
analysed in terms of what Habermas refers to as the colonisation of the lifeworld.
The logic of the economic market and administrative power extends to the private
sphere. Communicative action is replaced by strategic action in order to achieve ends,
which undermines rational consensus and validity claims. It is perhaps the case that the
systems (state and market) continue to colonise the lifeworld, but within the lifeworld
there is a conflation of private-public spheres (see Crossley 1996 and Fornäs 1995 for a
useful discussion of the mutual exchange flows between the spheres within a communi-
cative framework). It is important to keep the distinction between, on the one hand, the
colonisation of the lifeworld by the system (which gives rise to distorted communica-
tion) and, on the other hand, the fuzzy border between public and private spheres as they
mutually infiltrate each other. At the level of information exchange, public and private
discourses continue to draw upon each other and the hybridity is as much noticeable in
the political domain as in the cultural domain of the public sphere.

5.2 Surveillance and control: Information exchange as a site of struggle

The state often redefines the public/private domains with the use of surveillance
and discipline as methods of social control. Consider the public/private dimen-
sion of social life in relation to the state, the individual self and the family as an
organisational unit. With regard to the shifting nature of parent–children relation-
ship vis-à-vis state intervention, we can examine the setting up of bureaucratic
institutions such as the Child Support Agency in the UK to monitor failed fam-
ily lives and to make absent fathers pay for their children’s well-being. A further
example of state intervention in family life relates to the issue of parents’ power to
use corporal punishment in order to monitor their children’s behaviour. According
to Weber (1922), the surveillance capacity of the state is such that the distinction
between the public and the private is itself a matter of state definition (cf. Habermas’s
[1973] account of how this is accomplished through the extension of the Law to
regulate the private domain).

As Giddens (1985) points out, heightened surveillance is a prerequisite for social
organisation and social control. Following Foucault (1979), it can be argued that the
state and other private organisations use ‘panoptical’ methods of surveillance to control
information. As Webster (1995:54) puts it: “organisation and observation are Siamese
twins, which have grown together with the development of the modern world” (for a
fuller discussion of surveillance as a key technique of modern power both in state and
business organisations, see Dandeker 1990; Giddens 1985). In the transformed public
sphere with its locus on consumer culture, the market adopts surveillance as a mode of regulation and encourages forms of ‘auto-surveillance’ and ‘self-discipline’.

There seems to be a constant tension between the state and the market wanting to obtain as much information as possible in order to be able to control social action (see Gandy [1993] for a discussion of the relationship between information and power). Consider, for instance, the current trend in the UK of supermarkets obtaining and storing information about households for the purposes of issuing reward/bonus cards – in itself a marketing strategy with some economic advantage to the loyal customers. It is also possible to argue that such information exchange takes place in a given socio-political context, and therefore institutionally literate individuals would deploy filtering strategies when it comes to providing information about themselves. In other words, social agents as clients may choose to withhold vital information in pursuit of their own interest. This might mean being ‘economical with truth’ and constructing a ‘productive other’ (Barsky 1994). It would appear therefore that asymmetric information exchange is central to both the cultural and political domains of the public sphere.

6. Pragmatic theories of information exchange and the public sphere: Towards a social pragmatics

Given that pragmatics is inevitably concerned with ‘meaning-making’ against a set of parameters such as power, status, rights and obligations, various pragmatic theories of human communication can be reassessed to account for public discourse. In this section therefore let us briefly examine the descriptive and explanatory adequacy of various pragmatic theories of information exchange to account for communication in the public domain (to include state, market and media).

It is safe to argue that information exchange lies at the heart of the three most dominant models of pragmatic inquiry: the cooperative principle and conventional/conversational implicatures (Grice 1975), face wants and positive/negative politeness strategies (Brown & Levinson 1987), and principles of relevance and message processing (Sperber & Wilson 1986). One of the weaknesses of these models is that communication is viewed as primarily inter-personal and understanding-oriented. It is also worth pointing out that much of the critique and application of these models of information exchange is grounded, for example, in cross-cultural or gender-related differences. It is important to consider the possibility of extending these pragmatic theories to the public domain generally, focusing mainly on information exchange vis-à-vis issues of role-relationships, identity construction, strategic goal imposition etc. The public domain here would include not only face-to-face communicative encounters between clients/consumers and institutional/organisational representatives of various
kinds, but also the dynamic aspects of inter-institutional communicative networks in relation to contemporary processes of social change. Such a programme will blend well with the Habermasian characterisation of public discourse as systematically distorted communication, without subscribing to his universal pragmatics model. In a further stage, strategic aspects of public discourse can be linked to participant roles, rights and obligations.

In a series of papers Sarangi & Slembrouck (1992, 1997, 1997, forthcoming) argue in favour of a social pragmatic model of information exchange in the public domain. The point of departure for a model of social pragmatics is that most of pragmatics theory building is based on an archetypical view of casual conversation at an interpersonal level. With some exception in terms of illustrative examples, this is true of Grice (1975), Brown & Levinson (1987) and Sperber & Wilson (1986). Additionally, a social pragmatic model of information exchange analysis has advantage over a conversational-analytic model of sequential analysis. While the latter is constrained by practical reasoning, local logic and manifest aspects of accounting, the former subscribes to the distinction between strategic and communicative rationality vis-à-vis role-categories and authority claims. Note, however, Garfinkel’s (1967: 38) disclaimer: “a knowledge of how the structures of everyday activities are routinely produced should permit us to tell how we might proceed for the effective production of desired disturbances” (this is the Habermasian equivalent of ‘distorted communication’).

Future research in information exchange in the public domain, carried out within a framework of societally-based pragmatics, will supplement the current work within critical discourse analysis, mainly targeted at power, social struggle, ideological investments on the one hand and globalisation tendencies on the other hand. Combining insights from Goffman and Habermas, future pragmatic studies of media can focus on claims of authority via discourse roles as well as on validity/truth claims (this will be a strand which is rather different from CA-oriented media discourse). Communication which is not face-to-face and which has multiple audiences requires a pragmatic framework to account for multiple sources of authorship and audience. A pragmatic framework grounded in social theory (social structure and agency) will enable researchers to bring together the linguistic parameters at interactional/relational and the institutional/rational levels.

References


1. On terminology

When in the late 1960s syntacticians and semanticists became convinced of the usefulness of considering stretches longer than individual sentences in their analyses, at least two terms came to be used in parallel fashion: text linguistics and discourse analysis.

Since many of the European proponents of the drive to go ‘beyond the sentence’ also had a keen interest in stylistics, rhetoric, and literature, it was only natural that their initial focus was indeed directed at concrete texts. In the Anglo-American tradition, again, the connection of discourse analysis to literature was a loose one – if at all present. As spoken language was very much in focus within this tradition, cognitive and social aspects of discourse became exceedingly relevant.

In the 1970s, attempts were made to assign slightly different meanings to the terms text and discourse. For instance, discourse was seen as ‘text + situation’ – whence ‘text = discourse minus situation’ (cf. e.g. Widdowson 1973).

Present-day text linguistics is just as interested in processual aspects of language as discourse analysis. In fact, the interests of the proponents of the two fields of inquiry overlap greatly. Here we use the phrase ‘text and discourse linguistics’ (TDL) as an umbrella-term for all issues that have been dealt with in the linguistic study of text and discourse. Although our general approach to discourse is to see it as an all-encompassing (and, admittedly, vague) notion of going ‘beyond the sentence/utterance’, for the purpose of delimiting the subject matter of this entry we have in some respects accepted Levinson’s (1983) controversial distinction between discourse analysis (including text linguistics), and approaches such as conversation analysis and dialogical analysis, which are closely related to ethnomethodology and attempt as much as possible to avoid a priori theorizing. The exposition will, however, not focus on theoretical models or analytical categories per se, but rather on important areas of research.

In this overview we focus on the early, formative decades of TDL in order to provide a background understanding of where it all started and why and how we do the things we do in TDL research today.
2. Historical overview

Although discourse studies did not hit mainstream linguistics until fairly late, interest in longer stretches of verbal material and its relation to particular communicative situations goes far back. More scholarly interest was typically channeled through studies in argumentation and rhetoric, so that in the Socratic dialogues, Plato combined argumentation, dialectics and aesthetics. Oratory and persuasive elements of language were at the heart of ancient rhetoric. The interest in rhetoric reached a second peak as part of the medieval trivium. Although rhetoric has perhaps not been in the center of academic linguistic attention in modern times, many of its categories and much of its methodology are still – explicitly or implicitly – made use of today in, say, newspaper and propaganda analyses.

The first half of the 20th century witnessed the publication of many important studies which can be seen as laying the foundations for present-day work in text and discourse linguistics. One very important branch was that of the Russian Formalists. For instance, Vladimir Propp’s well-known analyses of Russian wonder tales influenced later views about the structure and main ingredients of any story. Without this background, it is unlikely that Mikhail Bakhtin could have produced his 1920s and 1930s studies, which dissociated him from this tradition and which were later to become so influential. As early as the mid-19th century, Henri Weil had done his ground-breaking research on word order, which was much later to become as important as the influence from the Russian Formalists for generations of Prague School linguists, including Roman Jakobson and Vilém Mathesius.

Bronislaw Malinowski’s analyses of the communicative behavior of the Trobriand Islanders introduced the importance of phatic communion to linguists. J.R. Firth followed in his teacher’s footsteps and insisted that the ultimate meaning of a message only comes about after it has been placed in its context-of-situation. Firth’s views were paralleled in the Ebbinghaus-Bartlett debate in psychology, when F.C. Bartlett showed how important the knowledge of what today we would call schemata, discourse topics and cultural background is for accurate memory and understanding of a narrative.

Kenneth Lee Pike and his colleagues at the Summer Institute of Linguistics are also forerunners in this field. They were simply forced to develop systematic methods to deal with longer stretches of discourse in order to adequately translate Bible texts into very different kinds of languages. (Cf. Grimes’ influential 1975 study, and Longacre 1976.)

Although Zellig Harris (1952) was among the first to use the term discourse analysis, many of his successors within mainstream linguistics in the 1950s and 1960s continued to focus on formalizations of rules for describing and explaining sentence-level syntactic phenomena. However, this focus – and in particular its implications – created counter-reactions even within transformational-generative grammar itself.
Especially within generative semantics, scholars started to ask questions like the following: *If it takes longer to process passive constructions than active ones, why would language users need or ever want to use a passive construction?* At one stage of theorizing, an extra box called ‘context’ was added to the other three (syntax, semantics, and phonology), with an arrow going from it in the direction towards the syntactic component. Sentence-external triggers became part of the jargon.

The question of how discourse influences manifestations on the sentential level (e.g. word order) was one prevalent research perspective. Another problem concerned the nature of rules for stretches longer than the sentence: some linguists (e.g. van Dijk 1980) built architectures from below, others (e.g. Labov 1972) from above. (See also de Beaugrande 1980, and the discussion around de Beaugrande 1982 in *Journal of Pragmatics* 6.) Both of these perspectives are still relevant today and continue to complement each other.

As we get further into the 1970s, text and discourse studies start to catch on all over the world. Section 3 gives an overview of some of the most important fields of study from the 1970s to the 1990s. After the initial ground-breaking phase in different directions, basically two approaches developed virtually simultaneously: a structural approach, focusing on texts and discourses (both spoken and written) as products to be analyzed as such; and a more dynamic approach, mainly interested in discourse as an interactional process influenced by various cognitive and social factors. Naturally, these ways of approaching discourse complement one another, as we can very well study a product in order to get at the processes assumed to lie behind it.

The last thirty years constitute a long enough temporal stretch to have witnessed various approaches at abstract theorizing in the field. In addition to discussions on more global perspectives, a host of particular notions and concepts have been defined. Being an umbrella concept, the notion of TDL also brings with it the risk of becoming too all-embracing. Thus, differentiating between discourse analysis, text linguistics, pragmatics, semiotics, and even linguistics has become a field of inquiry in itself.

But perhaps more than anything else, TDL has witnessed a staggering amount of empirical studies during the last decades, including cross-cultural studies, studies of cognitive processes, of computer-mediated discourse, and of non-verbal communication, and it has raised important questions about the very ontology of orality and literacy. The mid-1980s saw the publication, not only of a number of textbooks on discourse analysis, but also of the four-volume *Handbook of discourse analysis*, edited by Teun van Dijk (1985). New textbooks and monographs in the field are continuously being published. What follows is a representative list of books dealing explicitly with different aspects of discourse analysis up and until the early 1990s: de Beaugrande & Dressler (1981), Brown & Yule (1983), Edmondson (1981), Enkvist (1975), Gumperz (1982), Grimes (1975), Hoey (1983), Longacre (1983), Lundquist (1983), Sinclair & Coulthard (1975), and Stubbs (1983). In the early 1990s, some of the more influential overviews were Schiffrin (1994), Kerbrat-Orecchioni (1990/1992/1994),
Renkema (1993), Nunan (1993), Maingueneau (1991), and Cook (1989). Important journals specifically devoted to TDL were started at around this time, and they have continued to be influential in the field: *Discourse and Society, Discourse Processes, Discourse Studies* and *Text and Talk*. New journals that have been started during the last fifteen years have focussed on specific perspectives on TDL.

3. Important fields of study

This section presents a few important and foundational fields of research within TDL. Some of these fields have received attention all along, e.g. ‘information structure’ and ‘cohesion’. Others, like ‘coherence’ and ‘grounding’, have grown in importance as research has continued to go deeper into the realms of meaning and function. Issues having to do with ‘discourse types and genres’, again, have always been in the background, but only gradually received systematic attention in linguistics.

3.1 Information structure

One starting point for introducing TDL concepts into linguistics was the need to explain variations in word order, the use of the active and the passive and other seemingly synonymous syntactic constructions. One way to approach such variation is to ask why a text is a ‘better’ text if it contains a sentence with word order A rather than word order B. In other words, what factors – in the surrounding co-text of the sentence – ‘trigger’ the use of a particular word order?

Most sentences occur in a larger co-text which influences their form and, conversely, the syntactic form of sentences contributes to their ‘textual fit’ (cf. Enkvist 1981). Syntactic devices which allow the text producer to regulate the flow of given and new information include passivization, clefting, extraposition and dislocations.

An early interest in this kind of structuring of information (especially in the Prague School; in the U.S.A. by such prominent linguists as Dwight Bolinger, e.g. 1952, and gradually also in generative grammars) brought textual aspects into sentence grammar. Unfortunately, however, the terminology is particularly confusing here. Europeans usually spoke of ‘themes’ and ‘rhemes’, while, on the other side of the Atlantic, ‘topics’ and ‘comments’ were referred to when dividing a clause or sentence into two information-structural parts. Another set of terms include, on the one hand, ‘given’, ‘old’ or ‘known’ information, and, on the other hand, ‘new’ or ‘unknown’ information. These may, but need not, coincide with the notions of theme and rhyme. Jan Firbas of the Prague School suggested (e.g. Firbas 1959) that information structure should not be talked about as a binary opposition, but as a scale of communicative dynamism. Detailed patterns of ‘theme progression’ were developed by František Daneš (e.g. 1974).

One way of distinguishing between the terms was to view ‘theme’ and ‘rHEME’ positionally (cf. Halliday 1967, 1985), ‘topic’ in terms of ‘aboutness’, i.e. what a proposition
is about (cf. van Dijk 1977, 1980), and given and new information cognitively, in terms of the stage of activation assumed by the text producer (cf. Chafe 1976, 1994; Prince 1981; on accessibility, activation and topicality, see also Lambrecht 1994).

It has been proposed that the basic principle of information structure is that themes, topics, and given information precede rhemes, comments, and new information. (Cf. Section 4 on iconicity.) Since this sequence is seen as the default order by text receivers, it becomes necessary for the text producer to either choose verbs that allow her/him to use the prototypical word order of her/his language, or to signal deviation from the basic pattern, for instance through the use of a cleft sentence, or marked focus in speech. In spoken discourse, given information is frequently recoverable from the situation, which may allow the speaker to either start with, or even neglect, all other except the most crucial information (a typical case would be sports commentaries given under time pressure, cf. Enkvist 1989). Starting with crucial information first in an utterance is also an effective way of getting an interlocutor’s attention.

Research in this field has taken two complementary directions. First, there have been attempts at finding a close correspondence between the cognitive and the linguistic structures (an early suggestion is Chafe 1980). Secondly, inherent givenness values have been ascribed to different kinds of linguistic elements, e.g. setting up a givenness hierarchy among NPs (cf. e.g. Givón 1984–1990; Ariel 1990).

3.2 Cohesion

Many aspects of what is dealt with in the previous section take us into the area of cohesion. Hence another early interest in TDL concerns the question of how sentences – and in later studies, propositions – are explicitly linked together in a text by different kinds of overt ties. Such cohesion devices include repetition of items, coreference, synonymy, antonymy, hyponymy, comparison, indexical relationships, ellipsis and substitution, conjunction, and structural iconicity.

Problems of cohesion and textuality were tackled in France by Michel Charolles, in Germany by János Petöfi, in Austria by Wolfgang Dressler, in Finland by Nils Erik Enkvist, and in Japan by Yoshihiko Ikegami. An influential work in the area of surface cohesion is the sentence-based model of Halliday & Hasan (1976), in which cohesion devices are grouped into five different categories: reference (endophoric and exophoric), substitution, ellipsis, conjunction, and lexical cohesion. Hoey (1991) is an early, detailed study of lexical cohesion.

Elements in a text which have the same referent or application form a ‘cohesive chain’ (Halliday & Hasan 1976), which ties together parts in the text, and thus the text itself into a whole. Such cohesive chains were also viewed in a processual light, as signals that a particular text/discourse strategy has been chosen by the text producer.
to structure the text in view of her/his communicative goal(s). Thus, chains also facilitate the text receiver’s task of discourse processing since they help to segment the text (see Enkvist 1987; Givón 1983; Virtanen 1992a). The most common discourse strategies involve temporal, locative, and/or participant/topic-oriented continuity.

With the advance of studies in conversation analysis and ethnomethodology, cohesion in spoken interaction also received considerable attention early on. In particular, studies of the behavior of different kinds of adjacency pairs (such as a question-answer sequence, a greeting followed by another greeting) proved very fruitful. Another vast field of research deals with the functions and use of special signals to segment the discourse flow and to indicate that a change of topic is taking place. Such ‘discourse markers’ or ‘pragmatic particles’ have been found to be the organizers of discourse *par excellence*. In English, such typical markers would include *anyway*, *so*, and *well then*. In addition to their discourse-segmenting function, these markers also indicate speaker – hearer relations and attitudes (early studies include Fernandez 1994; Östman 1981; Schourup 1985; Schiffrin 1987).

### 3.3 Coherence

Not all relations among the various parts of a discourse are explicitly marked with the kinds of cohesive devices talked about in the preceding section. Still, as speakers of a language and as members of a discourse community and culture, we have built up expectations and background knowledge that we can rely on to understand our interlocutor even if s/he does not state everything overtly and explicitly. Such implicit textuality is usually referred to as ‘coherence’. While surface cohesion may be seen as a characteristic of discourse as a product, coherence is rather connected with interpretability, the text world which the text receiver is building around the text (Enkvist 1989), on the basis of context, background knowledge, and the text producer’s choice of discourse strategy (cf. 3.2).

The distinction between surface cohesion and underlying coherence was early on extensively addressed by Widdowson (1973), Östman (1978), de Beaugrande & Dressler (1981), Charolles (1981), and Petöfi (1989). Enkvist (1978) uses the term ‘pseudo-coherent’ for a string of sentences with overt surface cohesion, which is nevertheless not a coherent text. For instance, if in a text about a whistling boy we suddenly find the sentence *Whistling is a nine-letter word*, we might say that ‘whistling’ in this sentence creates cohesion with previous mentionings of the activity through repetition. But the joint text that these two parts form, might rather be characterized as pseudo-coherent.

In France, the concept of ‘enunciation’ (*énonciation*) was suggested as ‘a domain of mediation’ by which discourse is produced. The concept is based on Benveniste’s (1966–1974) semiotic approach to language and was further developed by Culüoli (1990), and Anscombe & Ducrot (1983), cf. also Ducrot (1984). In a sense, the
distinction between coherence and cohesion corresponds to their distinction between enunciation (proper) and ‘uttered enunciation’, respectively.

The distinction between cohesion and coherence can of course only be upheld in theory – the concepts are convenient tools for the discourse analyst. Textual elements cannot discretely be categorized as either cohesion or coherence markers. A question-answer sequence might be said to have a cohesive tie due to, say, the particular prosody, word order, or – graphically – the occurrence of a question mark in the first part. But it is clear that it will not be easy to find unambiguous surface indicators for, e.g. an acceptance of an apology. All elements in a sentence or utterance ultimately contribute in some way – overtly or covertly – to the textuality of a discourse, to making it look a coherent whole. Even the pragmatic particles we mentioned in the preceding section, which might seem to be explicit indicators of coherence, are really very implicit markers. Interlocutors hardly ever notice that they use them. Speakers can ‘deny’ that they have used a pragmatic particle in a way that they cannot deny having transmitted the propositional content of their utterance. Admittedly, this is a very monological view of how communication works, and in the last couple of decades more dialogical approaches have been advanced, where Malinowski’s distinction between communication and communion is blurred, and the latter arguably gets to be the main impetus for the former.

There are at least six major approaches that early on addressed the question of how coherence could be explained; these are still relevant today. Some address the issue with the help of micro-level analyses of what happens when two sentences are combined. One early representative of this approach was work done within Sperber & Wilson’s relevance theory (cf. Blakemore 1992).

Another tradition is van Dijk’s (1977, 1980) model of ‘macrostructures’. A macrostructure is based on a summary of the content of a discourse, and it can be recursively reduced to finally yield only one ‘macroproposition’. A very similar approach is in terms of the notion of ‘discourse topic’ (see Ochs-Keenan & Schieffelin 1976; for a broader interpretation, see Brown & Yule 1983). The idea here is that in the same way as sentences have topics/themes as pegs to hang the rest on (cf. 3.1.), so too, discourses have topics, usually expressed in the title or first sentence/utterance of a unit of discourse.

A third approach to coherence is to systematize and further develop the ideas brought forth in the traditions of argumentation and rhetoric. Perhaps the best known approach in this line of thinking is rhetorical structure theory, as put forth by William Mann and Sandra Thompson (cf. Mann et al. 1992). This model further develops insights in Grimes (1975) and is set up to reveal underlying rhetorical relations between units of text, e.g. causal and circumstantial relations, and the discourse functions such relations have.

A fourth set of approaches tackle coherence by focusing on the interactive properties of discourse. Though methodologically very different, speech act theory, the
Birmingham School of discourse analysis, and conversation analysis all treat coherence in a very similar manner, through adjacency pairs, turn-taking, and similar principles. Communicative acts similar to those developed in speech act theory are being made use of to show the intricacies of the underlying coherence of a text.

A fifth approach follows in the footsteps of Bartlett. In order to understand and adequately interpret a text, the receiver has to be able to build up a particular frame of reference for it, a schema that organizes the ensuing discourse. Ideally, a text should clearly indicate what its discourse topic is. It should be able to call forth a cognitive scenario to which all the rest of the discourse can easily be related, and in terms of which it can be adequately understood. For instance, the occurrence of *Once upon a time* raises certain story-schema expectations in a reader.

The sixth attempt at coming to terms with the concept of coherence is to use notions like implicitness, negotiation and adaptability as explanatory tools – in addition to the ever-important concepts of inference and context. A discourse is a process whose purpose and effect changes as it unfolds. Producers and receivers of discourse partake in a constant act of adaptation, changing their predispositions as they go along, and negotiating the unfolding coherence. Verschueren (1987) showed the importance of adaptability, Gumperz (1982) stressed aspects of negotiation, and developed coherence on an interactive basis, and Östman (1986) suggested three basic parameters of implicitness which influence the coherence of a discourse: politeness, involvement, and what he calls coherence. The society and culture at large impose requirements and norms on its members; through the use of implicit reference to aspects of politeness, we take our interlocutor into account and adapt our message to her/his world of experience; and by the manner in which we express affect and involvement, we embed feelings and prejudices in our discourse.

Coherence and implicitness are – like context and function – notions which, as core phenomena, constantly need to be addressed in pragmatics and demand attention and adequate explanations. The goal, however, should be to discuss and explicate them rather than to define them.

### 3.4 Grounding

Getting a deeper understanding of what makes discourse coherent takes us a long way, but in order to adequately process a piece of discourse, we have to be able to pay attention to its salient parts more than to its digressions. Certain parts of a discourse are bound to be more ‘important’ than others.

Some elements, especially in spoken interaction, are used to check that the listener understands or is paying attention, other elements – evaluations, expressions of feeling and camaraderie, jokes – are added to make discourse more interesting, and others are of course directly concerned with the propositional content of what one wants to communicate. Languages use various devices to indicate that some parts are in some
way more foregrounded, and others more backgrounded, or digressive. Speakers have
different strategies available to them to indicate what point of view they take on what
is being said. Grounding has usually been studied in narratives (see, e.g. Hopper &
Thompson 1980). This has lead some linguists to equate foreground in discourse with
the temporally sequential main thread of actions and events in a prototypical story.
But temporal sequentiality is only one factor that influences what is taken to be fore-
grounded information. For instance, the main participants in a story are often referred
to by using pronouns and zero anaphora, while reference to minor participants would
usually involve full noun phrases of various kinds. Thus, reduced noun phrases come
to be another foregrounding device. A fair number of studies have been devoted to the
search for an inventory of such grounding factors. Some languages have, thus, been
shown to have specific foregrounding particles (for instance, this was the function of
Old English *þa*, see 5.2.). The following are some further factors that have been found
to influence what is foregrounded in narrative text: a high degree of individuation and
agentivity of the subject, affectedness of the most affected participant, a dynamic, telic,
and punctual situation time, perfective aspect, and volitional verbs. For a survey of the
field of grounding, see Wårvik (1990, 2002).

The foreground-background distinction derives from the concepts of ‘figure’ and
‘ground’ in Gestalt psychology: the foregrounded part of the text – the figure – is often
also viewed as its most salient portion (cf. e.g. Chvany 1985; for ‘salience’, see Osgood
1980). One direction in research on grounding has retained this original cognitive ori-
entation. Since events or sequences of events cannot be talked about without relating
them to some observer, i.e. to a human being who interprets them as such in the first
place, one focus of grounding studies has moved to encompass issues of point of view.
The language user’s point of view – which in turn is influenced by her/his interest,
empathy and involvement – guides all observation and hence affects the grounding
values of linguistic elements (see e.g. Björklund 1993; Ehrlich 1990).

One area of research that awaits detailed study is how grounding works and how
it is marked in non-narrative text.

### 3.5 Discourse types and genres

When discourse linguists became interested in phenomena such as grounding and
point of view, they approached an area that has of tradition been part of the study of
literature. Another area that has constantly received attention in literary studies is that
of genre.

In linguistics, the last thirty years have seen interesting attempts at systemati-
cally discussing genre, or more generally, the different kinds and types of text that we
encounter. To a large extent, the impetus for categorizing texts and discourses came
from the practical needs of corpus linguists. For instance, texts in the *Brown* and *LOB*
corpora of written English made a first distinction between fiction and non-fiction, and had further sub-divisions for each category. Such intuitive classifications have continued to be used for other corpora, e.g. in the Helsinki Corpus of diachronic texts. Since such classifications are primarily situation-based – i.e. they are made on the basis of the purpose for which a text is produced, rather than on purely linguistic criteria – they correspond to our intuitive feelings about whether texts/discourses are of the same type or not; in processual terms, whether the use of a particular kind of text achieves the communicative purpose at hand. A type of text understood intuitively as being of a certain kind can then be analyzed in terms of what its prototypical linguistic characteristics are. However, Biber (1989) – using the same method as Carroll (1960) had employed in stylistics – approached the problem from a very different point of view. He used factor analysis on a large set of linguistic features in a variety of texts, and interpreted the resulting clusterings of these features as functional types of text, such as ‘imaginative narrative’, and ‘learned exposition’.

Issues relating to genre differences have been dealt with in ancient rhetoric ever since the Ad Herennium. In modern times, Crystal & Davy’s 1969 book on stylistics was one of the first in linguistics to systematically account for differences between genres. Halliday (1978) uses the term ‘register’. In his model, registers can be defined in terms of variables such as ‘field’, ‘tenor’, and ‘mode’ – variables which are used in systemic functional linguistics in general. Within this approach to TDL, the notion of genre has particularly been developed by Martin (e.g. 2006).

A complementary approach to the primarily situational ones mentioned above, is one that is based on discourse-functional criteria. Text differences in this sense are talked about as text types, or discourse types. Whereas ‘genre’ and ‘register’ refer to text-externally definable classes of text (such as fairy-tale, news report, diary), used for a specific purpose, in a specific communication situation, with often particular interlocutor roles (e.g. story-teller and audience), classifications into text/discourse types are made on a text-internal basis, to indicate variation according to the organization and content of texts. Discourse types are prototypical categories, and text-internally characterizable discourse types may be found in several text-externally defined genres or registers. Thus, the narrative discourse type is representative not only of fairy-tales, but also of genres like news stories, diaries, and reports of scientific experiments. These and many other genres may manifest coherence in terms of such prototypical characteristics of narratives as temporal succession and/or agent orientation. And, the other way round, a diary, for instance, would not necessarily have to be a narrative discourse type, although typically, of course, it is.

1. In this overview we use the terms ‘discourse type’ and ‘text type’ synonymously; see, however, Virtanen (1992b).
Traditional text-type categories such as ‘narrative’, ‘descriptive’ and ‘argumentative’ discourse have been widely discussed in the literature. Werlich (1976) distinguishes five idealized ‘types of text’: narrative, descriptive, instructive, expository, and argumentative text. These abstract categories are further discussed in terms of five parallel ‘text forms’, which are divided into a number of ‘text form variants’ (i.e. everyday text categories such as anecdotes, advertisements, and sermons). In addition to Werlich’s studies, the most influential works in this field are Longacre (1983) and Kinneavy (1971).

The most influential approach to genre in the 1990s came from applied linguistics and in particular the seminal work by Swales (1990). It is profitable in genre analyses not to work with too broad categories like ‘journalesse’, but to distinguish between genres like news report, editorial, background article, letter to the editor, sports commentary, profile article, and advertisement; or even 'subgenres' like the headline and the lead. Such hierarchies or categories must not, however, become a straitjacket for the analyst; Biber’s work clearly shows how much such categories overlap. Genres are continuously on the move: emergent and established genres are maintained or altered to fit the communicative needs of communities of people.

Still, in the analysis of authentic discourse, it is crucial to pay attention to variation in terms of ‘discourse types’, ‘text types’, ‘genres’, and ‘registers’. Otherwise there is a risk of uncontrolled comparisons, where for instance the type of discourse affects the results of an investigation but these are interpreted as evidence for some other, e.g. dialectal or sociolectal, phenomena. There is still a tendency for this variation not to be systematically addressed, for stories to be taken as discourse par excellence, and for generalizations about language to be made on the basis of the linguistic characteristics of stories.

4. Other trends

In addition to a continuing interest in the traditional fields discussed above, certain trends particularly stood out at the turn of the millenium. This section will very briefly survey some of these areas. As has continuously been stressed in this overview, TDL covers a great number of sub-areas, and the overlap with other ‘fields’ – especially conversation analysis – is immense. It is thus no wonder that research in TDL touches on almost every field in linguistics.

One issue that has received extensive attention in TDL studies the last twenty years is the difference between speech and writing. Although there is still a general bias in linguistics in favor of written discourse, discourse analysts have just as often studied spoken interaction – so much so that for some linguists, the term ‘discourse’ itself refers to spoken language. There is, however, no either-or divide between spoken and written language. Biber’s (1988) extensive corpus study confirms the existence of variation within and across speech and writing. A related dichotomy – or rather, scale – often
discussed in TDL is that of orality vs. literacy. Cultures can be discussed in relation to a prototypical set of characteristics associated with orality and literacy. According to Ong (1982), an oral culture is basically formulaic, participatory, situational, and a literal culture analytic, distanced and abstract. In this sense, texts can be regarded as more or less oral, independent of whether they *de facto* are spoken or written. As research within computer-mediated discourse/communication (CMD/CMC) has advanced, the question of how e.g. chat discourse should be classified in relation to speech and writing has attracted a lot of interest. Herring (e.g. 1996) has convincingly argued that CMC is not reducible to either, but a third mode of expression, showing systematic variation across languages, contexts, users and technological modes.

Chafe (1982) very early on drew attention to a parameter of ‘involvement vs. detachment’: a speaker/writer’s *involvement* in a text manifests itself in the frequent occurrence of particular linguistic features, for instance, first person references and verbs like *think*, indicating cognitive processes. *Detachment*, again, may be manifested through the use of the passive. According to Chafe, involvement is also often coupled with fragmentation (cf. contractions, pragmatic particles), and detachment with integration (cf. attributive adjectives and nominalizations). Prior to Chafe, Labov (1972) had carried out ground-breaking research into the use of evaluative elements in language, showing how evaluative elements may be found dispersed throughout any story. Fleischman (1990) found a clustering of evaluative elements around the most salient peak of narratives. Two early collections of articles on involvement, or – another term often used in pragmatic research – on *affect* are Ochs (1989) and Caffi & Janney (1994).

Isomorphism and the discoursal impact of the *iconicity* of structures also need to be given attention in any analysis of discourse. On all levels of language, we can find tendencies toward iconic relationships. The obvious case in a prototypical narrative is that events are displayed in a sequential order – mirroring the order in which these events might have been experienced or interpreted as having taken place in real time. Fairy tales, for instance, are very often presented in this manner. Other examples include the following: horoscopes are ordered in a temporal order according to the sequence in which the signs have been assigned stretches of time; recipes first give the ingredients that are causally primary for the food production to take place; and travel guides tend to take the reader by his/her hand and lead him/her through the scenery or place under description. Important early references include Haiman (1985), Enkvist (1981), Givón (1989), and Östman (1989).

Although *Critical discourse analysis (CDA)* has developed into a method in its own right, the attribute ‘critical’ is indicative of the similarity in its goals with those of Critical linguistics. Both attempt to describe the persuasive and manipulative functions of language, and the linguistic manifestations of these, e.g. in news texts and advertisements. Thus, TDL is used as a tool to unravel hidden prejudices and insincerities in the speeches and documents produced by politicians and other wo/men in power. The original impetus for critical linguists was to raise the consciousness of the members of a
particular society, to go behind the superficial meanings and look for the attitudes and ideologies that messages implicitly carry with them. A stereotypical issue would be the use of agentless passives to avoid mentioning the actor or controller behind an event. The journal *Discourse and Society* was specifically established to deal with such issues; a more recent influential journal in this field is the *Journal of Language and Politics*. The sphere of interest of CDA is close to that of sociolinguistics and social psychology, where the impact of factors like age, ethnicity, sex, class, and the attitudes of speakers/writers is in focus. However, ‘critical’ approaches are not just concerned with the impact of social factors on language, but also with the impact of language on society.

*Computational* applications have also had a major impact on TDL in recent decades, notably through work associated with *corpus studies*. Some corpora have also been planned in view of the study of discourse phenomena, both for spoken discourse like the *London-Lund Corpus* of British English and the *Santa Barbara Corpus* of American English, and for specific fields of research, like the *Helsinki Corpus* of diachronic texts, the *CHILDES* corpus of acquisitional data, and *ICLE*, the International Corpus of Learner English. Examples of two early but very different kinds of computational approaches to discourse are Hovy (1988) and Hoey (1995). Eduard Hovy designed a program, PAULINE, with a large set of parameters related e.g. to the formality and addressee of texts, and showed how PAULINE can produce different texts with the same propositional content for different audiences. Michael Hoey was interested in what he calls lexical ‘bonding’ within and across texts: on the basis of the recurrences of the same or similar lexical elements in different texts on the same topic, one could ultimately establish the pool of knowledge that a culture has about that topic.

One of the spheres of research in the 1960s that sparked the then growing interest in large chunks of text was literary criticism and stylistics. Recently, TDL and *narratology* have established a fruitful give-and-take relationship. Propp, the Russian Formalists, and Bakhtin all directly or indirectly inspired the work of narratologists like Roland Barthes, Tzvetan Todorov, A.J. Greimas, and Gérard Genette. Bakhtin’s studies of voices, ‘polyphony’, and ‘heteroglossia’ have been particularly influential: a piece of discourse typically manifests several perspectives, several voices, simultaneously, and the words we use evoke other discourses. A similar notion was developed as ‘intertextuality’ by Julia Kristeva (1969). The point of focus here is precisely how we match a new text with texts and situations we have encountered before. Discourse types and genres, as well as Hoey’s notion of cross-textual bonding, and the whole field of allusions are also closely related to intertextuality. Other important notions that have been developed in parallel in TDL and in narratology include ‘point of view’ (cf. 3.4), and Genette’s

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(1972) distinction between ‘histoire’ and ‘récit’, going back to the Russian Formalists’ distinction between ‘fabula’ (the activity as it is experienced to have taken place) and ‘sjužet’ (the way the activity is presented in a text). More recently, narrative studies have tended to become more dialogically oriented; cf. e.g. Bamberg (2007).

Contrastive studies have a long history in linguistics – both for language teaching purposes, and for the purpose of setting up language universals and typologies. In pragmatics, as such studies have received a more contextual and functional orientation, we speak about cross-cultural studies. One of the first influential studies in this area, with a direct influence on research in TDL, is Kaplan (1966), attempting to show how people from a variety of cultures construct paragraphs differently. Galtung’s (1979) discussion of the characteristics of academic writing in the Teutonic, Saxon, Romance and Nipponic styles is another early study in this field, showing how communication differs across cultures in accordance with different patterns of thought and of argumentation. The most persistent challenge for cross-cultural discourse analysts is no doubt to find a workable metalanguage. Today, the field of cross-cultural studies is variably referred to as contrastive text linguistics, contrastive pragmatics, or contrastive rhetoric, depending on the particular perspective of the analyst. Early important studies in this rapidly growing field include Blum-Kulka et al. (1989), Kaplan (1987), Polanyi (1981), Purves (1988), Clyne (1987), Régent (1985), and the journals Applied Linguistics and Languages in Contrast.

A recent trend in pragmatics and TDL addresses the ontology of culture as such, arguing that culture does not exist without discourse. Discourse gives structure and contents to what we understand by culture. TDL in this view thus becomes an umbrella concept not only for text studies, but for language and interaction studies in general. The impact of addressing questions of ontology has far-reaching consequences. For instance, everybody will agree that ‘context’ is one of the most crucial concepts in pragmatics; and intuitively it may seem straightforward to relate a message to a set of extralinguistic parameters. However, if contextualization itself is to be seen in terms of discourse, the status of any presumed common denominator for understanding will be questionable. Further research in this field will no doubt give us a better understanding of notions like variability, indeterminacy and ambivalence. Relevant early references include Sherzer (1987), Duranti & Goodwin (1992), Auer & Di Luzio (1992), Bauman & Briggs (1990).

5. Applications

So far our overview has dealt with aspects of TDL from a rather theory-centered point of view. This brief section will draw together and mention the most important areas of applicational work within TDL.
5.1 Practical applications

An early interest within TDL was classroom interaction, and studies of the characteristics of teacher-student interaction by Sinclair & Coulthard (1975), Coulthard (1977), Brazil et al. (1980), and other Birmingham-based discourse analysts brought this field to the very center of TDL (cf. also Edmondson 1981). Whereas the Birmingham school addressed both theoretical and practical questions, others focused primarily on the renewed interest in texts as an inspiration for developing new kinds of teaching methods and materials. Widdowson (1979) is one of the forerunners here.

The analysis of cross-cultural communication (cf. 4) is also often connected with pedagogical aims, and it has proved particularly useful for those engaged in the teaching of writing, for students of business negotiations across cultures, and for translators. Reading and writing often go hand in hand, both benefiting from various applications of TDL (cf. e.g. Hoey 1991). On the basis of reading experiments, van Dijk & Kintsch (1983) showed that different readings result in different macrostructures. The technique of ‘process writing’ makes TDL even more useful to the teaching of academic and other writing, since the focus is not solely on the resulting text, but on the process as such, and thus on the various available strategies at the disposal of the student/writer. (On writing, see, e.g. Connor & Kaplan 1987; Connor & Johns 1990.) Recently, Bakhtin’s concept of different voices and ways of how to make use of this concept have started to influence developments even in this field.

There are also specific journals devoted to applications of TDL methods, such as Written Communication and College Composition and Communication. Other professional fields to which TDL has profitably been applied include psychotherapy, law, business communication, advertising, academic writing and studies of different languages for specific purposes, e.g. technical or engineering English. For early applications of TDL to various professions, see Di Pietro (1982), Bhatia (1993), and Drew & Heritage (1992).

5.2 Acquisitional and diachronic studies

Work on the acquisition of discourse has been fairly abundant during the last decades. Two of the first systematic attempts at tying down TDL notions at large were the projects conducted in the late 1970s and early 1980s by Lily Wong Fillmore on second-language acquisition and Susan Ervin-Tripp’s study of first-language acquisition.

The first book-length studies on ‘developmental pragmatics’ (Bates 1976; Ochs & Schieffelin 1979) also appeared very early on. Within first language acquisition, early work concentrated on the order and manner in which children acquire different communicative acts (cf. McTear 1979), and how they learn to understand them; for instance, how they learn to interpret directives in the speech of their peers and caregivers (cf. Ervin-Tripp et al. 1990). Another field of interest was the acquisition of
modality and of discourse-organizing markers and hedges in a variety of languages (cf. Gerhardt 1991; Clancy 1980).

In work on second-language acquisition and foreign-language learning, issues like the difficulty in teaching and learning the acceptable use of pragmatic particles and discourse markers have been under constant debate. This work has resulted in a number of contrastive studies on such particles in different languages, pointing to functional correspondences between particles, prosody, and gestures.

TDL interest in diachronic aspects of language was primarily due to the establishment of corpora such as the Helsinki Corpus (cf. Kytö 1991), which allow easy access to a representative collection of texts from different genres. Moreover, Traugott’s (1982) early suggestion of a general principle for semantic change in words also contributed considerably to this interest. The former has seen large-scale attempts at tracking down the histories of different genres – Biber’s multidimensional approach is a case in point. The gist of the latter is that Traugott suggested a general principle of subjectification according to which a word will change from having a propositional meaning to becoming more textual and ultimately more interactional and attitudinal.

In addition to these two developments, diachronic applications of the issues dealt with in Sections 3 and 4 are also gaining in importance. Thus, e.g. the phenomenon that discourse-organizing particles and adverbials foreground certain elements, show the peak-salience of others, and the backgrounderd, digressive function of still others have received extensive attention due to the findings that English seems to have changed from marking grounding distinctions with particles in the Old English period, to relying more on tense and aspect distinctions in Modern English (cf. Enkvist 1972; Wårvik 1990). The establishment of the Journal of Historical Pragmatics in 2000 greatly enhanced research in this field.

6. Final remarks

In this overview we have not attempted to give hard-and-fast definitions of text and discourse. At times, there has been competition between discourse analysts and pragmaticists about which one is more general. For instance, Schiffrin (1994) includes her view of what pragmatics is as one subfield of her Approaches to discourse. Although we have indicated the possibility of seeing discourse as a very general term, on the same level of abstraction as, or even more general than, ‘pragmatics’, we have here retained Morris’ (1938) view of pragmatics as the most general term.

To a certain extent, of course, this is a question of the hierarchization of traditional labels of academic subjects. A slightly more interesting response to this debate is

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3. Van Dijk (1985: Vol. 2) has pragmatics as one ‘dimension of discourse’.
that we are faced with different perspectives. Discourse and pragmatics have the same fields of interest, but different aspects in focus. Thus, discourse will typically require larger stretches of text or conversation, whereas for pragmatics this is not necessarily the case. The function of, for example, sound symbolism, or the specification of potential functional set-ups for pragmatic particles can be approached linguistically without explicit reference to a particular discourse. Furthermore, pragmatics will be interested in, say, contact phenomena, irrespective of whether these are definable in relation to discourse. Finally, if we see pragmatics as the study of functional aspects of language, and semiotics as that of the communication of symbolic values with the help of symbols, there is also a close relationship between semiotics and TDL.

The variety of methods and theoretical approaches used within TDL might seem fragmentative to non-practitioners, but discourse analysts would no doubt consider it a sign of flexibility and open-mindedness.

References


1. The rise of text linguistics

A decisive step in the rise of modern ‘Western Continental’ linguistics was to instate the central tenet that language should be considered a uniform, stable and abstract system apart from variations due to individual or social contexts and activities. The description of the language should be couched in highly general statements about the language as a whole or even in universal ones about all languages. This (Saussurean) programme inaugurated the search for the complete set of constraints upon ‘language in and for itself’ (‘langue’) without reference to the use of language (‘parole’). The constraints should cover all valid instances or sets of instances of the language.

Instead of accepting the central tenet as an incontestable a priori principle, as ‘mainstream’ linguistics has widely done, we might view it as a working hypothesis that should be tested. The crucial tests would surely be the convergence among the data discovered and described, and the consensus among linguists about the constraints that govern the data. Beyond the scope of phonemics and morphemics, however, these tests have not been met. Instead, we can observe linguists choosing between two compensatory strategies for tapping constraints that had not yet been properly discovered and stated. Either they have sought to describe corpuses of recorded real data that are ‘naturally’ constrained by their contexts of occurrence, or they have used their own intuition and introspection as a source of constraints while inventing language data, mostly isolated sentences. The second strategy looks easier than the first but turns out not to be because it obliges linguists to devise artificial constraints to describe some ‘well-formed’ sentences and to exclude some ‘ill-formed’ ones that would be unlikely to appear in real data. Not surprisingly, the switch from real corpuses over to invented sentences led to an increasing breakdown in convergence and consensus.

The situation was obscured somewhat by the versatile role of the sentence. For Saussure (1966 [1916]: 124), the sentence was “the ideal type of syntagma, but it belongs to speaking [parole], not to language [langue]”. For Bloomfield (1933: 170ff), the sentence was “an independent form not included in any larger (complex) linguistic form”; “perhaps all languages distinguish” “sentence types”. For Chomsky (1957: 55 and 1965: 34), the sentence was a main “notion that must be defined by general linguistic theory”, and the unit to which “a descriptively adequate grammar … assigns structural descriptions … in accordance with the linguistic competence of the native speaker”. 

Text linguistics

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For Halliday & Hasan (1976: 8, 244, 235), a sentence was “the highest unit of grammatical structure” and was defined as “any set of clauses that are hypotactically and/or paratactically related … sentences cannot be rearranged, as a coordinate structure can, in different sequences”. This versatility suggests that the sentence provided a strategic compromise between language versus use by being both (1) a formal or ‘grammatical’ pattern whose obligatory or optional constituents are specified by the general language system, and (2) a fairly self-contained utterance pattern. Every reasonable sentence, real or invented, entails some constraints reflecting its possible uses. So the sentence has readily been accepted as the standard realisation of semantic and pragmatic entities like the ‘proposition’, ‘predication’, ‘utterance’, ‘assertion’, or ‘speech act’.

Yet even so versatile a notion of the sentence has not supplied linguistic theories and models with any definitive set of constraints, either for corpuses of real data or for accumulations of invented data. Naturally, some linguists looked ‘beyond the sentence boundary’, giving a vital impulse to text linguistics in the late 1960s and early 1970s. For the sake of continuity, early text linguists based the ‘text’ in more abstract or concrete ways on the sentence, witness the tactic of studying the constraints only within ‘sentence pairs’, especially question and answer, the grammatical structure of the preceding sentence being treated as a minimal context (e.g. Isačenko 1965).

To the degree that the ‘sentence’ was officially a ‘grammatical’ or ‘syntactic’ unit, research was dominated by notions like ‘text grammar’ (e.g. van Dijk 1972), ‘text syntax’ (e.g. Dressler 1970), ‘hyper-syntax’ (Palek 1969), and ‘macro-syntax’ (Gülich 1970), which allowed some double-tracking by referring to the sentence while moving ‘beyond’ it. Research sought to project the prevailing concepts and methods from sentences over to texts with relatively modest revisions, yet justified text studies by raising grammatical issues not well accounted for within the single sentence. For instance, the ellipsis found in “faithful recordings of spontaneous conversation” could be grasped as “a grammatical connection among sentences” rather than a phenomenon inside the single sentence, yet can be constrained by deriving each instance from an “underlying sentence [that] native speakers reconstruct” (Gunter 1963: 137, 140).

Such double-tracking at the boundaries of the sentence eventually led to a reassessment of its role in ‘grammar’. In a genuine ‘text grammar’, the sentence could be neither the ‘largest linguistic form’ to be studied (Bloomfield) nor the only unit to which ‘structural descriptions’ are assigned (Chomsky). Such a ‘grammar’ was expected also to “specify the formal features that make a sequence of sentences into a text” (Isačenko 1965: 164); or to “distinguish whether two successive sentences belong to the same text” (Dressler 1970: 66), or to “specify the formal properties determining a typology of texts” (van Dijk 1972: 5); or to “explain how speakers of a language […] are able to distinguish between grammatical and ungrammatical texts” (van Dijk 1972: 4); and so on.

But no such ‘text grammar’ managed to supply adequate constraints. Non-grammatical factors were required even to account for manifestations that are undeniably
‘grammatical’, such as pronouns (e.g. Steinitz 1971), articles (e.g. Weinrich 1969) and tenses (e.g. Weinrich 1964); and the same holds far more plainly textual factors, such as cohesion, coherence, topic progression, narrativity, and situationality, which also affect grammar. So text linguistics energetically explored semantic and pragmatic issues, including those previously discounted for describing abstract, isolated sentences.

This exploration engendered a wide spectrum of definitions for the text. For Isenberg (1970:1), a text was a “coherent sequence of sentences”. For Harweg (1968a:148), a text was “a series [Nacheinander] of linguistic units constituted by uninterrupted pronominal chaining”. For van Dijk, a text was “the abstract theoretical construct underlying discourse” (1976:3); or “a sentence sequence with a macro-structure”, i.e. a “global structure of meaning” (1978:41; cf. van Dijk 1979). For Hartmann (1968:220), the text was a “finite ordered set of textually complicated partial signs of various sorts and functions” and hence “the linguistically significant originary sign of language”. For Weinrich (1976:186), a text was “an ordered sequence of language signs between two noticeable discontinuations [Unterbrechungen] of communication”. For Halliday & Hasan (1976:1, 4, 23) a text was “any passage, spoken or written, of whatever length, that does form a unified whole”; it was variously said to be ‘defined’ by ‘relations of meaning’ or by ‘cohesion’ and ‘register’. For Schmidt (1973:144ff), a text was “a linguistic realisation of textuality as an organisational form for the formation of pluralistic complexes”, hence a “matrix for the mutually relevant and coherent occurrence of elements in the language system”.

This brief gallery of text definitions in text studies was emblematic for the lively discussions of fundamental concepts and problems merely implicit in ‘sentence linguistics’, as earlier approaches now came to be called. If the text is so diverse an entity and yet consists of sentences, then the sentence should also have a high diversity that has hitherto not been acknowledged or strictly formalised, but has remained inherent in the intuitions of linguists or in the conditions of social contexts. Some of this diversity was ambivalently acknowledged at times, e.g. when ‘sentence linguists’ sought richer constraints by adding a ‘semantic component’ but balked at advancing it from an ‘interpretative’ to a properly ‘generative’ role, doubtless fearing to lose the formality; the ‘syntactic features’ and ‘logical form’ proved even less conducive to convergence and consensus than did purely ‘syntactic’ notions.

When the text became an object of ‘syntactic’ inquiry, the pressure redoubled to reintroduce the semantic and pragmatic constraints that had previously been diluted by discounting real corpuses of empirical data and centring linguistic theory on the syntax of the single sentence. Thus, Weinrich (1967:112) redefined ‘syntax’ as a ‘dialectic’ that “investigates all semantic elements of language in their relation to the speech situation”. Dressler’s (1970:68) ‘text-syntax’ “favoured hypotheses that take account of the actualities of the speech process”. Gülich’s (1970:46, 297)
‘macro-syntax’ eschewed the concept of ‘sentence’ as “highly questionable however you define it”, and looked for the ‘arrangement signals’ (‘Gliederungssignale’) marking “the beginning or end of spoken texts or text segments”. Daneš’s (1970) model of ‘thematic progression’ in texts reflected his well-known ‘three-level approach to syntax’, wherein the ‘grammatical structure of sentence’ was paralleled by its ‘semantic structure’ and its pragmatic ‘organisation of utterance’ (1964: 226ff). And Petöfi’s (1978: 40) ambitious “text-structure/world structure theory (…) aims at describing the syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic structures of natural language text” through a “formal semiotics”.

It was high time to consider whether the text would belong on the side of language or of language use. The simplest ‘mainstream’ recourse of putting it among language use had the drawback that linguistic theory had not just neglected use, but had described it in negative terms to rationalise its neglect. For Saussure (1966 [1916]: 13, 15, 19, 11), ‘parole’ was “individual”, “heterogeneous”, and “momentary”; “speech cannot be studied … for we cannot discover its unity”. For Chomsky (1965: 4, 44, 58, 201), ‘actual speech’ in ‘performance’ was “scattered” and “deficient” and had a “degenerate quality”, replete with “false starts … fragments, and deviant expressions”.

Text linguists in turn remained cautious about putting the text in the domain of actual use even though they viewed use much more positively. Van Dijk (1972: 3ff) reasoned: ‘although theories, and especially grammars, do not ‘directly’ describe empirical phenomena, but only formally reconstruct the entities, relations and systems ‘underlying’ these phenomena, it is necessary to postulate entities or regularities which are as close as possible to the empirical phenomena without losing their general character’. So he proposed to make the text a “theoretical concept” and an “abstract unit [that] underlies a meaningful utterance [of a] discourse”; “any utterance is the token of a text” (1978: 41, 1972: 317ff, 1976: 3). Similar reasoning motivated such conceptions as Bellert’s (1970: 366) “idealised text with no digressions … expressing one uniform reasoning, continuous plot, etc.”; Dressler’s (1970: 65) “potential text in the sense of a pre-linguistic text”; Schmidt’s (1973: 150) “meta-linguistic” “text formulary”, being “a set of linguistic constituents ordered by a thematic deep structure”; and Harweg’s (1968a: 152, 1971: 179) “emic text defined by text-immanent criteria” as opposed to “etic text determined by extra-linguistic criteria not based on language structure”. Like Saussure’s ‘speech’, Harweg’s ‘etic’ side lacked “unifying delimiting criteria”, witness the “etic text beginnings [of] novels, short stories, poems, scientific treatises”; still, he allowed that emic and etic texts might coincide to varying degrees (1968a: 152ff, 1968b: 348).

For Hartmann, in contrast, “sentence formation proceeds through rules of individual languages”, whereas “text formation proceeds through principles applying to all languages and through extralinguistic stylistic and individual requirements”, e.g. “motives, intentions, effects” (1968: 218ff). This formulation justified treating the sentence within a ‘grammar’ in a ‘langue’ perspective yet suggested that speakers
who ‘form’ a text are transcending the boundary between langue and parole plus the boundary between the particular language and ‘all languages’. The text would be both more general and more specific than the sentence, and text theory would need to span the whole range from abstract ‘universals’ over to concrete situational factors.

Hartmann’s vision signalled his remarkable agility as a theorist, which powerfully influenced his students (e.g. Harweg, Koch, Schmidt, Rieser, Wienold, de Beaugrande). Like the British functional school that did not call itself ‘text linguistics’ (e.g. Firth, Halliday, Sinclair, and their students), he realised that separating the text from the communicative context and situation obscures rather than clarifies the question of what a theory should account for. So we should not confine the term ‘text’ to a theoretical abstraction as proposed by van Dijk: beside the huge task of analysing and describing actual texts, we incur the task of translating between the actual text and the hypothetical ‘underlying’ text, typically a formal representation, the interpretation of which is vastly less conductive to convergence and consensus that is that of the text, as van Dijk himself and his co-workers in the Konstanz project soon discovered (cf. van Dijk et al. 1972).

Today, the ‘text’ is widely defined as an empirical communicative event given through human communication rather than specified by a formal theory. Each such event ‘rides on’ a dynamic dialectic between the ‘virtual system’ of language (the repertory of possibilities) and the ‘actual system’ constituted by the choices of the text producer; the text is thus on neither side of language versus use, but integrates and reconciles the two. Our task is to describe, as empirically and realistically as we can, the processes whereby communicative participants can and do produce and receive texts. The task plainly demands interdisciplinary research between text linguistics and psychology, sociology, ethnography, and so on, all of whom work with real data from the standpoint of human activities.

Defining the ‘text’ and our main task this way brings ‘text linguistics’ into line with the research tradition of discourse analysis, which has operated ‘bottom up’ with realistic data obtained from fieldwork. Since its earliest formulations (e.g. Harris 1952), investigators have looked a real data beyond the sentence and developed a ‘grammar’ incorporating semantic and pragmatic issues, such as how different languages deploy grammatical resources for expressing events and participants in narratives (see now Longacre 1990). The ethnographic emphasis obviated the need for the abstract theoretical formalisations cultivated in ‘mainstream linguistics’, including the isolation of ‘language in and for itself’ from the use of language (cf. Stubbs 1993; Sinclair 1994). Today, the same emphasis has brought discourse analysis into the mainstream, while formalist linguistics drifted into a ‘scientific crisis’ by failing to meet its announced goals, notably to formulate a complete ‘generative grammar’ for any natural language. The constraints once excluded on theoretical grounds now had to be reintroduced, and discourse analysis steadily merged with text linguistics.
The latest and most decisive step has been the compilation of the 'Bank of English', a vast computerised corpus of contemporary spoken and written English discourse, which enables reliable statements about the typical patterns and collections of English (Sinclair 1992a, 1992b; Baker et al. eds. 1993). Some of the many regularities that are not open to mere intuition or introspection emerged at 20 million words (1992 figure); others at 200 million words (1994 figure). For example, the verb *brook* was found to have a clearly defined set of constraints on its usage (Sinclair 1994). Grammatically, it takes negation (usually *not* just before it or, *no* just after), and does not appear with the first or second person singular as the subject. Semantically, its direct object is a concept associated with opposition, interference, or delay. Pragmatically, the subject must be in a position of sufficient authority to carry the performative perlocutionary force entailed in declaring what it will not *brook*.

The implications Sinclair (1994) draws from such data are likely to be felt through all of linguistics. (He provocatively compares the large corpus to the telescope in astronomy and the microscope in biology – instruments which vastly enhanced the scientific status of inquiries). First, the rift between ‘langue’ versus ‘parole’ is finally healed, because we can derive the regularities in the language fairly directly from real data. Second, the pendulum swings decisively back toward convergence and consensus because such constraints as those upon the verb *brook* are strongly implicated by the totality of data in the display,¹ whereas the constraints upon a single invented sentence that might hardly ever be uttered can be endlessly disputed. Third, the semantic and pragmatic constraints set aside by formalist models are effectively restored and placed on a more realistic basis than ever before. Fourth, we see that the appropriate unit for analysis is not the morpheme, word, or phrase but the ‘co-text’, the utterance environment, of variable lengths, in which words of phrases tend to appear together. And fifth, we no longer need to cut up linguistics into tidy ‘levels’ or ‘components’ for separate analysis and description; even the staid division between grammar and lexicon proves to be merely two complementary points of view upon the same phenomena.

Text linguistics too will feel the impact. First, the dialectic between virtual system and actual system becomes far clearer and more direct when the function of a word of phrase in the representative corpus can be explicitly correlated with the function it has in a given text. Second, the text as whole does not need a formal circumscribed definition; for most purposes, it can be perfectly well grasped as one actualization within a set of attested cross-sections we can pull up for display as we choose. Third,

1. Sinclair (1994) suggests that the displays shows *competence* if read vertically and *performance* if read horizontally; but this ‘competence’ would at most be *probabilistic* because speakers of English know how to produce data that have not yet occured in the corpus, although they may well not be likely to.
the sentence boundary loses its theoretical significance and becomes an empirical phenomenon which, like the other boundary signals of punctuation or intonation, occurs with higher probability after some word combination (Firth’s ‘collocations’) and grammatical patterns (Firth’s ‘colligations’) than others. Fourth, the production of a text is viewed as a set of interactive local choices, some of which are made well before the key word appears in the sequence. And fifth, we can use subcorpora as a data-driven bottom-up method for characterising text types and discourse domains, a task for which speculative schemes have remained ineffectual.

We can now reach a consensus about realistic definitions of our two main terms: text being the individual communicative event within the ongoing interaction of discourse. Our shared research interests should decide how abstract or concrete, how theoretical or empirical, these terms should be in specific projects with explicit goals, e.g. studies of ‘discourse for special purposes’ (DSP) in technical fields (an analogue to ‘register’ studies) with the goal of developing strategies to make specialised knowledge more generally accessible. The same interests could resolve other thematic questions in text linguistics that are not resolvable on general theoretical grounds, e.g. how far we would analyse a text in an ‘ascendant mode from smaller units to the text or in a descendant mode from text to its constituent units’ (Kallmeyer et al. eds. 1971: 57).

Text research is also swinging into line with discourse processing, an interdisciplinary exploration of the processes that make discourse both feasible useful in so many settings (e.g. Freedle ed. 1977, 1979; Beaugrande 1980, 1984; van Dijk & Kintsch 1983) and a major sector in cognitive science, itself a convergence among psychology, computer science, sociology, and anthropology, along with their offshoots and intermediaries like psycholinguistics, cognitive psychology, artificial intelligence, sociolinguistics, and social psychology. The question of ‘ascendant’ versus ‘descendant’, for instance, could be assessed in light of finding that text receivers combine both tactics, doing ‘bottom-up’ scans of the local text units while forming and testing ‘top-down’ hypotheses about the global organisation, e.g. the ‘macro-structures’ of overall coherence.

Further, text linguistics has become strongly engaged with pragmatics (e.g. Schmidt 1973, 1976). Instead of giving a set of ‘rules’ that “turn these objects into acts” and “place these acts in a situation” (van Dijk 1976: 190), pragmatics investigates how texts and co-texts (not sentences) are always already acts in situations, even while the syntactic or semantic operations are being carried out. Hence, pragmatics forms the outermost framework for approaching syntax and semantics in terms of communicative activities.

And finally, text linguistics has assumed a cordial relation to stylistics (e.g. Enkvist 1977), which mainstream linguistics tended to marginalise by situating it in the use of language rather than in language itself. For Weinrich (1969:69), ‘the border’ consists of text linguistics exploring the syntactic function of an element such as the indefinite article in the language, i.e. “in every real or possible text”, whereas ‘stylistics’ “explores the particular use in a certain text” by one ‘author’; in between lies ‘text typology’,
stating for which “text types certain affinities can be determined”. Here, we may feel reminded of Weinrich’s (1967:112) already cited definition of ‘syntax’ as a ‘dialectic’ that “investigates all semantic elements of language in their relation to the [pragmatic] speech situation”; the relation between the function of an element in the language and in a given text is surely dialectical too. As with Hartmann and Sinclair, the old static opposition between ‘language’ and ‘parole’ was here given a dynamic reinterpretation making the text the entity that interfaces the two sides.

The increasing engagement of text linguistics with the four domains just cited – discourse analysis, discourse processing, pragmatics, and stylistics – has both increased our flexibility and guided us in resetting our priorities. We have grown more aware of how to coordinate theoretical with empirical, and categories with data, when we set up and implement a research project. Instead of following one set of orthodox all-purpose procedures, we seek theoretical principles for telling which to address. Moreover, we acknowledge that, as a communicative event, the text does not simply hold still like an inert object while we analyse it. Instead, we become engaged in ‘retextualising’ it, which can influence the conditions of its ‘textuality’. We must consider how far our intentions and interpretations as investigators parallel, or differ from, those of the discourse participants whose activities are now expressly included in the scope of our studies, e.g. how far we may develop more elaborate representations to register and resolve multiple meanings, or single out deviations or disturbances, well beyond what would reach the consciousness of a speaker or hearer. Such issues too can be empirically approached.

In retrospect, then, we might distinguish three stages in the rise of ‘text linguistics’. The earliest stage (late 1960s, early 1970s) was dominated by ‘text grammar’ and remained fairly circumscribed and uniform by working to extend prevailing theories from sentence to text. The next stage (late 1970s, early 1980s) was more dominated by ‘textuality as ‘a structure’ with ‘both linguistic and social aspects’. The ‘principles of textuality’ apply whenever an artifact is treated as a text; so textuality is not a linguistic property or feature (or set of these) which some samples possess and other do not, but an empirical human predisposition and activity wherever communicative events occur. The mutual relevance assigned to linguistic forms is cohesion and that assigned to the ‘meanings’ is coherence; intentionality covers what speakers intend, and acceptability what hearers engage to do; situationality concerns ongoing circumstances; and intertextuality covers relations with other text, notably those of the same or a similar ‘text type’.

The third and most recent stage has been dominated by ‘textualisation’, the social and cognitive processes entailed in the actual production and reception of texts. This trend too was driven by the search for richer and more global constraints, but now assuming that ‘process models’ can provide more than can ‘product models’ starting from a text-artifact.

The 1990s look toward a general science of text and discourse. Its ‘syntax’ could be a ‘cognitive functional grammar’ wherein ‘world-knowledge’ constrains the
organisation of phrases, clauses, and clause complexes (not just sentences). Its ‘semantics’ could be a ‘post-classical epistemology’ that ‘brackets’ knowledge and content by examining them not via ‘reference’, ‘reality’, or ‘truth value’ but via the applied ‘modeling styles’ such as ‘realism’ with ‘parameters of design’ such as complexity, novelty, and determinacy. Its ‘pragmatics’ could be a ‘critical’ view of communication as an ongoing interaction whereby the significance of a situation (real or hypothetical) is being negotiated, speaking turns are assigned, and relations of power or solidarity are enacted. These three domains are organised within a text agenda reflecting the ongoing docket of actions, plans, and goals, and within a text economy of focuses, values, and priorities. The three thus merge in a framework for exploring the relation of texts to such factors as text types, style, register, language for special purposes (LSP) and terminology, but also socialisation, education, translation, ideology, gender, and emotion.

2. Some central issues

The following central issues in text studies have crystallized in the work of numerous researchers:

1. The text is not merely a linguistic unit, but an event of human action, interaction, communication, and cognition. The notion of the text being merely an instance of language has a long tradition both in folk-wisdom and in the various specialised disciplines that have studied texts – from ancient grammar and rhetoric up through modern linguistics. The notion was hardly challenged as long as the ‘text’ did not have the status of a central or explicitly defined term. When language studies reached the point in the search for constraints where the ‘text’ did attain this status, its ‘multi-media’ qualities as a social and interactional event came into focus. The perennial question, ‘Is it still linguistics?’ generated during half a century of self-conscious questing for ‘language by itself’, seems quaint or irrelevant now. The constraints bearing upon texts must be comprehensively explored, whatever their sources.

2. The main source of data is naturally occurring texts and discourses. Through history, most studies of language have expropriated language data without expressly justifying its authenticity. Most samples in earlier studies were in practice taken from prestigious sources such as literary or sacred texts, whose specialised qualities were not considered problematic. Modern linguistics recognised the problems and emphatically turned to ordinary speech but, somewhat contradictorily, proposed to describe it apart from texts. The proposal eventually led to descriptions based on invented data, which was artificial in many respects including even its supposed ‘ordinariness’. Today, large corpuses of real data reveal the arguments in favour of this tactic to be either obsolete, e.g. that we cannot get our hands
on enough data; or spurious from the start, e.g. that speakers have some idealised ‘competence’ whose relation to what they actually say is deeply uncertain. The corpuses also show that the supposed ‘uniqueness’ of every utterance impels us not to retreat from ‘surface structure’ to ‘deep structure’ but rather to exploit the commonalities of collocation and colligation that we can derive from the data.

3. **Text analysis is rich and expansive.** The amount of potentially relevant data for describing a text as a communicative event is in principle open. We can be content when we have uncovered some non-obvious and useful insights about the human consequences of the text, e.g. how and how well it makes knowledge accessible to people who need it.

4. **In modern-day text research, the investigator has to engage and re-engage with the texts** rather than strive for an idealised separation of subject from object or scientist from data.

5. **The motives for doing text research in terms of epistemological interests bearing on the relations between texts and society** have become more and more important for researchers in the field. Thus, e.g. projects addressing issues of inequality in the access to knowledge through discourse are socially relevant and thus enhanced. ‘Critical’ text research should ultimately try to establish freedom of access to knowledge and to reveal and redistribute communicative power structures.

6. **Text linguistics has an interdisciplinary perspective;** linguistics cannot be the sole basis for a science of text and discourse. To understand a phenomenon as complex as language, we need to regard it from continually alternating and evolving viewpoints.

These issues have increased in importance within text linguistics. They all go in the direction of Coseriu’s (1971:189) vision of “a new dimension” wherein “the text is a perspective concerning all of linguistics, and every linguistic discipline would be reconceived from this standpoint”.

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